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Religious disagreements have always been potential challenges for maintaining a peaceful 
political society. Although religious wars seem to be a thing of  the past, religious 
radicalism has in fact drastically escalated since 9/11. It has become an urgent issue how 
free and equal citizens, deeply divided by conflicting religious disagreements, can still live 
together peacefully and endorse the same set of political principles in a liberal democracy. 
This question makes it necessary to address two issues: first, it demands an answer to the 
issue of religious disagreement in contemporary politics; second, this answer has to be 
justified. This dissertation proposes a solution that meets both requirements: the political 
principle of secularism, as a combination of liberty of conscience and the separation of 
state and religion, which can be endorsed by all reasonable citizens in a democratic polity. 
The particular separation of state and religion that I argue for is a separation in the 
robust sense, meaning that religion ought to be excluded from the public sphere. That is 
to say, religious arguments should not play any role in public matters, especially in 
law-making.  
My answer follows from considering two issues. One theme is the understanding of 
the term “secularism”, as secularism is a complicated concept with many different 
connotations. And understanding “what secularism is” also intertwines with its 
justification. The other issue is the problem of political legitimacy. Here I follow John 
Rawls’s Political Liberalism in which he understands legitimacy as the justification of the 
exercise of political power. The justification of secularism as a constitutional principle is 
thus part of the problem of political legitimacy.  
 
I. Secularism: Political or Philosophical? 
 
My primary aim in this dissertation is to defend a particular constitutional principle, 
secularism, for our religiously pluralistic world. The term “secularism” was first used by 
the English scholar George Jacob Holyoake in 1851. Since then, there has been a lot of  
confusion concerning the exact meaning of  the term. At the beginning, secularism was 
thought of  as a transitional period in a larger trend toward atheism. To a large degree, 
such an understanding of  the concept to a large degree stems from the fact that the 
concept of  secularism lacked a clear definition when it was adopted. Such a 
characterization of secularism and atheism has led to many unnecessary difficulties in 
understanding and accepting secularism. Today’s heated discussion on religiously 
motivated violence seems to worsen the tendency to conflate secularism and atheism. 
What is noteworthy in those discussions is that people tend to misidentify religion as the 
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root of escalated religious violence, and thus consciously or unconsciously seem to 
suggest that the best or only solution is the abandonment of religion.  
However, atheism is neither a requirement for, nor the future direction of, 
secularism. Atheism claims the falsity of a deity’s existence, whereas, secularism makes 
no such claim, enabling it to coexist with even the most intense religious beliefs. The 
main point I am going to make in this dissertation is that secularism should be 
understood as a political doctrine rather than a philosophical one. Secularism does not 
arise out of any substantive view on religion. To conflate secularism and atheism would 
only result in a deeper divide between citizens who hold different religious outlooks and 
would contribute nothing to the maintenance of a stable political community. Rather, the 
prescription for the problem caused by religious disagreements must be secularism, a 
political principle of liberty of conscience and the separation of state and religion. This 
offers the only perspective under which people of different religious persuasions can live 
together, and it is also an essential precondition for the freedom of religion. Therefore, 
the conception of  secularism defended in this dissertation is a political rather than a 
philosophical one.  
The separation of  state and religion, as part of  the principle of  secularism, is 
susceptible to several interpretations. I discuss four different theses with regard to this 
separation, and the majority of  this dissertation, from chapter two till the last chapter, is 
devoted to establishing which of  these theses is the most convincing one. The four 
theses, ranking from the softest to the most robust separation, are: Separation-thesis 1 
(S1), the separation of  state and religion only demands the non-establishment of  a state 
religion; Separation-thesis 2 (S2), the separation of  state and religion requires state 
neutrality toward all religions; thesis S2’, departing from thesis S2, requires the 
incorporation of  all comprehensive views, including all religions, in the public sphere; 
finally, Separation-thesis 3 (S3), the separation, contends the opposite, and requires the 
exclusion of  religion from the public sphere altogether. Because thesis S1 (separation as 
non-establishment) turns out to be too general so as to be trivial, and thesis S2 
(separation as state neutrality) suffers from the difficulty of  defining “neutrality” they are 
dismissed, and the main debate on the substance of  the separation between state and 
religion in this dissertation therefore will be between thesis S2’ and thesis S3.     
 
II. Why Political Liberalism and Public Reason? 
 
Generally, the topic of  political legitimacy involves two major approaches: the public 
justification approach, which means that the political authority is justifiable to all citizens; 
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and the comprehensive justification approach, which argues that the legitimacy of  
political authority depends on what truth requires.  
See the different approaches to political legitimacy:  
 
                                           The consensus approach 
                                            (Thesis S3) 
                      Public justification  
Political legitimacy       (political justification)     The convergence approach 
                                              (Thesis S2’) 
                      Comprehensive justification 
 
Against the backdrop of  contemporary societies, Rawls brought the fact of  reasonable 
pluralism to our attention: the fact that citizens are bound to differ greatly on 
comprehensive doctrines (conceptions of  the good, life and death, ontological issues). 
This is the key idea that explains Rawls’s shift from regarding liberalism as a metaphysical 
doctrine to seeing it as a political doctrine. This disagreement on conceptions of  the 
good in modern society is so profound that the state cannot impose any of  these 
comprehensive conceptions on its citizens as it cannot be justified to all of  them. Rawls’s 
description of  the fact of  reasonable pluralism pushes us to consider how all citizens 
who share the same political community can harmoniously and prosperously live 
together. The importance of  the fact of  reasonable pluralism of  comprehensive 
doctrines does not lie in those doctrines as such; rather, the importance lies in the 
reasonable citizens in our political community who hold those comprehensive doctrines. 
Only doing the right thing according to moral truth could be a universal ethical standard 
for individuals, while politics is not just about doing the right thing, since decisions in 
politics are related to the citizen who lives in the same political society together with their 
fellow-citizens. Roughly, what essentially matters in political life is not the truth of  
comprehensive doctrines held by the people, but the people who hold different comprehensive 
doctrines. Therefore, that a liberal state should refrain from imposing any particular 
comprehensive doctrine not due to the merit of  one of  the comprehensive doctrines, but 
rather out of  respect for the citizens holding those doctrines.  
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that secularism cannot be given a justification 
by appealing to our comprehensive beliefs. It is perfectly possible that we cannot 
appreciate the whole truth about secularism without appealing to other beliefs that fall 
outside the domain of liberal political theory. The approach of political liberalism just 
insists that whatever the truth may be in the domain of comprehensive doctrines, the 
only way that we can live together as free and equal citizens is by avoiding judgments on 
comprehensive truth in politics, and instead committing ourselves to the public 
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justification of political authority. 1  For this reason, the mainstream debate in 
contemporary political philosophy on the subject of  political legitimacy is how to find 
the best political justification, under recognition of  the fact of  reasonable pluralism. 
    Political liberalism proposes that we abstain from invoking the truth claims of  our 
comprehensive doctrines in the justification of  political institutions (e.g., laws). Therefore, 
the justification of  political legitimacy shall be reached on the condition that all 
reasonable citizens are expected to endorse an account of shareable public reason, which consists 
in a family of  political conceptions supported by an overlapping consensus of  reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.  
Overlapping consensus is a key concept that Rawls introduces in Political Liberalism 
(represented as PL in this thesis) to account for the public justification of  a family of  
political conceptions of  justice, regardless of  their comprehensive basis. The public 
justification of  a political conception is found when an overlapping consensus is created. 
An overlapping consensus happens when a family of  political conceptions of  justice is, 
at least, not too much in conflict with reasonable comprehensive doctrines.2 In other 
words, political conceptions of  justice will gain enough support in spite of  their possible 
conflict with other comprehensive doctrines. The values of  the political are very 
important intrinsic values and therefore they are not easily overridden by comprehensive 
values. The subject of  the overlapping consensus concerns those political values or ideals 
which would be endorsed by all reasonable citizens in a well-ordered society, and in turn 
form the foundation for public reason. Public reason holds that fundamental political 
decisions are to be settled by appealing to these political values, which are expected to be 
intelligible, understood, and shared by all reasonable citizens. 
Since the requirement of  “shareability” is a key characteristic of  public reason, 
those comprehensive doctrines that cannot be shared, particularly religious doctrines, are 
inescapably excluded from the realm of  public reason for public justification of  political 
legitimacy. Therefore, the separation of  state and religion as a constitutional principle 
shall be formulated in the light of  the restraints imposed by shareable public reason, 
which leads to the separation principle in the robust sense, meaning that religious reasons 
shall be excluded from the law-making process. The approach which meets this 
requirement of  shareability of  public reason is also called the consensus approach. 
Likewise, on the basis of  a sharable public reason justification, other non-public reasons 
are excluded too. 
Thus, the main thesis of  my argument for public reason secularism is established, 
and it will be explained in detail in chapter three. However, the requirement of  
                                                             
1 See Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (Oxford University Press, 2011) 317. 
2 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1996)139. 
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shareability of  public reason has become an intensely debated issue in contemporary 
political theory. Many political liberals and religious critics are against the idea that public 
discussion must be restricted to public reasons; rather, they view the target of  public 
justification as a convergence of  the opinions of  every single individual’s choice, which 
means that when a convergent political decision is made, citizens should be able to 
supply any personal reason including religious reasons they regard fit for the public forum, 
and there should therefore not be any constraints. This approach is called the 
convergence approach. The following chapters describe and evaluate the debate between 
the consensus approach and the convergence approach, and argue that public reason 
secularism in the end is the better form of  secularism. 
 
III. My Departure from Political Liberalism 
 
It is clear by now that in this dissertation my defense of  secularism as a political principle 
will be based on the central ideas of  political liberalism, but I also will ultimately part 
ways with political liberalism. Moreover, I will argue that my departure point is precisely 
where the project of  political liberalism and political justification should be heading. 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls refrains from explicitly providing any moral foundation 
for political liberalism for an obvious reason: It might compromise the very assumption 
of  political liberalism, i.e. the fact of  reasonable pluralism. The project of  political 
liberalism needs to distance itself  from committing to any moral value in order to uphold 
its commitment to the fact of  reasonable pluralism. In order to prevent upending 
reasonable pluralism, Rawls and some other political liberals such as Jonathan Quong, 
assume some underlying presumptions of  political liberalism in the notion of  “persons 
and society”. According to them, a reasonable person would respect the fact of  
reasonable pluralism, honoring the free and equal standing of  every individual citizen, 
and recognizing the society as a structure of  fair social cooperation. But if we ask why a 
reasonable person has those qualities, their only answer would be “otherwise they are 
being unreasonable”, which, to some extent, begs the question. In my view, the answer 
“secularism is publicly justified, because a reasonable person would accept that” is not 
satisfactory. This answer places too much justificatory force on a rich notion of a 
reasonable person and society, which political liberalism assumes to be a package deal, 
whereas it has not said anything about why political liberalism must assume the notion of 
“a reasonable person and society” in such a thick manner in the first place.  
In this dissertation, I argue that political liberalism would be able to account for the 
richness of its theoretical foundations if it is viewed in the light of Ronald Dworkin’s 
interpretivism, which requires a more conspicuous role for morality to play. 
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Interpretivism understands a useful theory as an interpretation. And a successful 
interpretation includes two dimensions: first, it should fit the contemporary liberal 
institutional and social practices; second, it should also put the practices in the best moral 
light.3 By the same token, I argue that political liberalism calls for a furthermore 
underlying moral foundation: equal respect for persons. By virtue of the equal respect for 
persons, we would understand why we take the fact of reasonable pluralism so seriously 
in the first place. Equal respect for persons will help us to grasp the importance of the 
fact of reasonable pluralism and understand that the ethical concern that political 
liberalism harbors is more profound than what its critics are willing to give credit to. If  
we figure in the cardinal value of  equal respect for persons as the foundation of  the 
reasonableness thesis, it is clearer to see that both of  the fact of  reasonable pluralism and 
the so-called presumed idea of  persons and society actually derive from the equal respect 
for persons. If  we miss the foundational place of  equal respect for persons, we will fail to 
fathom the essential moral concern that the project of  political liberalism carries, echoing 
the very core of  liberal tradition: in terms of  the coercion of  political power, liberalism 
always prioritizes respect above truth, persons above doctrines. 
 
IV. A Few Caveats 
 
Before offering an outline of  the chapters in this dissertation, it is worth making a few 
remarks regarding what this dissertation is unable to offer. First, this is a dissertation 
about secularism, but secularism involves various subjects and theses. For instance, 
secularism also refers to moral autonomy, which aims to disconnect religion from 
morality in the sense that the authority of  morality can stand on its own feet. My 
discussion is limited, however, to the canon of  political and legal philosophy. And I only 
engage in discussions about secularism in matters of  political concern. Thus, this 
dissertation does not have anything specific to say about questions like “do divine 
commands from God generate any moral obligation?”, although such questions and the 
present discussions are related; we shall see some of  these connections in Chapter Five.  
Second, although secularism as a political principle includes the ideas of  liberty of  
conscience and the separation of  state and religion, most of  the attention in this 
dissertation goes to the latter part, namely the exploration of  the nature of  the 
separation of  state and religion. It certainly would be a more all-embracing dissertation if  
I could have dedicated as much discussion to liberty of  conscience; however it would 
have been a much lengthier one. More importantly, it seems to me that the discussion 
                                                             
3 See Ronald Dworkin’s detailed explication of  those two dimensions of  interpretation in Justice in 
Robes (Harvard University Press, 2006) 13-18. 
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concerning what the separation of  state and religion entails, is a more controversial and 
pressing concern; in addition, the appropriate identification of  the “separation” in turn 
has implications for the boundaries of  liberty of  conscience as well.  
Third, although the discussion of  this dissertation is in every sense pertinent to 
matters of  law-making, and my arguments largely derive from disputes and 
disagreements in present-day politics, it does not directly address issues of  policy. For 
instance, it does not intend to give a definitive answer to, for example, issues of  abortion 
or religious manifestations in public. Rather, the arguments in this dissertation are 
concerned with finding the right approach to answer such questions. Therefore, it is more 
a dissertation about how to reason in these matters, than on what the result of  this 
reasoning in concrete cases would be. 
Finally, although it will be repeated many times throughout the dissertation, I have 
to make clear beforehand that the whole discussion in this dissertation addresses a 
particular readership which excludes religious fundamentalists, Nazis, racists and other 
groups who refuse to recognize the equal moral status of  every individual and deny them 
basic rights. In the examination of  public justification, when we try to determine whether 
certain laws are publicly justified, we do not take their illiberal views into consideration. It 
is not possible to reason with people who deny the fundamental importance of  freedom, 
equality and fairness in any sense, and therefore, when it comes to the justification of  
constitutional principles or laws, we do not need to justify these principles to them or 
make them accept our laws. However, what we can do is to cultivate a secular shared 
public culture and to prevent the growth of  ideological or religious extremism in our 
society.  
 
V. Outline of  the Chapters of  This Dissertation 
 
In the first chapter, I draw an analytical distinction between secularism as a political 
principle regarding the relation between state and religion, and secularism as a view of  
religion per se. I argue that the latter view mistakenly identifies secularism with atheism. 
Atheism as I understand it is a view that denies the existence and authority of  any deity, 
whereas secularism as a political principle merely entails the principle of  separation 
between religious and political authority, and therefore does not imply any substantive 
view of  religion as such. Simply put, secularism as a political principle does not engage in 
metaphysical exploration of  theological claims, nor does it hold any hostile views against 
religion. I argue that atheism is neither theoretically solid nor in any way useful for 
political purposes. This is because democratic societies are characterized by reasonable 
pluralism, the permanent fact that citizens are bound to differ greatly on comprehensive 
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doctrines (conceptions of  the good, life and death, religious and moral views, ontological 
issues). This disagreement is so profound that it is unjust for the state to impose certain 
comprehensive doctrines, for instance atheism, on the citizens. Therefore, secularism 
should be approached as a freestanding political principle. 
After establishing secularism as a political principle, Chapter Two lays the 
groundwork for my defense of  this principle. Secularism, concerning the relationship 
between state and religion, is a constitutional principle; hence, its justification is a matter 
of  political legitimacy. Due to the fact of  reasonable pluralism, secularism cannot be 
established or built upon any comprehensive justifications. Instead, the justification of  
secularism should not be comprehensive but public, which means that it should be 
justified to all citizens in a democratic regime. However, a rejection of  the 
comprehensive justificatory approach does not amount to explaining how far the 
“separation” goes exactly. I therefore discuss four variations of  the separation thesis, 
ranking from the most lenient to the most stringent. First, thesis S1 interprets the 
separation to simply mean as that there is no state-religion. Second, thesis S2 regards the 
separation as the strict neutrality of  the state with regard to religion. Departing from 
thesis S2, two contrasting variations are generated, while thesis S2’ understands 
state-neutrality with regard to all religions as implying the impartial incorporation of  all 
religions in the public sphere, by contrast, thesis S3 sees the separation as implying that 
religious discourse should be excluded from the public sphere. (To highlight their 
contrasting relationship, I refer to the approach of  thesis S3 as the consensus approach 
and the approach of  thesis S2’ as the convergence approach.) In chapter two, I argue that 
thesis S1 and S2 are not convincing interpretations of  the “separation”. 
In Chapter Three, I present the justification for thesis S3 built upon public reason 
shared by all reasonable citizens in a democratic society. The gist of  this argument is that, 
due to the fact of  reasonable pluralism, the justification of  political legitimacy shall be 
reached only if  all reasonable citizens endorse an account of  shareable public reason 
which consists of  a family of  political conceptions supported by an overlapping 
consensus of  reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Therefore, those comprehensive 
doctrines that cannot be shared, notably religious doctrines, are inescapably excluded 
from public reason. Therefore, the separation of  state and religion as a constitutional 
principle shall be formulated in the light of  the requirements of  shareable public reason, 
which leads to the separation principle in the robust sense in the form of  S3, i.e. that 
religion shall be excluded from the public sphere. This approach on the basis of  public 
reason will be referred to as “the consensus approach”.4  
                                                             
4 The explicit endorsement of  the consensus approach can be seen from Thomas Nagel, “Moral 
Conflict and Political Legitimacy”, in Philosophy & Public Affairs 16(1987): 215-40; Charles Larmore, 
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Because thesis S3’s emphasis on the shareability of  public reason leads to the 
exclusion of  religion in the public domain, it has been criticized by many who support 
the interpretation of  thesis S2’. They believe that the separation of  state and religion 
ought not to be so rigid that religion is not permitted in politics. They question the 
formation of  an overlapping consensus and they argue that religious citizens can 
reasonably reject the idea of  public reason and its moral duty of  civility. They also believe, 
that when fundamental political matters are at stake citizens are permitted to advocate 
and vote on the basis of  religious reasons alone. Insofar as there is a convergence on a 
certain institution or laws from individuals, they argue that we do not need a public 
shared reason underlying such a convergence, and hence there is no strict separation of  
state and religion. Therefore, I call the approach which advocates for permitting personal 
standpoints, including religious ones, into politics the convergence approach.5 From 
chapter four till the end, I discuss thesis S2’s four major critiques of  thesis S3—the 
Subjectivism Critique, the Asymmetry Critique, the Integrity Critique, and the Assurance 
Critique—and refute them. 
In Chapter Four, I focus on examining thesis S2’’s two critiques of  thesis S3 
regarding the plausibility of  the shareability requirement of  public reason. These two 
critiques are both based on the fact of reasonable pluralism. The first critique says that, 
on the basis of the appreciation of the fact of reasonable pluralism, thesis S2’ holds that 
there will not be any public reason that can be shared, as reasons and beliefs are relative 
or subjective to each individual. The second critique specifically questions the plausibility 
                                                                                                                                                                              
“Political Liberalism”, in Political Theory 18(1990): 339-60; Stephen Macedo, “Liberal Civic Education 
and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of  God v. John Rawls” in Ethics 105 (1995): 468-96, “Why 
public reason? Citizens’ reasons and the constitution of  the public sphere”, in Citizens’ Reasons and the 
Constitution of  the Public Sphere (August 23, 2010); Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
5 The two contrasted camps are labelled as the consensus approach and the convergence approach by 
Fred D’ Agostino. Fred D’ Agostino, Free Public Reason: making it up as we go along. (New York: Oxford 
University Press 1996) 29.  
The main figures of the convergence approach include some so-called political liberals as Gerald 
Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism: an essay on epistemology and political theory. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996); Kevin Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation (New York: Routledge, 
2014), and religious critics such as Michael Perry, “Religious Morality and Political Choice: Further 
Thoughts--and Second Thoughts--on Love and Power.” San Diego Law Review 30 (1993): 703-27; 
Jeremy Waldron, “Religious Contribution in Public Deliberation”, San Diego Law Review 30 (1993): 
817-48; Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of  Religion in Decision and Discussion of  Political Issues”, 
in Robert Audi & Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: the place of  religious convictions in 
political debate. (Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers Inc.1997); Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and 
Tradition. (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2004); Christopher Eberle, Religious Conviction in 
Liberal Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Christopher Eberle, “Consensus, Convergence, and 
Religiously Justified Coercion,” Public Affairs Quarterly 25.4 (2011): 281-303. 
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of the content of public reason, namely the probability of arriving at an overlapping 
consensus on a family of conceptions of justice. They argue that, besides reasonable 
disagreements about comprehensive doctrines, there are also profound and fundamental 
reasonable disagreements about conceptions of justice. It follows that if comprehensive 
doctrines are refrained from being introduced in the public domain because they are too 
controversial, conceptions of justice should be refrained from into public as well. It is 
hard to explain why only comprehensive doctrines are to be kept out from public reason. 
Therefore, there is an asymmetry treatment here between comprehensive doctrines and 
conceptions of justice. Thesis S3’s insistence on shared public reason might collapse as 
there will probably not be any political conception of justice supported by shareable 
public reasons. In other words, the prospect of forming an overlapping consensus is not 
as optimistic as the political liberals have imagined it to be. I reject both of these critiques. 
With regard to the critique based on subjectivism of reasons: the fact that reasonable 
citizens accept that they are bound to disagree with each other about comprehensive 
doctrines does not mean that they can also accept others’ comprehensive doctrines as 
justified. Furthermore, even if we confirm the fact of reasonable pluralism, public reason 
could nevertheless be understood as practically objective so long as the content of public 
reason, namely the political conceptions of justice, are reasonable. As for the critique that 
points out the fact of reasonable disagreements of justice aside from reasonable 
disagreements of comprehensive doctrines, I explain that reasonable disagreements of 
justice are actually anticipated by political liberalism. I also introduce a distinction 
between “justificatory disagreement” and “foundational disagreement” to illustrate that 
the former disagreement is not as fundamental as the latter. Moreover, I explain that 
reasonable disagreements of  justice are anticipated, and they are not as foundational as 
critics claim if we view the project of  political liberalism as an interpretive project. And if  
political liberalism is understood as an interpretive project, it not only anticipates 
reasonable disagreements of justice, but it will also promote our understanding of justice 
in political and legal practices.  
In Chapter Five, my central focus shifts to one of thesis S2’’s critique of the 
desirability of shareable public reason, namely the Integrity Critique. This critique is 
mainly addressed from the perspective of an individual’s moral motivation in following 
public reason. Those who support thesis S2’ have two levels of argument: thesis S3 (1) 
has damaged religious citizens’ integrated existence and (2) has imposed too onerous a 
burden on citizens and has violated citizens’ religious liberty. Thus, the principle of 
secularism as characterized in thesis S3 is too demanding for citizens to accept and 
follow. With respect to the first layer of the Integrity Critique, I argue that, first of all, the 
respect or recognition of one’s integrity or identity is not a trumping ideal that directs 
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one’s decisions in every matter of life. And the exclusion of religious argument in the 
public discussion does not mean disrespecting or degrading religious citizens’ integrated 
existence. Concerning the second level of this critique, I argue that, for starters, this 
critique conflates legal right and moral evaluation, namely “the (legal) right to do 
something” and “doing the (morally) right thing”. Religious liberty is citizens’ 
fundamental constitutional right; however, countenancing this legal right does not imply 
that every exercise of it is beyond moral criticism. Moreover, the benchmark of defining 
the violation of religious liberty does not depend on the burdens that have been imposed 
on religious citizens, but upon whether it deprives individuals of a fair opportunity in 
background conditions for them to pursue and fulfill their religious commitments. 
In chapter six, I explore thesis S2’’s other critique, the Assurance Critique, 
concerning the desirability of shareable public reason. While the Integrity Critique 
charges thesis S3 with being too demanding on citizens, the Assurance Critique says that 
not only can we not be sure that all citizens would agree to Thesis S3’s requirement, but 
we cannot know if they would actually comply with it. The assurance problem is not 
merely a challenge for thesis S3 but also for thesis S2’. Those who endorse thesis S2’, 
however, claim that they offer better solutions to this issue. I identify two of  these 
solutions and point out that neither of  them succeeds in solving the assurance problem. 
One is “the absolutist strategy”, in which the state intends to persuade every member 
and prospective social members to agree with the political decision by understanding 
every one’s comprehensive doctrines. The absolutist strategy has its theoretical attraction 
in providing every individual member of  the society adequate moral motivation to be 
cooperative. But this solution is problematic in practice due to a lack of  efficiency and 
determinacy in implementing this ambition. The other strategy overcomes those two 
problems by the use of  public rules coupled with the threat of  punishment. However, 
this strategy is also normatively problematic as it fails to supply genuine moral motivation 
for citizens, which is what makes thesis S2’ attractive in the first place. I believe that the 
root of  the inadequacy of  thesis S2’’s approach is the fact that this approach is unable to 
grasp the core inter homines feature of  public justification. By contrast, political liberals 
endorsing thesis S3 have a better plan for the assurance problem. They recognize that the 
power of  public justification lies in the idea that public reasons are for us collectively, 
rather than for you or for me individually. Moreover, the promise of  their solution 
consists in an underappreciated aspect of  public reason, the transformative role of  
public reason, which precisely explains the transformation or the development of  
cooperative virtues in reasonable citizens.  
In fending off all four major critiques raised by those who support thesis S2’, I 
believe that thesis S3 has been strengthened. Both thesis S3 and thesis S2’ offer 
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compelling but contrasting visions of the relationship of state and religion. The best we 
can do is to place these two theses side by side and carefully examine their strengths and 
weaknesses. If my projection of viewing political liberalism as interpretive is cogent, we 
must decide how well each theory fits with our considered convictions, and which theory 
offers the best interpretation of the ideal of citizenship and political society. I believe that 
once we have weighed all the arguments, the following chapters will show that thesis S3 
offers the best answer. 
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Chapter One: Secularism and Atheism 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Secularism is encountering a myriad of  existential challenges across the globe, while the 
unsettling, longstanding assumptions about “what secularism is”, among others, greatly 
haunt secularism. If  we cannot come to a clear understanding of  what secularism is, then 
all subsequent discussions about whether secularism is desirable, or how to improve 
secularism as a political mode, or how to implement secularism in certain regimes are 
groundless. Jose Casanova reminds us of  a significant distinction within the concept of  
secularism. On the one hand, secularism can refer to “a whole range of  worldviews and 
ideologies concerning religion”; on the other hand, secularism also refers to “different 
state projects, as well as to different legal-constitutional frameworks of  separation of  
state and religion.”1 Therefore, the preliminary step is to draw an analytical distinction 
between secularism as a political doctrine about the relation between state and religion, 
and secularism as a view of  religion per se. Secularism as a political principle entails the 
principle of  separation between religious and political authority. Such a doctrine neither 
presupposes nor entails any substantive view of  religion. At most it could be seen as a 
meta-religion theory (in the same sense as meta-ethics), so a theory about religion but not 
of  religion. Once the state explicitly upholds a particular conception of  religion, one 
enters the realm of  ideological evaluation. If  religion in a self-claimed secularist state is 
presupposed as an outdated or an irrational force of  discourse that should be banished 
from the public sphere, the state is actually referring to secularism as an antireligious 
ideology rather than a political principle.  
In my view, a plausible and compelling defense of  secularism should be restricted to 
the political realm, which means that we will take secularism as a political principle which 
requires the separation of  church and state. If  we fail to distinguish secularism as a 
political principle from an ideology of  religion, secularism in political discourse is likely 
to be confused with atheism2 and even an antireligious worldview. For instance, even a 
                                                             
1 See Jose Casanova, “The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms” in Rethinking Secularism (Craig 
Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer & Jonathan Van Antwerpen ed., Oxford University Press, 2011) 66. 
2  Apart from atheism, there are some other related concepts which have always been inevitably but 
mistakenly associated with secularism; secularization, for instance. In the very beginning, secularism 
was diagnosed as the transition period toward the better state of  atheism. Some prominent 
sociologists and philosophers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, like Karl Marx, Emile 
Durkheim and Max Weber, all believed that, through functional differentiation, scientific knowledge, 
and de-mystification, the world would move toward atheism and a total rejection of  God. It is actually 
a prediction of  religion’s demise, a secularization thesis. In contrast to it, secularism is a normative 
creed that makes no prediction, and its validity is sustained regardless of  religion’s future.  
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philosopher as sophisticated as Charles Taylor claims that: 
 
“A political system that replaces religion with a comprehensive secular 
philosophy as the foundation of  its actions makes all the faithful members of  a 
religion into second-class citizens, since these citizens do not embrace the 
reasons and evaluations enshrined in the officially recognized philosophy. In other 
words, that political system replaces established religion, as well as the core 
beliefs that define it, with a secular but antireligious moral philosophy, which in 
turn establishes an order of  metaphysical and moral beliefs.”3 
 
At least three inferences can be made from Taylor’s statement. One, either the state has 
an established religion, or it has an official established secular doctrine; two, this 
established secular doctrine is antireligious; three, a state with an established secular 
doctrine, namely an antireligious doctrine, discriminates against its religious citizens. 
Taylor’s understanding of  secularism, as voiced in the word above, is so misleading that 
many influential anti-secularism and multicultural arguments share this line of  thought. 
This representative line of  reasoning presumes that secularism stands opposite an 
established religion, under the assumption of  an either-or binary opposition between 
secularism and religion. Nevertheless, if  the distinction between secularism in its political 
sense and secularism’s ideological entailment is recognized, we can see that secularism as 
a political principle occupies a different level than an ideology of  religion. Secularism 
invoked as a political principle exemplifies an institutional arrangement of  state and 
religion, which is not a substantive view of  religion. Therefore, it is a ridiculous and 
logically fallacious allegation to accuse a secular state principle of  being antireligious. And 
thus there is no ground for discrimination of  religious citizens either. Before moving on 
in this chapter, I will make it clear that, in this dissertation, when I refer to religion, I am 
referring only to monotheist religions.   
Taylor’s misleading usage of  secularism as an antireligious ideology demonstrates an 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Also, the confusion between secularism and agnosticism is similar to the confusion between 
secularism and atheism. With regard to the question whether there is a supernatural deity in the world, 
there are three possible stances. One, theism, there is a God; two, atheism, there is no God; and three, 
agnosticism, there is no way to know the answer. Secularism cannot be attributed to any of  the three 
stances, and in fact, secularism does not, and does not need to consider the question of  God’s 
existence.  
In this chapter, I follow Paul Cliteur, taking atheism as a concept as contrary to theism, which “is 
not a belief; it is the absence of  belief.” An atheist “is not convinced by the proofs of  theism.” See 
Paul Cliteur, “The Definition of  Atheism,” Journal of  Religion and Society 11(2009): 1-23. 
3 Jocelyn Maclure & Charles Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of  Conscience (Harvard University Press, 
2011) 13-14. Italics added by me. 
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underlying subtle confusion of  secularism and atheism. This confusion goes all the way 
back to the very first adoption of  the term secularism, and it still remains in 
contemporary political theory. Although the distinction between secularism and atheism 
does receive considerable recognition and careful analyses, at least in academies,4 the 
confusion has been aggravated over recent years. The philosopher David Novak, also an 
ordained Conservative Rabbi, thinks that what undergirds authentic secularism is an 
“inevitably vehement denial of  any God”, which is precisely a claim of  atheism.5 The 
contemporary overheated discussion about religious extremist violence seems to 
exasperate the tendency to conflate secularism and atheism, as a motivation for the 
violence seems to be a misidentification of  secularism as an anti-deity worldview. There 
is a perilous and misleading trend embedded in the confusion. People tend to misidentify 
religion itself  as the root of  escalated religious violence. Thus they consciously or 
unconsciously campaign for atheism as if  the best or only solution is the abandonment 
of  religion. Jacques Berlinerblau warns us that, in the United States, religious 
conservatives have profitably promulgated this misconception at least since the 1970s. 
Claiming that secularism and atheism are the same thing makes for good “culture 
warfare”.6 Many Americans harbor irrational prejudices toward non-believers. Jacques 
Berlinerblau worries that by “intentionally blurring the distinction between atheism and 
secularism, the religious conservative succeeds in drowning both.”7 That is precisely why 
we need to make a conceptual distinction to shield secularism from being viewed as 
atheism or even an antireligious worldview.  
But what is wrong with atheism and an antireligious worldview in the public 
discourse, really? Why do we need to make this distinction and restrict secularism in the 
political sense in the first place, and why not defend secularism as a comprehensive moral 
view? These are the questions I need to answer in this and the next chapter. Part of  the 
answer hinges on the deficiencies of  atheism which I am about to discuss in section V. I 
am going to explain the quintessential new atheist arguments and unravel their flaws 
(section IV & V). Apart from the weaknesses of  atheism, the purpose and limitation of  
political philosophy also demands that we to defend secularism as a political doctrine, 
which will be dealt with in the following chapters.   
Historically speaking, secularism is a product of  the Protestant ethic and was 
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shaped by it, so they were far from opposites Before the Protestant Reformation, the 
Church had absolute authority in both the religious sphere and in secular politics. The 
Protestant Reformation came to “designate the passage, transfer, or relocation of  
persons, things, functions, meanings, and so forth from their traditional location in the 
religious sphere to the secular sphere.”8 One of  the most prominent effects of  the 
Protestant Reformation is the undermining of  the Church’s authority. After the 
Reformation, the Church’s monopolist compulsory character was undermined by the rise 
of  a modern secular state which was able to progressively concentrate and monopolize 
the means of  violence and coercion within its territory.9 The secular and the religious 
were envisioned as coordinated, mutually enriching components of  a polity under God. 
That is why Berlinerblau points out that the attempts to equate secularism with atheism 
are at least “historically imprecise”.10 Nevertheless, the official term “secularism” was not 
used until the 19th century. The term was coined by British freethinker George Jacob 
Holyoake (1817-1906), who coined the term in a newspaper, The Reasoner, on 10 
December, 1851.11 Holyoake’s promotion of  secularism as a comprehensive worldview 
that, to some extent, could replace religion leads to the inevitably dubious equation of  
secularism and atheism. It is therefore very important for us to grasp the cause of  the 
continuing confusion by examining the conceptual beginnings of  secularism and atheism, 
their entailments, and their long-standing entanglement with each other (section II & 
III).         
 
II.  The Birth of  the Concept of  Secularism  
 
The dominant Victorian values in 19th century England were seen as repressive and 
hypocritical. It was not a coincidence that such a concept was born in such a time. With 
the fall of  dogmatic religious faith and the rise of  freethought12, 19th century England 
                                                             
8 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1994) 22. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See Jacques Berlinerblau, Introduction: Secularism and Its Confusions in Secularism on the Edge: Rethinking 
Church-State Relations in the United States, France, and Israel (Jacques Berlinerblau ed., St. Martin’s Press, 
2014) 8. 
11 George Jacob Holyoake, English Secularism: A Confession of  Belief (Open Court Publishing Co., 1896) 
Chapter IX. Also see http://www.gutenberg.org/files/38104/38104-h/38104-h.htm, produced by 
David Widger. In this dissertation, I am citing from this free online source. 
12 The tradition of  freethought is closely associated with secularist ideas. Freethought aims to criticize 
religion, which is because freethought is, first of  all, the free development of  thought. The 
practitioners of  freethought are known as “freethinkers”. In Holyoake’s time in England, the term 
freethinker was used “to describe those who stood in opposition to the institution of  the Church of  
England and to literal belief  in the Bible. The beliefs of  these individuals were centred on the concept 
that people could understand the world through consideration of  nature.” See Paul Cliteur, The Secular 
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was in drastic intellectual turmoil. Most of  Europe, including England, went through a 
period of  rapid industrialization and urbanization, and the conditions of  the poor caused 
much concern in society. The religious majority’s opposition to contraception, treatment 
of  sexually transmitted diseases, and legal controls on prostitution inspired intellectual 
push-back. Although the 19th century is thought of  as a pious age, it was also an age of  
“doubt and loss of  faith for many thoughtful people”.13 Correspondingly, humanist 
thinking developed rapidly in this era, largely owing to new scientific thinking and 
discoveries. One of  the most influential publications in the 19th century, Charles Darwin’s 
(1809-1882) Origin of  Species, was published in 1859. Evolution theory caused many 
people to doubt their long-held views about religion. T. H. Huxley (1825-1895), a 
staunch defender of  Darwin, coined the word “agnostic” in 1869 to describe his belief  
that there were things that “we could not possibly know”.14 Coincidentally, moral 
philosophy also became increasingly detached from religion. The positivist movement 
put forward by French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-1857) profoundly fortified 
people’s dependence on empirical observation and, in the meantime, reduced their 
reliance on metaphysical thought. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) further developed Jeremy 
Bentham’s (1748-1832) utilitarianism by introducing higher and lower pleasures and 
proof  of  the principle of  utility, the ultimate standard by which to measure moral 
actions.  
The England of  the 19th century also witnessed the ascent of  intellectuals who 
openly challenged religion and theology. George Jacob Holyoake and Charles Bradlaugh 
(1833-1891) are both representatives of  the freethinkers of  19th century England. 
Holyoake was the person who invented the concept of  secularism while Bradlaugh was 
Britain’s first open atheist. They were both significantly influenced by the social and 
political reforms of  that time, and both aimed to advocate humanist thinking by 
undermining the impact of  religious doctrines and spreading rational principles. However, 
they had their disagreements with respect to their approaches to dealing with religion and 
theology. While Holyoake advanced secularism as a comprehensive worldview in place of  
religion, Bradlaugh insisted on treating atheism as the only alternative to theism.  
  
2.1 Holyoake’s Life 
 
Holyoake was born and bred in Birmingham, in an age “when social and political ideas 
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were in the air”.15 Robert Owen16 declared in the London Tavern that all the religions of  
the world were wrong; Jonathan Wooler17 issued the first issue of  The Black Dwarf; St. 
Jean Godin 18 founded the famous Familistere of  Guise. 19 Trained in Christianity, 
Holyoake began to understand that “sincerity was not the same thing as truth”, just as 
knowledge was more than what could be found in the books lying about everywhere to 
those who observe and think.20 “Seeing that he had to be answerable for what he 
believed”21 made him realize it was prudent to form his own opinions. The habit he had 
acquired in his early days of  frequenting chapels and missionary meetings led him to 
attend political assemblies, which further broadened his views of  life and duty. 22 
Holyoake met Robert Owen in 1837, and they quickly became friends. They began to 
lecture and write articles advocating socialism together. Later, he joined Charles 
Southwell in protesting against and refusing to enforce the official policy that lecturers 
should take a religious oath. Holyoake became the editor of  an atheist newspaper, Oracle, 
and became an atheist himself.23 Holyoake retained his disbelief  in God all his life; 
however, he decided to adopt Huxley’s label of  agnostic24once it was available. He felt 
that agnosticism more exactly suited his a-theological position since it illustrated “the 
limitation of  an assertion to actual knowledge”.25 “Never doubting that other persons 
                                                             
15 See George Jacob Holyoake, Sixty Years of  an Agitator’s Life (London T. Fisher Urwin, 1892)4. 
16 Robert Owen (1771-1858) was a Welsh social reformer and one of  the founders of  utopian 
socialism and the cooperative movement, also a renowned secularist who combined secularism with 
socialism. He inspired Holyoake’s secularism idea and maintained close relationship with him. 
17 Thomas Jonathan Wooler (1786-1853) was a publisher, and he was active in the radical movement 
of  early 19th century Britain. He used to work for the journal The Reasoner, the one Holyoake took 
over in 1860. The Black Dwarf was a satirical journal, which made him famous. 
18 Jean-Baptiste André Godin (1817 –1888) was a French industrialist, writer and political theorist, 
and social innovator.  
19 George Jacob Holyoake, Sixty Years of  an Agitator’s Life, 4. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 See ibid, 33. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Agnostic is a contextual word, which can be used in a non-theological way. For example, a 
cosmologist could say he is agnostic about quantum theory. Huxley nevertheless confines the word to 
a theological context. Huxley explains his account of  agnosticism: “I took thought, and invented what 
I conceived to be the appropriate title of  ‘agnostic’. It came into my head as suggestively antithetic to 
the ‘agnostic’ of  Church history, who professed to know so much about the very things of  which I 
was ignorant.” By way of  clarification, Huxley states, “In matters of  the intellect, follow your reason 
as far as it will take you, without regard to any other consideration. And negatively: In matters of  the 
intellect, do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable.” 
Huxley thought that we would never be able to know about the ultimate origin and causes of  the 
universe. Aldous Huxley, Agnosticism (London: K. Paul. Trench, 1889)183, 186-187. 
25 See George Jacob Holyoake, Bygones Worth Remembering (Vol. II, E.P. Dutton & Company, Two 
volumes, 1905): Chapter XXX. Also see 
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had a right to disagree” 26 : that is what Holyoake found was lacking from the 
theological-inclined. This taught him the “dangerous” habit of  freely saying what he 
thought, which resulted in his being imprisoned for six months in 1842.27  
It happened when Holyoake was delivering a public lecture in the Cheltenham 
Mechanics’ Institution upon Self-Supporting Home Colonies. A local preacher rose and 
said Holyoake had spoken of  “our duty towards men, but had said nothing of  our duty 
towards God,” and so the preacher asked for information about this.28 Holyoake could 
have replied that theology was not his subject, but instead he subversively condemned 
spending too much money to build churches in British industrial colonies, while people 
there were living in distressed conditions. He said, “If  I could have my way, I would place 
the deity on half  pay as the Government of  this country did its subaltern officers.”29 It 
was a defiant answer to the preacher, but not to the extent to shock anyone, as it was 
conveyed in a light tone yet with audacity, which he deemed the occasion required, but 
later he was charged with blasphemy.30 Holyoake was the first and also the last person in 
England who was to be imprisoned on such a charge.  
Before his incarceration in 1842, Holyoake was the editor of  the newspaper Oracle, 
whilst after the imprisonment it was not easy for him to find profitable employment. He 
thought if  he retired from public advocacy he would be regarded “as a coward”, that 
many others would be discouraged too, and that “the enemies of  freethought would 
triumph and grow insolent”, so he became a free speaker on prohibited subjects.31 In 
1845, Holyoake established the newspaper The Reasoner, in the context of  which he 
developed the concept of  secularism in 1851. Before its official launch, secularism as a 
new form of  thought and action was not in Holyoake’s mind yet; he admitted that he 
merely had “a taste for reasoning on morality” that excluded theology.32 By the time 
Holyoake coined the term secularism, he took the term secularism as a new name for a 
new conception, epitomizing a new form of  freethought.  
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26 George Jacob Holyoake, Sixty Years of  an Agitator’s Life, 49. 
27 Ibid., 5. 
28 Ibid., 142. 
29 George Jacob Holyoake, The History of  the Last Trial by Jury for Atheism in England: A Fragment of  
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In Holyoake’s later years, he mainly dedicated to facilitate the cooperative 
movement of  lower-class workers. On 22nd January, 1906, Holyoake died at Brighton, 
Sussex. He was buried in London. 
 
2.2 Secularism as a Comprehensive Set of  Affirmative Principles  
 
When Holyoake maintains that secularism is a new name for a new conception, what 
Holyoake has in mind is a set of  affirmative principles mainly intended “for those who 
find theology indefinite or inadequate, unreliable or unbelievable.”33 It is, however, 
already more than a mere negation of  theology.  
Tremendously influenced by the positivist philosophy of  French philosopher 
Auguste Comte, Holyoake believes that negation cannot bring sustained progress.34 
Comte believes that the scientific method, especially the mutual dependence of  theory 
and observation must replace the abstract and unverifiable metaphysics. Holyoake 
repeatedly referred to one maxim which was also quoted by Comte: “nothing is 
destroyed until it has been replaced.”35 This criticism has precisely revealed the deficiency 
of  theology for mankind, and the real task of  secularism is to “set up and maintain 
affirmative propositions”, replacing “negations by affirmations”, substituting 
“demonstration for denunciation”, spelling out “the truths of  nature and humanity”.36 So 
far we can see that what Holyoake understands by secularism is what is called 
“humanism” in contemporary speech. 37  Holyoake is also hugely impacted by the 
utilitarianism of  John Stuart Mill, with whom he sustains a life-long friendship. Strongly 
under the influence of  19th century humanist thinking, especially Comte’s and Mill’s, 
Holyoake forms his own system of  what secularism entails.  
Holyoake wrote extensively in his life, but his major work of  secularism was 
compiled in The Origin and Nature of  Secularism (1896), while its American version was 
entitled as English Secularism: A Confession of  Belief. Holyoake defines secularism as “a code 
of  duty pertaining to this life, founded on considerations purely human.”38 In general, 
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Holyoake claims that  
 
“[S]ecularism is the study of  promoting human welfare by material means, 
measuring human welfare by the utilitarian rule, and making service to others a 
duty of  life. Secularism relates to the present existence of  man, and to action, 
while both of  those issues can be tested by the experience of  this life.”39  
 
Secularism propagates itself  “in the promotion of  human improvement by material 
means”, and thrives as the foundation of  “common unity for all who would regulate life by 
reason and ennoble it by service.”40 Holyoake proposes three affirmative principles of  
secularism to compensate the deficiency of  theology, which are “(1) the improvement of  
this life by material means; (2) that science is the available providence of  man; (3) that it 
is good to do good. Whether there is other good or not, the good of  the present life is 
good, and it is good to seek that good.”41  
At first glance, the first principle of  secularism appears far removed from today’s 
discussion of  political philosophy and ethics. Simply put, Christians and secularists both 
intend to cultivate people but their methods are quite different: “Theology works by 
spiritual means”, while secularism works by “material means”.42 The second principle 
proposed by Holyoake is that “science is the available providence of  man”.43 One of  
theology’s common claims is that mankind is limited in power and is often in peril; 
however, those “who are taught to trust in supernatural aid are betrayed to their own 
destruction”44 as praying for help actually does not help. By contrast, secular life is 
enhanced by the idea of  self-help. Holyoake believes that a secularist guides himself  by 
means of  “maxims of  positivism”45 so that he upholds provable principles. Secularists do 
not have to be scientific, but they are able to “discern the value of  science, to appreciate 
and promote it.”46 These two principles show the strong influence of  Comte’s positivist 
philosophy on Holyoake.  
When it comes to meta-ethics, Holyoake’s philosophy of  secularism also manifests a 
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naturalistic position. Holyoake reckons that a secularist seeks to discern what is in nature 
so that he knows what ought to be in morals. Secularism only accepts the authority of  
nature, adopting the methods of  science and philosophy, and only respects rules of  
conscience, as they exist in the common sense of  mankind.47 As for the meaning of  
“secular”, what “can be tested by the experience of  this life”48, the principle requires that 
precedence should be given to the duties of  this life over those which pertain to another 
world. The common ground of  all freethinkers then is the independence of  opinion. It 
can be prompted by atheism depriving superstition of  its foundation, so as to compel 
theism to argue for its validity. Or it also can be induced by materialism, “which shows 
the physical consequences of  error, supplying, as it were, beacon lights to morality.”49 On 
the subject of  the dispute on the nature of  existence between atheists and theists, due to 
a lack of  sufficient evidence, secularism “neither asks nor gives any opinion” on this, and 
it confines “itself  to the entirely independent field of  study, the order of  the universe.”50  
Holyoake states the third principle as “it is good to do good. Whether there is other 
good or not, the good of  the present life is good, and it is good to seek that good.”51 
The third principle is, as far as I am concerned, the most crucial, complex, and relevant 
one for secularism in the contemporary context. Even in today’s world, one of  the most 
powerful assertions of  theology or religious ethics is that religion represents the utmost 
good and leads human beings toward it. To a large extent, all of  our persistent arguments 
of  secularism, religion, or even ethics spring from that principle. Does religion symbolize 
the supreme good in the world? Do we uphold religion solely because it is fundamentally 
good? Is it justified and desirable to bring the good of  religion into political debates? Do 
we have any obligations to do what religious scripture specifies? Is it possible to act 
morally without religion? Certainly it is not Holyoake who invented or initiated those 
arguments. But Holyoake’s claim explicitly shakes the fundamental grounds of  religion. 
Secularism denotes the “moral duty of  humans in this life, deduced from 
considerations”52 pertaining to this life alone. Holyoake argues that “goodness is service 
to others with a view to their advantage” and human welfare; that is the “sanction of  
morality”. 53  Enlightened and convinced by J. S. Mill, Holyoake builds the moral 
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correctness of  his secularism on utilitarian moral philosophy, on the idea that morality is 
independent of  scriptural religion and that it is built on reason and utility. Holyoake’s 
defense of  this principle or the whole idea of  secularism is established on the basis of  
Mill’s utilitarianism by asking whether secularism is useful or serviceable to many minds. 
He argues that the “measure of  a good action is its conduciveness to progress.”54  
 
“Whatever may be the value of  metaphysical or theological theories of  morals, 
utility in conduct is a daily test of  common sense, and is capable of  deciding 
intelligently more questions of  practical duty than any other rule.”55  
 
On the premise of  taking utilitarian rules as adequate guides in all matters of  morality, 
Holyoake states that the sufficiency of  secular reason for guidance in human duties is 
part of  what secularism means. Admittedly, Holyoake’s defense of  such a moral principle 
may not be compelling or comprehensive enough; it does indeed leave room for the 
religious good. As human beings, we are perfectly able to perform our duties as rational 
agents and seek the good as what is desired in this secular world. By virtue of  this 
principle, the significance of  humanism and the moral thinking of  secularism emerged. 
Secularism is no longer merely a fancy cover for atheism, or a natural attribution, e.g., a 
substitute for nature of  origins. 
 
III. Atheism Endorsed by Charles Bradlaugh  
 
3.1 Bradlaugh’s Life  
 
As the first open atheist in the UK, Charles Bradlaugh was a zealous social activist, an 
eloquent speaker, a parliamentarian, and one of  the most important leaders of  organized 
atheism in 19th century Britain. Bradlaugh was born and grew up in Bethnal Green in 
London under financially unprivileged circumstances. He started his schooling, which 
was steeped in Christian teaching, at seven years old, and ended it before eleven.56 After 
that, Bradlaugh continued to attend Sunday school and eventually became a Sunday 
school teacher, presumably immersing him more in the Bible than his regular school had 
ever done.57 However, later on, Bradlaugh carefully studied and compared the thirty-nine 
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articles of  the Church of  England and the four gospels. To his dismay, he found that 
they did not agree and he was completely unable to reconcile them.58 Bradlaugh thus 
wrote a letter to the Reverend of  his parish asking for aid and explanation, which 
brought him three months of  Sunday school teaching suspension and he was thrown out 
of  his own house. During the three months suspension, Bradlaugh had the opportunity 
to meet people of  whom “he had scarcely heard” before.59 He joined an energetic and 
enthusiastic group of  freethinkers led by Richard Carlile (1790-1843),60 who was an 
important propagandist promoting the establishment of  universal suffrage and freedom 
of  the press in the UK.  
Due to his financial predicament, Bradlaugh joined the British Army from 1850 to 
1853, and then became an antireligious lecturer under the name of  “Iconoclast”.61 By 
then, Bradlaugh had grown more radical in his views compared to before he was enlisted. 
Bradlaugh delivered a series of  anti-Bible lectures which gained prominence in a number 
of  liberal groups and among secularists. In 1858, Bradlaugh became the president of  the 
London Secular Society. Two years later, he took over the editorship of  the secularist 
newspaper the National Reformer, which was prosecuted for blasphemy and sedition. 
Luckily, Bradlaugh was eventually acquitted on those charges.62 Later on, Bradlaugh was 
elected Member of  Parliament for Northampton in 1880, but his seat was denied 
because he asked to be allowed to make a solemn affirmation in court instead of  taking 
the religious oath of  the parliament.63 For the next five years, he compromised and 
relinquished his request eventually. After three more elections, Bradlaugh was finally 
admitted to be seated in 1886.64 Over the next few years, he had the right to speak and 
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vote in the House of  Commons regarding issues ranging from domestic affairs to 
Britain’s foreign policies. He died at the age of  57 in 1891 in London, with over 3000 
mourners at his funeral.  
 
3.2 Bradlaugh’s Defense of  Atheism and Refutation of  Theism 
 
Bradlaugh mounts systematic, thorough, and strong defenses of  atheism in his life’s work. 
He argues that atheism, properly understood, is no mere disbelief; “it is, on the contrary, 
a hearty, fruitful affirmation of  all truth, and involves the positive assertion of  the 
highest humanity.”65 Atheism is a positive affirmation which does not include any 
possibility of  theology. To defend atheism, Bradlaugh has to collect the meaning of  God 
as expressed by theism and defeat it first. Theism includes pantheism, polytheism, and 
monotheism, in which Bradlaugh locks on monotheism as the form of  theism he will 
deal with. It is because, according to Bradlaugh, if  monism is defeated then all pretenses 
of  theism collapse. Moreover, “there cannot be more than one ultimate explanation of  
the universe,”66 which has to be either atheism or monotheism. Therefore, Bradlaugh 
focuses on the Christian Scripture, with an animating purpose to discredit the Bible in 
every possible way, point by point.  
Bradlaugh refutes theism from four perspectives: 1) the untenable explanations of  
what God is; 2) the nullity of  the specific word “God” itself; 3) the implausibility of  
God’s intelligence; 4) the fallibility of  proving God’s existence. First of  all, regarding the 
theistic explanations of  God as the creator and the governor of  the universe, Bradlaugh 
considers both inconceivable. As for the theists’ claim of  God as a creator, atheists think 
this conception is utterly impossible. According to Bradlaugh, “we are utterly unable to 
construe it in thought that the complement of  existence has been either increased or 
diminished, and we certainly cannot conceive of  an absolute origination of  substance.”67 
Bradlaugh continues, “we also cannot conceive of, on the one hand, nothing becoming 
something, or on the other, something becoming nothing. The words ‘creation’ and 
‘destruction’ have no value except when applied to phenomena.”68 In confronting the 
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claim of  God as the governor of  the universe, atheists point to the contradiction of  all 
the existing evil things, like “pain, misery, crime, poverty”, and the eternal goodness of  
God.69 “Theism, asserting God as the creator and governor of  the universe, hinders and 
checks men’s efforts by declaring God’s will to be the sole directing and controlling 
power.”70 Conversely, atheism, “by declaring all events to be in accordance with natural 
laws — that is, happening in certain ascertainable sequences — stimulates men to 
discover the best conditions of  life, and offers them the most powerful inducements to 
morality.”71 While theism provides “future happiness for a scoundrel repentant on his 
death-bed”,72 atheism “affirms present and certain happiness”73 for those who live a 
fulfilled life in this life.  
Secondly, as for the specific meaning of  the word “God”, Bradlaugh wanted to 
ascertain what is meant to be conveyed by the word “God”, it is very important to 
prevent any misunderstanding of  theism in the first place.74 In order to search for the 
meaning attached to the word “God”, Bradlaugh learns Hebrew and traces back the 
word “God” in its Hebraistic origin in the ancient Jewish records. In Hebrew, Bradlaugh 
hardly finds anything within it to aid what is required for the sustenance of  modern 
theism. The most charitable definition of  the word can only be equivalent to such a 
declaration: “I am, I have been, I shall be”.75 When it comes to tracing the theistic ideas’ 
growth amongst all people, Bradlaugh ends up finding its root “in the superstition and 
ignorance of  a petty and barbarous people, nearly ignorant of  literature, poor in language, 
and almost entirely wanting in sophisticated conceptions of  humanity.”76 Bradlaugh thus 
concludes that “the theist derives no argument in his favor; it teaches nothing, defines 
nothing, demonstrates nothing, explains nothing”.77  
Thirdly, the theists also declare their God to be infinitely intelligent, whereas atheists 
disagree. Bradlaugh holds that there is no perfect intelligence without reason, will, and 
perception, and God has none of  them. By reason, Bradlaugh means the ability to 
predict the future based on the past and present experience, which can never be true of  
God. To God, there can be neither past nor future; therefore, to him, reason is 
impossible. As for will, if  God wills, “the will of  the all-powerful must be irresistible 
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while the will of  the infinite must exclude all other wills. God can never perceive,”78 as 
the act of  perception leads to a new idea, which is impossible for God since, if  he is 
omniscient, his ideas should have been and always remains unchanged.79  
The last proposition of  theism, and also the strongest one Bradlaugh examines, is 
the claim that God is the first cause of  every effect in the world.80 It is the most difficult 
one to deal with as well. Through a priori arguments and a posteriori arguments, theists 
try to demonstrate the existence of  the omnipotent God. Bradlaugh nullifies their 
endeavors by deconstructing the priori argument and posteriori argument respectively. 
The a priori argument, from cause to effect, is “a method of  proof  in which the matter 
of  the premises exists in the order of  conception antecedent to that of  the 
conclusion.”81 The a priori argument argues that “the universe owes its existence…to the 
reason and will of  a self-existent being who is infinitely powerful, wise, and good.”82 The 
a priori argument nevertheless forces theism into an impasse by assuming that the 
universe has not always existed. The claim was that the new existence added when the 
universe began was either an improvement or a deterioration, or precisely identical with 
what had always existed in all respects.  
 
“…[I]f  the new universe was an improvement, then the previously self-existent 
being could not have been infinitely good. If  the universe was a deterioration, 
then the creator could have scarcely been all-wise, or he could not have been 
all-powerful. If  the universe was in all respects precisely identical with the 
self-existent being, then it must have been infinitely powerful, wise and good, 
and must have been self-existent.”83  
 
Again, if  a God exists, he could have convinced all mankind of  the fact of  his existence 
so that there would not be any doubt, disagreement, or disbelief. If  he fails to do so, then 
he is neither omnipotent nor omniscient.84 Contrariwise, the posteriori argument aims to 
establish itself  on the analogy between other substances and God as the designer. 
Proponents of  the posteriori argument endeavor to deduce the existence of  a deity from 
the appearance of  designs in nature. But the most the posteriori argument can do is to 
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“infer the existence of  a finite cause or…of  a multitude of  finite causes”.85 The problem 
of  the posteriori argument is that it is impossible to deduce the infinite from the finite, 
and thus it cannot demonstrate God’s existence. By the same token, God’s omnipotence 
remains unproved too. Theists’ inability to convince all mankind of  God’s existence 
precisely contradicts God’s omniscience. Besides, if  God does exist then, being a good 
God, he would not allow all that unfortunate persecution, strife, and bloodshed resulting 
from doubts and disagreements about his existence and attributes. Hence, either he is not 
good or he is not all powerful after all.86    
Apart from the above refutation against theism from the perspective of  metaphysics, 
Bradlaugh also criticizes the delusion that progress and civilization are the product of  
Christian theology.87 It was claimed that many prominent humanity endorsers were 
Christians, which claim puts the cart before the horse: the development in other ideas 
and principles of  civilization were long procrastinated by Christian dominated 
governments.88 He takes the abolition of  slavery as a clear exemplification of  a gain to 
humanity led by unbelief  in contrast with the fact that Christianity supported slavery for 
ages. As for those prominent proponents of  humanity, Bradlaugh argues that their 
exceptionality was not “a consequence of  their adhesion to Christianity, but that it 
existed in spite of  it; the specific points of  advantage to human kind have been in direct 
opposition to precise biblical enactments.”89 The progress of  the human race has sprung 
precisely from unbelief. 
 
3.3 The Cross between Holyoake and Bradlaugh 
 
In attending freethought meetings, young Bradlaugh became acquainted with Holyoake’s 
brother Austin Holyoake, by whom he was first introduced to George Jacob Holyoake.90 
From his first meeting with Holyoake in 1850 till his death, the relationship between the 
two most prominent freethinkers at that time endured many twists and turns. According 
to Bradlaugh’s daughter, Holyoake “had long been on strained terms with Bradlaugh, and 
avowedly regarded him with disfavor as a too militant atheist.”91 But in Holyoake’s own 
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view, he had personal relations with Charles Bradlaugh all his life.92 Holyoake helped 
Bradlaugh with his first lecture “Past, Present, And Future of  Theology” when 
Bradlaugh was only sixteen years old. 93 Holyoake admitted that it was with great 
reluctance and only in defense of  principle that he had to oppose him.94  
The deterioration point of  Bradlaugh and Holyoake’s relationship came in 1857. 
Holyoake refused to publish Bradlaugh’s work “The Bible: What It Is”, on the ground 
that “Bradlaugh had probably gone too far in his mode of  criticism”.95 Holyoake did not 
want to be identified with Bradlaugh’s progressive criticism of  religion. Bradlaugh was 
both surprised and indignant by such an unexpected rejection at the time. After that, in 
the beginning of  1862, Holyoake became a special contributor to Bradlaugh’s newspaper 
the National Reformer, which engendered a financial dispute between the two of  them in 
the end. Apart from those two unhappy incidents, Holyoake also resented freethinkers 
taking a religious oath under any circumstances, but Bradlaugh was willing to do it as 
“the forced formality is a much smaller matter than the evil of  a miscarriage of  justice”.96 
In 1881, at the opening of  the Leicester Secular Society’s new Secular Hall, both of  them 
spoke, representing different unions. Bradlaugh was the leader of  the National Secular 
Society, while Holyoake was the founder of  the British Secular Union.  
The culmination of  their being lifelong frenemies was epitomized in the following 
event. In 1870, they held two oral debates entitled “the principles of  secularism do not 
include atheism” and “secular criticism does not involve scepticism” respectively on two 
consecutive nights from 10 to 11 March, which drew great attention and were copiously 
quoted for many years.97 Both of  them were freethinkers of  the most convinced kind, 
but whereas Holyoake chose rather to describe himself  as a secularist, Bradlaugh called 
himself  an atheist. The whole difference between them is already indicated in these two 
descriptors. Bradlaugh referred to atheist in its simplest meaning as “without God”, and 
as for all those attached opprobria; they merely lay in the narrowness of  others’ minds 
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but not in the atheists’.98 Holyoake personally was an atheist as well, but he refused to 
adopt such a term. He preferred to adopt the new name of  secularism and disassociated 
it from atheism altogether, not as a matter of  policy, which point he underscores 
repeatedly.99  
In those two debates, Holyoake held that secularism had no connection with 
atheism or skepticism. Secularism should assert its own principles without assailing 
others, including theological systems. He conceded that secularism, which presupposed 
the existence of  atheist societies and freethinking societies, is indeed built partly upon the 
results attained by atheism or theism.100 “The significant next step of  secularism, also the 
one distinguishing it from atheism, is to go farther than that, to be distinct from them, to 
be affirmative, to act upon what free inquiry had discovered, to occupy the ground 
criticism had won, to set up principles of  nature in the place of  principles of  theology, 
and found, if  possible, a kingdom of  reason, for those who found the kingdom of  faith 
inadequate and unreliable.”101 Neither the existence of  God, nor the non-existence of  
God, neither the mortality, nor the immortality of  the soul are in any way necessary; they 
are separate and independent from secular tenets.102 Holyoake stressed his point as 
follows:  
 
“Secularism is not an argument against Christianity; it is one independent of  it. 
It does not question the pretensions of  Christianity, it advances others. 
Secularism does not say there is no light and guidance elsewhere, but maintains 
that there is light and guidance in secular truth, whose conditions and sanctions 
exist independently, act independently, and act forever. Secular knowledge is 
manifestly that kind of  knowledge which is founded in this life, which relates to 
the conduct of  this life, conduces to the welfare of  this life, and is capable of  
being tested by the experience of  this life.”103  
 
Like what Holyoake underlines before, the term secularism is never merely taken to be a 
mask or as a substitute term for skepticism or atheism. Secularism extends free thought 
to ethics, to the extent of  replacing the chief  errors and uncertainties of  theology. 
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Secularism claims that morality does not rest on theology but on material and social facts 
without actively dismissing or criticizing religious beliefs. The word “secular” implies 
those issues “which can be tested by the experience of  this life.” Secularism is not the 
removal of  Christianity; secularism’s object was to “contest the error, not the truth, 
which was also likely included in Christianity, whereas to remove it would amount to 
removing the good as well as the evil.”104 What Holyoake yearned to maintain was that:   
 
“The secular principle that duties of  this life which we know should take 
precedence over those of  another which we do not know; that in human affairs 
science is the providence of  man, that morality rests upon foundation purely 
human; that escape from the penalties of  sin by the death of  another is not 
good in principle nor in example; and that where scriptural precepts appear to 
conflict, guidance can only come by selection.”105 
 
Holyoake being an atheist himself  should not interfere with his arguments for 
secularism. 106  The Reasoner’s reader, the English social theorist and writer Harriet 
Martineau, was a supporter of  Darwin’s theory and a steady endorser of  Holyoake’s work. 
In a letter she sent to an American newspaper, Liberator, she understood that, Secularism 
could be justified by  
 
“[T]ts including a large number of  persons who are not atheists, and uniting 
them for action which has secularism for its object, and not atheism. On this 
ground, and because by the adoption of  a new term a vast amount of  
impediment from prejudice is got rid of, the use of  the name secularism is 
found advantageous; but in no way interferes with Mr. Holyoake’s profession of  
his own unaltered views on the subject of  a First Cause.”107  
 
By contrast, Bradlaugh questions the genuine intelligibility of  Holyoake’s secularism. 
According to Holyoake, the secularist’s position is a kingdom of  reason for those who 
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find the kingdom of  faith impossible. The secularist finds the kingdom of  faith 
impossible, he finds belief  in god impossible, and he finds belief  in religion impossible. 
Bradlaugh argues there is no difference between a secularist’s claim of  “finding belief  in 
God impossible” and that of  an atheist.108 He further argues that, even at present, it is 
possible that all men who are secularists are not atheists; the “logical consequence of  the 
acceptance of  secularism” must be atheism.109 The divergence in their thoughts is that 
Holyoake thinks ignoring something does not amount to denying something, whereas, to 
Bradlaugh, finding theological doctrines unreliable is denying them because there is no 
other truth besides theism and atheism. In his own words, “every idea of  God is such 
that as a secularist I am bound to deny.”110 Additionally, Bradlaugh disregards the 
opprobrium cast upon the word atheism. An atheist, as also a human being deserves the 
same respect.111  
Bradlaugh’s stance of  atheism is quite common among freethinkers of  that time. 
Even Holyoake’s own brother criticized Holyoake’s approach by asking, “How can 
anyone not an atheist be a secularist?”112 According to Bradlaugh, nearly all secularists 
sided with him in agreeing that the use of  the term of  secularism was reduced to nullity. 
Secularism is not an appropriate name for Bradlaugh and his endorsers. They deprive the 
name of  specific meaning to counter the agitators of  freethought, while showing no 
reason why it should be adopted by anybody else. In accordance with secularism’s 
overreaching view of  regarding secularism-related concerns as secularism, every political 
club is a secular organization and an exponent of  secularism.113 
 
3.4 Periodical Summary 
 
Bradlaugh’s critique of  Holyoake’s equivocality is not without reason. On account of  
Holyoake’s narrative of  secularism, the confusion between it and atheism is almost 
inescapable. As Holyoake admits, his accounts of  secularism are already established on 
the conclusion of  atheism, namely the unreliability of  faith. It then seems that he does 
not leave much room for a positive argument for secularism apart from rejecting 
unreliable faith. The only weight Holyoake holds to maintain his distinct secularist 
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position compared to atheism is his insistence on not denying God’s existence. Holyoake 
defends secularism as a comprehensive outlook, based on positivism and utilitarianism. It 
aims to answer questions ranging from nature to ethics, as a comprehensive doctrine to 
replace theology. What Holyoake aspires to purport is a general metaphysical theory 
proceeding from a general encompassing point beyond religious contestations. 
However, Holyoake’s idea of  secularism both over- and under-reaches. Holyoake 
tries to characterize secularism in an all-encompassing fashion with answers for all 
philosophical and moral questions. That is to say, as a substitution of  a worldview for 
theism. In that sense, Holyoake has constructed an over-reaching scheme of  a secularism 
that is too heavily laden with contents. When it comes to its projection in moral 
philosophy, Holyoake’s secularism also under-reaches in taking utility as the sole secular 
standard against which to measure moral actions, while it excludes other moral standards 
such, for instance, good will. Nevertheless, the significance of  Holyoake’s slightly crude 
system of  secularism lies in its affirmativeness. It is not just an approach to criticize or 
negate theism; it delivers its own assertions and offers another option besides theism for 
all mankind.  
In today’s discussion, secularism has already evolved from an all-encompassing 
doctrine to an ethical creed proposing that “the best way to deal with religious 
differences is a morally neutral vocabulary that we all share and a morality that is not 
based on religion.”114 The concept of  secularism we are addressing today has largely 
retreated from Holyoake’s ambitious denotation to a certain extent, whereas it has also 
refined the old version as well. In my opinion, generally, there are two major retreats and 
one big adaption: (1) Holyoake’s secularism does not argue against theological 
metaphysical truth because of  a lack of  empirical proofs to verify. Today’s secularism, 
though not necessarily upholding a positivist stance of  the truth of  nature, refrains from 
involving itself  in metaphysical discussions of  theology altogether. (2) The reason that 
Holyoake maintains secularism as a morally correct philosophy is because he considers 
Mill’s utilitarianism to be secularism’s moral foundation, whereas today, there is no moral 
doctrine called “secular moral philosophy”, as secularism can refer to any moral theory 
which accommodates utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, or any eccentric moral 
philosophy as long as it does not include the concept of  God. (3) Holyoake’s secular 
philosophy is rather a concise and general one. With the exception of  the one time he 
explicitly stated that “the state could not continue to exist upon Christian principles”115, 
he did not, at least explicitly, make any statements about the relationship between church 
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and state. He does consider it and even promotes the setting of  certain limits in states, 
but it is solely for the sake of  secular education for the children. However, the secularism 
we are addressing today is more about the role of  religion in public life. The relationship 
between church and state has been one of  the most important debates of  
contemporary’s secularism.   
 
IV. Mainstream Arguments of  the New Atheism: a Scientific Perspective  
 
Bradlaugh’s account of  atheism, built upon the critique of  the theory that posits God as 
a creator, including God’s characteristics, definitions, and proofs, works as a negative 
approach against theism. As a matter of  fact, Bradlaugh’s atheism stance is not only 
common among freethinkers in the 19th century; it is also inherited by new atheists in the 
21st century. The essence of  contemporary atheism has not significantly altered since 
Bradlaugh’s writing. However, the most crucial progress contemporary atheists have 
offered is an alternate scientific explanation of  the world. They propound the view that 
“religion should not simply be tolerated but should be countered, criticized, and exposed 
by rational arguments wherever its influence arises.”116 Richard Dawkins (the author of  
The God Delusion), Christopher Hitchens (the author of  God is Not Great), Sam Harris (the 
author of The End of  Faith) and Daniel Dennett (the author of Darwin’s Dangerous Idea) 
were seen as the four most prominent figures in the New Atheism movement. These 
new atheists, using Darwin’s theory in On the Origin of  Species as their theoretical weapon, 
seek to excoriate religion from scientific perspectives to illustrate the falsity of  
creationism and Divine creation theory. In this section, I will display their criticisms of  
religion by two main propositions on the questions of  God’s being and God’s impact 
respectively: one, God cannot be the explanation of  the world’s origin and everything in 
the universe; second, religion in general brings about more misery than well-being to 
human kind.  
 
4.1 Divine Creation Theory v. Natural Selection 
 
Among contemporary atheists, Richard Dawkins (1941-), a British biologist, is probably 
one of  the most prominent of  this era.117 Dawkins assembles a comprehensive attack 
                                                             
116 Simon Hooper, “The rise of  the New Atheists”. CNN, 16 March 2010. 
117 To my surprise, recently (approximately May, 2014), Dawkins denounces to continue calling 
himself  atheist, but describing himself  as a secular Christian, because he has a feeling for nostalgia 
and Christian ceremonies. See 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/hay-festival/10853648/Richard-Dawkins-I-am-a-secular-Christia
n.html.   
43 
 
against religion in one influential book, The God Delusion (2006), which is one of the most 
popular and accessible books advocating atheism in our age. This publication was indeed 
an indication of the rise of the New Atheism movement. In The God Delusion, Dawkins 
not only criticizes the arguments for God’s existence; he also discusses the relationship 
between morality and religion. In the most general sense, Dawkins’s contention is already 
vividly illuminated by the book’s name, which claims that the whole idea of God is a 
delusion. Identifying himself as a scientist, Dawkins intends to debunk such a delusion by 
scientific arguments.  
It is not the first time Dawkins wages the atheism battle against the hypothesis for 
the existence of a supernatural creator. Dawkins has always been a prominent critic of 
creationism. Admiring and taking natural selection as the only known and solution to the 
origin of  the world, Dawkins is one of  the sturdiest endorsers of  Darwinism. In his 
previous scientific works The Selfish Gene (1976) and The Extended Phenotype (1982), 
Dawkins supported Darwin’s natural selection hypothesis by arguing that the gene is the 
unit of natural selection. Moreover, Dawkins also aims to extend Darwinian natural 
selection to culture. In analogy with how the gene works in natural selection, in The Selfish 
Gene, Dawkins coined the term “meme” as the units of cultural inheritance which can 
self-replicate, disappear, and respond to variety. The meme can be transmitted from one 
to another consciously and unconsciously through social means. Nevertheless, Dawkins’s 
systematic criticism of creationism, especially divine creation theory, did not start until 
his 1986 book The Blind Watchmaker. The 18th century English theologian William Paley 
proposed a notorious watchmaker analogy to argue for God’s existence. Paley argues that, 
since a watch is too complicated to come into being without design, all living things in 
this world must also have been purposefully designed by an omnipotent Supreme Being. 
Dawkins’s theoretical aim in The Blind Watchmaker is to oppose Paley’s analogy. 118 
Dawkins believes that natural selection theory is sufficient to explain the biological world, 
albeit automatically, and he continues that argument in The God Delusion. 
Dawkins recognizes a gap between what we already know and what is still a mystery. 
On the one hand, science is indeed benefited by such a gap insofar as it is ignorance that 
drives scientists to solve more mysteries; on the other hand, once scientists fail to give an 
immediate and comprehensive answer, divine creation theory would try to attribute any 
unknown gap to God’s intelligent design by default.119 Dawkins contends the reason why 
he is an atheist is that “the holy book is an axiom but not the end product of  a process 
of  reasoning.”120 Instead, books about evolution are believed not because they are holy 
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but because they “present overwhelming quantities of  mutually buttressed evidence” that 
“any reader can go and check.”121 Despite the science lesson of  the origin of  the universe 
and life Dawkins tries to teach in The God Delusion, his main message in the book is that 
natural selection in general “not only explains the whole of  life”, but also “raises our 
consciousness to the power of  science to explain how organized complexity can emerge 
from simple beginnings without any deliberate guidance.”122  
In The God Delusion, Dawkins also summarizes, examines, and refutes several 
philosophical arguments on God’s existence, including the arguments from beauty, 
personal experience, scripture, admiration for religious scientists, and also Thomas 
Aquinas’s proofs.123 The argument from beauty is a rather romantic one, which implies 
that if there is no God, there is nothing that could explain the beauty of Shakespeare’s 
sonnets or Beethoven’s late quartets. Dawkins disregards this argument inasmuch as the 
beauty of Shakespeare’s or Beethoven’s works is not affected by whether God exists or 
not. Those works do not prove the existence of God, but only the existence of 
Shakespeare and Beethoven. 124  The argument from personal experience is like a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is most convincing to those people who claim 
they have experienced a vision of God, and on the other hand, it is most unconvincing to 
anyone else, because it is purely personal.125 The argument from scripture is only 
persuasive for people who are not used to asking questions about the source and veracity 
of the texts. Ever since the 19th century, gospels that featured Jesus’s birth were already 
proved by theologians to be unreliable accounts of the real history.126 Even if Jesus 
existed, the reliability of the New Testament as a record of history is generally doubted 
by reputable biblical scholars.127 Dawkins therefore also dismisses the Bible as evidence 
for any kind of deity. As for the argument from esteemed religious scientists, Dawkins 
also deprecates it since almost every significant figure before the 19th century was 
religious.128 The great French mathematician Pascal once argued that whatever “the odds 
against God’s existence might be”, we had better still believe in God due to the eternal 
penalty for guessing wrong.129 Dawkins considers Pascal’s argument odd, as believing is 
not something to decide “as a matter of policy”.130 After the 20th century, those great 
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scientists who claim to be religious use the term “religious” in a wider Einsteinian131 
sense, such as a belief in nature or the universe.  
Thomas Aquinas’s five proofs of God’s existence are treated in much more detail 
than other arguments by Dawkins. Three of the five proofs of God’s existence involve 
infinite regresses: nothing moves without a prior mover, nothing is caused by itself; 
therefore “there must have been something non-physical”, like God, “to bring [physical 
things]them into existence.”132 Dawkins thinks that all three of them rely upon invoking 
God to terminate the infinite regress, but they also “make the entirely unwarranted 
assumption that God himself is immune to the regress.”133 Moreover, all the features that 
people normally ascribe to God are indeed self-contradictory. For example, if God is 
omniscient in the sense that he knows exactly how to change the world by using his 
omnipotence, then he cannot change again, which means he is not omnipotent after all. 
The fourth one is the proof from degree. For Aquinas, there are degrees in the world of 
goodness or perfection and there must be “a maximum to set the standard for 
perfection.”134 That standard must be God. Dawkins does not think it is an actual 
argument, for it is conspicuously insane to presume any maximum, such as the smelliest 
person or the shortest person, to be a God.135 The last proof Aquinas provides is the one 
still used today: divine creation theory, denoting that every living thing in the world looks 
as though it has been designed, so there must have been a designer.136 This theory also 
presumes that complex things could not have occurred randomly; therefore a designer 
who deliberately designs those things must exist.137 It is the argument that Dawkins 
chooses to tackle emphatically with a whole chapter (Chapter Four in The God Delusion). 
Dawkins argues that Darwin’s natural selection theory and similar scientific theories are 
superior to divine creation theory in explaining the living world and the universe.  
In the fourth, and also the core chapter of  The God Delusion, Dawkins deploys an 
argument of  improbability to illustrate the falsity of  divine creation theory. Generally, a 
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designer God cannot be inferred to explain how complex the world is.138 That is because 
if  any God is capable of  designing everything, he would have to be complex enough to 
design himself  and explain that design, which eventually leads to “an infinite regress 
from which he cannot help us to escape.”139 Along with divine creation theory, chance 
theory also attempts to deploy the argument from improbability for its purpose, by 
assuming that biological adaptation is a question of  all or nothing.140 In that sense, 
natural selection theory is not a theory of  chance; it is the opposite. Dawkins believes in 
the power of  accumulation, which can be traced from natural selection. Precisely by 
virtue of  this accumulation, the plausibility of  chance theory along with divine creation 
theory is ruled out. Working as a cumulative process, natural selection “breaks the 
problem of  the improbability up into small pieces”.141 While each piece is improbable to 
a certain extent, “large numbers of  these improbable [pieces] are stacked up in series”, 
where “the end product of  the accumulation is…improbable enough to be far beyond 
the reach of  chance.”142 Even if  Darwinian natural selection theory does not suffice to 
explain everything, God’s design hypothesis certainly does not work either, “because 
design is ultimately not cumulative, and it therefore raises bigger questions than it 
answers” about its own origin.143 Thus, far from terminating the infinite regress, divine 
creation theory “aggravates it with a vengeance”.144 
 
4.2 Epistemic Atheist Argument: Religion Does More Harm than Good  
 
In The God Delusion, Dawkins also discusses the relationship between religion and 
morality and what is the matter with religion. He explains that his hostility toward 
religion is because strong religious faith tends to result in religious absolutism and also 
helps to produce a force for evil in the world.145 For example, blasphemy, one of the 
fiercest penalties in the Bible, still exists and exerts its force in some countries (including 
Iceland, which might come as a surprise to many146). Religious absolutism also lays the 
groundwork for fostering a more restrictive moral code which condemns distribution of 
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pornography and views some sexual activities as criminal offences: for instance, 
homosexuality.147 Even the usage of condoms in sexual activities is seen as unnatural and 
thus frowned upon by Christianity. More seriously, in light of the terrorist attacks in 
prosperous and liberal lands, religions, even the moderate ones, “help to provide the 
climate of faith in which extremism naturally flourishes.”148 In comparison with patriotic 
love of country or the sense of glory of ethnic groups, religious faith “is an especially 
potent silencer of rational calculation, which usually seems to trump all others.”149 And 
only religious faith is a strong enough force to induce an unreasonable craziness in 
ordinary people.150 Dawkins reckons that it is “because of the easy and beguiling promise 
that death is not the end, and that a martyr’s heaven is especially glorious.”151 Plus, the 
discouragement of questioning and the quest for knowledge is religion’s very nature, 
since both Christianity and Islam teach children that it is virtuous to not question faith.152 
Dawkins is certainly not alone in this battle against possibly the most potent 
delusion, namely the idea of God. One year after the publication of The God Delusion, the 
late, celebrated British author, prominent atheist, and critic of religion, Christopher 
Hitchens (1949-2011) published another significant book critical of religion with a 
forthright title: God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (2007). Hitchens often 
publicly spoke against the Abrahamic religions and considered them to be the axis of evil. 
This book further fortified his reputation as a major advocate of the New Atheism 
movement. Hitchens welcomed any invitation from religious leaders who wished to 
debate him. He was not afraid of controversies and openly criticized public figures like 
Mother Teresa, Bill Clinton, Henry Kissinger, and Pope Benedict XVI, including his own 
brother, a conservative Christian journalist, Peter Hitchens.153 Particularly, he had a series 
of written debates on the question “Is Christianity Good for the World?” with Christian 
theologian and Pastor Douglas Wilson in 2007, which became a book with the same title 
in 2008.154 In 2010, Hitchens debated the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair about 
whether religion is a force for good, and he won the debate by a 68 percent majority 
according to the website of the debate.155 Differing from some atheists, Hitchens is not 
satisfied to be merely identified as an atheist; rather he called himself an antitheist. He did 
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this because an atheist can be someone who could still “wish belief in God were correct, 
but an antitheist would be relieved that there is no evidence for any belief in God.”156 
Hitchens admitted that his final goal was to eradicate religion because ultimately religion 
is incapable of leaving atheists alone.  
Generally, from the aspects of religion’s unreliability in its source and its immorality 
in its influence on humankind, Hitchens lists four irreducible objections to religious faith:  
 
“(1) [I]t wholly misrepresents the origins of man and the cosmos; (2) because of 
this original error, it manages to combine the maximum of servility with the 
maximum of solipsism; (3) it is both the result and the cause of dangerous 
sexual repression; and (4) it is ultimately grounded on wish-thinking.”157  
 
As the name of the book illustrates, it is mainly a collection of criticisms with regard to 
the negative repercussions of religion on people or the world. Both of Dawkins’s and 
Hitchens’s works address the issue of God’s existence and how religion does more harm 
than good in human history. While Dawkins’s core arguments focus on the former part, 
God’s existence, Hitchens takes more time to explicate religion’s murky side.  
In addition to the harms brought by religion presented by Dawkins, Hitchens also 
particularly lists the damage done to children by religion. Such as, children had their 
psychological minds and physical lives eternally hurt being nonvoluntarily exposed to 
religion, not to mention circumcision and a fear of healthy sexual activities.158 According 
to Hitchens, if not severely damaging, religion at least does not assist to make people 
behave better or feel more peaceful. In some of the most famous battles against 
fanaticism or the violation of human civilization, e.g., slavery in United States and the 
Second World War, he thinks that non-religious people fought for moral causes with as 
much vigor and effect as religious advocates.159 In his view, the argument that “religious 
belief improves people, or that it helps to civilize society, is one that people tend to bring 
up when they have exhausted the rest of their case.”160 
According to Hitchens, religion poisons everything. Moreover, he believes that 
religion is also sinful in itself. Religion is sinful in its very infancy; the texts of religious 
scriptures are full of inconsistencies, contradictions, and even plagiarisms; the precepts of 
religion are plainly immoral.161 He aims his critiques at all religions, ranging from the 
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Abrahamic religions to Hinduism and Islam. He depicts them as “violent, irrational, and 
intolerant”162, with abundant support from his personal anecdotes, historical documents, 
and semantic analysis of religious scriptures such as the Bible and the Koran.163 For 
starters, Hitchens says that religion’s beginnings were spearheaded by corrupt and 
immoral individuals.164 Citing from a New York court examination, Hitchens regards the 
founder of Mormonism, Joseph Smith, as “a disorderly person and an impostor” who 
defrauded people.165 Hitchens depicts the Old Testament as a “nightmare”, as there are 
innumerable “anachronisms”, inconsistences, “dreams”, “astrology”, and even 
“genocidal incitements” in the Old Testament.166 At different times and places, huge 
discrepancies in prophets or mediums occur. Most notably in Christianity, one prophet 
or revelation is not sufficient and needs to be reinforced by others. Hitchens points out 
that they are “hopelessly inconsistent” and cannot be true at the same time.167 Likewise, 
the New Testament, “full of star-predictions and witch doctors and sorcerers”168, is also a 
work of “crude carpentry, hammered together long after its purported events”.169 For 
instance, the questionable existence of Jesus calls for improvised attempts to make out a 
good case for the contradictions within it. Hitchens points out that many of the sayings 
and deeds of Jesus in the New Testament are innocuous; “many are unintelligible and 
show a belief in magic”, overflowing with absurdities and primitive attitudes; while many 
are plainly immoral.170 For instance, to Hitchens, Islam is a composition of contents 
borrowed from other religious sources, such as Christianity and Judaism.171 Not only 
both doubtful and flawed in terms of textual sources, religion is also positively immoral. 
The immorality lies in its original precepts, including “presenting a false picture of the 
world to the innocent and the credulous”; praising sacrifice, which results in bloodshed; 
propagandizing “doctrines of atonement and eternal punishments or rewards”; and “the 
imposition of impossible tasks”.172  
Hitchens almost spends the entire book discussing the abhorrent side of religion, 
but he does not omit the potential arguments of the opposition. What about those 
religious leaders “who protested in the name of religion and who tried to stand athwart 
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the rising tide of fanaticism and the cult of death”173 in human history? As for those cases, 
Hitchens takes them as a tribute paid to humanism rather than to religion. It is the 
humanist spirit embedded in them as human beings that inspires their bravery and 
integrity, which is irrelevant to their religions.   
 
V. Why Atheism Is Not Appealing  
 
Atheism is an indispensable description of people who do not believe in the existence of 
God. Nevertheless it gains some misleading popularity in political philosophy. In my 
view, the appeal of atheism lies in its completeness, thoroughness, and robustness. First 
of all, some atheists and most believers tend to confuse their personal religious beliefs 
with the understanding of religion’s place in the political arena. For most believers, 
asserting God’s existence amounts to taking God as the only truth, moral and 
epistemological, of the world. Therefore, correctly following God’s guidance is certainly 
required in political philosophy as well. Likewise, in denying God’s existence, some 
atheists also negate the whole idea of religion. After all, for atheists, what is the reason to 
build and organize society according to a false philosophy? Secondly, no matter what the 
reasons are, both secularism and atheism ask to separate religion from state authority, 
while atheism seems more tempting, considering its theoretical virtue of thoroughness. 
The third charm of atheism could, oddly enough, be associated with the resurgence of 
religious fundamentalism in the past two to three decades. A disturbing identification of 
religion as the root of the growing religious extremist violence has gradually gained 
sympathy in the contemporary world. Against such a backdrop, the rigid stance of 
atheism appears more attractive than in any other time. Those violent atrocities have 
deviously transferred the focus of people’s indignation from extremist violence to 
religion per se. It might trigger this idea that religion resulted in those tragedies so that the 
idea of rejecting religion at least invites some serious consideration.  
However, the appeal of  atheism nevertheless stems from three corresponding 
deficiencies, which also demonstrate the core disparities between atheism and secularism. 
Departing from the purpose of  disclosing the ontological absurdity of  theology, atheist 
arguments backed by Darwinian natural selection theory suffer from a philosophical 
naiveté. They presume an either-or binary opposition of  religion and science. The 
underlying assumption is that once the delusion of  religion is exposed, we would 
embrace a naturalistic, evidence-based mode of  thinking that could be applied to both 
the natural world and our moral compass. Such a philosophical presumption of  atheism 
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derives from an underlying kind of  thinking that resembles that of  religious adherents. In 
order to rebut theological contentions thoroughly, atheism adopts the same point of  
view that religious adherents adopt, which is also rejected by secularism. Religious 
adherents take God’s existence as both an epistemic foundation and a value foundation, 
so that the ethical creed is established on the premise of  God being the creator of  
everything in the world.174 That logic leaves atheists no option but to directly debunk the 
assumption of  God as the creator of  the world. But the justification for secularism is 
made from a general and morally neutral perspective. Additionally, there is a persistent 
myth of  secularism, which is also explicitly expressed by Bradlaugh, that secularism is a 
soft version or an intermediate phase toward atheism.  
 
5.1 Religion and Science Are Not Necessarily Mutually Exclusive  
 
There is one widely recognized assumption that is also an argumentative strategy 
embedded in atheistic arguments. In order to destroy the epistemic foundation of  belief  
in God, the rejection of  any belief  in God’s existence is prerequisite. As I have 
previously shown, Dawkins also holds such an assumption in both of  The Blind 
Watchmaker and The God Delusion. He mainly objects to taking the God hypothesis as the 
final explanation of  the universe. In the core chapter of  The God Delusion, Dawkins sets 
up a binary opposition between the God hypothesis and physicalist naturalism in terms 
of  the explanation for everything in the universe. Thomas Nagel points out that 
Dawkins’s binary does not exhaust every possibility, so that even if  we reject religion, we 
do not have to embrace a naturalistic explanation for the world.175  
In The God Delusion, on the question of  “what explains the existence and character 
of  the astounding natural order we can observe in the universe,”176 Dawkins cautiously 
sets out his position by displaying two alternatives: the divine creation hypothesis and 
natural selection theory. As previously illustrated, in refuting the view of  “a superhuman 
intelligence who deliberately designed and created the universe and everything in it,”177 
Dawkins, who believes in the accumulation, holds that “the possibility of  any creative 
intelligence of  sufficient complexity to design anything only comes into existence as the 
end product of  an extended process of  gradual evolution.”178 Dawkins thinks the 
ultimate explanation of  everything lies in the law of  physics.  
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Nevertheless, Nagel indicates that neither the God hypothesis nor Dawkins’s 
physicalist naturalism offers an ultimate explanation for everything. It is not necessarily 
the case that, if  we reject the one explanation, we automatically embrace the other. The 
binary opposition between religion and science that Dawkins reveals is not necessarily a 
real opposition. Nagel suggests that the real opposition between Dawkins’s physicalist 
naturalism and the God hypothesis is about whether the world is purely “physical, 
extensional and purposeless”, or whether it is “mental, intentional and purposive”.179 But 
as Nagel put it, “the God hypothesis does not explain the existence of  God, while 
naturalistic physicalism does not explain the laws of  physics.”180 The point of  the God 
hypothesis is to claim that not all explanation is physical, and that there is a mental, 
purposive or intentional explanation more fundamental than the basic laws of  physics.181 
Nagel points out that the key omission here is that Dawkins’s dialectic leaves out another 
possibility, which is the teleological principle in nature. It is more or less the Aristotelian 
view, which is explained neither by “intentional design nor by purposeless physical 
causation.”182 Fundamentally, there is more than one form of  understanding to account 
for different genres of  subjects.183  
In The God Delusion, Dawkins’s contempt for Aquinas’s fourth argument, the one 
claiming that God is the maximum to establish the standard for perfection, precisely 
reflects this critical mistake. Dawkins overlooks the difference between moral calibration 
and empirical comparison, namely the difference between how we evaluate what is 
morally good or bad and how we determine the comparison result of empirical facts. 
Aquinas’s fourth proof from degree is an argument based only on what is crucial for our 
moral thinking, whereas Dawkins’s rebuttal misses the point by applying the argument to 
both the world of moral evaluation and that of empirical comparison. The possibility that 
Dawkins’s propaganda for physicalist naturalism might severely damage our moral 
thinking worries Nagel. Nagel worries that if  we follow Dawkins’s line of  thinking, then 
                                                             
179 Ibid, 23. It is worthwhile to be careful that the extension of  a sentence or expression is usually 
contrasted with the intension, not with the intention: intensionality and intentionality are not identical 
terms. Extensionality is the reference to the state of  affairs of  a sentence in the world “out there”, 
while intensionality is a particular mode in which this state of  affairs is presented. Intentionality refers 
to the general directedness of  language towards something outside itself; according to John Searle, 
this is the product of  the general directness of  the human mind toward the world. The 
intensionality-extensionality distinction derives from German philosopher Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob 
Frege, while the term intentionality derives from German philosopher Edmund Husserl. I thank 




183 Ibid., 26. 
53 
 
“moral reasoning, introspection, or conceptual analysis as ways of  discovering the truth” 
would be dismissed merely because they are not physics.184 It is understandable, especially 
against the contemporary backdrop of  rampant religious extremist violence, that many 
intellectuals, including Dawkins, are horrified by the dreadful things that continue to be 
done by religion.185 However, the dangers of  both blind faith and the authority of  dogma 
do not imply that “we can make ultimate sense of  the world only by understanding it as 
the expression of  mind or purpose.”186  
From the perspective of  some religious believers, religion and science are also not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Some religious believers, especially Christians, do accept 
Darwin’s theory of  evolution by natural selection as a scientific explanation of  lives on 
earth, because above all, Genesis is not scientific material that counts as factual 
documentation. Some Christians tend to extend their understanding of  their scripture 
beyond its literal meaning to a deeper meaning, otherwise there will be no room for any 
theological reflection at all. According to Alvin Plantinga, there is no genuine or 
“superficial conflict but deep concord between science and theistic religion”. 187  
Theologians and scientists occupy different territories, and theologians do not seek 
dominance on scientific matters, so nor should scientists. The real conflict, however, is 
between “theistic religion and a philosophical gloss…to the scientific doctrine of  
evolution”, which is claimed as “undirected, unguided, and not orchestrated by God”.188  
As one of  the most militant atheists of  our age, Dawkins does understand the key 
difference between atheism and secularism completely. In recollecting the history of  
American religion, Dawkins indicates that America, one of  the most religious nations in 
the world, was actually built upon a secular republican tradition. No matter what those 
founding fathers’ personal religious views were, the one identity they shared was 
secularist: they believed in keeping religion out of  politics.189 Jacques Berlinerblau also 
suggests that “the secular vision was bred by religious thinkers, such as Martin Luther, 
John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison… Throughout American history, it 
has been religious groups like Baptists, Jews, progressive Catholics, as well as countless 
smaller religious minorities who have championed secular political ideas.”190 But religious 
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believers, even moderate ones, are extremely vigilant of  the claim of  atheism.191 Precisely 
because Dawkins does understand what it means to be a secularist, his attacks on theism 
and religion in The God Delusion are particularly based on his atheism. He claims to be a 
secularist as well, but if  he wants to defend secularism, he needs a different book to do 
that. It is evident that Hitchens also grasps the key difference when he uses the 
expression like “…secular Christians and Jews, and many atheist and agnostic militants 
of…”192 Hitchens is perfectly aware that there is no necessary connection between being 
secular and being an atheist. It is perfectly compatible to be secular and religious 
simultaneously. If  we misidentify Hitchens’s arguments as arguments for secularism, then 
we are falling straight into the trap of  “soft” atheism.   
 
5.2 The Myth of  Secularism Being a “Soft” Atheism 
 
There is a popular myth surrounding the relationship between secularism and atheism. It 
claims that secularism is too moderate a strategy to cope with the potential dangers 
brought by religious extremism, and secularism will evolve into atheism eventually. Such a 
myth stems from a tacitly cognized assertion that religion is negative, troublesome, and 
potentially wedded to paranoid violence. Would the world be a better place if  one day 
there were no religion anymore? Both Dawkins and Hitchens pinpoint the answer to 
such a question by spending plenty of  ink in expounding the harms religion has already 
done to the world and humanity. Is that necessarily so? At least the safest thing to say is 
that it is a complex question. If  Dawkins, Hitchens, or other atheists can illustrate the 
harmful or the evil side of  religion by abundant historical instances, contemporary 
recurring tragedies, or vivid personal experiences, John Finnis, John Hare, and even 
Jeremy Waldron can enumerate correspondent or even more numerous examples of  the 
uplifting and inspiring side of  religion as well.193 For example, Hitchens mentioned that 
the tribute paid to those “priests and bishops and rabbis and imams who have put 
humanity ahead of  their own sect or creed is a tribute paid to humanism, not to 
religion.”194 By the same token, is it not also possible to say that the condemnation and 
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indignation we feel with regard to those religious fundamentalists who commit terrorist 
attacks should be attributed to the intolerance, bigotry, inferiority, stupidity, or just the 
dark corner hidden inside human nature instead of  religion? Would it not be like 
throwing the baby out with the bath water to reject the whole idea of  religion when 
encountering religious violence? Either way, it is too hasty to determine that religion is 
the obsolete, evil source of  human problems which ought to be sifted out.  
More importantly, unlike atheism, secularism does not require a rejection of  the 
concept of  God to be a morally correct philosophy; rather, it holds an independent 
position from the metaphysical discussions of  religion so that the validity of  secularism 
will stand still irrespective of  our value judgment of  religion.  
This discussion highlights the significant distinction between the concept of  
atheism and the concept of  secularism I made at the outset of  this chapter. Secularism is 
not concerned with religion per se, but is concerned about religion’s position in the public 
and political arena. Confronting religious extremist terrorism, secularism has prescribed a 
more mature and stable prescription which does not involve rejecting, denouncing, or 
praising religion. Atheism and secularism just launch their claims from different 
discourses, while atheism is an assertion of  metaphysics of  religion; secularism belongs 
to normative ethics and political discourse. Atheism declares the falsity of  deity’s 
existence along with any belief  in such a deity, whereas secularism makes no such claim 
so that it can coexist with even the most sincere religious beliefs. While atheism entails a 
rejection of  belief  in God, secularism does not necessarily call for such a rejection. 
Atheism is neither the precondition nor the future direction of  secularism. 
 
5.3 Particular and General Points of  View 
 
As previously mentioned, almost all of  the atheists’ arguments to some extent depart 
from a believer’s perspective. For a religious believer, the belief  in a deity’s existence 
determines his outlook on moral duties, ethical values, and conceptions of  what is good. 
Theism, especially monotheism, professes theological doctrines as the only truth of  the 
world. Hence, for atheists such as Bradlaugh, in order to render secular truths and values 
available, the sham of  theology’s metaphysics must be penetrated. It is also what 
Dawkins and Hitchens purport to do in their works. To atheism, if  the false ontological 
assertion of  religion, namely God’s existence, cannot be exposed, then other fallacies of  
theology, especially those concerning morality, cannot be revealed either. The opponent, 
or rather the critic of  theism concedes that atheism has to object to every aspect of  
theism. Atheism is thus unfortunately susceptible to being a negative doctrine, incapable 
of  proposing positive dogmas for itself. It is unreasonable and unnecessary to think that 
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one must refute the metaphysical arguments of  theism in order to resist the normative 
ethical arguments thereof. The ultimate validity of  atheistic arguments lies in whether a 
God exists in the world, which is not secularism’s concern.  
Unlike atheistic and theistic arguments, secularism does not particularly take 
religious believers’ perspective into account. In answering to which justified principles 
could be the basis of  general agreement, as I am going to propose in this book, 
secularism is the principle that should govern the relation between religion and state that 
no one could reasonably reject. Secularism stands on a general and political viewpoint 
that both religious adherents and atheists are expected to support for the sake of  a stable 
life in a political system. Therefore it is the only perspective under which people of  
different religious persuasions can live together. I’ll come back to this point in more 
detail in the next chapter.  
I can summarize the three deficiencies of  atheist arguments as follows. First of  all, 
when atheism reveals the mistaken foundation of  theology by exposing its ontological 
unintelligibility, it also suffers from an oversimplified philosophical assertion of  the 
binary opposition between naturalism and the God hypothesis. Secondly, the myth of  
viewing secularism as a phase toward atheism overlooks the distinction between 
secularism as a comprehensive doctrine of  religion and secularism as a political doctrine. 
Secularism as a political doctrine is indeed independent from metaphysical discussions 
about religion and thus does not, and does not have to, reject religion. Thirdly, atheism as 
a theory intended to oppose theism occupies the same viewpoint as religious adherents 
do, so that it fails to provide a general basis agreed on by most reasonable people. 
Contrariwise, secularism, which departs from a general political point, could be 
supported by people of  different religious backgrounds.  
From the summary above, the implausibility of  atheism is clearly shown. At the 
same time, the key discrepancies between secularism and atheism are also exposed. The 
fundamental conceptual distinction between the two concepts lies in the divergence of  
the questions they address. Atheism answers questions regarding the substantive view of  
religion. Atheism disclaims the existence of  God, or any conception of  God, and thus 
denounces faith as a basis for belief. Secularism addresses the relationship between 
religion and state authority in political discourse and does not engage in any substantive 
discussions of  religion. Moreover, secularism does not imply negative or hostile attitudes 
toward religion. Admittedly, in the contemporary world, support for atheism and 
secularism tends to overlap. Commonly, when someone states her idea of  secularism 
both as an ethical notion and a political vision, she intertwines such a claim with a 
disavowal of  God or religion. The illusion of  secularism as a moderate form of  atheism, 
or of  atheism as a final destiny of  secularism stems from such an unreflective, but 
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nonetheless prevalent attitude. However, when someone states her indignation about 
religion while at the same time advocating for secularism, we need to carefully identify 
two distinctive attitudes here: the attitude of  atheism when she addresses her disbelief  in 
religion; the attitude of  secularism when she argues that religion should be separated 
from the state. It is one thing to reject a belief  in a certain God, another to disapprove of  
the connection of  politics and religion. The former rejection is the rejection of  the 
ontological presupposition of  God’s existence and religion itself, whereas the latter, the 
characterization of  secularism, is a rejection of  certain institutional arrangements in 
political systems.  
      
VI. Concluding Remarks  
 
This book is dedicated to justifying secularism. Before commencing to defend secularism, 
it is vitally important to draw a preliminary distinction between secularism as a political 
principle and secularism as a comprehensive view of  religion, which is actually a view of  
atheism. Two reasons account for why I restrict my defense of  secularism to secularism 
as a political concept instead of  undertaking a comprehensive project. The previous 
discussion in this chapter explains the first reason.   
Secularism can refer broadly to a range of  worldviews and ideologies concerning 
religion. A lack of  analytic distinction would confuse secularism with some other related 
concepts, such as atheism, agnosticism, secularization, etc. Especially secularism in the 
sense of  characterizing religion as an outdated, obsolete, and irrational ideology has led 
to a dubious equation of  secularism and atheism. If  we retrieve the elucidation of  
secularism from Holyoake’s writings, which treats secularism as a comprehensive 
replacement of  religion, we will find the skeptical confusion of  secularism and atheism 
understandable. But many contemporary influential critiques of  secularism are also 
mistakenly made from the perspective of  taking secularism as an atheistic and 
antireligious worldview. Atheism has its appeal. However, it is also severely theoretically 
defective. In contrast with atheism, the secularism I am about to defend in this book is a 
political concept. The secularism I am about to defend does not engage in metaphysical 
exploration of  theological claims, nor does it hold any hostile views against religion. It is 
certainly possible that people can be morally or politically inspired by religious ideas; 
what I am rejecting is simply the notion of  religion as the basis of  politics.195 
The second reason why I am defending secularism as a political concept is 
associated with how we view political philosophy. If  we identify political philosophy as 
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part of  moral philosophy, then its aim is to lay out the moral principles of  an ideal 
society. However, as I will argue in the next chapter, the social fact of  reasonable 
disagreement determines that there is a certain distance between morally just principles 
and the principles which can be legitimately forced on citizens.       
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Chapter Two: Secularism as a Political Doctrine 
 
I. Introduction  
 
The discussion of  this chapter derives from the danger posed by the present political 
situation. Increasingly, violence is used in the name of  religion, and one of  the most 
precious virtues of  liberalism—toleration—has been severely provoked. Besides this, 
religious and ethical disagreements about right and wrong have aggravated social 
divisions. Especially in the past decades, the rise of  political multiculturalism has 
highlighted the challenge religious disagreements have posed to our communal political 
life. Even for citizens who live in the same nation, their deeply irreconcilable religious 
and moral disagreements still prevent them from shaping and sustaining a just and stable 
political life together. It is rather difficult to find shared ideals and principles that are 
upheld by all reasonable citizens on the basis of  their comprehensive doctrines. This 
chapter is therefore going to consider a recurrent problem in our contemporary political 
life: how can free and equal citizens, deeply divided by conflicting religious disagreements, 
live together and endorse the same political principles of  a constitutional democratic 
regime?1  
My answer is that secularism as a political doctrine consisting of  liberty of  
conscience and the separation of  state and religion can be presented as the best 
candidate to solve the recurrent problem. By solving this problem, secularism does not 
aim or suffice to replace any comprehensive doctrine. Rather, secularism aims to serve as 
a publicly justified political conception, generally acceptable to all citizens on the 
fundamental political issue of  state and religion. In other words, my aim is to defend the 
political legitimacy of  the principle of  secularism.   
There are two general problems obstructing my defense of  secularism. The first 
problem (P1) is the one brought about by “the fact of  reasonable pluralism”.2 In a 
democratic society, reasonable citizens are profoundly divided by their disagreements on 
comprehensive doctrines as a result of  the normal exercise of  human reason.3 Therefore, 
it is impossible for reasonable citizens to agree on any comprehensive doctrine. 
Consequently, a political principle defended from the perspective of  comprehensive 
doctrines cannot be justifiably forced upon all citizens. The other problem (P2) is the 
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indeterminacy in understanding secularism. Secularism, especially the principle of  the 
separation of  state and religion (Thesis S) is subjected to four interpretations and we 
need to be sure which interpretation is the most tenable one. The first one (Thesis S1) 
understands the separation in the broadest sense as a non-establishment of  state religion 
principle. The second (Thesis S2) considers the separation as an attitude of  non-favoring 
on the part of  the state. That is to say, states should remain neutral when it comes to 
religions. Two further theses depart from the second interpretation. One (Thesis S2’) 
advocates a state neutrality principle which encourages accommodating all 
comprehensive (including religious) doctrines in the public discourse. In this thesis, the 
separation of  state and religion is at most institutional, while the involvement of  religion 
in public discussions ought not to be restrained. The other one (Thesis S3) is the 
narrowest one; it interprets the principle as excluding religious reasons from the public 
discourse. A complete argument for secularism thus needs to accommodate the problem 
brought by reasonable pluralism, as well as explicitly select a variation of  the separation 
of  state and religion.   
Due to the first problem produced by reasonable pluralism4, any comprehensive or 
moral justification for secularism is likely to prove too contentious. Hence we cannot 
come to a public justification for this principle in a democratic society by a 
comprehensive approach. In light of  John Rawls’s advancement of  the project of  
political liberalism, I will argue that a successful defense of  secularism calls for a political 
turn. Political liberalism shifts the focus from a philosophical conception of  justice, 
formulated abstractly and meant to be applied universally, to a practical conception of  
political legitimacy. A political justification avoids engaging in discussions about 
comprehensive doctrines. Thus, we hope to uncover a public basis of  political 
conceptions by means of  a political approach which forsakes wading into religion and 
philosophy’s profoundest controversies. However, a political approach for justifying 
secularism itself  has no answer to the second problem, namely, which variation of  the 
separation of  state and religion ought to be endorsed. I will introduce three more 
justifications espousing different versions of  Thesis S to try to find the most defensible 
justification for the most tenable thesis.  
Specifically, in Section II, I will first clarify my argumentative purpose and present 
the variations of  the separation of  state and religion. I will also try to show how the 
principle of  secularism can be defended from the perspective of  a comprehensive 
approach and its two subsequent problems (P1& P2). The problem of  reasonable 
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pluralism (P1) fundamentally prompts a political approach to justifying secularism. As a 
result, I will explain the political approach to a public justification in Section III. In 
Section IV, the political justification of  the less controversial part of  secularism, liberty 
of  conscience, will be given. In Section V and VI, I will discuss the two traditional 
solutions to the problem of  determining Thesis S (P2), which are both unsuccessful. 
Specifically, in Section V, I will discuss how liberty of  conscience essentially leads to 
Thesis S1 and Thesis S1’s shortcomings. In Section VI, I will try to present how Thesis S 
is supported as Thesis S2 in the form of  the state neutrality principle and its deficiencies 
as well.   
 
II. Problems Revealed in Comprehensive Justification for Secularism 
 
2.1 Preliminary Demarcations on Justification, Legitimacy and Coercion  
 
My central purpose in this chapter is to provide a public justification for secularism as a 
constitutional principle in democratic regimes. In order to provide a political principle 
with legitimacy or to achieve its public justification, there are generally two approaches. 
One, the comprehensive approach, posits that the principle can be forced upon citizens 
because it is morally true (regardless of  whether citizens accept it). Two, as Rawls 
develops into a project of  political liberalism; we can argue that such a principle can be 
publically endorsed by the majority of  citizens of  a democratic state, which is a political 
approach. I argue that the comprehensive approach is implausible in a democratic regime. 
In a democratic regime, if  citizens cannot agree on or persuade each other that his or her 
comprehensive doctrines are the only true ones, it is unreasonable and wrong to use state 
power to coerce those who have disagreed.5 Instead, we should aim for a publically 
justified basis that is endorsed by a majority of  a state’s citizens for a political principle to 
be applied coercively. Namely, my argumentative goal is to uncover a public justification 
that is politically sound for the legitimacy of  a political principle such as secularism. For a 
political principle such as secularism to be legitimate, its coercion has to be widely 
endorsed by or justified to a majority of  the citizens.  
As my readers probably have already noticed, I have recognized a political 
conception’s legitimacy as what justifies coercive power. Taking legitimacy as what 
justifies the permissible use of  coercive power is not the only interpretation of  legitimacy 
though. There are two other dominant ways of  understanding political legitimacy. One is 
to relate it to moral justification of  a political authority, while the other is to see it as the 
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element that creates political obligations.6 The reasons behind each understanding are 
variously intricate. Nevertheless, for my purpose, I only have to make it clear that, 
although it is not the only way of  interpreting political legitimacy, when I address a 
political principle’s legitimacy I am discussing its justification for permissible coercion.7    
 
2.2 The Principle of  the Separation of  State and Religion: Four Theses   
 
In my view, secularism as a political principle consists of  liberty of  conscience and the 
separation of  state and religion. In defending secularism’s legitimacy, we need to be sure 
of  what kind of  secularism is legitimate, since the principle of  secularism, especially the 
separation of  state and religion, can be understood differently. For example, should the 
separation be understood and applied as a rigid separation, opposed to any mingling of  
the government and religious activities? Or should it be interpreted more mildly, as a 
system in which the government sponsors or supports religious organizations and 
nonreligious organizations on a neutral basis? Should religious reasons be equally 
incorporated into the public justification for a democratic system? Or should they be 
excluded from public justification? I argue that there are four versions of  this principle, 
and all these four variations surround the different interpretations of  “separation”. 
Before unfolding these four interpretations of  this principle, I need to briefly explain the 
limitations and reservations in addressing the concepts of  “state” and “religion” 
respectively.    
   The concept and extension of  “state” are somewhat inclusive and vague. However, it 
is enough for now that we determine the “state” to be the institutional arrangements of  a 
state. The interpretation of  religion is more precarious, and the disagreements about 
what counts as religion are legally significant. It is unlikely that we will find an 
uncontroversial definition of  religion. Nonetheless, the difficulty in defining religion is 
not a fatal problem for understanding what religion is in terms of  the principle. And we 
do not need to undertake a case-by-case study to determine the extension of  religion. 
Reference to “religion” in constitutional documents are understood by most people as 
“pointing to institutionally organized churches or other groups worshipping some form 
of  god” that prescribes practice, rituals, norms, beliefs, and actions.8 Identifying the core 
elements of  “religion” regarding state-religion issues (for instance, “forbidding the 
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Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/legitimacy/>. 
7 Apart from Rawls in PL, this way of  understanding is also taken on by, for instance, Allen 
Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy and Democracy”, in Ethics 112(2002):689-719. Philip Pettit, On the 
People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of  Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 136. 
8 Ronald Dworkin, Religion without God (Harvard University Press, 2013) 107. 
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government to declare any official state religion, supporting one religion or all religions 
through subsidies or other special privileges, permitting legal constraints that assume one 
religion is preferable to others, or stating that religion is preferable to non-religion”) is 
usually possible given our understanding of  uncontroversial cases.9 Robert Audi believes 
it is generally better to extend the application of  the term religion than have too 
restrictive a definition.10 Nevertheless, two negative demarcations should be drawn and 
their pertinence in constitutional cases will be illustrated later. First, “a moral outlook on 
life”, no matter how “reverently held, is not sufficient for its possessor being religious” in 
terms of  this principle.11 Second, holding a view religiously does not imply that the view 
counts as a religion or that the person who holds the view is a religious person.12 For 
instance, as the greatest tennis player of  all time, Roger Federer is often claimed to be 
tennis fans’ “God” or watching him play to be a “religious experience”,13 but no one will 
seriously consider Federer as a “God” or his tennis as a religion, legally speaking. When 
the legal definitions of  “state” and “religion” are done, the major task of  defining the 
principle of  separation can begin.           
Mainly, the principle of  the separation of  state and religion has four interpretations 
in terms of  its scope of  separation. The widest interpretation is simply to understand the 
separation of  state and religion as the non-establishment of  a state religion. As for 
exactly what type of  approach or attitude the state should uphold toward religion or 
religions, or what role religion plays in political life, this broadest non-establishment 
interpretation has no preference. It could be either way. It is exactly why the first 
interpretation is the broadest one, as it only asks for no state religion. The second 
interpretation is less broad than the first interpretation, which understands the separation 
as an attitude of  non-favoring from the state. Namely, for the purpose of  manifesting the 
separation of  state and religion, the state should refrain from adopting any favorable 
position toward any religion. That is to say, the state ought to stay neutral among all 
religions. Being neutral, however, implies two types of  attitudes. One is to unbiasedly 
incorporate religious reason into the public basis of  justification, and the other is to 
exclude it from the public justification. In both cases, the state sustains its neutrality 
among all religions. The last interpretation is the narrowest one. It claims that the 
                                                             
9 Ibid., 106. Although defining religion is always a big problem in the judgment of  freedom of  
religion, as I’ve emphasized in Chapter One, only theistic religions are qualified as “religion” 
legal-wise.  
10 Robert Audi, “The Separation of  Church and State and the Obligations of  Citizenship,” Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 18(1989): 273 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 David Foster Wallace, “Roger Federer as Religious Experience,” New York Times, 20/08/2006. 
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neutrality among all religions is not accurate either. Rather, the separation of  state and 
religion means that the state needs to exclude religious reasons from political affairs. I 
will name the principle of  separation of  state and religion in general Thesis S, while 
naming the broadest interpretation Thesis S1, the neutrality claims Thesis S2, the 
all-inclusive-neutrality principle Thesis S2’, and the narrowest version Thesis S3. All four 
these theses can claim various supportive grounds in judicial decisions and legislation. 
One of  the difficulties of  our task is to make sure which form is the most tenable 
variation of  Thesis S. The forms of  these theses are shown as: 
    Thesis S: There should be a separation of  state and religion. 
The four variations of  Thesis S are listed from the broadest variation to the narrowest 
one as the chart shows:14 
Thesis S2’ 
                                 (Impartial incorporation of  all religions) 
Thesis S2 
               (Neutrality among religions)   Thesis S3 
Thesis S1                      (Exclusion of  religious reasons in public discourse) 
(Non-establishment)       
Thesis S1’ 
                    (No neutrality, just no state religion) 
                    
(Figure 1: Thesis S1, S2, S2’, S3) 
 
Thesis S1: Thesis S is a non-establishment of  state religion principle. 
Thesis S2: Thesis S is the state neutrality among all religions principle. 
Thesis S2’: Thesis S is a principle of  including all comprehensive viewpoints in the public 
debate. 
Thesis S3: Thesis S is a principle excluding religious reasons from the political arena. 
     
2.3 Comprehensive Justifications for Liberty of  Conscience and Thesis S 
 
                                                             
14 Paul Cliteur has discerned five models of  state and religion: (1) political atheism, (2) the secular 
state, (3) the multiculturalist state, (4) state religion and (5) theocracy. See Paul Cliteur, “State and 
Religion against the Backdrop of  Religious Radicalism”, in International Journal of  Constitutional Law, 10 
(2012): 127-52. Political atheism and theocracy both ignore the fact of  reasonable pluralism and 
impose a certain kind of  comprehensive doctrine, therefore they are unreasonable models. While the 
model of  state religion is what my Thesis S1 negates, the debate between the multiculturalist state and 




Before explaining why the approach of  justifying a principle on its moral merits is 
unsuccessful, I will first illustrate how the principle of  secularism, including liberty of  
conscience and Thesis S, can be defended on moral grounds. For example, one of  the 
most common arguments of  defending liberty of  conscience departs from the 
protection of  individual autonomy. And Thesis S is also seen as the reason why such a 
liberty and autonomy is fundamentally warranted.15 
Autonomy conventionally is a substantive ideal of  individuality advanced by Kant 
and Mill’s classical liberalism. As Mill writes in On Liberty, “If  a person possesses any 
tolerable amount of  common sense and experience, his own mode of  laying out his 
existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode.”16 
Mill’s ideal of  autonomy requires us to consider what the supreme value is in our whole 
life based on our own choices and free from authoritative intervention. Apart from Mill’s 
emulation of  autonomy, Kant also considers the principle of  autonomy as one of  the 
moral formulas. According to the formula of  autonomy, we are subject to the moral law 
only because it is the necessary expression of  our own nature as rational agents. “[I]f  a 
rational agent is truly an end in himself, he must be the author of  the laws which he is 
bound to obey, and it is this which gives him his supreme value.”17 And such a Kantian 
interpretation of  autonomy is also active in contemporary philosophical discussions.  
                                                             
15 I need to remark on the precarious philosophical confusion between two concepts, personal 
autonomy and moral autonomy, a little bit. The complex relationship between these two conceptions 
of  autonomy was seen as an unresolved dilemma for liberalism, but I believe that the idea of  
conscience, especially conscience in the Kantian sense, would help us to point a way out of  that 
dilemma.  
   While personal autonomy is conceived in “a morally neutral manner, without specific reference to 
substantive values”, moral autonomy is regarded as taking up “the Kantian mantle of  defining the 
self-governing person as having the capacity to grasp certain objective moral norms.” “The central 
liberal principle that citizens should be allowed to pursue their own conception of  the good involves 
recognition of  personal autonomy insofar as that pursuit is understood to proceed autonomously.” 
Here is where it gets tricky: on the one hand, personally autonomous citizens see their individual 
pursuits of  their conception of  the good as a critical reflection of  their first-order desire; in that way, 
personal autonomy and moral autonomy could not be seen as exactly separate. On the other hand, if  
the autonomy respected in liberal states is moral autonomy, then respect for a deep plurality of  moral 
views threatens an overlapping consensus generated from them. Therefore, Jeremy Waldron argues 
that while we do need a sharp distinction between them, we should not “erect too high a wall of  
separation”. A moderate position is what is called for in this delicate situation.    
John Christman and Joel Anderson, “Introduction” in Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism 
(John Christman and Joel Anderson ed., Cambridge University Press, 2005)17-18. And Jeremy 
Waldron, “Moral Autonomy and Personal Autonomy” in Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, 325. 
16 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (David Bromwich and George Kate ed., Yale University Press, 
2003)131. 
17 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of  The Metaphysic of  Morals (H. J. Paton trans., The Mayflower Press, 
1948) 35.  
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Gerald Dworkin and Harry Frankfurt’s understandings of  autonomy are in line with 
their views of  personhood. Frankfurt claims that humans are not alone in having 
first-order desires and motives, or in making choices (animals have that ability as well); 
however it seems that only humans are able to form a second-order desire.18 That is to 
say, only humans have the capacity to stand back from our inclinations of  the moment to 
conduct reflective self-evaluation to see whether we want to be motivated by our 
first-order desire.19 Autonomy is not just a first-order value; rather; it is considered a 
second-order ability of  people to “reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, 
desires, wishes, and so forth, and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in 
light of  higher-order preferences and values.”20 Simply put, according to Frankfurt and 
Dworkin, what is crucial for the claim of  autonomy is not the identification of  a person’s 
first-order desires, but whether they have the capacity to question their first-order desires. 
That is to say, autonomy is a reflective ideal. The reflective ideal of  autonomy directs us 
to make moral decisions according to our own rational deliberation or will,21 and concurs 
with our exercise of  liberty of  conscience. 
Conscience as the will to be moral is not only a claim about the inner mental state 
of  a person, it is more of  a reflective ethical claim about what is morally right. It is not 
uncommon that many people perceive conscience as an interior psychological issue, 
which would severely undermine the central position of  ethical judgment in a human’s 
development. Moreover, conscience shall be distinguished from personal inclination 
(preference, desire) no matter how strong that is. Conscience is not driven by self-interest, 
and the fact that it is invoked by an individual does not mean that s/he is invoking it 
purely out of  self-interest. “Unlike matters of  mere preferences, the pursuit of  
conscientious commitments is generally more concerned about others or matters 
external to one’s self  than it is about internal or egoistic concerns.”22 Liberty of  
conscience is not based on a desire to protect individuals from far-reaching consequences 
to them against the law. It is a moral right, not a right “in the name of  one’s own interest 
in preserving one’s basic life-style and one’s fundamental plans for the future.”23 In a 
frequently-cited paper “Four Conceptions of  Conscience”, Thomas Hill Jr. argues that 
                                                             
18 See Harry G. Frankfurt, “Freedom of  the Will and the Concept of  a Person,” The Journal of  
Philosophy 68(1971): 6. 
19 Ibid., 7. 
20 See Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of  Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 1988) 20. 
21 See Harry G. Frankfurt, “Freedom of  the Will and the Concept of  a Person,” 11. 
22 Rodney K. Smith, “Converting the Religious Equality Amendment into a Statute with a Little 
‘Conscience’,” Brigham Young University Law Review (1996): 681. 
23 Joseph Raz, “A Right to Dissent? II. Conscientious Objection” in The Authority of  Law: Essays on 
Law and Morality (Oxford University Press, 2009) 277. 
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the core idea of  conscience strikingly resembles autonomy. “The core idea those 
conceptions have in common is, roughly, the idea of  a capacity, commonly attributed to 
most human beings, to sense or immediately discern that what he or she has done, is 
doing, or is about to do is wrong, bad, and worthy of  disapproval.”24 Roughly, to say that 
conscience is the ability to sense or immediately discern is to say that it is a way of  
arriving at the moral beliefs that are relevant to our actions.25 “Following our conscience” 
in a Kantian sense, roughly, is treading carefully when we reflect our first-order moral 
actions. In other words, Kantian conscience is “a reliable guide to live a blameless life and 
certainly not necessarily a guarantee that we will do what is morally correct in every 
instance.”26 For Kant, conscience reacts to two things: “(1) that what we have done is at 
odds with what, even in our own judgment, is wrong in the circumstances and (2) that 
the act is fully imputable to ourselves as free agents.”27 Kant’s conception of  conscience 
is not only that people aim to “make good moral judgments and govern themselves by 
their best moral judgments”, but also that they “follow a moral law that is itself  a 
reflection of  their own autonomous, rational will, not an acceptance of  standards found 
in nature.”28 In short, liberty of  conscience is first and foremost a guarantee of  liberty. 
To be sure, the guarantee is of  liberty of  a specified domain; it is liberty with respect to 
conscientious choices and commitments. No conscientious choices or conceptions of  
the good life are guaranteed—only freedom is guaranteed.  
The problem with this defense of  liberty of  conscience on the basis of  autonomy is 
that autonomy is not uncontroversial, although this reflective level of  autonomy only 
governs the way in which we are to affirm such views. There are two examples that 
illustrate the controversy with regard to autonomy: one stems from Romantic thinkers 
and the other is represented by religious thinking. Romantic thinkers have relentlessly 
argued against a fundamental ground for autonomy in our moral life. They do not take 
the value of  choosing what is best or right for us as lying at the foundation of  morality. 
Thus, they suspect that liberals have overstated the significant place of  autonomy in our 
moral life. They claim that “the ideals of  autonomy and individuality effectively blind us 
to the real merits of  many ways of  life,”29 which might destroy the roots of  morality. For 
Romantic thinkers, there are certain ways of  life, or conceptions of  the good life, that are 
more important to us than autonomy. They help build our goals in moral life, and “shape 
                                                             
24 Thomas E. Hill Jr, “Four Conceptions of  Conscience” in Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian 
Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2002) 278. 
25 Ibid., 278, fn3. 
26 Ibid., 283. 
27 Ibid., 301-302. 
28 Ibid., 308. 
29 Charles Larmore, The Morals of  Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 130. 
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the sense of  value on the basis of  which we make whatever choices we do”.30 The 
importance of  liberty of  conscience for Romantic thinkers is not liberty per se, but the 
kind of  good life that such liberty can promote or lead to.  
Besides Romantic thinkers, many religious believers also argue against the 
assumption of  an autonomous view of  human nature. The prevalent understanding of  
human nature does not suffice to incorporate the view thereof  by religious people, 
thereby affecting the way they employ their autonomy. It is claimed that this standard 
view of  autonomy is “inconsistent in several ways with recurring ideas in Christian 
theology”.31 For one thing, according to Christian theology, human nature is unable to 
“master sinful desires” and to freely decide to do good deeds.32 Or, in contrast with the 
sin-based view of  human nature, “there is an idea of  grace, a kind of  sharing in divine 
life, a power that enables us to control sinful desire, live good lives, and win salvation, 
which is given by God gratuitously.”33 In light of  those two views, individuals do not 
have complete control over choosing the religious option (only God is able to).34 
Consequently, the real freedom would be freedom from sin. Additionally, religious people 
play a central role in formulating laws about free exercise, thus their own view of  human 
nature cannot be easily disregarded.35 
My aim here is not to defend the Romantic ideal or religious believers’ arguments 
against autonomy, but only to illustrate the possibility of  reasonable people with different 
backgrounds arriving at reasonable views. In finding a public justification for secularism, 
including liberty of  conscience and Thesis S, that can be forced upon all citizens, we 
cannot disregard the profound disagreements that reasonable people might have when it 
comes to this justification’s moral grounds.  
 
2.4 Two Subsequent Problems: P1& P2  
 
From these examinations of  those comprehensive grounds for secularism, two obvious 
problems regarding comprehensive justifications have clearly manifested. In order to find 
a public basis for secularism, we aim to make its coercion legitimate to all citizens from 
different backgrounds with different moral and religious convictions. Unfortunately, in a 
democratic regime, there is a permanent fact called reasonable pluralism which makes it 
                                                             
30 Ibid., 129. 
31 John H. Garvey, “An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom,” in Journal of  Contemporary 




35 See ibid., 283.  
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impossible for reasonable citizens to agree on any comprehensive doctrine. Reasonable 
citizens are profoundly divided by their disagreements on comprehensive issues such as 
whether autonomy is desirable, or whether we should strive for utmost happiness for 
most people. As I have explained in the last section, any moral justification for secularism 
is likely to be proved too contentious, and hence we cannot achieve a public justification 
for this principle. I will call the first problem resulting from reasonable pluralism P1.  
The other problem is related to the fact of  reasonable pluralism, although it is a 
separate problem. In defending secularism as liberty of  conscience and Thesis S, we find 
that Thesis S is a precarious political principle which is subject to four interpretations. 
Various values and justifications espousing Thesis S tend to lead to differing theses, and 
due to these disagreements we cannot be sure which form of  Thesis S is the most 
tenable thesis. In fundamental respects, Thesis S supports liberty of  conscience. A 
constitutional democratic government refrains from promoting religious truth or 
bolstering any particular religious denomination and its theological positions. The 
separation of  state and religion serves to promote the liberty of  conscience of  
individuals by removing the government from individuals’ choices of  which religion to 
practice.  
By not establishing any state religion, the government cannot demand that anyone 
engage in religious practice, subscribe to a religious creed or financially contribute to any 
religion. To demand that other people act according to established religious beliefs is to 
“promote or impose those beliefs”,36 which is against the basic political value of  liberty 
of  conscience. “Nor can the government make eligibility for civil benefits conditional on 
someone’s having or expressing particular religious views.”37 The political rights of  
citizens do not and should not attach to their religious affiliations, and so it is the case 
with religious leaders, they do not exercise civil authority by virtue of  their religious 
positions. Even “though the religious beliefs themselves are not being directly imposed, 
requiring other people to live their lives as the beliefs prescribe is to impose the practical 
consequences of  the beliefs.”38 For most people, forced exposure to another religion 
would violate their liberty of  conscience. Such a compulsion both denies liberty of  
conscience and amounts to establishment of  the favored practice or creed. For example, 
if  students in state schools are required or pressured into participating in rituals of  an 
established religion, it constitutes a violation of  their liberty of  conscience. “When the 
acts that the law forbids cause no ascertainable harm, this kind of  imposition should be 
                                                             
36 Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (Oxford University Press, 1988) 247. 
37 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution I: Free Exercise and Fairness (Princeton University Press, 
2006) 35. 
38 Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice, 247. 
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regarded as amounting to their establishment in a constitutional sense.”39  
Apart from being a means to protect liberty of  conscience, there could be several 
other interrelated values lying behind Thesis S. However, multiple moral values lead to 
endorsing different variations of  Thesis S, and it is not clear which form of  Thesis S, 
Thesis S1, Thesis S2, S2’, S3, is best supported by those values. For instance, the 
individualistic value of  autonomy offers a valid justification of  Thesis S2, namely the 
state should not promote any controversial view of  the good life at the expense of  others. 
The treatment of  citizens in a liberal state will not take into account their status, 
preference and their comprehensive doctrines. The state ought to refrain from favoring 
any comprehensive doctrine, including any religious doctrines.  
Furthermore, Kent Greenawalt lists some major comprehensive views that 
legislators and judges need to take into account, such as  
 
“[T]he withdrawal of  civil government from an area in which it is markedly 
incompetent, the removal of  one source of  corruption of  religion and 
deflection from religious missions, the removal of  one source of  corruption of  
government, the prevention of  unhealthy mingling of  government and religion, 
the avoidance of  political conflict along religious lines that could threaten social 
stability, and the promotion of  a sense of  equal dignity among citizens and so 
on.”40  
 
These views tend to end up supporting different versions of  Thesis S. Greenawalt points 
out that for governments which lack special competence in religious issues, although they 
cannot therefore establish a state religion, they would be constantly tempted to favor 
those religions that support their agendas or are likely to win them the next election.41 
This is an instance of  support for Thesis S1. However, “the prevention of  unhealthy 
mingling of  government and religion”42 may induce an endorsement directly for Thesis 
S3. In a modern society, “if  public officials become heavily involved in the review and 
supervision of  religions,” or if  religious power takes control in political decisions, there 
would be substantial risks of  such a severe interference.43 As for the promotion of  a 
sense of  equal dignity among citizens, Thesis S is also likely to be interpreted differently 
than Thesis S1, S2, S2’ or S3, as the nature of  equality is addressed differently. 
                                                             
39 Ibid. 
40 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution II: Establishment and Fairness (Princeton University Press, 
2009) 6-7. 
41 See ibid., 10. 
42 Ibid., 6. 
43 Ibid., 11. 
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Therefore, defending secularism as a political conception does not suffice to point 
out whether we ought to uphold Thesis S1, S2, S2’, or S3. I will call the problem of  the 
indeterminacy of  Thesis S P2. Further justifications for the principle are to be 
incorporated, and hence a clear exploration of  those additional justifications is needed.  
To sum up, P1 has encouraged us to forsake the comprehensive justificatory 
approach of  defending secularism and to consider the political approach instead. 
However, a mere turn to the political approach still is not sufficient to solve P2. What is 
more, a plausible resolution to P2 also fully completes our answer to P1. Therefore, to 
reach my argumentative goal in this chapter, I will need a tenable solution to both P1 and 
P2.          
 
III. A Political Approach to Publically Justifying Political Conceptions: The Solution to 
P1 
  
3.1 Reasonable Pluralism: We Agree, to Disagree 
 
The concept of  reasonable pluralism is introduced by John Rawls in Political Liberalism. 
According to Rawls’s characterization, reasonable pluralism refers to “a pluralism of  
incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines”44 in a modern democratic society. 
It is also a defining feature of  our democratic society. By comprehensive doctrines or 
comprehensive views, it means “views on certain fundamental questions such as the 
meaning and importance of  human life, the kinds of  freedom that human beings should 
strive for and are capable of, and the kind of  life that is best for human beings to live.”45 
For instance, Christianity, Kantian ethics, utilitarianism, quietism and so on are all 
comprehensive doctrines endorsing different views in those matters, such as whether the 
fundamental meaning of  human life is to act according to God’s will or act morally, and 
whether a deliberated life is the best life we could live. The fact of  reasonable pluralism 
denotes that it is unrealistic to expect every reasonable citizen in a democratic regime to 
agree upon a conception of  justice consistent with every one’s comprehensive doctrines. 
Moreover, we understand that “a plurality of  reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive 
doctrines is the normal result of  the exercise of  human reason within the framework of  
the free institutions of  a constitutional democratic regime.”46 By realizing the normal 
outcome of  human reason, we as reasonable persons, have at least arrived at one minimal 
                                                             
44 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xviii. 
45 T.M. Scanlon, “Rawls on Justification,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Samuel Freeman ed., 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 159.  
46 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xviii. 
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consensus: we agree, to disagree. Rawls points out that the fact of  reasonable pluralism is 
not mere historical condition, but “a permanent feature of  the public culture of  
democracy.”47 
The key to understanding the term “reasonable pluralism” is to distinguish it from 
an old doctrine of  pluralism as such. The plain “pluralism” is “what Isaiah Berlin has so 
memorably described” as the simple fact that people have different conceptions of  
values.48 In contrast with monism, pluralism is precisely an account of  the nature of  the 
good, according to which there are many kinds of  objective values in the world.49 The 
idea of  reasonable pluralism “lies at a different, more reflective level than pluralism.”50 
Reasonable pluralism is the idea that reasonable people tend to disagree with each other 
about comprehensive religious, moral and metaphysical doctrines, precisely by virtue of  
exercising their human reason to their best abilities.51 Charles Larmore points out that 
reasonable pluralism, unlike value pluralism in Berlin’s sense, does not involve a claim 
about the nature of  value, but is a claim about the nature of  human judgment by reason. 
“It responds to the religious and metaphysical disenchantment of  the world, not by 
affirming it, as pluralism seems to do, but rather by recognizing that like other deep 
conceptions of  value, this disenchantment is an idea about which reasonable people are 
likely to disagree, as indeed they do.”52 Larmore emphasizes the distinctive feature of  
reasonable pluralism in a recent paper, “the expectation of  reasonable disagreement in 
regard to moral questions is not itself  a moral doctrine but instead a conception of  
reason’s capacities for dealing with these questions.”53 That is to say, reasonable pluralism 
is an understanding or a realization of  the impossibility that humans all agree with each 
other in terms of  comprehensive doctrines. Such an understanding or a realization of  
this impossibility is the starting point of  the political approach to secularism. Before 
further explaining why reasonable pluralism is where we start a political approach to 
secularism, I should present what accounts for reasonable pluralism. 
Rawls introduced a concept called “the burdens of  judgment” to illustrate the 
sources of  reasonable pluralism. He listed six obvious sources to account for reasonable 
pluralism, covering a wider span than the domain of  practical thinking, some of  which 
                                                             
47 Ibid., 36. 
48 Charles Larmore, “Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement,” Social Philosophy and Policy 11(1994): 
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49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid., 74. 
51 See Charles Larmore, “Political Liberalism: Its Motivation and Goals,” in Oxford Studies in Political 
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also apply to theoretical reasoning.54 These sources are: one, the evidence is “conflicting 
and complex”, which makes it “hard to assess and evaluate”; two, even if  we could agree 
on the content of  the considerations taken into account, “we may still disagree about 
their weight”; three, moral and political concepts are vague and may be subject to stark 
disagreements in hard cases; four, to some extent, the way we assess moral values is 
“shaped by our total experience”, which is bound to differ among reasonable people; five, 
different “normative considerations of  different forces on both sides of  an issue” cause 
great difficulty in making an overall assessment; six, in selecting among our cherished 
values, it is very difficult to set priorities.55 Admittedly, these six sources do not include all 
possibilities; they are likely to be agreed on as the predominant cores of  our reasonable 
disagreements.56 What is noteworthy in these sources accounting for reasonable pluralism 
is that we have excluded “prejudice and bias, ignorance and blindness, self-interest,”57 
rivalries for power and so on. These exclusions do not mean that those elements do not 
play any role in moral and political life. Rather, by excluding these from the burdens of  
judgments, what Rawls emphasized is that not all of  our differences are rooted in these 
elements, which stand in sharp contrast to everyone being reasonable. Reasonable 
pluralism is precisely what we achieve inevitably, with full powers of  reason, after 
sufficient discussion. What divides us from each other is so deeply rooted and 
irreconcilable that we, as reasonable people, just have to accept it. 
These burdens of  judgment that Rawls has described may seem inapplicable to 
religious disagreements. After all, religious disagreements are about what we believe and 
what we do not. A Christian, a Muslim, and an atheist certainly differ with one another 
when it comes to religious matters, and such a divergence is to a large extent about faith, 
but it has nothing to do with reason or fact. It triggers the wonder that religious believers 
from different religions, even religious believers from the same religion but from 
different sects, and possibly even atheists recognize that the disagreements about their 
religious convictions are inevitable and acceptable as well. In my opinion, reasonable 
pluralism also applies to religious disagreements. The sources Rawls listed, including 
diverse interpretations of  certain concepts, differing weights for the same consideration, 
and personal experience also play a part in the shaping of  a person’s religious belief. As 
long as a person is being reasonable, the fact of  reasonable pluralism of  religious matters 
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is also acknowledgeable. 
 
3.2 A Political Approach to Public Justifications  
 
Recall that I said there are two general approaches to justify a political conception’s 
public justification at the outset: one is to justify its moral correctness, and the other is to 
show it can be publically agreed on by a majority of  the citizens. Likewise, the 
conception of  secularism can be presented either by starting from within a general and 
comprehensive doctrine, or from “fundamental ideas regarded as latent in the public 
culture”58, which “comprises the political institutions of  a constitutional regime and the 
public traditions of  their interpretation.”59  
Given the fact of  reasonable pluralism, reasonable persons do not all affirm the 
same comprehensive doctrine, such as autonomy, or the good of  some particular or all 
religions. Moreover, in a constitutional democratic regime, our own doctrines in general 
have no special claims on others who hold different reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 
One of  the distinguishing features of  a political conception is its coerciveness, and 
political power is always coercive power backed by a government’s use of  sanctions. The 
only way to overcome these kinds of  disagreements in a constitutional regime is by 
oppressive political power.60 In a democratic regime, if  citizens cannot agree with or 
persuade others that their comprehensive doctrine is the only true one, it is unreasonable 
and wrong to use state power to punish those who have disagreed.61 That is why it is 
unreasonable for those who possess political power to repress those different 
comprehensive reasonable views, if  there is not a public basis of  justification that applies 
to all. Therefore, I believe that the first approach has already lost its attractiveness, and 
we need to find answers from the latter approach. For the purpose of  revealing the 
legitimacy of  the principle of  secularism, our awareness of  reasonable pluralism 
therefore directs us to avoid longstanding philosophical, religious, and moral 
disagreements. Once we accept the fact that, in a democratic regime, reasonable people 
tend to disagree with each other with regard to their comprehensive doctrines, it is clear 
that no moral foundation is sufficiently agreed upon as a public basis of  justification for 
political conceptions on fundamental political matters.  
Instead, it is best for us to step away from the discussions of  comprehensive 
doctrines, to look for an adequate political conception that is acceptable to citizens with 
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divergent religious and moral beliefs. The public justification of  secularism can only be 
found in the public political culture of  a constitutional democratic regime. The 
conception of  secularism ought to be able to provide a publicly recognized point of  view 
from which all reasonable citizens can openly examine, on the same basis, whether their 
political and social institutions are just. Public justification in this sense is not regarded as 
“valid argument from valid premises” 62 , but as addressed to other citizens in a 
democratic society that features reasonable pluralism. For this reason, public justification 
must proceed from some consensus that is acceptable to us “for the purpose of  reaching 
agreement on the fundamental aspects of  political questions.”63 In this sense, the public 
justification we aim to reach for secularism ought to be political. It follows that the 
conception of  secularism consists of  liberty of  conscience, and Thesis S, affirmed in a 
constitutional democratic society, therefore must be a conception whose justification is 
limited to the domain of  the political. And this limitation perfectly represents the 
freestanding or the independent characteristic of  a political view. By remaining 
independent, the justification of  a political conception can be spared from referring to 
one or more comprehensive doctrines. The freestanding characteristic of  political 
conceptions also calls for a clear distinction between how a political conception is 
presented and its being part of  a comprehensive doctrine. Nevertheless, we still need to 
keep in mind that a political conception is still a moral conception worked out for a 
constitutional democratic society’s “basic structures”, i.e., its main political, social, and 
economic institutions, 64  and “how they fit together into one system of  social 
cooperation.”65 The importance of  the political turn of  justifying secularism is embodied 
by the distinctiveness of  the question of  “what can be legitimately enforced” from the 
question of  “what is morally just”. It is perfectly consistent for secularism that we may, 
on the one hand, uphold our own religious doctrines as ultimately good and true, and on 
the other hand agree that it is unreasonable to use state power to enforce our religious 
doctrines.    
To briefly summarize, reasonable pluralism is not a problem or burden as such, 
rather, it is a fact of  the extent of  human reason. Nevertheless, such a fact reminds us of  
the impossibility of  persuading all citizens to agree on the same comprehensive doctrine. 
The realization of  such a fact induces us to not defend secularism as a true or morally 
correct principle, but as a political conception that can be endorsed by the majority 
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citizens in a democratic regime.  
 
IV. Liberty of  Conscience Justified as a Political Doctrine 
   
4.1 Liberty of  Conscience Justified as a Political Doctrine 
 
Given the democratic feature of  reasonable pluralism, it is certainly impossible to 
generate wide political agreement between free and equal citizens on the basis of  such 
questions as: Which religion is the wisest or the best? What religious truth is the only 
truth? Or is atheism the only truth? And so on. Our purpose here is also to look for the 
most reasonable political conception of  secularism, with the principles and values all free 
and equal citizens from different religious backgrounds can endorse. 
   It is assumed that all reasonable citizens in a well-ordered society have two views: “a 
comprehensive and a political view; and that our overall view can be divided into these 
two parts.”66 Political liberalism tries to work out a family of  political conceptions of  
justice solely in political values, as a freestanding view that can be justified pro tanto, which 
means that it can be justified without referring to or in accordance with the existing 
comprehensive doctrines.67 It is left to citizens to settle individually how they think of  the 
connection between the values of  the political domain and other values in their 
comprehensive doctrine. That is how the political approach of  liberalism arises, that “the 
appeal is rather to the political value of  a public life conducted on terms that all 
reasonable citizens can accept.”68 Such an approach leads to the idea that it is only by 
affirming a political and not a metaphysical conception that citizens “generally can expect 
to find principles that all can accept”69, which leaves room for citizens’ own conscience 
or reflection on their comprehensive doctrines. It is thus clear that citizens do not need 
to deny the deeper aspects of  their reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The question of  
how to settle the interplay between the values of  the political domain and the 
comprehensive religious doctrines, namely whether the full justification of  a political 
principle could be carried out by an individual citizen, is also part of  the content of  
liberty of  conscience. Therefore, the liberty of  conscience, citizens’ liberty in holding 
diverse comprehensive religious views, is not an act of  free choice based on autonomy or 
individuality; rather, “as free and equal citizens, whether we affirm these views is 
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regarded as within our political competence specified by basic constitutional rights and 
liberties.”70 As demonstrated by the burdens of  judgment, differing comprehensive 
doctrines can reasonably be argued and defended from different standpoints, and 
therefore diversity arises. It is impossible to expect a comprehensive religious or moral 
doctrine to serve as the basis of  lasting and reasoned political agreement in a free society.  
Although liberty of  conscience is a highly liberal idea which might be associated 
with Kant’s or Mill’s liberalism, upholding liberty of  conscience does not have to invoke 
any comprehensive doctrines as its value foundation. A well-ordered society of  political 
liberalism ought to be able to establish the circumstance honoring the value of  liberty of  
conscience, namely, allowing a just basic structure within which all reasonable 
comprehensive views could be fairly maintained. Political liberalism is not biased toward 
any comprehensive conceptions, unless those conceptions in our social and political 
institutions cannot serve as a fair background condition for competing diverse 
“conceptions of  the good to be affirmed and pursued”.71 Under the framework of  
political liberalism, the encouragement or discouragement of  comprehensive doctrines 
depends upon either whether these comprehensive doctrines are “in direct conflict with 
the principles of  justice”, or whether these comprehensive doctrines can engender 
sufficient agreements “under the political and social conditions of  a just constitutional 
regime”.72 Suppose that, in order to sustain the political value of  mutual toleration of  
religions, a constitutional regime has to take measures to discourage various kinds of  
religions, it does not thereby support other religions or any other particular religion. 
Rather, it is important for us to distinguish “taking reasonable measures to strengthen the 
forms of  thought and feeling that sustain fair social cooperation between its free and 
equal citizens”, from the state’s “advancing a particular comprehensive doctrine in its 
own name”.73  
 
4.2 Liberty of  Conscience and Freedom of  Religion 
 
I believe my readers must have already noticed that in this chapter I refer to liberty of  
conscience instead of  religious freedom. Does the concept of  conscience cover a 
broader scope than religion? A full examination of  this issue would require a much more 
extensive examination than I can produce here in this chapter. Nevertheless, I will say 
that referring to “liberty of  conscience” is not just a semantic preference but is because 
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conscience has a wider scope and a more solid justification than religion.  
With respect to conscience’s wider scope than religion, it could be objected that while 
almost all the international or national constitutional documents have confirmed the 
principle of  freedom of  religion, not all of  them have given the same recognition to 
liberty of  conscience. Some theorists argue that religion, compared to the much vaguer 
and looser concept of  conscience, has enjoyed an ethically and legally superior position, 
which has inevitably earned it more legal protection. Generally, their strategy relies on a 
contentious claim that religion is fundamentally good, either drawn from the perspective 
of  religious truth or on basis of  past judicial decisions that favored religion.74 However, 
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favored religion. Andrew Koppelman claims that the constitutional protection of  religious convictions 
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religious protection and religious privilege are logically continuous. If  deep commitments, like 
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support special treatment of  religion per se. Koppelman argues that being protected entails being 
protected from discrimination, and that it also implies a relative privileged position compared to other 
convictions that are not being protected. For example, two adults, A and B, are entitled to vote, while 
infant C is not, thus the two adults are privileged relative to the infant. Suppose someone proposes to 
deny adult A the right to vote based on his race or gender, which constitutes discrimination, thus A 
should be protected from such a rule because such a rule treats him/her as an infant. Granting the 
right to vote to both A and B protects both from discrimination by the other, but it also privileges C. 
See Andrew Koppelman, “Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?” University of  Illinois Law 
Review 3(2006): 572, 581-582. 
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although the Supreme Court (of  the U.S.) has given religious convictions and practices 
exemptions several times, there is not enough evidence to conclude that religion is 
ethically or legally superior to other convictions or conscience in general. These decisions 
merely illuminate the U.S’s constitutional warrant of  free exercise instead of  evaluating 
whether it is superior or not. And more importantly, as I have argued, whether religion 
itself  is good, or whether holding such a comprehensive conception of  morality is 
beyond reasonable people’s scope of  agreement.  
Actually, according to two famous judicial decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
U.S. has already broadened the protection of  religious liberty in its first amendment to a 
wider realm of  conscience. In the case United States v. Seeger (1964), even though the draft 
resister Daniel Andrew Seeger was agnostic about the existence of  God, he called his 
views “religious” by referring to Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza. The Supreme Court 
supported a broad interpretation of  religious belief  that  
 
“[T]he test of  belief  in a relation to a Supreme Being is whether a given belief  
that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of  its possessor 
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief  in God of  one who clearly qualifies 
for the exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of  
their respective holders we cannot say that one is in a relation to a Supreme 
Being and the other is not.”75  
 
The Seeger case was not a unique instance in American constitutional history; a similar 
case, Welsh v. United States (1970), appeared in front of  the Supreme Court six years later. 
While Seeger succeeded in his case by citing doctrines of  Paul Tillich and ethical culture 
as guidance, Welsh explicitly denied that his beliefs were religious in any ordinary sense.76 
Instead, Welsh argued that the duty not to kill another human being is not superior to 
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human relations but rather essential to all human relations, and he based his opposition 
to participation in war on readings in the fields of  history and sociology. The majority 
opinion finally ruled to extending the approach in the Seeger case; it declared that Welsh 
counted as “religious”, as his conscience was initiated by deeply “moral, ethical, or 
religious beliefs, which gave him no rest or peace if  he allowed himself  to become a part 
of  an instrument of  war.” 77  Although the Supreme Court adopted an extensive 
interpretation of  “religious belief ” in the first amendment to support Seeger and Welsh, 
still, I believe these rulings have clearly shown how the Supreme Court has extended its 
explicit religious exemption to conscientious exemption. Just like I suggested about the 
limitation of  using the concept of  “religion” in section 2.2, as  quoted before, “a moral 
outlook on life”, no matter how “reverently held, is not sufficient for its possessor’s 
being religious in the sense relevant to the separation of  church and state”.78 It is either 
an incongruent interpretation of  “religion” in the clause of  non-establishment and free 
exercise in the first amendment, or the court opts for a broader accommodation of  
liberty of  conscience. Besides, religion is not tantamount to any coherent set of  ideals 
central to one’s life. We need to distinguish between “holding a world view religiously and 
holding a religious view,” and one who holds a worldview religiously is not a religious 
person.79 Moreover, the Welsh case disconnects moral authority from religion in the 
sense that a person need not be religious to hold committed moral concerns. Therefore, 
liberty of  conscience has more moral substance than the claim of  religious freedom too.  
After all, as I have argued in section of  4.1, liberty of  conscience is one of  the 
grounding political values of  a constitutional democratic regime that we all can share, 
which includes the liberty to hold any comprehensive views, including religious beliefs, as 
we deem best. The recognition of  the liberty to harbor any view at all comes before the 
realization of  a specific freedom in the realm of  religious views. Therefore, liberty of  
conscience also occupies a more reflective level than religious liberty.    
 
V. A Political Defense of  Thesis S1: Separation as Non-Establishment  
 
5.1 Separation as Non-establishment as the Necessary Upshot of  Liberty of  Conscience 
 
As I have stated in section 2.3, once the political principle of  liberty of  conscience is 
settled, the requirement of  no state-established religion as a measure to secure it naturally 
follows. The separation of  state and religion, manifesting a no state-religion 
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constitutional mechanism is the necessary upshot of  a state verifying liberty of  
conscience. An absence of  establishment entails that no particular religion is recognized 
by the government as official for its citizens or receives official financial support from 
citizens’ taxes. Non-establishment promotes liberty of  conscience by preventing the 
government from getting in the way of  individuals’ own choices about their religious 
belief  and practice. An established religion or ideology which confirms the value of  
certain comprehensive doctrines would be an outspoken denial of  its citizens’ liberty of  
conscience. That is also why the clauses of  non-establishment and free exercise (of  
religious liberty) go hand in hand in the first amendment of  the U.S. constitution despite 
their deeper conflict, which I will come back to at the end of  this section.   
Liberty of  conscience and the separation of  state and religion not only protect 
individuals’ basic rights; they also protect churches from coming under the control of  the 
government and other powerful institutions. 80 For instance, those who no longer 
recognize a church’s authority are not the church’s members, and this change would not 
be recognized as a criminal act, since “apostasy and heresy are not legal offenses.”81 This 
is an example of  how liberty of  conscience protects individuals against the church 
generally. The separation of  church and state can work as a mutual protection for both 
church and state. It allows all religious groups to worship and order their affairs 
autonomously. As Rawls indicates, “It protects religion from the state and the state from 
religion; it protects citizens from their churches and citizens from one another.”82 
Although an established church has a predominant advantage over other churches, 
members of  the official church are also vulnerable to losing their liberty. If  religion is 
essentially not the business of  a civil government, it would still be a violation of  liberty 
of  conscience if  political officials exercising state power control or influence religion. 
Rawls takes “the vitality and wide acceptance of  religion in America” as having benefited 
from the fact that the various religions in America have been protected by the separation 
of  state and religion.83 None of  the religions have been able to “determinate and 
suppress the other religions by the capture and use of  state power.”84 
Apart from being the necessary prerequisite for liberty of  conscience, the 
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separation of  state and religion as non-state religion (Thesis S1) can be widely supported 
by a family of  political values that undergird liberal democratic regimes. A liberal 
democratic regime is organized by a set of  fundamental constitutional principles which 
are acceptable and can be endorsed by every reasonable citizen. An established religion is 
a representative of  an official, recognized superior comprehensive doctrine, which 
disadvantages those citizens whose belief  conflicts with the established religion. 
 
5.2 Non-Establishment: De Jure and De Facto  
 
The constitutional scheme of  non-establishment is so elusive in some states, however, 
that it is inconsistent de jure and de facto, due to historical and cultural reasons. For 
example, the UK and some Scandinavia countries (Denmark, Sweden) have an 
established church in their constitutions, and the members of  their royal families also 
belong to that church. However, their politics in reality are not so much affected by an 
established church, and their citizens’ liberty of  conscience is also protected and 
respected. States like the U.S. and some European countries with Catholic traditions are 
now free from an established church, although they also give forms of  recognition to the 
churches. One crucial feature of  U.S. society is that it has a long and positive experience 
of  integration through religious identities. In the early U.S., religious faith could be 
re-established in two ways. The first involved the presence of  God at the level of  the 
whole society as the author of  a design which defines the political identity of  this society. 
The second consists in free churches, which are “set up as instruments of  mutual help 
whereby individuals are brought in contact with the word of  God and mutually 
strengthen each other in ordering their lives along Godly lines.” 85 The entangled 
relationship between religion and society continues to today as well. For example, U.S. 
presidents have to swear on the Bible at their inaugurations. During trials, witnesses also 
have to hold the Bible and swear to it that they are telling “the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth”. Not to mention the big engravings of  the phrase “In God We 
Trust” in every court room. Those are simply institutional examples of  how much 
homage a non-establishment country paid to religions (Christianity mostly), while there 
are more vivid examples showing the prominent place of  religion in ordinary people’s 
views of  political figures and their own daily life.  
For the imbalance of  the de jure and de facto of  non-establishment, it is not accurate 
to conclude that those states with an established church are not secular, whilst it is also 
difficult to define states like the U.S. as perfectly secular. Although the UK never had a 
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constitution written down like those of  the U.S. or Germany, or any other statutory law 
country, we surely cannot claim the UK does not have a constitution or does not value it. 
By the same token, some contemporary democratic states still adopt a state church 
system, but it is plain that their state church models are very much mitigated systems of  
establishment, so that the maintenance of  a state church is more a symbol of  tradition or 
culture, symbolizing nothing of  political legitimacy. From that perspective, a lack of  the 
separation of  church and state de jure does not necessarily prevent a state from being 
secular. On the other hand, despite the pervasive influence of  religion in states like the 
U.S. and some southern European countries, de facto, the separation of  church and state 
exists and is upheld in a fundamental position in their political systems.  
 
5.3 The Over-Inconclusiveness of  Separation as Non-establishment 
 
Aside from the gap between de jure and de facto when it comes to Separation as 
Non-Establishment in many political systems, there is another, more serious issue with 
regard to Separation as Non-Establishment. It is a relatively general and unspecific 
principle which cannot give conclusive guidance in hard cases. It is clear that the core of  
not having an established religion as a means of  realizing liberty of  conscience entails 
that no particular religion enjoys official government status. For instance, religious 
groups must handle their own affairs, governmental financial support should not be 
involved, the government cannot establish or defend particular religious doctrines, and so 
on. However, since even the act of  governments granting special accommodations or 
exemptions to religious claimants may seem to establish religion over non-religion, or to 
establish favored religions over those who are not favored, the matter of  how to interpret 
the separation of  state and religion is rather precarious. As previously mentioned, in the 
U.S. Constitution, the non-establishment clause facilitates the free exercise clause 
fundamentally, whereas there is also strong tension between those two constitutional 
principles. I believe that their tension derives from their generality as constitutional 
principles together with their parallel positions in the constitution, both being highest 
rights. A more robust interpretation of  the non-establishment clause is argued to be an 
impairment of  free exercise, while granted religious exemptions will challenge the 
specific content and extent of  non-establishment. There is no clear boundary or 
traceable guidelines for their implementations in judicial decisions so far.   
For instance, the landmark case of  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby86(2014) shows firm 
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support for the free exercise clause on a whole new level. In 2010, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which requires for-profit health insurance 
companies to cover certain kinds of  preventive care for women, including all twenty 
FDA (Food and Drug Administration)-approved contraceptives (sixteen of  which are 
contraceptives and four of  which can act to induce abortions) in their employer-based 
health plans. In September 2012, on the basis of  another federal law, the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Free Exercise Clause of  the First Amendment 
in the U.S. Constitution, Hobby Lobby filed a suit against the U.S. department of  Health 
and Human Services (HHS) requesting a preliminary injunction against the enforcement 
of  the part of  the law that forced employers to provide the four contraceptive drugs that 
lead to abortion. After a denial by the Oklahoma District Court and an overruling by the 
Tenth Circuit, in June 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court extended religious exemptions to the 
for-profit company for the first time. Moreover, recently, as a reaction to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of  nationwide same-sex marriage in June 2015, 
legislators in several (southern) U.S. states have proposed pieces of  legislation to offer 
exemptions to a variety of  occupations where religious citizens who are uncomfortable 
with serving same-sex couples’ weddings. The question here is that it is not decided (by 
the Supreme Court) whether these bills strengthen the protection guaranteed by the free 
exercise clause in the first amendment of  the U.S. constitution, or violate the first 
amendment’s establishment clause.87 
   To sum up, given the fact of  reasonable pluralism, the principle of  liberty of  
conscience is a derivative from the political justification of  liberalism. Reasonable 
persons therefore endorse the political value of  liberty of  conscience and freedom of  
thought, which “takes the truths of  religion off  the political agenda” 88 , as it is 
unreasonable for us to use political power to repress other comprehensive views just 
because they are different from ours, provided that they are also reasonable. In 
fundamental respects, Thesis S (the separation of  state and religion) helps guarantee the 
liberty of  conscience. However, understanding secularism simply as non-establishment 
(along with liberty of  conscience) is too wide and general. It cannot illustrate whether 
secularism as non-establishment should be further interpreted in more detail and 
concrete forms, and which form of  Thesis S is the one we ought to defend exactly. 
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Besides, lacking a more concrete form or additional designations, the implementation of  
non-establishment, suffering from the unevenness of  its de jure and de facto manifestations, 
can be largely equivocal in many democratic regimes. In order to solve P2, the problem 
of  the indeterminacy of  Thesis S, in addition to adopting the political approach, more 
specific forms to supplement the relatively general political approach of  Thesis S1 need 
to be taken into consideration. 
 
VI. In Support of  Separation as Neutral Treatment of  all Religions?  
 
Due to the impossibility of  achieving agreement on comprehensive doctrines, many 
political liberals believe that a political conception’s legitimacy can only be defended on 
grounds that are neutral between comprehensive doctrines. A liberal democratic state 
should demand neutrality in its relation to different religions, and also between those 
who embrace religious beliefs and those who do not. In other words, a state ought to be 
neutral with regard to different comprehensive doctrines, including religious ones. Hence, 
the indeterminacy problem of  Thesis S could be understood or investigated under a 
bigger framework of  liberal neutrality with respect to comprehensive doctrines of  
citizens in democratic societies. In this section, I shall consider whether interpreting the 
separation of  state and religion as the state neutrality principle is desirable. 
 
 6.1 Confronting P1: Thesis S2 as the State Neutrality Principle 
 
According to the Rawlsian political approach we just turned to, a political conception of  
justice is independent of  any particular comprehensive doctrine. Therefore, it is possible 
for a society to be governed by liberal neutrality in the sense that its basic structures are 
not designed or sustained to move toward any particular comprehensive doctrine, 
including any particular religious doctrines. Thesis S interpreted in this manner is to be 
understood as the form of  Thesis S2, a neutral attitude toward all religions and between 
religion and non-religion. Rawls is not alone in the sense that some political liberals’ 
advocacy of  the neutrality principle also rest on the recognition of  P1, the problem of  
reasonable pluralism. They consider the neutrality principle as what is required by the 
goal of  public justification under the constraint of  the fact of  reasonable pluralism.  
   Bruce Ackerman claims that the essence of  liberalism is to deny anyone the moral 
privilege to settle the problem of  reasonable pluralism, namely, to declare that they have 
the authority to define the only truth.89 Convincing others of  our own belief  of  
                                                             
89 See Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (Yale University Press, 1980) 10. 
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liberalism as truth is to make liberalism a hostage to a particular metaphysical system. 
Therefore, liberalism does not and does not have to depend on the truth of  any single 
metaphysical or epistemological system. 90  Rather, liberalism’s “ultimate justification 
locates at its strategic location in a web of  talk that converges upon it from every 
direction.”91 Ackerman’s core argument is that, if  the power holder or the state asserts 
“his conception of  the good is better than that asserted by any of  his fellow citizens, or 
regardless of  his conception of  the good, he is intrinsically superior to one or many of  
his fellow citizens,” then its power structure is illegitimate.92 In other words, if  the state 
does not hold to the neutrality principle in terms of  conceptions of  the good, then it is 
not a legitimate state.  
Likewise, Charles Larmore regards the neutrality principle as a morally minimal 
solution to the problem of  reasonable pluralism.93 By “morally minimal”, he means that 
neutrality “serves as a common ground” that is acceptable by all citizens and not that 
those who affirm it will easily live up to it.94 He reckons that this problem calls for the 
recasting of  liberal theory, marking the renovation of  a familiar 17th century idea of  
political liberalism, which could be traced back to Locke’s toleration.95 It was an idea 
generated as a result of  reasonable disagreements about what the true religion is.96 
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civil goods. “All the right and authority of  the civil power is confined and restricted to the protection 
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salvation of  souls…The civil power should not use the civil law to prescribe articles of  faith (or 
doctrines) or the manner in which one should worship God.” Nor can the civil power use law, force, 
and penalties to enforce any religion on its citizens, as only the citizens themselves can decide whether 
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Larmore shares Locke’s vision in terms of  the goal of  political liberalism: that it does not 
express any comprehensive aspirations about values, but is “an appropriate response to 
the problems of  reasonable pluralism”.97 Similarly, in a modern democratic society in 
which citizens subscribe to many different conceptions of  the good, the state cannot 
justify its coercive power by attaching itself  to the ideals of  any particular group, but can 
only defend its coercion on grounds that are neutral between them. It follows that a 
liberal state shall refrain from forcing its citizens to accept any particular conception of  
the good, or to force them to affirm the superiority of  certain conceptions of  the good 
to others. In other words, a liberal state ought to stay neutral among differing 
conceptions of  the good that its citizens uphold. 
 
6.2 The Deficiencies of  Taking Thesis S as Thesis S2  
 
Confronting the permanent fact that citizens cannot agree on a conception of  the good 
life, the neutrality principle appears as a promising candidate to solve P2. And I will 
consider whether the neutrality principle is convincing in this subsection.  
 
a. The Problem with Understanding the Neutrality Principle 
 
Ackerman characterizes neutrality as the constraint on appealing to any privileged moral 
authority in justifying the use of  political power. However, he refuses to pin down how 
to defend the neutrality principle, which renders his defense of  political legitimacy 
incomplete as well. By declining to work out a justification for neutrality on moral 
foundations, Ackerman’s claim of  neutrality is likely to be agnostic, or is prone to be 
diagnosed as a form of  procedural neutrality. Procedural neutrality refers to a procedure 
that can be legitimated without invoking any moral values, or only appealing to neutral 
                                                                                                                                                                               
the religion is acceptable to them or not. Locke underlined that neither persons, nor churches, nor 
even commonwealths can have any right to attack each other’s civil goods and steal each other’s 
secular assets on the pretext of  religion.  
Conversely, within the jurisdiction of  the church, “the purpose of  a religious association is public 
worship of  God and the attainment of  eternal life by means of  it. This is what the whole of  the 
church’s teaching should aim at; these are the only ends to which all of  its laws should be directed. 
There is and can be no concern in this association with the possession of  civil or earthly goods. No 
force is to be used here for any reason.” Moreover, “if  a civil ruler tried to make laws about another 
person’s religion, it is all the same whether he does so by his own judgment or by the authority of  a 
church, that is by the opinions of  other men,” which violates this person’s liberty of  conscience. 
See John Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” in Locke on Toleration, Richard Vernon ed., 
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values like impartiality, consistency, or coherence.98 Yet, the specification of  a neutral 
procedure itself  might draw on “substantive values that underlie the principles of  
rational discussion between reasonable citizens.”99 Furthermore, political liberalism is not 
procedurally neutral, and any liberal view must be substantive. Its political principles are 
substantive and express far more values than just procedural values. It is true indeed that, 
by insisting on the principle of  neutrality, we aim to look for a common ground on 
which we will not be treated with bias due to our different comprehensive doctrines. 
Nonetheless, such a common ground is not a procedurally neutral ground.100 In a 
constitutional democratic regime, citizens must already have some ideas of  right and 
justice in their minds and some basis for their reasoning. A political principle is 
substantive in the sense that it “springs from and belongs to” the liberal tradition thought 
and the public political culture of  democratic societies.101 
   Procedural neutrality is not the only approach to clarifying the neutrality principle. 
The principle of  neutrality can be defined in a variety of  ways. Conventionally, the 
neutrality principle can be construed as neutrality of  effects and neutrality of  justification 
(intention), which concentrates on the effects and the intention of  the state policy, 
respectively.102 Namely, for neutrality of  effects, a policy is neutral “when and only when, 
relative to an appropriate baseline, it is not expected to produce unequal effects on 
different conceptions of  the good”, and for neutrality of  justification or intention, the 
state maintains neutrality “when and only when its policies are adopted with an 
appropriate kind of  intention.”103  
Nevertheless, both of  these two traditional constructions seem to be deeply flawed. 
To begin with, neutrality of  effect might end up excluding many policies as it regards 
virtually all policies as non-neutral. It is unpreventable that any policy could lead to 
affirming the “superiority of  certain forms of  moral character and encourage certain 
moral virtues.”104 Policies that “seek to establish a fair distribution of  material resources 
make it relatively harder for people with expensive tastes to realize the ways of  life they 
value.”105 On the other hand, neutrality of  intention or justification is highly unrealistic as, 
at minimum, the state has to secure some basic public goods (basic resources for 
                                                             
98 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 191. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid., 192. 
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sustaining human life, national defense, etc.). Furthermore, it seems to suggest that there 
are no important liberal values or principles that “support a general prohibition against 
the state acting on particular judgments about the good.”106 In other words, it is rather a 
questionable claim to argue for the fundamental place of  the value of  neutrality.107  
Stephen Macedo expounds a quite robust view of  the relation between liberalism 
and the neutrality principle. He strongly objects to the thought that the liberal law is “in 
any strong sense purposeless, or non-instrumental, or neutral with regard to conceptions 
of  the good life, either at the level of  society as a whole or at the level of  individual life 
plans.”108 He argues that “if  liberalism stands for mere toleration or an indiscriminate 
spirit of  accommodation, then it stands for everything, and it takes a stand for 
nothing.”109 Macedo’s robust conception of  liberalism is to a certain extent a criticism of  
Larmore’s political neutrality conception. 110  Macedo argues that Larmore’s liberal 
neutrality, which stands for mutual respect among people and a commitment to values at 
the most basic level, is not neutral at all. Rather, liberalism requires the support of  
positive values to explain why we should equally respect other people. Liberalism stands 
for the “positive value of  freedom, freedom to devise, criticize, revise, and pursue a plan 
of  life, and it calls upon people to respect the rights of  others whether or not they share 
the same goals and ideals”.111 Therefore, it is liberals’ goal to design political institutions 
and practices to embody and sustain these values. Besides, neutrality of  intention would 
include too many non-neutral policies as neutral. For instance, a state might set up its 
majority religion as the state-religion for some neutral aim—say, bringing citizens closer 
together—but it is clearly non-neutral in character (I will get to this point in a moment). 
Therefore, the conventional neutrality principle is actually quite troublesome, as Rawls 
calls it, “unfortunate”112. 
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b. The Neutrality Principle and The Separation of  State and Religion: A Contingent 
Relationship 
 
More importantly, for my purpose here, the relationship between the state neutrality 
principle and secularism is only contingent: the neutrality principle does not necessarily 
support or entail the separation of  state and religion. For the sake of  protecting some 
individuals’ liberty of  conscience, a state’s commitment to the neutrality principle is easily 
questionable. Moreover, the confusion over the concept of  neutrality opens the door to 
subjecting neutrality to two divergent interpretations with regard to religion: one is to 
understand it as abstinence with regard to all comprehensive doctrines, and the other is 
to take neutrality as giving every comprehensive outlook the same accommodation and 
incorporating them all (Thesis S3 and Thesis S2’ respectively, and that is also the reason 
we do not characterize these two theses as falling within the concept of  neutrality).  
   Two following recent cases exactly illustrate the gap between the endorsement of  the 
neutrality principle and secularism. One is related to legislation while the other is one of  
the most influential cases in Europe in recent years. Both of  them have made the 
statement that the state neutrality principle does not necessarily entail secularism, and 
secularism is not necessarily a manifestation of  the state neutrality principle. In February 
2007, the government of  Quebec (a Canadian province) organized a Consultation 
Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences (CCPARDC) 
spearheaded by Gerard Bouchard and Charles Taylor.113 After doing research for a year, 
they drew up a report in response to public discontent concerning reasonable 
accommodation and formulated their recommendations to the government to ensure 
that “accommodation practices conform to Quebec’s values as a pluralist, democratic and 
egalitarian society”.114 One key issue of  this report that they address is the relationship 
between neutrality and secularism. The commission believes “a modern democracy 
demands the state be neutral or impartial in its relations with different religions,”115 that is 
to say, it must be neutral regarding different comprehensive doctrines, including secular 
and religious conceptions. The question of  understanding secularism therefore cannot be 
deprived of  the framework of  a neutral state with respect to the comprehensive 
doctrines its citizens hold. Nevertheless, they also believe that a democratic liberal state 
cannot be neutral among some fundamental constituent values of  democratic political 
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systems. The commission argues that the state must “remain neutral in the realm of  core 
beliefs and commitments.”116 In other words, the neutrality principle that they adopt “is 
not only an attitude of  neutrality toward religions but also toward the different 
philosophical conceptions that present themselves as the secular equivalents of  
religions.”117 As far as the commission is concerned, secularism as the separation of  state 
and religion replaces the established religion as the foundation of  a state’s comprehensive 
doctrine. It in turn encourages an inclusion of  “an array of  values and principles”, 
including religious outlooks, into common political principles.118 Simply put, the way to 
formulate Thesis S in accordance with the state neutrality principle would be like Thesis 
S2’. These views are not held just in North-America: this particular approach to 
understanding the relationship between the neutrality principle and secularism is also, to 
some degree, largely shared in Europe.  
In 2005 in Italy, Mrs. Soile Lautsi requested the school council of  a state school in 
the province of  Padua to remove the crucifixes in classrooms since it impedes her 
children’s freedom from religion, which follows from the freedom of  religion clause. Her 
request was denied by the school and her subsequent lawsuits in Italy were denied as well. 
This case was first brought to the European Court of  Human Rights in 2006, and was 
supported as the court declared there had been a violation of  human rights according to 
Article 9 (freedom of  thought, conscience and religion) and Article 2 of  the first 
Protocol (right to education) in 2009. The Italian government later made an appeal to the 
grand chamber of  the court, and the case went on to cause Europe-wide upheaval. In 
2011, the Court’s grand chamber overruled the court’s decision of  2009 and decided that 
the requirement of  displaying crucifixes in classrooms of  state schools in Italian law was 
not a violation of  Article 2 of  Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 (reached by 15:2 votes).119 
The court argued that “States have responsibility for ensuring, neutrally and impartially, 
the exercise of  various religions, faiths and beliefs. Their role is to help maintain public 
order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society, particularly between 
opposing groups”,120 while a crucifix on a wall is only a passive symbol which cannot be 
deemed to have an influence on pupils. One of  the concurring opinions of  the court also 
argued that to allow all religious denominations to freely manifest their religious 
convictions in state schools is “a demonstration of  religious tolerance and state 
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neutrality”. 121  The concurring opinion from Judge Bonello and Judge Power 
straightforwardly pointed out that removing the crucifix would have been “a positive and 
aggressive espousal of  agnosticism or of  secularism, and consequently anything but 
neutral.”122 Along with the Consultation Commission of  Quebec, they argued that a 
preference for secularism over an alternative world view, or comprehensive doctrines in 
Rawlsian language, is not a neutral option. In the same vein as the Quebec report, Judge 
Power also believed that the state had a duty to uphold the state neutrality principle when 
it comes to public education; however, neutrality requires a pluralist approach which 
“encourages respect for all world views rather than a secularist one”.123  
   These two independent cases in North-America and Europe have shown an essential 
resemblance in terms of  the relationship between the neutrality principle and secularism. 
The reasoning behind the Quebec report and that of  the majority judges in Lautsi v. Italy 
(2011) undercuts the envisioned relationship between the neutrality principle and 
secularism upheld by Ackerman and Larmore, and therefore undermines the 
interpretation of  Thesis S as Thesis S2. These two examples reveal a conspicuous 
approach of  interpreting neutrality in a more accommodative and open fashion, namely, 
as Thesis S2’. According to the reasoning behind these two cases, a state is neutral not 
when it abstains from taking a stand in comprehensive views, but only when it 
encourages or positively supports all comprehensive doctrines, including religious ones, 
therefore religious manifestations are ought to be allowed and religious views cannot be 
outcast from public justification. The neutrality principle therefore does not necessarily 
entail secularism. As a result, the form of  Thesis S2 as an interpretation of  the 
separation of  state and religion is, at best, inaccurate. 
In short, I argue that to interpret the separation of  state and religion (Thesis S) as 
the neutrality principle (Thesis S2) is untenable primarily for three reasons. One, the way 
political liberals formulate the neutrality principle is not specific to what the goal of  
public justification requires. Two, and more problematically, the neutrality principle itself  
is very likely to be subject to reasonable pluralism as well.124 What Thesis S2 prescribes, a 
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neutral attitude with regard to all religions, is still less clear-cut. For instance, Thesis S2 
does not answer questions as to whether the state should sponsor all religions in an 
impartial matter, or whether the state should not let religions mingle with political 
decision making. Three, connected with the second complaint about the neutrality 
principle, state neutrality can be characterized in two ways, which leads to two possible 
versions of  Thesis S2: Thesis S2’and Thesis S3. One is to manifest its neutrality by 
incorporating all comprehensive doctrines, including religious ones, into public discourse, 
while the other is to exclude comprehensive doctrines, including religious ones.  
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
 
Thus far, in this chapter, my task has been to provide a public justification for secularism, 
which rests on a successful answer to two problems. One is the problem of  reasonable 
pluralism (P1), which marks the permanent feature of  our democratic political culture. 
Reasonable citizens in a constitutional democratic society tend to disagree with each 
other in terms of  comprehensive doctrines or conceptions of  the good, which is “the 
natural outcome of  the exercise of  human reason” in a democratic society.125 These 
disagreements are so fundamentally ingrained that they could deeply plague our 
conceptions of  justice. It is of  no use to convince religious believers that their deepest 
conviction of  the ultimate meaning of  everything is false, and it is also of  no use to 
persuade atheists that the only truth of  the world and morality is in God’s hands. It is 
precisely because we take reasonable pluralism, this permanent democratic fact, into 
account; we abnegate seeking the only right conception of  justice or moral truth as the 
moral basis for a democratic society. Instead, we retreat from the arguments in the 
metaphysical and comprehensive domain to the domain of  the political. The quest for a 
moral conception of  justice has hence transformed into the quest for its political 
legitimacy, the publically justified condition for the exercise of  coercive political power 
against citizens. 
   The political approach of  defending secularism itself  cannot, however, resolve the 
second problem of  P2, the confusion in interpretation of  Thesis S, the separation of  
state and religion. A successful justification of  secularism must solve both P1 and P2 at 
the same time. Tentatively, Thesis S can be interpreted from the widest meaning to the 
narrowest one: Thesis S1 refers to non-establishment of  any single religion; Thesis S2 
signifies state neutrality among all religions, and they are both untenable. Due to the 
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deficiencies of  the neutrality principle, state neutrality cannot work as a public 
justification. Two further interpretations depart from Thesis S2: Thesis S2’ and Thesis S3. 
While Thesis S2’ requires including all comprehensive reasons, including religious ones, 
in the public discussion, Thesis S3 prescribes restraint when it comes to bringing 
religious reasons into the public discourse.  
Subsequently, the following four chapters are going to focus on discussing the 
options of  Thesis S3 and Thesis S2’, of  which I will argue that Thesis S3 is the form of  
Thesis S we ought to uphold as a constitutional principle in a democratic polity. I will 
present a main argument for Thesis S3 in Chapter Three.  
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Chapter Three: In Defense of  Thesis S3: on Shareable Public Reason  
 
I. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I am going to present the justification for Thesis S3, the exclusion of  
religion from politics. The justification introduced here for Thesis S3 emphasizes the role 
the citizen body could play in politics, since it is built upon public reason shareable by all 
reasonable citizens in a democratic society.  
Due to the fact of  reasonable pluralism, reasonable citizens are bound to differ 
greatly on comprehensive doctrines; therefore, political liberalism proposes that we 
abstain from invoking the truth claims of  our comprehensive doctrines in the 
justification of  the political coercion of  political institutions. In other words, political 
liberalism advocates shelving the truth issue of  comprehensive doctrines in the 
justification of  political legitimacy. Rather, the justification of  political legitimacy will be 
conducted publicly; that is to say, it will be reached on the condition that all reasonable 
citizens are expected to endorse on account of  shareable public reason consisting in a 
family of  political conceptions supported by an overlapping consensus of  reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.1 Since the requirement of  shareability is a key characteristic of  
public reason, those comprehensive doctrines that cannot be shared, notably religious 
doctrines, are inescapably excluded from the realm of  public reason for the public 
justification of  political legitimacy. Therefore, the separation of  state and religion as a 
constitutional principle will be formulated in the light of  the restraint imposed by 
shareable public reason, which leads the separation principle in the robust sense that 
religion shall be separated from politics.  
The point of  defining Thesis S as the exclusion of  religion from politics is not 
because religion is a less worthy conception of  the good or an inferior epistemic belief. 
Moreover, citizens who hold religious beliefs shall not be coerced to endorse other 
beliefs, so long as they are reasonable. The reason that religious doctrines are not part of  
public reason lies in religious reasons’ lack of  shareability. Reasonable citizens cannot 
genuinely reason with each other on the subjects which cannot either be revealed as 
mistaken or be explained in the manner that is expected to be understood by others.2 For 
this reason, public reason on a shareable basis is actually quite resilient and inclusive in 
that religious doctrines can still be included in it, provided that it can be supported by 
public reason. From this perspective, what we are excluding from public reason are 
reasons out of religious doctrines rather than religious doctrines per se.  
The separation of  state and religion as the exclusion of  religion from politics 
constitutes a restraint not only applying to public officials, but more significantly, to 
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ordinary, reasonable citizens. Public reason is concerned with political relations, and it 
understands a constitutional democratic government’s relation to its citizens as 
fundamentally determined by basic moral and political values. As the name suggests, 
public reason is the reason of  a state’s citizens in general. Moreover, it is the “reason of  
equal citizens as a collective body to exercise coercive power over another in enacting 
laws.”3 Citizens also have a moral duty to refrain from deploying religious reasons which 
are not in the overlapping consensus of  political conceptions in a democratic discussion 
of  political issues in the public forum. I believe that, in a democratic regime, reasonable 
citizens do not merely share a public life together; they also share a “participant’s 
perspective” on political matters. A “participant’s perspective” impels reasonable citizens 
to employ justificatory public reasons that can be shared among all reasonable citizens in 
the public arena. Therefore, reasonable citizens are all able to equally examine a political 
conception’s legitimacy on the same basis of  matters that they all care about.  
     Here is how I shall proceed. In Section II, I will present the Rawlsian account of  
public reason for public justification accounting for political legitimacy. It is the political 
conceptions supported by an overlapping consensus of  reasonable comprehensive views 
that provide the content of  public reason for citizens to reason on fundamental political 
matters. In Section III, I will elucidate that due to the lack of  shareability of  religious 
reasons, religious doctrines cannot be introduced into public reason. Nonetheless, an 
inclusive reading of  public reason would allow the inclusion of  some religious doctrines 
as long as they can be endorsed by public reason as well. In Section IV, I will present the 
subjects of  public reason, highlighting ordinary reasonable citizens. Also, I will explain 
the demarcation between reasonable citizens and unreasonable citizens and this 
demarcation’s practical implication for unreasonable citizens. In Section V, I will consider 
a theoretical gap raised by Charles Larmore, which is that the shift to public justification 
of  political legitimacy is not necessarily entailed by the rejection of  appealing to 
comprehensive truth, and there should be an explanation to account for why we must 
turn to public justification. Hence the debates in the rest of  my chapters about Thesis S3 
will be conducted within the realm of  public justification. For now, let us turn to the 
Rawlsian account of  public reason for public justification.  
 
II. Public Reason4 for Public Justification of  Political Legitimacy 
                                                             
3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 214. 
4 The idea of  public reason has been often discussed and has a long history. For instance, Hobbes 
argues that those who insist on employing their own reason to determine the requirements of  the law 
of  nature asserting that “their reason is right reason, prevent a peaceful social life, for they are 
essentially insisting that we remain in the state of  nature.” Thus, for Hobbes, “a cooperative and 
peaceful social life requires a public mark of  right reason that each gives up his own right to private 
judgment, provided that others do so, by settling on a sovereign, whose voice represents a voice of  




As presented in the previous chapter, due to the fact of  reasonable pluralism, John Rawls 
develops a project of  political liberalism to discuss the issue of  legitimacy or public 
justification, namely under what conditions the coercion of  political principles can be 
publicly justified. The justification of  a comprehensive conception is implausible in a 
democratic regime. In a democratic regime, if  citizens cannot agree on or persuade each 
other that his or her own comprehensive doctrine is the only true one, it is unreasonable 
and wrong to use state power to coerce those who have disagreed.5 According to Rawls, 
the political power is fully proper only when the political principles are expected to be 
endorsed by all free and equal citizens. And only “a political conception of  justice that all 
citizens are expected to endorse can serve as a basis of  public reason and justification.”6 
Rawls argues that justification is reasoning addressed to others, and it requires some 
common ground from which the public reasoning can begin. Therefore, public reason in 
this sense can be shared by all free and equal citizens in a well-ordered society. In this 
section, apart from unfolding the foregoing account of  public reason, I shall clarify the 
content of  public reason, which is a family of  political conceptions supported by an 
overlapping consensus.  
 
2.1 Shared Public Reason for Public Justification 
 
The concept of  an overlapping consensus was introduced by Rawls in Political Liberalism 
(PL) to solve the instability problem of  political conceptions of  justice. The idea of  
overlapping consensus claims that reasonable comprehensive doctrines, each from its 
own point of  view, could endorse a family of  political conceptions of  justice. Before 
explicating the concept of  overlapping consensus, it is of  some importance to explain 
what the concept was set out to do initially.  
Rawls explains that although “the problem of  stability has played little role in the 
history of  moral philosophy, it is however fundamental to political philosophy.”7 Stability 
is more than the dominance of  a particular conception of  public justification over others. 
In PL, the search for stability is tightly intertwined with the fulfillment of  public 
                                                                                                                                                                               
judgment is excluded, and the government serves as the public reason to interpret the moral order 
regulating interpersonal actions. Likewise, Kant’s famous article “What is Enlightenment?” (1784) is 
also a perfect illustration of  explaining how public life is possible. “Public reason allows us to avoid 
reliance on our own controversial private judgment about morality, rights and our civil interests, acting 
instead on impartial considerations that all can endorse.” See Gerald Gaus, “Public Reason 
Liberalism”, https://arizona.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/public-reason-liberalism. Differing 
from these earlier liberals, Rawls’ account of  public reason is primarily concerned with the idea of  
democracy and emphasizes citizens’ positive involvement. 
5 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 138. 
6 Ibid., 137. 
7 Ibid., xix. 
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justification. A society can only be stable for the right reasons when it gains public 
justification, 8 namely, when its coercive power is justified to its citizens. What is 
noteworthy is that the stability of  a conception of  justice and citizens’ moral motivations 
to act justly are both sides of  the same issue. In A Theory of  Justice (TJ), a conception of  
justice obtains its stability when it is congruent with citizens’ conceptions of  the good.9 
In other words, in a well-ordered society, a stable conception of  justice designates that 
the society’s citizens are morally motivated and driven to act justly since it is in 
accordance with their conceptions of  the good. According to PL, a political conception 
of  justice gains stability for the right reason when it is publically justified to its reasonable 
citizens. That is to say, a political conception of  justice will only be stable when it is 
acceptable to and can be endorsed by all reasonable citizens. 
In TJ, Rawls deals with the issue of  stability in two stages. The first stage involves 
the acquisition of  the sense of  justice by the members of  a well-ordered society.10 
According to Rawls, the sense of  justice “would take place once just institutions are 
firmly established and recognized to be just.”11 The first stage of  the stability issue is 
untouched by Rawls in PL. The problem of  his treatment appears in the second stage of  
stability. The second stage examines the issue of  congruence, that is, “whether the sense 
of  justice coheres with the conception of  our good” under the ideal conditions of  a 
well-ordered society.12 Rawls suggests that a person’s conception of  the good, or at least 
                                                             
8 Ibid., 390.  
9 John Rawls, A Theory of  Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971) 453. 
10 See the full explication of  the sense of  justice in TJ’s chapter VIII. 
11 See in John Rawls, A Theory of  Justice, 453. 
12 Ibid., 453. This is a very important restriction both for Rawls’s project of  political liberalism and 
for my argument for secularism. This restriction has limited the application of  a political conception 
and all its subsequent discussions within a well-ordered society. It is in general for those educated 
common sense citizens in a deeply ingrained public democratic culture. The idea of  public reason 
marks that the society we are discussing is a society where its citizens share equal status of  citizenship. 
By setting that limit, neither Rawls’s political liberalism nor my secularism is suitable to answer 
questions like: what about an uncivilized society? Or what about a totalitarian regime? Or even more, 
what about a religiously fundamentalist regime like Saudi Arabia? It is because societies like those do 
not have equal citizenship, and therefore they have no public reason, that “the mere fact that people 
commonly accept and reason in terms of  some common religion or other comprehensive doctrine 
does not make that common doctrine part of  public reason.” Even if  all citizens in Saudi Arabia 
accepted the same sect of  Islam and appealed to such a religion as their common reason, it would by 
no means amount to making Islam part of  public reason. Questions such as these are likely to arise 
(Samuel Scheffler has already asked similar questions in “The Appeal of  Political Liberalism,” Ethics 
105(1994): 16-20): It is obvious that most of  the severe contemporary political and social tragedies 
arising from religious intolerance do not occur predominantly in well-ordered, constitutional 
democratic societies. By removing those regimes from the discussion, to what extent is Rawls’s or my 
discussion useful or even relevant? I explained part of  this in section 4.3. Additionally, I do believe 
that a discussion in a well-ordered society precisely manifests the delicacy of  fundamental political 
issues and how deeply reasonable pluralism divides us. After all, it is in relatively organized and 
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the thin conception of  the good, “is determined by what is for him the most rational 
plan of  life given reasonably favorable circumstances.”13 The thin theory’s purpose is to 
“secure the premises about the primary goods required to arrive at the principles of  
justice.”14 Given the circumstances of  a well-ordered society, the congruence between the 
sense of  justice and the conception of  the good has to fulfill two conditions: one, the 
sense of  justice belongs to a person’s conception of  the good; and second, a person’s 
conception of  the good supports and affirms his sense of  justice. That is to say, it is not 
only a rational good for a person to act justly, but his conception of  the good would 
actually endorse the priority of  acting justly when it conflicts with his other rational 
goods.15 Rawls’s argument for congruence involves his conception of  person, account of  
rationality, and the Aristotelian principle, which is a principle about human nature 
entailing that human beings tend to desire to do more intricate activities than simple ones, 
and take the most joy in realizing their highest capacities.16 First of  all, according to 
Rawls, humans in nature are free and equal rational beings. It is a natural tendency for 
rational humans to express their free and equal human natures, which in turn require 
them to act from principles that would be chosen in the original position, namely the 
principles of  justice. Thus, acting justly or the sense of  justice is part of  our rational 
good.17 Moreover, the capacity for a sense of  justice is complex and is among our higher 
capacities, which involves “an ability to understand, apply and act on and from 
requirements of  justice.”18 According to the Aristotelian principle, the expression of  
human beings’ nature by affirming the sense of  justice is a fundamental element of  the 
rational good. Therefore, realizing our sense of  justice by acting justly is intrinsic to our 
human nature, and subsequently we affirm the sense of  justice as a highest-order good 
within our rational conception of  the good.19 Thus far, Rawls concludes that those two 
conditions of  congruence have been met.  
     Nevertheless, Rawls later realizes that, in the second stage of  addressing the issue 
of  stability, he failed to consider the fact that reasonable citizens are bound to disagree 
profoundly when it comes to their conceptions of  the good, including their religious, 
                                                                                                                                                                               
democratic societies that hard cases of  reasonable pluralism arise. 
13 Ibid., 395. 
14 See ibid., 396. 
15  Brian Barry has argued that Rawls’s argument of  congruence is both “unnecessary and 
wrongheaded.” It is unnecessary “because Rawls has already shown how people normally come to 
acquire a sense of  justice to support just institutions,” and that should be enough here. According to 
Barry, the congruence argument “stems from Rawls’s rejection of  the idea that a person can be 
motivated to do what is right and out of  a sense of  duty.” See Samuel Freeman, “Congruence and the 
Good of  Justice”, in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge University Press, 2003)281-282. 
16 See John Rawls, A Theory of  Justice, 424-428. 
17 See ibid., 395-397. 
18 Ibid., 443.  
19 See Samuel Freeman, Congruence and the Good of  Justice, 292-294. 
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philosophical, or ethical beliefs (in PL, they are all included in the umbrella concept of  
“comprehensive doctrines”). Due to reasonable citizens’ profound divergences in 
comprehensive doctrines, their sense of  justice does not necessarily form a part of  their 
conceptions of  the good, let alone that it is the regulative good that motivates their 
actions. Subsequently, the congruence of  the sense of  justice and the conception of  the 
good cannot be sustained. Moreover, the fact of  reasonable pluralism is not a disaster or 
unfortunate in itself; it is a permanent and “natural outcome of  the activities of  human 
reason under enduring free institutions.” 20 It follows that the previous picture of  
congruence that it is in everyone’s fundamental and intrinsic good to fulfill their higher 
capacity as sense of  justice has to be redrawn. And consequently, the issue of  stability 
has to be reconstructed as well. 
      The issue of  stability in PL is taken together with the search for the public 
justification for the political legitimacy of  political institutions and policies, which Rawls 
understands as the exercise of  coercive political power. A society can only be stable for 
the right reasons when it gains public justification, and demonstrating stability for the 
right reasons is also part of  public justification.21 Simply put, a political conception’s 
stability for the right reasons follows from the satisfaction of  public justification. In PL, 
Rawls’s effort in reaching public justification for political institutions’ legitimacy is made 
through public reasons that are shareable among all reasonable citizens, reasons whose 
content is a family of  political conceptions supported by an overlapping consensus of  
reasonable comprehensive views.22  
Four major elements are entailed by this account of  public reason. First of  all, given 
the fact of  reasonable pluralism, reasonable persons do not all affirm the same 
                                                             
20 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxvi. 
21 Ibid., 390. 
22 Rawls’s original statement is as follows, “[O]ur exercise of  political power is fully proper only when 
it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of  which all citizens as free and equal 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of  principles and ideals acceptable to their 
common human reason.” See ibid., 137.  
Rawls restricts the use of  public reason only to fundamental political questions as “constitutional 
essentials and questions of  basic justice”. Rawls identifies two kinds of  constitutional essentials: one is 
“fundamental principles that specify the general structure of  government and the political process, 
including the powers of  legislature, executive and the judiciary and the scope of  majority rule.” The 
second kind is “equal basic rights and liberties of  citizenship that legislative majorities are to respect, 
such as the right to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of  conscience, freedom of  thought and 
of  association, and the protections of  the rule of  law.” See ibid., 227. Whether the scope of  public 
reason only applies to “constitutional essentials and questions of  basic justice” or to a wider realm, 
including laws, is highly disputed in the discussions on public reason. However, I believe such a 
dispute is not really disputable. Apart from the characterizations of  two kinds of  constitutional 
essentials, there is no evidence that Rawls has defined what qualifies as “questions of  basic justice”. 




comprehensive doctrine as true, such as autonomy, or the good of  some particular or all 
religions. The insistence on the claim of  truth in politics is regarded as “incompatible 
with democratic citizenship and the idea of  legitimate law.”23 Instead, we should regard a 
conception of  justice as political, independent from controversial comprehensive 
doctrines, since it starts from within the democratic political tradition and applies to the 
basic structure of  a modern constitutional democracy. It is precisely why we say that the 
fact of  reasonable pluralism has steered the political approach to justification. Precisely 
because of  this political approach, religious doctrines are excluded from public reason 
and justification. Secondly, on the basis of  this view, in public reason, ideas of  truth 
based on comprehensive doctrines are replaced by an idea of  reasonableness, which is 
“necessary to establish a basis of  political reasoning that all can share as free and equal 
citizens.”24 Thirdly, for Rawls, the notion of  reasonableness comes along with the 
subjects of  public reason as reasonable citizens. Rawls argues that reasonable citizens 
view each other “as free and equal in a system of  social cooperation over generations”, 
and “they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of  cooperation according to what 
they consider the most reasonable conceptions of  justice.”25 When citizens agree to act 
on those terms, they are willing to act against their own interests provided that other 
citizens also do so.26 Therefore, Rawls has already set two prerequisite conditions for 
citizens and society as the common ground from which we proceed, since public 
justification is not simply regarded as a valid argument from premises; rather, it is 
addressed to others, especially to those “who disagree with us”, and therefore must 
always proceed from “the common ground that we and others publicly recognize as 
reasonable”.27 One, we have a presumed idea of  the society as a well-ordered, fair system 
of  social cooperation, and two, we also have a political conception of  people as free and 
equal citizens to go along with the assumed conception of  society. These two 
presumptions are necessary societal conditions for political justifications for political 
conceptions of  justice. As long as we begin from such a common ground, we are 
engaged in public reasoning addressed to other reasonable citizens. Lastly, the political 
conception’s public justification is reached when an overlapping consensus forms. An 
overlapping consensus “happens” when a family of  political conceptions of  justice is at 
least not too much in conflict with reasonable comprehensive doctrines.28 In other words, 
political conceptions of  justice would gain enough support in spite of  their possible 
                                                             
23 John Rawls, “The Idea of  Public Reason Revisited”, The University of  Chicago Law Review 64(1997): 
771. 
24 Ibid., 799. 
25 Ibid., 770. 
26 Ibid. 
27 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 (1985): 
229. 
28 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 387. 
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conflict with other comprehensive doctrines. The values of  the political are very 
important, intrinsic values and therefore they are not easily overridden by comprehensive 
values.29 The subject of  the overlapping consensus is thus those political values or ideals 
which would be endorsed by all reasonable citizens in a well-ordered society, and which 
in turn form the foundation for public reason.30 Public reason holds that fundamental 
political decisions are to be settled by appeal to these political values, which are expected 
to be cognized, understood, and shared by all reasonable citizens.  
A key question hence arises: how is the idea of  overlapping consensus possible? 
Specifically, how to make sure that political conceptions of  justice gain enough support 
in spite of  their possible conflict with other comprehensive doctrines? In other words, 
how to make sure citizens will believe political values outweigh or are prior to 
non-political values? This question stays at the center of  the debate about my 
interpretation of  Thesis S as S3 and of  the plausibility of  the project of  political 
liberalism as well. For this reason, the answer will be developed and strengthened more 
extensively in the following chapters. For now, generally speaking, I have two remarks 
here. One is that the political values are very important intrinsic values, and therefore 
they are not easily overridden by comprehensive values. 31 These political values govern 
the basic aspects of  our communal life and specify the fundamental conditions of  social 
cooperation. They protect basic rights and also include measures to secure citizens’ 
exercise of  those basic rights. For example, when the political virtues of  tolerance and 
reasonableness are widespread and serve as a political conception of  justice, they form 
the foundation of  a society’s political culture. They are what constitute “the very 
conditions that make fair social cooperation possible.”32 Reasonable citizens perceive the 
political values’ significance from the perspective of  their reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, and they must think about what kind of  other doctrines they would prefer to 
live with in a free society. That is why values like “justice for the basic structure, equal 
political and civil liberty,” “equality of  opportunity”, mutual respect, reasonableness, 
                                                             
29 Rawls has supplied two mutually complementary answers to this general question: one is normative 
(that political values themselves are very important), and the other is historical. Rawls believes that the 
history of  religion and philosophy proves that there can be a wider realm of  reasonable values 
interpreted as congruent with or at least not in conflict with the values of  the domain of  the political. 
See ibid., 139, 156-7. 
However, I do not agree with Rawls on the historical point in particular, and it is a very 
important point. I do not believe the historical experience is able to explain how an overlapping 
consensus is possible in general. In fact, I do not believe any factual evidence could be a substantive 
reason here. After all, any historical argument could be easily overruled by any new incoming situation, 
and we cannot use successes in the past to prove that the success of  congruence is going to last into 
future. As Rawls himself  claims, “History is full of  surprises” (ibid., 87.).  
30 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (Oxford University Press, 2011)185. 
31 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 139. 












liberty of  conscience, and so on are pivotal values in a well-ordered democratic society.33 
Two, the hope of  forming an overlapping consensus actually lies in the assumption that 
each reasonable citizen accepts the “political conception as reasonable from the standpoint 
of  their own comprehensive view.”34 An overlapping consensus is therefore not merely 
founded on a convergence of  self  or sectarian interests, whereas an affirmation of  the 
same political conception of  justice does not make people’s own comprehensive views 
any less assertive. The “fundamental ideas of  the political conception are endorsed by the 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines,” which “represent what citizens regard as their 
deepest conviction.”35 The other essential point rendering an overlapping consensus 
possible therefore lies in a sufficient explanation of  what is reasonable, which I will turn 
to in the next section. Before moving on to that point, I shall stress a common confusing 
point associated with the concept of  “overlapping consensus”. 
 
2.2 The Content of  Public Reason: an Overlapping Consensus of  Political Values 
 
A significant point in understanding the concept of  overlapping consensus is that it is 
fundamentally moral. An overlapping consensus of  a political conception is not a 
compromise or a modus vivendi between those who hold different views. Such a 
misunderstanding of  an overlapping consensus is quite widespread in contemporary 
political philosophy literature. Partly this is because the freestanding character of  political 
conceptions of  justice is not appreciated, and partly because the moral character of  an 
overlapping consensus is still underestimated.36 The two graphics below show a modus 
vivendi understanding of  overlapping consensus and the correct way to understand an 











                                                             
33 See ibid., 224. 
34 Ibid., 150. 
35 See ibid., 392. 
36 For example, Charles Taylor has understood overlapping consensus simply as a convergence of  












                        
(Figure 2: an overlapping consensus) 
 
When we speak of  a reasonable overlapping consensus, it involves two levels of  
doctrines: comprehensive doctrines and political ones. At the point where an overlapping 
consensus is reached, all comprehensive doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, 
support “a political conception of  justice underwriting a constitutional democratic 
society” satisfying “the criterion of  reciprocity”.37 That is to say, political conceptions of  
justice in an overlapping consensus are all based on underlying ideas of  free and equal 
citizens and a fair, cooperative society. 
A typical use and conception of  modus vivendi between different doctrines is what 
Hobbes had in mind. In his view, individuals with different conceptions of  the good 
would struggle and balance their powers until a bargain is reached, which is purely 
prudential. Sticking with the bargain is therefore in every party’s best interest. However, 
such a modus vivendi is highly unstable in nature as it is a hostage to the shifting of  
power.38 If  the power of  each party changes or any condition ceases to be the way it was, 
individual parties will lose any reason to uphold the agreement. In parallel, the stability of  
a social consensus which is founded on sectarian interests or on the outcome of  political 
bargaining is contingent on the maintenance of  its background circumstance.39  
However, the idea of  overlapping consensus is to be distinguished from modus 
vivendi in two respects, both of  which are relevant to the moral character of  the idea of  
overlapping consensus, and it is also precisely the moral character of  overlapping 
consensus that makes it stable. That an overlapping consensus is moral means that the 
                                                             
37 John Rawls, “The Idea of  Public Reason Revisited”, 801. 
38 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 147-148. 
39 Ibid., 147. 
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objects of  the overlapping consensus, the political conceptions of  justice, are also moral 
conceptions.40 Besides, it is also affirmed on moral grounds, as the political conceptions 
of  justice are embedded in or congruent with their underlying moral values.41  
An overlapping consensus is by no means a modus vivendi; nonetheless, a modus vivendi 
can become an overlapping consensus over time. This development can be shown by the 
example of  religious toleration in the 16th century.42 There was no overlapping consensus 
on the political principle of  religious toleration. However, the bloody religious disputes 
made Catholics and Protestants accept toleration as a mere modus vivendi, on the condition 
that neither of  them were to gain the upper hand in terms of  power. In that situation, no 
faith was dominant, and that is how the toleration was reluctantly accepted by both 
parties. Nevertheless, as time went by, the modus vivendi of  toleration became the only 
workable alternative to endless and destructive civil strife. More importantly, citizens 
came to so appreciate the good things toleration had accomplished for them and for the 
society in general—for instance, guaranteeing them certain basic political rights and 
liberties, laying the foundation for democratic procedures, and so forth—that they would 
affirm toleration as a principle.43 In turn, it might even gradually and delicately have 
guided their revision of  those parts of  their comprehensive doctrines which were 
conspicuously incompatible with such a principle. To this extent, citizens’ comprehensive 
doctrines were reasonable even if  they had not been reasonable before. A constitutional 
overlapping consensus is achieved when citizens have reasonable assurance that others all 
appreciate and comply with the political principle.44 Steadily, as “the success of  political 
cooperation continues, citizens gain increasing trust and confidence in one another.”45 
The consensus’s depth, breadth, and concreteness are strengthened. This process also 
applies to how religious citizens could accept the non-establishment clause, a state with 
no established religion. They realize such a separation protects their church from the 
government’s dominance or interference and protects the integrity of  their religious faith. 
They are able to appreciate that it is not wise to advocate or emphasize their religious 
outlook as a single dominating one, which might cause their religion’s marginalization and 
even persecution. It cannot be emphasized enough that such an overlapping consensus 
of  no established religion is moral, but not a modus vivendi. Such an overlapping consensus 
stems from our understanding of  the priority of  those fundamental political values that 
maintain fair social cooperation, such as equality, individual liberty, fairness of  
opportunities, “economic reciprocity”, and so forth.46  
                                                             
40 Ibid., 147. 
41 Ibid., 148. 
42 See ibid. 
43 See ibid., 159. 
44 See ibid., 161-162. 
45 Ibid., 168. 




2.3 Section Summary 
 
The Rawlsian account of  public reason consists in four main parts. (1) Due to the fact of  
reasonable pluralism, it is a freestanding and political project to begin with. (2) Also 
driven by the fact of  reasonable pluralism, the truth claim is replaced by political 
reasonableness as the basis of  public reason in the political domain. (3) Two basic 
presumptions are assumed for this public reason account, which are the free and equal 
standing of  reasonable citizens and the idea of  the society as a well-ordered and fair 
system of  social cooperation. (4) Public justification of  legitimacy is reached when an 
overlapping consensus on political conceptions of  justice of  comprehensive doctrines 
forms, which happens when comprehensive doctrines support a family of  political 
conceptions of  justice. Since the political values supported by an overlapping consensus 
are important values in themselves, and with the significance of  the criterion of  
reasonableness taken into account, the formation of  an overlapping consensus of  
reasonable comprehensive doctrines is plausible. An overlapping consensus is therefore a 
stable moral conception and supplies the requisite content to public reason. Therefore, 
on this account, public reasons can be shared among reasonable citizens.  
 
III. Shareable Public Reason Justification: In Support of  Thesis S3 
 
3.1 The Exclusion of  Religion in Public Reason Justification 
 
Since the requirement of  shareability is a key characteristic of  public reason, it naturally 
follows that the most direct and notable implication of  shared public reason as the basis 
for public justification is the exclusion of  religious doctrines. Inasmuch as the 
comprehensive doctrines that cannot be shared, notably religious doctrines, are bound to 
be “unshareable” for all citizens. 
   Since religious doctrines are not expected to be endorsed by all reasonable citizens, 
they are not adequate candidates to form the basis for public justification. Nevertheless, 
the fact that religious doctrines fall short of  being part of  public reason does not mean 
that public reason amounts to secular reason, since an inclusive interpretation of  public 
reason allows the incorporation of  religious doctrines, if  the religious doctrines are able 
to be supported by public reason. 
Up to this point, I have to underline an important distinction between public reason 
and secular reason, as the adoption of  Rawlsian public reason in effect excludes religious 
reasons from public reason and justification. Does this mean that public reason amounts 
to secular reason? Is public reason only a fig leaf  for a blatant exclusion of  and even 
hostility toward religion in the public discourse? I believe that both of  the answers are 
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negative. On the one hand, public reason can have religious content as long as it can be 
explained or supported by secular reasons that we all can understand and share. For 
instance, the extension from liberty of  religion to liberty of  conscience explains how a 
political principle with religious content can still be supported. On the other hand, 
secular reasons can also be non-public and unendorsable. For instance, someone cannot 
refer to Jane Austen’s books to argue for or against the laws of  marriage. 
Specifically, first of  all, public reason and secular reason occupy different levels: 
public reason is for political justification while secular reason is fundamentally a 
comprehensive reason. Both secular and religious views contain deep and controversial 
doctrines that are not public in the sense that they can be reasonably accepted by most 
reasonable citizens. Rawls was fully aware of  the relationship and confusion between 
these two categories of  reasons. Apart from the emphasis on the difference between 
reasons in the political domain and comprehensive domain, he endorses an “inclusive 
view of  public reason” that allows citizens to present what they regard as the basis of  
political values from their comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, as long as 
they eventually give properly public reasons to “support the principles and policies our 
comprehensive doctrine is said to support.”47 (By contrast, the exclusive view of  public 
reason refuses to incorporate reasons in terms of  comprehensive doctrines into public 
reason.)48 On the basis of  such an inclusive view, regarding the allegation of  public 
reason’s hostility to religion, we need to be very careful here with regard to the difference 
between religious doctrines and religious reasons. Although it is possible to include 
religious doctrines in the content of  public reason, that does not mean it is an inclusion 
because of  religion or for religious reasons. The inclusion of  religious doctrines is about 
religion in terms of  content; however, the inclusion of  religious reasons or arguments is 
normatively pertinent to religion as such.   
Religious doctrines can be incorporated into public reason if  we see such a moral 
duty as a filter which only filters out those doctrines which are incompatible with 
reasonable political conceptions. Reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or 
nonreligious, could be introduced into the political discussion in the public arena, as long 
as there is a compelling political reason to support this introduction of  comprehensive 
doctrines, if  such an introduction in turn strengthens the ideal of  public reason.49 For 
instance, a religious doctrine based on the truth of  the Church or the Holy book is 
certainly not a liberal comprehensive doctrine, and a comprehensive liberalism would 
need to reject such an account of  truth. Nevertheless, a reasonable religious doctrine also 
could endorse a constitutional democratic society and recognize its public reason. Public 
reason does not “trespass upon religious beliefs…insofar as these are consistent with the 
                                                             
47 See ibid., 247; & “The Idea of  Public Reason Revisited,” 776. 
48 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 247. 
49 See John Rawls, “The Idea of  Public Reason Revisited,” 784-785. 
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essential constitutional liberties, including…liberty of  conscience.”50 That is why religious 
doctrines can be part of  the content of  public reason; however, public reasons are by 
necessity expressed in secular terms, at least. The incorporation of  religious doctrines 
into the public arena is only because it helps enhance public reason, not because it is 
religious. In other words, religious doctrines are introduced into public reason not 
because they express religious reasons or religious values, but as a result of  their 
endorsement of  fundamental political values. Public reason admits the possibility of  
including comprehensive doctrines, including moral and religious aspects, although this 
possibility is founded on the condition that it can be deemed as supportive of  political 
values and principles, which are nonreligious.  
This reasoning is also consistent with Robert Audi’s construction of  secular reason, 
which could be fully aligned with a religious view, for example in affirming a universal 
right to liberty. Audi understands a secular reason as what engenders real normative force 
in advocacy or support of  any political decisions.51 Audi claims that citizens in a free and 
democratic society are obligated not to “advocate or support any law or public policy 
that restricts human conduct unless one has, and is willing to offer, adequate secular 
reason for this advocacy or support.” 52 Audi even concedes that religiously inspired, 
impressed, and expressed reasons are allowed to be advocated, just like secular reasons, 
as long as a final decision to adopt a policy is fully guaranteed by secular reasons.53 Audi 
explains that he does not favor public reason over secular reason for two reasons. Firstly, 
“a public could be ill-educated or blinded by prejudice;” secondly, the implication of  
using public reason in effect does not really differ from reasoning with secular reason as 
public reason also demands “public accessibility”.54 It is quite interesting that Audi’s 
argument here is precisely the reverse of  Rawls’s. Rawls is not against religious reason per 
se; it is just that a normally religious reason does not belong to public reason. Audi, on 
the other hand, does not address the notion of  public reason, but argues that religious 
reason cannot play the determinate role for people’s rationale and motivation because it 
is too dangerous. I believe that the major merit of  Audi’s approach is the directness and 
clarity in practice; however, I also believe that his approach is unlikely to be a solid 
principle compared to public reason. First of  all, a justified defense of  Audi’s approach 
will require a sufficient argument of  the dangers and unfitness of  religious reason, in 
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terms of  religion in general and particular religions, which is likely to be at odds with the 
religious freedom principle in the first place. Secondly, such an argument goes against the 
fact of  reasonable pluralism as it demands a comprehensive negation of  religious ideas as 
a whole. In addition, I am inclined to leave the possibility open that in some cases 
religious reasons could still play a positive role in politics, provided that religious reasons 
also support the political values endorsed by public reason. All in all, I believe that the 
essential basis of  political justification is embedded not in reason’s source but in its 
publicness, namely, that it could be accepted by all reasonable citizens, which I will turn 
to in Section V in detail. 
The landmark case Sherbert v. Verner (1963) can help show this distinction clearly. 
Sherbert was a member of  the Seventh-day Adventist Church and originally worked as a 
textile-mill operator five days a week. However, she was asked to also start working on 
Saturdays, which contradicted with her religious belief. She thus refused and 
unfortunately, failed to find any other work elsewhere. Her claim for unemployment 
compensation was denied by the Employment Security Commission, and the decision 
was confirmed by a state trial court and the South Carolina Supreme Court. The U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed the commission and lower courts.55 The majority opinion found 
that denying Sherbert’s claim was unconstitutional, as the government created an 
infringement on a constitutional right to practice religion, meanwhile, in this case, the 
government does not have “a compelling state interest” to justify the burden on religious 
activity.56 The Court’s opinion may appear like an endorsement of  Sherbert getting 
compensation for her religious claim. Nonetheless, what the Court fundamentally 
endorses here is her liberty of  conscience, prevention of  discrimination, and fairness of  
opportunities, which are all fundamental political values that we all can understand and 
share, and which are hence secured by public reason. Therefore, although public reason 
entails secular reason, it does not conceptually denote secular doctrines, nor is it solely 
embodied by secular doctrines.  
Admittedly, the shareability feature of  public reason in effect makes it amount to 
secular reasons in excluding religious reasons from the political domain. However, public 
reasons differ from secular reasons categorically as they are political reasons, while 
secular reasons are addressed in the comprehensive sense. If  this categorical difference 
between public reason and secular reason had been taken into account sufficiently, some 
associated misunderstandings could have been avoided.  
Christopher Eberle argues that, first of  all, some justified secular reasons are not 
necessarily shared, and we can justify political coercion on the basis of  different 
unshareable secular reasons. He imagines a hypothetic example in which the United 
States decides to invade Afghanistan, and American citizens can support this decision on 
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the basis of  differing unshared secular reasons, such as the promotion of  democracy in 
Afghanistan, the safety of  the United States, or for the well-being of  the Afghan 
people.57 These are all justified secular reasons to invade Afghanistan, while they are not 
shared by American citizens. Secondly, as for the unshareability which disallows religious 
reasons into public reason, Eberle argues that secular reasons, by the same token, may 
not be normatively compelling enough to justify political coercion after all.58 Some 
secular reasons are not more epistemically impressive than so-called unshareable religious 
reasons in justifying political coercive actions, for instance, secular reasons in justifying 
the waging of  a war.59  
These two critiques exactly demonstrate the confusion in confusing secular reason 
and public reason. As for the first complaint, reasons being secular by no means 
guarantees their shareability; as shown in Section II, the basis we have proposed for 
political coercion’s public justification is shareable public reason rather than secular 
reason. Being secular is inadequate for political coercion’s justification and is also 
over-compelling in the light of  inclusive public reason, which keeps the possibility of  
incorporating religious doctrines open. As for Eberle’s second charge, likewise, apart 
from the lack of  shareability, secular reason does not entail any epistemic superiority to 
religious reasons. Being secular alone does not earn reason any justificatory force by 
default. However, owing to the unshareability characteristic of  religious reasons, I believe 
that there is a fundamental difference between the lack of  justificatory force of  secular 
reasons and that of  religious reasons, inasmuch as the former deficiency is a form of  
reason’s uncertainty, while the latter inadequacy is reason’s indeterminacy.60 Uncertainty is a 
position in which “I see arguments on all sides of  some issues and do not find…one set 
of  arguments stronger than the others”, but “I am entitled…to declare that I am 
uncertain” about this, and “I do not need furthermore substantive reasons.” 61 Suppose 
that the secular reasons are all laid on the table, to say that I am uncertain about whether 
we should support the war is consistent with both “we should” and “we should not”, but 
not with “there is no right answer either way”. However, the position of  indeterminacy is 
different from uncertainty. If  I am indeterminate about whether we should support the 
war, given all the religious reasons in front of  us, just as there is no way to tell whether 
Picasso is a better artist than Mozart, it means that no exact comparison can be made 
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between the two options since we cannot make commensurable judgments about them.62 
There is simply no way for us to decide whether we should support the war or not if  
what we are offered to contemplate on are only religious concerns.  
However, Jeremy Waldron argues that the trouble induced by the 
incommensurability and unshareability of  religious reasons has been over exaggerated. 
The presumption of  religious reason’s incommensurability and unshareability 
“underestimates the human capacity to conduct conversations” even in difficult 
circumstances.63 He argues that the view that we can only converse after sharing some 
common ground is too conservative. The Rawlsian shareable public reason conception 
of  public justification seems to rule out the novel or disconcerting move in political 
argumentation. Waldron continues, “Rawls’ conception seems to assume an inherent 
limit in the human capacity for imagination and creativity in politics, implying as it does 
that something counts as a legitimate move in public reasoning only to the extent that it 
latches onto existing premises that everybody already shares.”64 I think Waldron is 
mistaken about the relationship between public reason and religious reason for the 
precise opposite reason. It seems that Waldron regards public reason as too timid and 
cautious in dealing with novel arguments and reasons; however, the problem of  religious 
reasons for politics is not their novelty or creativity. On the contrary, religious arguments 
are some of  the oldest arguments in human history (perhaps older than most moral 
arguments, deontological arguments, or consequential ones), and they are still incapable 
of  being understood and shared by all reasonable citizens in a democratic society.  
To summarize, the inclusive interpretation of  public reason has enormously 
enlarged the possibility of  incorporating those religious doctrines whose central values 
can be employed to support public reason. For this reason, the question of  the 
shareability of  religious doctrines has been downsized to the challenge of  the shareability 
of  religious reasons, namely reasons only derived from religion, which is not a common 
challenge. And the incommensurability of  religious reasons does not leave much room 
indeed for sharing among all reasonable citizens holding various comprehensive 
doctrines. Moreover, the ineligibility of  religious reason playing a role in public reason, 
resulting from its unshareability, applies to secular reasons as well, as the clarification of  
public reason and secular reason helps to explain away the confusion brought by secular 
reason’s uncertainty in resolving political issues. Nevertheless, the clarification 
distinguishing public reason from secular reason does not clear the cloud that public 
reason unfairly privileges nonreligious citizens and doctrines over religious ones. The 
tension between public reason and religion in general will be much more extensively 
discussed in the following chapters. 
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3.2 Public Reason and General Will 
 
The emphasis on shareable public reason might invite a question: does the shareable 
public reason of  public justification resemble Rousseau’s general will? It is worth noting 
that Rousseau emphasizes that it is the compliance with the general will that ensures the 
political machine’s operation, and by virtue of  that, it alone legitimizes the civil obligation 
of  complying with the general will, “which without it would be absurd and tyrannical, 
and subject to the most terrible abuses”.65 However, I will explain that Rousseau’s 
account is much stronger than the consensus approach, as the consensus approach’s 
insistence on public reason is for the stability of  the political society, whereas, according 
to Rousseau, it is directly pertinent to individuals’ true freedom and their ability to realize 
their fundamental interests in the political society. 
According to Rousseau, in the ideal form of  social association, each individual, as a 
subject of  the state, must obey the law, and at the same time he “will obey himself  alone 
and remain as free as before” entering into the association.66 The form of  states or the 
basis of  entering a public society “is a form of  a social interdependence” among each 
individual that we unite together to protect persons and our goods, to develop and 
exercise our capacities and to broaden our ideas and feelings.67 However, in this union, 
each individual also aims to secure our freedom, which defines our nature. In order to 
solve this problem, on the basis of  the existence of  social interdependence, Rousseau 
believes that in a society each member “puts his person and all his power in common 
under the supreme direction of  the general will”.68 In order to understand how this 
general will works, Rousseau reminds us that, apart from every citizen’s particular interest, 
all citizens share a conception of  the common good, which is made possible because of  
the fundamental interests every member of  society shares.69 This society’s “authority 
ultimately rests in such a shared understanding of  the common good”, inasmuch as “the 
social order ought to advance common interests corresponds to the fact that the [social] 
contract is a unanimous agreement among rational individuals who are [fundamentally] 
moved by self-love”.70 This motivation of  self-love consists in two aspects; one is the 
natural concern for one’s good as determined by certain natural needs, whereas the other 
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aspect of  self-love puts such self-love into contact with others in a society.71 This second 
aspect of  self-love provides a psychological incentive for citizens to be willing to advance 
the interests of  others. Rousseau believes that the idea of  reciprocity 72  plays a 
psychological role in that it makes citizens willing to advance the interests of  others so 
that each individual can come together to form a general will while every member 
“remains as free as before”. As members of  the state, citizens’ choices and decisions are 
always made in the context of  identifying with the common good. Simply put, it is the 
sharing of  the common good of  each citizen that forms a general will of  citizens, which 
is not the will of  the society as a whole as such but is what each citizen shares with all 
other citizens by virtue of  the common good that they all share.73 Citizens endorse the 
general will as a rule internally or as their own; therefore, they do not give over their 
freedom to anyone else in the political society. As such, to Rousseau, the protection of  
citizens’ “being as free as before” is juxtaposed with them forming a general will on the 
basis of  their social interdependent relations in the public society. To Rousseau, the 
unalienable freedom of  citizens exactly consists in having a general will.74 Moreover, the 
general will, which wills the fundamental interests that every individual shares, organizes 
other parts of  his theory with regard to the complete picture of  the social pact and 
political authority. 
With regard to the possible conflicts of  private judgments and public reason, 
Rousseau makes it clear that it is through the general will’s regulative role that citizens’ 
private judgments will not take precedence over the general will.75 Consequently, citizens 
are truly free in the sense that they endorse the rules from the point of  view of  the 
general will; therefore there will not be sacrifice of  individual freedom or loss of  
authenticity. Moreover, complying with the general will is contained within the general 
will as a “civil obligation”.76 Rousseau characterizes the sovereign (state) as one body 
consisting solely of  the individual persons who form it. As one integrated body, the 
sovereign does not and cannot have interest conflicting with his citizens since the 
sovereign cannot want to harm his constituents, namely its citizens.77 Nonetheless, 
Rousseau also concedes that each individual also has a private will “that is contrary or 
dissimilar to the general will that [s]he has as a citizen” in a political society.78 Rousseau 
realizes that the private will of  an individual can lead her to enjoy her rights as a citizen 
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while reducing her duty as a citizen, since her private will could make her believe that 
what she “owes to the common cause is a gratuitous contribution” while the loss of  her 
contribution will harm others less than it burdens her.79 Due to the danger of  this 
individuals’ inclination rendering the social pact empty, Rousseau argues that the social 
pact contains an implicit obligation “which alone can give force to the others.”80 If  
anyone refuses to obey the general will, he will be forced to be free in the sense that he 
will be compelled to do so by the whole body. In being forced to comply with the general 
will that we give to ourselves, we are forced to be free in a very different way than “if  we 
are subjected to rules we each endorse from…our general will.”81 We can see that 
Rousseau views the general will as regulative; in the social pact we are driven by the 
self-love (amour propre) to advance our private interests endorsed by the general will, 
which is guided by the common good that we all share.82 Citizens’ choices and actions are 
regulated by the common good, and they are forced to comply with the general will to be 
“truly masters” of  themselves.83 In that sense, we say that a citizen’s true freedom is 
always realized in a social association such as a state.  
Unlike Rousseau’s general will, the insistence on a shareable public reason basis of  
public justification presumes no such claim of  freedom pertaining to citizens’ own full 
justification.84 It was mainly introduced to provide a solution to the problem of  stability. 
The idea of  public reason holds that “questions of  constitutional essentials and basic 
justice are to be settled by appeal to political values that everyone in the society”, “has 
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reason to care about” in spite of  their comprehensive doctrines.85 If  we take the fact of  
reasonable pluralism seriously, “justifications of  a society’s basic institutions that crucially 
depend on particular comprehensive doctrines would be destabilizing” as they cannot be 
shared by all citizens.86 
 
IV. The Subjects of  Public Reason  
 
In the previous section, I mentioned that the accomplishment of  an overlapping 
consensus of  comprehensive doctrines partly relies on a generally reasonable citizen body, 
which constitutes the main subjects using public reason. In this section, I am going to 
illustrate the importance of  this reasonable citizen body. Before getting into that though, 
I will discuss a special subject body in public reasoning: public officials. 
 
4.1 Subjects I: Public Officials 
 
For public reason theorists, the scope of  the exercising subject of  public reason is rather 
contentious. They argue that, the idea of  public reason ought to only apply to public 
officials. For instance, Kent Greenawalt points out that there should be a distinction 
between public officials and ordinary citizens in political discussions, and the requirement 
of  public reason should only apply to public officials.87 “The government may withhold a 
public position from someone who expresses religious views that have disturbing 
implications for how he might perform his public duties.”88 This kind of  view thus only 
requires public officials to understand the political values of  liberty of  conscience and 
the separation of  state and religion, whereas it does not demand citizens to exclude their 
religious reasons from discussions of  political issues. For example, Lawrence Solum 
portrays public officials as personas of  the state so that “the statements of  public 
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officials in their official capacity…are the statement of  the state at large”.89 Therefore, it 
would be “unfair to allow public officials to express their own convictions of  the 
good…for state action.”90 Audi goes even further in saying that he believes officials are 
bounded “even when they are not acting in their official capacities”, inasmuch as they 
have “the greater information and social responsibility” attaching to their public 
positions, or “the wide visibility or significant influence of  such people as role models.”91  
Rawls also emphasizes that the idea of  public reason does not apply to all citizens in 
the democratic society indiscriminately. It is significant to deploy the idea of  public 
reason as a legal duty only applying to public officials “when they speak on the floor of  
parliament, or to the executive and especially to the judiciary in their public acts and 
decisions.”92 Specifically, the requirement of  public reason ought to apply to “the 
discourse of  judges in their decisions”, “the discourse of  government officials” and “the 
discourse of  candidates for public office.”93 However, it is not enough to merely apply 
public reason to public officials. Public reason is also part of  the requirement of  
democratic citizenship, of  a democratic society’s free and equal citizens, who “exercise 
political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in amending their 
constitution.”94 Public reason requires that, as reasonable and rational citizens, they 
should be able to “explain the basis of  their actions” mainly their voting “to one another 
in terms each could reasonably be expected to endorse.”95 This is what Rawls calls the 
“duty of  civility”, a moral duty among reasonable citizens themselves belonging to the 
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ideal of  democratic politics.96 
 
4.2 Subjects II: Reasonable Citizens 
  
A moral duty of  civility is imposed by the ideal of  democratic citizenship, namely citizens’ 
duty to be able to explain to each other their arguments and vote with the political values 
of  public reason on fundamental political questions.97 It also includes “a willingness to 
listen to others’ reasoning and fair-mindedness” in balancing and deciding each other’s 
views.98 These reasons not only ought to be understood by all citizens, but are also 
expected to be accepted by all citizens. When citizens engage in public issues, ideally, they 
picture “themselves as if  they were legislators and ask themselves”99 what laws supported 
by what kind of  reasons are the most reasonable. Citizens fulfill their moral duty of  
civility and support the idea of  public reason by “putting themselves into public officials’ 
shoes”. That is to say, by doing what they can to hold public officials to account. Citizens 
are “prepared to offer each other fair terms of  cooperation according to the most 
reasonable conception of  political justice”100, and they would agree to act upon these 
conceptions on the condition that other citizens also do so. Therefore, in a constitutional 
regime where both public officials and citizens honor public reason on constitutional 
essentials or matters of  basic justice, all public officials act from and on public reason, 
expressing the opinion of  the majority in legal form, and the legitimacy of  this political 
institution is hence satisfied.  
The question is: why do citizens have such a moral duty to honor the limits of  
public reason? Are not the limits of  public reason too narrow to exclude what we think 
are true or foundational reasons for our views? In particular, how is it possible for those 
who hold religious doctrines as the only truth to also uphold a reasonable political 
conception like secularism that supports a reasonable constitutional democratic regime? 
Especially since these religious doctrines may not prosper or even may decline under 
such a constitutional democratic regime, so how is it possible that they could still support 
a political conception like secularism supported by public reason? What is the 
requirement of  democratic citizenship? These difficult questions will be discussed in 
greater breadth and depth in the following chapters. For the moment, I will introduce a 
“participant’s point of  view” of  citizens to explain why it is a moral duty for reasonable 
citizens to use public reason.101 
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What is worth noting is that public reason encourages a sufficient degree of  positive 
willingness in citizens’ attitude to be part of  public life. Citizens not only share a public 
life together, they are also generally positive participants in a democratic regime in which 
we shape our public life together. And putting citizens into the perspective of  
participants adds a great deal to their views on fundamental political matters. Admittedly, 
even the most democratic regime is unlikely to have a citizen body in which every person 
is keen to take part in public life. A democratic society is still normally constituted by a 
great many positive participants, some nonchalant bystanders who do not care about 
politics and are not bothered to vote (for instance, the Amish, although maybe the last 
presidential election is an exception), and those unreasonable citizens (religious 
fundamentalists, and I’ll come to this point later) who do not recognize the basis for a 
political society. However, if  the number of  those nonchalant bystanders and 
unreasonable citizens outweighs that of  positive participants, namely, if  there are more 
citizens who are not willing to take part in and even aim to destroy the public life than 
those who are willing, the sustaining of  our democracy is in real jeopardy. The 
maintenance of  constitutional democracy therefore must primarily demand a positive 
participatory citizen body in general.102  
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fact of  reasonable pluralism, except by endorsing reasonable constitutional democracy, there is no 
other fair way to ensure the equal liberty of  its adherents with other reasonable free and equal citizens. 
An effort to establish a certain religion’s hegemony or impose on citizens the obligation to ensure its 
influence and success amounts to putting the idea of  equal basic liberties of  free and equal citizens in 
danger. Moreover, in public reason, “ideas of  truth or right based on comprehensive doctrines are 
replaced by an idea of  the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens.” This is a basis that 
free and equal citizens all can share. To seek the public basis of  justification for political conceptions, 
the difference between “persons” in standard political philosophy and “citizens” in political liberalism 
is vital. “We think of  persons as reasonable and rational, free and equal citizens with two moral 
powers,” in talking of  citizens instead of  persons, we put aside their social positions, group interests 
and divergent comprehensive conceptions of  good. Citizens are those who “take part in a fair system 
of  social cooperation in a well-ordered society,” seek a public justification shared by all citizens in 
such a society, which must satisfy the criterion of  reciprocity.” See ibid., 782, 799-800. 
102 I would not be surprised if  my readers think what I am advancing here reminds them of  the 
characterization of  classical republicanism. Rawls described it as follows: “without a widespread 
participation in democratic politics by a vigorous and informed citizen body, and with a general retreat 
into private life, even the most well-designed political institutions will fall into the hands of  those who 
seek to dominate and impose their will through the state apparatus either for the sake of  power and 
military glory, or for reasons of  class and economic interest, not to mention expansionist religious 
fervor and nationalist fanaticism…The safety of  democratic liberties requires the active participation 
of  citizens who possess the political virtues needed to maintain a constitutional regime.” See John 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 205. In this sense, classical republicanism is compatible with political 
liberalism as classical republicanism does not presuppose a comprehensive religious, philosophical, or 
moral doctrine. In a later article “The Idea of  Public Reason Revisited”, Rawls admits this awareness 
of  civil participation of  citizens is one of  the political and social roots of  democracy, and is “vital to 
its enduring strength and vigor.” See John Rawls, “The Idea of  Public Reason Revisited,” 769. 
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Let us see how to distinguish positive participants from nonchalant bystanders 
exactly first. Positive participants and nonchalant bystanders are all citizens and enjoy 
equal political rights in a democratic regime; it is how they view themselves as citizens 
and their perspectives on political matters that distinguishes them. As I see it, the most 
significant difference between citizens who are positive participants and citizens who are 
nonchalant bystanders is that the former consider political matters from a “participant’s 
point of  view”.103 Participants taking part in public discussion accept public reason as the 
reason they should take to guide their public life. Nonchalant bystanders do not share the 
reasons underlying a state’s plans and decisions; instead, they still reason as individuals 
only. When a citizen takes a participant’s point of  view toward a political matter, his/her 
reason in the public discussion does not have to merely make sense to him/herself  alone, 
it has to be accessible, understood and shared by a general citizen body as well, otherwise 
a genuine public discussion is impossible to formulate, not to mention the goal of  public 
justification. That is to say, when a citizen reasons as a participant, s/he is genuinely 
willing to engage in a public discussion with fellow citizens, and s/he is also willing to 
adopt the statement that other citizens can understand and reason with him/her on the 
same basis. Therefore, under the circumstance of  reasonable pluralism, a citizen could 
submit one’s reason to the criticism of  others, and also to find that “the exercise of  a 
common critical rationality and consideration of  evidence can be shared to reveal one’s 
mistake.”104 Moreover, s/he can explain others’ mistake by evidence, identifiable errors 
and so forth, in other words, not by solely insisting their individual views.105 Public reason 
with the content of  conceptions of  justice in an overlapping consensus facilitates citizens 
to reach a public justification of  a certain political conception. When a political 
conception’s public justification is attained, the political power can be appropriately 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Moreover, Philip Pettit has argued that republicanism is never meant to oppose liberalism. Rather, 
replacing the concept of  negative liberty, republicanism is rather a radicalization of  liberalism. See 
Philip Pettit, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics (Oxford University Press, 1993) 
304. 
103 My introduction of  this term into my argument is largely inspired by H. L. A. Hart’s “internal 
point of  view” in The Concept of  Law. According to Hart, the “internal point of  view” expresses an 
essential feature of  law. From the internal point of  view, the law is not simply regarded as 
sanction-threatening, or a prediction of  judges’ decisions, but rather is obligation-laden. The reason I 
am bringing this term into public reason is because of  the essential point of  “internal point of  view”, 
an attitude of  acceptance for inside participants rather than outsiders. When participants accept the 
rules, they treat the rules as the standard of  their conduct, and they can legitimately criticize others 
when they fail to conform to the rules. Interestingly, Hart has made a very clear distinction between 
public officials and regular citizens in terms of  the subject. For Hart, such an attitude of  acceptance 
to the moral legitimacy of  laws only applies to judges, not to regular citizens. Citizens can have a 
number of  reasons to conform to the rules. They do not have to accept, or even understand the laws. 
See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of  Law (Oxford University Press, 1961) 56-123 (Chapter IV-VI). 
104 Thomas Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” 232. 
105 See ibid. 
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exercised, or, the legitimacy of  such a conception is fulfilled. The idea of  public reason 
signifies how the political relationship is to be understood by grounding political 
conceptions on the basic political values at the deepest level. Those nonchalant 
bystanders who insist that they should decide on fundamental political issues according 
to comprehensive values instead of  public reason certainly are incompatible with 
democratic citizenship. 
Perhaps we can show the difference between participants and bystanders more 
clearly from a simplified story of  a hypothetical election. Suppose, a citizen Bob, votes 
for Candidate Claire, because they come from the same hometown. Or, as an Anglican, 
Bob votes for Claire only because she is also an Anglican, and she is as religious as he is. 
Bob can only trust and like someone if  they have something in common, and he also 
believes that an Anglican candidate is more reliable than candidates from any other 
religious sect, let alone atheists. It appears that Bob has been a rather responsible 
participant here, since he cares about who holds the position in the public office and he 
might sincerely believe that he is being reasonable in voting that way. The problem is that 
Bob has no other reason that he can share with a general citizen body to convince others 
to accept his decision in voting for Claire. The best scenario is that other (very 
understanding) citizens can understand the decision that Bob votes for Claire, and they 
might even make the same decision—voting for Claire too for other reasons—but they 
cannot share or even understand the reason that Bob holds for his decision. The reason 
for Bob’s decision is only intelligible to him. On the other hand, say, there is a citizen 
called Derek, who also votes for Claire. The reason Derek votes for Claire is that he 
believes she is competent, caring, and she would do everything to bridge the expanding 
gap between the rich and the poor, judging from her past work experience and possibly 
her campaign speech. Psychologically, Derek maybe even not be passionate as Bob in 
taking part in this election; Nevertheless, Derek has fully participated here, because 
compared to Bob’s reasons, Derek’s reasons can be understood, accepted, and even 
shared by a general citizen body. Furthermore, if  there is hard evidence that Claire is not 
who she claims to be and she was severely corrupted in her previous occupation, and if  
Derek is made aware of  that new finding, which has been proved to be true, he is 
expected to change his opinion or at least have second thoughts in that vote. If  he still 
insists on voting for Claire regardless of  that evidence (and if  there is no other evidence 
in support of  Claire’s campaign), which is perfectly within his right, he might face some 
legitimate moral criticisms from other citizens. By contrast, Bob’s reason for voting for 
Claire cannot be criticized or revealed to be false in any way. When someone objects to 
Bob’s decision and reasoning, saying that Claire is not a qualified Anglican or being an 
Anglican is bad, Bob can hardly defend himself  by explaining others’ mistake except for 
insisting on his own religious view. It seems that Bob is taking part in this election, with 
all his enthusiasm, for reasons that are most convincing to himself. Nonetheless, Bob is 
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not viewing himself  as a genuine participant in advocating a reason that is beyond 
everyone else’s comprehension.  
This hypothetical election story involving Bob, Derek, and Claire may seem too 
idealistic and hardly reflective of  the contemporary political environment in many 
democratic states. After all, we do not have to take a poll to know that there are many 
citizens like Bob among the public who reason with their own comprehensive points of  
view while taking no consideration of  public reason. There is a powerful objection that 
claims the following: considering only citizens like Derek as the real participants has 
posed excessive burdens on citizens. I believe that it is precisely such an objection that 
impedes the development and maintenance of  a responsible and involved citizen body, 
and hence undermines the constitutional democracy. The details of  my arguments 
against such an objection will be further discussed in chapter five.106 However, for now, I 
only need to stress one point. The contemporary political actuality is disappointing(that 
many citizens simply vote for who they personally prefer, not to mention the fact that 
many citizens do not even bother to vote at all), but our understanding of  what 
democratic citizenship should be like by no means needs to be constrained by the dismal 
current situation. As Rawls said, it is not a matter of  law for citizens to understand and 
honor public reason, but such a moral duty “presents how things might be, taking people 
as a just and well-ordered society would encourage them to be”.107 
 
4.3 What About Unreasonable Citizens? 
 
Given these denotations of  reasonable citizens, a natural question arises: what about 
unreasonable citizens such as religious fundamentalists? Where to draw the line when we 
claim that someone is unreasonable? How to persuade them to be reasonable and accept 
this standard instead of  their sole religious truth? Rawls’s answer is that there is nothing 
more that could be said in addition to what we have already said.  
 
“The idea of  the politically reasonable is sufficient unto itself  for the purposes 
of  public reason when basic political questions are at stake. Of  course, 
fundamentalist religious doctrines and autocratic and dictatorial rulers will reject 
the ideas of  public reason and deliberative democracy. They will say that 
                                                             
106 This objection is normally called “the integrity objection”, which especially concerns the political 
conception of  secularism. Such an objection holds that public justification imposes excessive burdens 
on people of  faith because it restricts their adoption of  religious reasons, which undermines their 
integrity. I will come back to this in details in chapter five. Christopher J. Eberle, Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
and Kevin Vallier are among the objectors. The integrity objection is also tied to “the fairness 
objection”, which holds that public reason liberalism treats religious reasons and secular reasons 
unequally, giving arbitrary and unjustified preference to secular reasons. 
107 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 213. 
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democracy leads to a culture contrary to their religion, or denies the values that 
only autocratic or dictatorial rule can secure. They assert that the religiously true, 
or the philosophically true, overrides the politically reasonable. We simply say 
that such a doctrine is politically unreasonable. Within political liberalism 
nothing more need be said.”108  
 
I also believe that it is impossible to use reason to persuade unreasonable citizens, i.e., 
religious fundamentalists, to accept the fact that it is perfectly reasonable that other 
people have different conceptions of  the good other than theirs. Moreover, unreasonable 
citizens like religious fundamentalists, white-supremacy extremists, psychopaths, and so 
on usually reject that political society should be a fair system of  social cooperation, and 
all citizens have free and equal moral standing. By rejecting the fact of  reasonable 
pluralism and the basic presumptions of  the society and people, unreasonable citizens 
and their unreasonable doctrines threaten the normative stability of  liberal democratic 
polities.109 Although citizens may have the right to do wrong things, they do not have the 
“right to be unreasonable”, since rights exist “to permit or protect choices made within a 
limited domain” demarcated by other people’s rights, and if  “an act ceases to respect the 
right of  others”, it cannot be protected in the name of  right either.110 Therefore, those 
unreasonable citizens are not part of  “the constituency of  public justification”, that is to 
say, the liberal state can legitimately exercise political power over unreasonable citizens 
though they find the exercise of  political power unacceptable.111 Furthermore, although 
unreasonable citizens are not to be included in the constituency of  public justification 
they are still “entitled to the benefits of  citizenship”, such as freedom of  speech. 
However, Quong argues that it is permissible for the state to “contain” those 
unreasonable doctrines and speeches by “preventing their proliferation”. 112  It is 
compatible that, on the one hand, a religious fundamentalist can make fundamentalist 
claims in exercising their free speech, and on the other hand, the state takes actions to 
stop his claims from spreading. Unreasonable doctrines such as religious fundamentalist 
claims form no part of  a theory of  justice since they reject the fundamental elements in a 
liberal democratic society. 
For instance, a religious fundamentalist will find these actions unacceptable: the 
abolishment of  the crime of  blasphemy, the legalization of  same-sex marriages, and 
possibly the non-establishment of  a state religion, just to name a few. Those are all 
constitutional matters and worthy of  serious debate, which requires acceptable political 
decisions for all reasonable citizens. Although a religious citizen may also find these legal 
                                                             
108 John Rawls, “The Idea of  Public Reason Revisited”, 805-806.  
109 See Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, 291, 300. 
110 Ibid., 307. 
111  Ibid., 298, 314. 
112 Ibid., 298, 303. 
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actions unjust, he could still find them acceptable. A religious citizen, not a fundamentalist, 
would feel uncomfortable if  his God were blasphemed against and he would prefer other 
people not do that, but he would not insist that the blasphemer deserves to die or be 
heavily punished. He might believe that a homosexual is inherently morally flawed and 
the legalization of  same-sex marriage is against God’s wish, but he would not claim that 
if  someone is gay then he is inferior as a citizen. Likewise, his belief  in his religion would 
not prevent him from defending equal protection of  all religions. Similarly, a 
white-supremacist certainly would be against the equal standing of  people regardless of  
their races in the constitution, which, as an opinion, has no weight in public reason.   
 
4.4 Section Summary 
      
In this section, I have discussed the subjects of  public reason, which include public 
officials and ordinary reasonable citizens. Public officials as the representatives of  state 
power must refrain from invoking comprehensive doctrines in politics. Ordinary 
reasonable citizens also have a moral duty to deploy public reason in the political forum. 
Such a moral duty of  civility from the perspective of  citizens who are positive 
participants warrants their support of  an overlapping consensus of  reasonable political 
conceptions.  
When citizens are able to explain to others their political actions with the 
expectation that others can understand and accept their reasons, a public justification of  
a political conception is reached. In order to equally examine the legitimacy of  political 
institutions and the legal system on the same basis, citizens as participants in a 
democratic state are encouraged to employ shared public reasons. Therefore, religious 
reasons which do not fall within the overlapping consensus of  political conceptions are 
excluded from public reason in the political domain. The reason that a public justification 
of  political legitimacy can be achieved is because, in spite of  the divergences among 
citizens in terms of  comprehensive doctrines, reasonable and rational citizens who 
participate in a fair-terms social cooperation need to seek a most reasonable political 
conception whose coercive exercise could be reasonably endorsed by the majority of  
citizens. The fulfillment of  this need is fundamentally guaranteed by what democratic 
citizenship gives rise to. As for those religious fundamentalists who essentially denounce 
the free and equal standing of  all citizens or fair cooperation in society, they shall not be 
treated as constituencies of  public justification. Their endorsement or deprecation of  our 
political institutions and legal system plays no role at all. 
 
V. Why Do We Need Public Justification at All?  
 




Continuing after the second chapter, this chapter has further pursued the political 
approach to the justification of  political institutions, and I have argued for the public 
reason account of  public justification for political institutions’ political legitimacy. 
However, Charles Larmore proposes a question reminding us of  a fundamental gap yet 
to be filled in the public justification of  political institutions.  
Larmore’s question is: why should we believe that it is fundamentally important that 
the political institutions must be “rationally acceptable to all” (reasonable) citizens at 
all?113 Simply put, why do we need public justification at all? In other words, why is the 
pursuit of  agreement prior to truth in the political domain? His question suggests that 
the rejection of  invoking truth in justifying a political principle does not necessarily lead 
to the approach of  the principle of  public justification. Larmore furthermore suggests 
that there could be a variety of  options to fill in that gap other than the principle of  
public justification. For example, the problem of  political legitimacy may be insoluble at 
all without appealing to truth; or we could organize our political life around some other 
principle such as “the maximization of  the general welfare.”114 Why should we believe 
the following: since metaphysical and religious conceptions are no longer apt as bases of  
political principles, the master rule ought to be that political norms must be rationally 
acceptable to all citizens who are to be bound? There is clearly a gap between our refusal 
of  comprehensive doctrines’ political roles and our embracing of  the principle of  public 
justification. I would like to emphasize that the gap discussed here is not a rebuttal of  the 
critiques concerning political liberalism’s avoidance of  truth claims, namely to defend 
why the political liberal approach stays clear of  metaphysical truth.115 Rather, the task is 
                                                             
113 Charles Larmore, “The Moral Basis of  Political Liberalism,” The Journal of  Philosophy 96 (1999):619. 
114 Ibid. I believe this is a misleading example as such a master principle of  political legitimacy other 
than the principle of  public justification would have been excluded by Rawls, since it is also an 
assumption about the truth of  a comprehensive doctrine, in this case, a moral doctrine. 
115 Most of  Political Liberalism’s critiques have been engendered by its avoidance of  discussing the 
question of  truth. For instance, Joseph Raz has famously argued that Rawls’s epistemic abstinence of  
truth could result in us accepting a false doctrine of  justice on the basis of  false beliefs. See Joseph 
Raz, “Facing Diversity: The Case of  Epistemic Abstinence,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 19(1990): 3-46. 
Onora O’Neill doubts Rawls’s political liberalism whose normative claims are merely based on 
political reasonableness can be sustained without a moral theory of  truth backing. See Onora O’Neill, 
“Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of  John Rawls, Political Liberalism,” The 
Philosophical Review 1(1997): 411-428. David Estlund claims that “political liberalism must assert the 
truth and not merely reasonableness of  its foundational principles that doctrines are admissible as 
premises in political justification,” therefore the reticence about truth cannot be “waived across the 
board”. See David Estlund, “Insularity of  The Reasonable: Why Political Liberalism Must Admit the 
Truth,” Ethics 108(1998): 252-275.  
However, in Rawls’s defense, the idea of  the reasonable also makes an overlapping consensus of  
reasonable doctrines possible in ways the concept of  truth may not. Accepting the conception of  
reasonableness means that we are open to the notion that there could be several reasonable or true 
comprehensive doctrines. The fact of  reasonable pluralism being a permanent condition of  public 
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to point out why the rejection of  truth claims must take us to a public reason basis of  
public justification, which is an issue that only occurs after the rejection of  truth. These 
are two distinct questions.116  
Larmore’s own solution to the gap between sidetracking truth and embracing public 
justification is the “equal respect for persons”.117 For him, it is the equal respect we have 
for each other that propels us to look for common grounds while lacking truth claims as 
independent criteria. I believe that Larmore has raised a significant question and a 
promising answer, but I do not believe that his answer alone suffices. Equal respect alone 
is practically too weak and inadequate to account for the full concern behind the 
principle of  public justification. In a later article, Larmore has strengthened his account 
of  equal respect in the sense of  political liberalism. Larmore later argues that nothing in 
his “conception of  a person or in the principle of  respect” builds upon “individualist 
ideals”.118 For Larmore, “as persons we are, whatever our view of  the good, beings 
essentially capable not only of  thinking and acting for what we take to be reasons, but 
also of  our capacity of  reflecting on such reasons in the sense of  examining whether 
what appear to be reasons really are good reasons.”119 Thus, Larmore deems the reason 
that “respect for persons has the position in political liberalism” is not “because it 
constitutes common ground and forms an object of  reasonable agreement, but because 
it is what directs us in the first place to look for common ground, to seek the principles 
                                                                                                                                                                               
culture under free institutions makes the idea of  the reasonable more suitable as part of  the basis of  
public justification for a constitutional regime than the idea of  moral truth. “Holding a political 
conception as true, and for that reason alone the one suitable basis of  public reason, is exclusive, even 
sectarian, and so likely to foster political division”. Nevertheless, Rawls underlines the point several 
times that political liberalism’s abstinence of  discussing truth by no means implies that political 
liberalism negates the criteria of  truth of  comprehensive views or deprecates their importance. 
Political liberalism does not, in any sense, criticize or reject any particular theory of  truth of  moral 
judgments. Conversely, political liberalism fully appreciates the importance of  moral or religious truth. 
They are simply beyond the scope of  political liberalism, as we are aware of  the fundamental 
irreconcilability of  diverse comprehensive doctrines including religious ones. Political liberalism does 
not aim to answer any questions regarding comprehensive views, not to mention to replace their 
criteria of  what is true. Political liberalism’s abstinence from engaging in questions of  comprehensive 
doctrines precisely manifests the acceptance of  the fact of  reasonable pluralism and the awareness of  
the fundamental importance of  our comprehensive religious and moral doctrines. More importantly, 
the reason that the truth of  comprehensive doctrines does not concern political liberalism is because 
it is precisely the room political liberalism leaves for liberty of  conscience. See John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, 129, 394-395. 
116 Nonetheless neither Rawls nor Habermas provides an adequate answer to this question. They just 
presume the inevitability of  the shift from comprehensive doctrines to the principle of  public 
justification as the master basis. 
117 See Charles Larmore, “The Moral Basis of  Political Liberalism”, 621. 
118 See Charles Larmore, “Political Liberalism: Its Motivation and Goals,” in Oxford Studies in Political 
Philosophy Vol I (David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall ed., Oxford University Press, 2015) 78. 
119 Ibid., 77. 
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of  our political life in the area of  reasonable agreement.”120 I believe that the inclination 
toward equal respect for persons is on the right track. Although Rawls does not explicitly 
spell out equal respect for persons as a moral principle, he does reckon that the free and 
equal status of  all citizens is a prerequisite condition for political liberalism.   
However, my problem is that the equal respect we have for each other does not 
necessarily direct us to look for common ground, nor does a common ground necessarily 
warrant acceptance from all reasonable citizens. Relations in the political domain include, 
on the one hand, the horizontal relationship between all reasonable citizens, whereas on 
the other hand, they are greatly highlighted by the vertical relationship between political 
authority and citizens.121 While Larmore’s proposal aims to focus on accounting for the 
vertical relationship in political life, it remains unexplained why equal respect alone could 
dictate my acceptance of  political coercion. We need something else, together with the 
equal respect, for persons to explain the normative force of  public justification of  
political legitimacy. 
 
5.2 Impersonal Standpoint and Interpersonal Standpoint 
 
Thomas Nagel’s plan in answer this question has illustrated exactly what we deem is 
lacking here. He believes that the shift to the principle of  public justification after the 
abstinence of  truth talk regarding political legitimacy pertains to an “epistemological 
restraint”: the distinction between what is needed to “justify a belief ” and “justify the 
political coercion of  a belief ”.122 And the latter task demands a more stringent standard 
of  objectivity, which he believes is impartiality independent of  all comprehensive beliefs. 
Nagel defends a “highest-order framework of  moral reasoning which takes us outside 
ourselves to a standpoint that is independent of  who we are.”123 Nagel has brought us 
nearer to the core by identifying the distinctiveness of  political coercion; however, 
political power exercised upon impartiality independent of  all comprehensive doctrines is 
still not necessarily acceptable to all reasonable citizens. That is to say, there is no 
conceptual relation between the impartiality of  political institutions and its acceptability 
to all reasonable citizens. A reasonable citizen may not accept the coercion of  a certain 
law even if  such a law is impartial to all reasonable citizens, since the principle of  
impartiality does not exclude the possibility that the law might be impartially irrelevant to 
all citizens. I understand that the point of  this independent standpoint is to implore the 
state and each citizen to be fair to every reasonable citizen, but the problem is precisely 
situated at the “independent” standpoint. Nagel seems to imply that we cannot be 
                                                             
120 Ibid., 80. 
121 See Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: a Republican Theory and Model of  Democracy (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012)136. 
122 See Thomas Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” 229. 
123 Ibid.  
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impartial and fair to each other if  we do not take ourselves out of  our own standpoints. 
The thing is that, if  we take a detached point of  view, unless our purpose is merely 
descriptive, say, to observe and understand the organization of  our society, there is no 
reason that we would be especially concerned about, or care about, the prescriptive 
question, such as the legitimacy of  this political society that we dwell upon. Do we have to 
picture ourselves as someone who is outside of  the political society to be fair to each 
other? Can we still be fair and reasonable to each other given that we are all committed 
participants within this political community and take the standpoint inside of  the political 
community? 
    I believe that the problem of  taking a detached point of  view for evaluating political 
legitimacy is that the nature of  political life is the inter homines, or more accurately, inter 
cives relations between every reasonable citizen in the same political community. It is 
perfectly possible for us to make observations and comprehend how the organism that is 
our political society works from an outside, Archimedean point of  view. However, we 
cannot genuinely accept the normative force for us to act in an impartial and fair way to 
all others from that standpoint. Rawls’s critique of  the impartial sympathetic spectator 
may of  some help to grasp the distinction between an Archimedean perspective and an 
internal one. Rawls argues that the adoption of  an outside perspective essentially 
“mistakes impersonality for impartiality” since the outside spectator neglects the 
differences between individuals.124 An Archimedean point of  view is envisioned to 
interpret impartiality; however, if  we identify ourselves as someone out of  this society, 
we identify ourselves with every member of  the society, and at the same time we stand 
for no one. We are tempted to imagine ourselves in the place of  each person in turn, and 
balance all desires and satisfactions to determine the total result.125 From the outside 
perspective, we “compare everyone’s aspirations and approve of  institutions according to 
the extent to which they satisfy the one system of  desire in which we view everyone’s 
desires as our own.126 The total result would be “a conflation of  all desires into one 
system of  desire.”127 Therefore, an outside spectator is not the only, and actually not a 
good perspective that is impartial enough to make moral judgments. “Instead of  defining 
impartiality from the standpoint of  an outside spectator [litigator] who responds to the 
conflicting interests of  others as if they were his own,” we could define impartiality from 
the standpoint of  the participants themselves.128 The genuine normative force for my 
action derives from the attitude that I see myself  as one equal member, just as everyone 
else, of  my political community, and the progress of  my political community is pertinent 
                                                             
124 See John Rawls, A Theory of  Justice, 190. 
125 Ibid., 187. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid., 188. 
128 Ibid., 190. 
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to my practical action.129  
Political life ultimately aims to resolve the issue of  how all human beings who share 
the same political community can live together, harmoniously and prosperously. Rawls’s 
shift of  political justification in the project of  political liberalism exactly takes note of  
such a nature of  politics. The importance of  the fact of  reasonable pluralism of  
comprehensive doctrines does not lie in those doctrines themselves; rather, it lies in the 
reasonable citizens who hold those comprehensive doctrines. Only doing the right thing 
according to moral truth could be a universal ethical standard for individuals in their 
ethical life, while politics is not just about doing the right thing, since the decision in 
politics is related to every citizen who lives in the same political society together with 
me.130 For the sake of  simplicity, but at the risk of  crudeness, what essentially matters in 
politics is not any truth of  comprehensive doctrines held by the people, but the people who hold 
different claims of  comprehensive doctrines. This difference applies to moral life as well, 
as an ethical judgment makes a claim about what people should do, while morality is 
about how we should interact with other people, and the subject of  morality is “how we 
should relate to one another.”131 Therefore, the previous epistemological restraint that 
Nagel brings about between “justifying a belief ” and “justifying the political coercion of  
a belief ” has omitted one step between them, which is “justifying a belief  to other 
people”. Hence, practical reason in morality and politics has a certain interpersonal or 
intersubjective character due to their natures. Since the moral point of  view is an 
essentially “common and intersubjective perspective that emerges from attempts of  
moral agents in actual social interaction to articulate together the outlines of  a common 
moral world,” the practical reasoning in morality is essentially “robustly public”.132 I 
believe that the consideration of  the justification of  political legitimacy, namely the 
justification of  the exercise of  political coercion, instead of  departing from the 
                                                             
129 I have to clarify that my aim is not to challenge the validity or intelligibility of  the impersonal or 
detached point of  view; rather, what I am calling into question is the desirability of  such an 
impersonal point of  view for the discourse of  morality and politics. I understand that Nagel 
introduces the impersonal standpoint, just like the original position in Rawls’s TJ, as a theoretical 
instrument to manifest the possibility to be impartial to all human beings when it comes to morality. 
Nevertheless, for my purpose here, if  we can understand how to be impartial and fair to all reasonable 
citizens from a more direct and accessible perspective, the interpersonal standpoint, I don’t see why 
we need to take the impersonal point into account. 
130 I follow the terminology of  ethics and morality developed by Bernard Williams in Ethics and the 
Limits of  Philosophy (1985) and adopted by Ronald Dworkin in Justice for Hedgehogs (2011). See Ronald 
Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 25, 426. And Christine M. Korsgaard also endorses such a grasp of  
morality. See Christine M. Korsgaard, “The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction 
between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values,” Social Philosophy and Policy 10(1993): 24-51. 
131 Christine M. Korsgaard, “The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction between 
Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values,” 24. 




impersonal, detached standpoint, it should depart from an interpersonal or 
intersubjective committed point of  view which takes the political society as a whole into 
account. As Rawls and Nagel have illuminated, what is special about the domain of  the 
political compared to the moral is that the justification of  certain beliefs could lend the 
political authority legitimacy to force those beliefs upon all citizens. Therefore, the reason 
that the state should refrain from imposing the truth claim of  any particular 
comprehensive doctrine is not because of  the merit of  other comprehensive doctrines, 
but rather out of  respect for those citizens who hold all kinds of  reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. 
Let me summarize the argumentative threads thus far. To begin with, Larmore 
reminds us of  an easily neglected argumentative gap between the rejection of  the truth 
claims of  comprehensive doctrines and the adoption of  public justification in political 
liberalism. He proposes to fill in the gap “equal respect for persons”, which correctly lays 
the emphasis of  political justification on persons who hold comprehensive doctrines, 
rather than the truth of  any comprehensive doctrine. However, I believe that the gap is 
not yet adequately fulfilled, since “equal respect for persons” alone by no means entails 
the acceptance or endorsement of  all reasonable citizens. We also need to look for the 
normative basis of  reasonable citizens’ acceptance of  political legitimacy. And I argue 
that such a basis hinges on a committed interpersonal standpoint, in contrast with a 
detached Archimedean point of  view, taken by reasonable citizens, which means that the 
exercise of  political coercion has to make sense to all of  them. That is to say, the 
justification of  political legitimacy should be sensitive to all reasonable citizens, and 
would cease to make sense without them.  
The favorability of  public justification from the standpoint of  the public (all 
reasonable citizens) is well displayed by Rawlsian public reason as shown in this chapter. 
Nevertheless, the standpoint of  the public leaves two interpretations of  thesis S available, 
and we have to decide which one is the more desirable interpretation: thesis S3, which 
Rawls has advocated and I would argue for, views public reason as the public avowing 
their shared reasons as a group agency representing all of  us, and therefore unshareable 
reasons cannot be counted as public reason (this is also usually referred to as ‘the 
consensus approach’); thesis S2’, which views public reason as the convergence of  
reasons of  each individual in the political community, and therefore all kinds of  reasons 
and doctrines should be accommodated in the public sphere (also called ‘the convergence 
approach’). The immediate task for me in the following chapters is to defend the former 
approach to thesis S and facing the challenges from the latter one.   
 
VI. Conclusions and Objections 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that Thesis S3 can be publicly justified on the basis of  
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public reason that can be shared among reasonable citizens, which is rooted in 
democratic citizenship. Public reason with the content of  political conceptions of  justice 
in an overlapping consensus facilitates citizens to reach a public justification of  political 
legitimacy. This public reason approach is usually referred to “the consensus approach”. 
Since in public reason, ideas of  truth based on comprehensive doctrines are replaced by 
an idea of  political reasonableness, a basis of  political reasoning that can be shared 
among free and equal citizens is created. This shareability feature of  public reason 
consequently excludes religious reasons from public reason and justification, and we thus 
arrive at the most exclusive version of  thesis S, thesis S3; that the separation of  state and 
religion requires the exclusion of  religion from the political domain. 
Thesis S3, secularism on the basis of  public reason, considers gaining the majority 
support of  reasonable and rational citizens as the ideal goal. It is nevertheless still subject 
to a wide range of  critiques, from religious critics and some political liberals as well. They 
believe that the separation of  state and religion ought not to be constrained to such an 
extent. They question the forming of  an overlapping consensus and they argue that 
religious citizens can reasonably reject the idea of  public reason and its moral duty of  
civility, in favor of  a view that citizens should be able to advocate and vote on their 
deepest concerns, even if  these are religious reasons alone, where fundamental political 
matters are at stake. For instance, they would argue that Bob’s decision and reasoning in 
voting for Claire only because she is an Anglican is as tenable as Derek’s reason to vote 
for Claire. Insofar as there is a convergence on a certain institution (e.g., laws) from 
individuals regardless of  their motivations or reasons, they argue that we do not need to 
require a public shared reason underlying such a convergence, and hence there is no stark 
separation of  state and religion. In the following two chapters, I will consider the 
convergence approach’s critiques of  the consensus approach at length. And finally, after 
addressing the challenges from the critics, I will come back to provide a final defense of  
the consensus approach in Chapter Six.   
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In contrast to the consensus approach which argues for a shareable public reason, an 
alternative convergence approach believes that citizens shall be capable of considering 
and supporting the laws and political institutions from their own standpoints. Regarding 
the consensus approach’s requirement of shareable public reason, I will summarize four 
major critiques raised by the convergence approach, which concern the plausibility and 
desirability of the requirement. In this chapter, my focus will be the two critiques of  the 
first aspect, the plausibility of  shareable public reason. The two critiques are both based 
on the fact of  reasonable pluralism. The examinations of  the two critiques intend to 
show that the consensus approach will not be rendered implausible due to the fact of  
reasonable pluralism. More significantly, I will claim that the fact of  reasonable pluralism 
has to concede to a boundary of  the value of  justice, which is the foundation that the 
consensus approach is established upon. This concession is, however, compatible with, 
rather than in conflict with the undertaking of  political liberalism.   
The first critique, on the basis of  the appreciation of  the fact of  reasonable 
pluralism, claims that the convergence approach does not believe that public reason can 
be shared at all, as reasons and beliefs are relative or subjective to each individual.1 The 
second critique specifically questions the plausibility of  the content of  public reason, 
namely the possibility of  reaching an overlapping consensus on a family of  conceptions 
of  justice. They argue that besides reasonable disagreements about comprehensive 
doctrines, there are also profound and fundamentally reasonable disagreements about 
justice. Hence, citizens are just as much divided by reasonable disagreements about 
justice as divided by reasonable pluralism of  comprehensive doctrines. Therefore, it is 
unlikely such a consensus on conceptions of  justice can be reached.  
I argue that these two objections cannot survive further scrutiny. The convergence 
approach has pushed the fact of  reasonable pluralism too far to destroy the objectivity 
of  public justification. Regarding the second objection, granted that reasonable 
disagreements about justice are as profound as reasonable disagreements about 
comprehensive doctrines, the former disagreements nonetheless do not plague liberalism 
as much as the latter one. I will point out that reasonable disagreements about justice are 
                                                             
1 This point is mainly illustrated in Gerald Gaus’s works. For instance, “Subjective Value and 
Justificatory Political Theory”, in Justification Nomos XXVIII(Roland J. Pennock and John W. Chapman 
ed., New York University Press, 1986); Justificatory Liberalism: an essay on epistemology and political theory, 
(Oxford University Press, 1996); The Order of  Public Reason: a theory of  freedom and morality in a diverse and 
bounded world (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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already presupposed and even encouraged by the project of  political liberalism. It is 
precisely our reasonable disagreements about the interpretations of  ‘what justice is’ that 
push the understanding and realization of  social justice forward. Furthermore, the 
former disagreements do not occupy the same level as the latter in that the 
disagreements about justice are still disagreements on the basis on the agreement of  
some basic assumptions. I will introduce a distinction between “justificatory 
disagreements” and “foundational disagreements” developed by Jonathan Quong to 
explain that.2 Moreover, I will argue that the deeper reason that reasonable disagreements 
about justice are less foundational than reasonable disagreements about comprehensive 
doctrines is because we already share the foundational commitment to the value of  
justice, whose grounding values are freedom, equality, and fairness. In subscribing to the 
foundational value of  justice, the fact of  reasonable pluralism of  comprehensive 
doctrines has also been limited by justice.  
    Here is how this chapter will proceed. In the next section, I’ll explain the 
convergence approach’s reasoning, including a standard account of  the label of  
convergence and the religious critiques which also follow a convergence approach to 
public justification. The third section will begin with the convergence approach’s 
critiques of  the plausibility of  public reason’s shareability requirement, followed by the 
consensus account’s refutations of  the subjectivism critique and the asymmetry critique 
in the fourth and fifth sections respectively. In the sixth and seventh sections, I will 
unfold my argument that the consensus approach is deeply committed to the value of  
justice.      
 
II. The Argument for the Convergence Approach 
 
2.1 Overview of  the Contrast between the Consensus Approach and the Convergence 
Approach 
 
As already illustrated in the previous chapter, in Political Liberalism, due to the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, John Rawls shifted his main purpose from the quest for a 
conception of justice to its public justification or legitimacy that a political conception 
should be justifiable to all reasonable citizens in a democratic regime. Once we accept the 
fact that in a democratic regime, reasonable people tend to disagree with each other with 
regard to their comprehensive doctrines, it is clear that no moral foundation is 
sufficiently agreed upon as a public basis of  justification for political conceptions on 
                                                             
2 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (Oxford University Press, 2011) 193. 
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fundamental political matters. Therefore, Rawls argues for a retreat from the discussions 
of  comprehensive doctrines to look for a legitimate political conception’s coercive 
exercise that is publically justifiable to all reasonable citizens, which together have 
divergent religious and moral beliefs. 
With regard to the justificatory reasons for coercive political conceptions, political 
liberals divide according to two approaches. Political liberals such as Thomas Nagel, 
Charles Larmore, Stephen Macedo and Jonathan Quong adopt a consensus approach that 
public justification should be reached on the basis of public reasons that can be shared 
among reasonable citizens.3 The alternative camp, mainly led by Gerald Gaus, argues for 
a convergence approach of public justification.4 According to Gaus, public justification of 
certain laws or policies can be obtained as long as those laws are supported by all citizens 
who do not necessarily and do not need to share any common standpoint on supporting 
reasons. Fred D’ Agostino nicely developed the contrast between these two approaches 
as5:  
 
The consensus approach: A and B share the reason R or a set of reasons Rs to 
support the law L.  
The convergence approach: A has a reason Ra to support the law L, B has a 
reason Rb to support the same law L. 
 
Before I unfold the convergence approach’s arguments further, two significant caveats 
need to be brought to attention. First, the public justification that the consensus 
approach puts forward at no point depends on actual endorsement but only needs to be 
                                                             
3 Their explicit endorsement of  the consensus approach can be seen in Thomas Nagel, “Moral 
Conflict and Political Legitimacy”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 16(1987): 215-240; Charles Larmore, 
“Political Liberalism”, Political Theory 18(1990): 339-360; Stephen Macedo, “Liberal Civic Education 
and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of  God v. John Rawls” in Ethics 105 (1995): 468-496, “Why 
public reason? Citizens’ reasons and the constitution of  the public sphere”, unpublished; Jonathan 
Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
4 I need to make it clear that the division of  the consensus approach and the convergence approach 
is not merely a division inside political liberalism. Rather, the convergence approach is also favored by 
a wider range than those political liberals who are against the consensus approach. For instance, 
Christopher Eberle and Nicholas Wolterstorff  opt for a convergence approach without necessarily 
accepting the conception of  public justification itself. The details are illustrated in 2.2. 
5 Fred D’ Agostino, Free Public Reason: making it up as we go along. (New York: Oxford University Press 
1996) 29.  
The two approaches do not actually exclude each other. We can start with the convergence 
approach, but try to find more common ground in a society. While the convergence approach is a 
threshold approach, the consensus approach strives for a more ambitious ideal of living together. I 
thank Paul Cliteur for making this point so clearly. 
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endorsable. The criterion for public justification is not actual acceptance but 
acceptability.6 The first caveat is to say that the question of public justification is a 
normative one, and it aims to work out the content and structure of liberal political 
justification given the fact of reasonable pluralism in any democratic society. Second, it 
does not depend on beliefs from all actual citizens but provisionally reasonable citizens. 
Reasonable citizens accept the fact of reasonable pluralism and are willing to abide by fair 
terms of social cooperation. The essence of  being reasonable for citizens who share a 
political life together simply is to take other people’s interests or considerations into 
account. The limitation in reasonable citizens as the constituency of  democratic societies 
responds to a naturally raised question about religious fundamentalists. As I’ve discussed 
previously in chapter three, those religious fundamentalists, who reject the fact of  
reasonable pluralism and who usually reject the notion that citizens are free and equal, 
necessarily reject the project of  public justification. Therefore they are excluded from the 
constituency of  public justifications despite their citizenship.7 The point of these two 
caveats is that if political conceptions cannot be publically justifiable to every reasonable 
citizen of a well-ordered society, it is not practically relevant at all. 
    In a nutshell, the consensus approach argues that given the respect for free and 
equal citizens and the fact of reasonable pluralism, in a democratic regime, it is 
unreasonable and wrong to use state power to coerce those who have disagreed with our 
comprehensive truth. The justification of coercive political conceptions, instead, must be 
based on the reasons that can be shared by most reasonable citizens. However, the 
convergence approach argues that what the consensus approach aspires to is implausible. 
Moreover, the consensus approach’s insistence on shared public reason has imposed 
unnecessary burdens on citizens, especially religious citizens. Why cannot citizens 
participate in public life according to their convictions? Would not the requirement or 
ideal of using shared public reason become a serious obstacle of citizens’ democratic 
                                                             
6 A popular misunderstanding of  the consensus approach confuses the task of  public justification 
with actual popular acceptance whereas popular acceptance is such a foundational assumption or 
starting point of  political liberalism that liberalism will be unstable without it. See Jonathan Quong, 
Liberalism without Perfection, 159. 
7 See ibid., 298. 
In a lecture on political liberalism, Burton Dreben said the following: “Too many philosophers, 
even today, spend too much of  their time trying to argue in the abstract for political liberalism against, 
say, totalitarianism and so forth. This does not seem to me to be a worthy philosophical enterprise. If  
one cannot see the benefits of  living in a liberal constitutional democracy, if  one does not see the 
virtue of  that ideal, then I do not know how to convince him. To be perfectly blunt, sometimes I am 
asked, when I go around speaking for Rawls, What do you say to an Adolf  Hitler? The answer is 
[nothing.] You shoot him. You do not try to reason with him. Reason has no bearing on that question.” 
Burton Dreben, “On Rawls and Political Liberalism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. (Samuel 
Freeman ed., New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 329. 
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participation, or even worse, their religious freedom? The convergence approach thus 
advances a different conception of public justification to emancipate religious citizens 
from the burdens. 
 
2.2 The Political Liberal Convergence Approach8 
 
The most prominent argument for the convergence approach derives from Gerald 
Gaus’s advocacy. As the leading figure of  the convergence approach, Gaus has 
constructed an exquisite framework of  the convergence approach to public justification. 
As a matter of  fact, Gaus’s convergence approach actually shares some basic 
assumptions and considerations with the consensus approach, which makes it a political 
liberal approach as well. However, it fundamentally departs from the consensus approach 
on the analysis of  rational justification and the criterion of  public justification. To start 
with, attributing Gaus’s convergence approach advocacy to political liberalism is based on 
the fact that Gaus’s convergence account also concedes the fact of  reasonable pluralism. 
Moreover, the framework of  Gaus’s endorsement of  the convergence approach of  
public justification is actually built upon the fact of  reasonable pluralism. While the 
consensus approach asks citizens to refrain from invoking their comprehensive doctrines 
in public reason because of  the fact of  reasonable pluralism, Gaus understands the fact 
of  reasonable pluralism as a basis for encouraging citizens to bring their comprehensive 
doctrines into public reason. Gaus believes that the fact of  reasonable pluralism entails a 
subjectivism of  reasons and beliefs. Consequently, he regards the law as publicly justified 
so long as it is justified for every individual regardless of  what grounds they have.  
Along with the consensus approach, Gaus also believes that a personal justified 
belief  need not be epistemically true or objectively justified for every individual. The 
consensus approach argues for the abstinence from referring to the idea of  truth in 
political justification, while it leaves the exploration of  moral truth to every reasonable 
citizen individually. Yet, Gaus argues for the “divorce the idea of  a good reason from the 
idea of  truth” in the whole sphere of  moral justification, on the basis of  a subjectivism 
of  reasons and rational justification, which also entails the fact of  reasonable pluralism.9 
Gaus proposes an idea of  “open justification”, whose core idea is that an openly justified 
belief  system is “stable in the face of  acute and sustained criticism by others and of  new 
information.”10 It is possible that there may be “multiple and conflicting belief  systems 
                                                             
8 The arguments I am going to discuss in this subsection are mainly made by Gerald Gaus, while 
some other scholars also follow this line of  convergence approach, such as Kevin Vallier.  
9 See Gerald Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism: an essay on epistemology and political theory, 63. 
10 Ibid., 31. 
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that are openly justifiable for the persons holding them.”11 This open justification 
therefore inescapably leads to subjectivism in relation to reasons. Gaus believes it is 
better to analyze a rational belief  system in terms of  the relations between its members 
instead of  referring to the idea of  truth. He believes that this line of  analyzing rational 
beliefs “allows us to proceed while putting aside divisive metaphysical issues.”12 Since the 
burden of  judgments has played a significant role in political liberalism, by loosening the 
link between justified rational belief  and the idea of  truth, Gaus believes that two routes 
lead to a subjectivism or pluralism of  reasons. First, everyone’s basic belief  differs, 
therefore even if  different people use the same inferential or “logical operations” on 
their basic beliefs, they would not agree with each other in the conclusions.13 Moreover, 
the fact of  reasonable pluralism is not just that pluralism restricted to normative ethics 
but also that it applies to moral epistemological views, which means that different people 
may employ different evaluative standards, and even various logical or inferential 
connectives to arrive at their conclusions. After all, the fact of  reasonable pluralism 
signifies that people can still recognize others’ belief  systems as rational even if  they 
differ both on their substantive beliefs and their theories of  justification.14 
The point of  searching for a public justification of  certain beliefs derives from the 
justification of  issuing moral demands on others, which is “a requirement of  moral 
life”.15 Generally speaking, Gaus believes that a free moral person has an interest in living 
in ways that are in accordance with their own standards of  what is right or what is good. 
At least, a free moral person is “bound only by moral requirements that can be validated 
from his own point of  view”.16 The crux of  morality according to Gaus is a way for us to 
“relate to each other as rational agents who can give each other reasons” for actions.17 
Morality thus requires us to reason from the standpoint of  others. And “to treat another 
as free and equal moral person is to accept that moral claims must be validated from 
their perspectives when they employ their rational faculties” with due reflection.18 Hence, 
to justify a moral belief  to someone is to make such a moral belief  justifiable from that 
person’s perspective, namely, “there must be a reason for her.”19 The justified reason is 
thus sensitive to the specific moral agents in certain interpersonal relations. In addition, 
                                                             
11 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, 269. 
12 Gerald Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism: an essay on epistemology and political theory, 43. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 129. 
16 Gerald Gaus, “The Moral Foundations of  Liberal Neutrality,” in Contemporary Debates in Political 
Philosophy (Thomas Christiano and John Christman ed., Wiley-Blackwell Publishing , 2009) 84. 
17 Ibid., 86. 
18 Ibid., 85. 
19 Ibid., 86. 
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the fact of  reasonable pluralism suggests that the reason I have to justify my moral 
demands on her is not expected to be valid to others, but particularly on her. Due to the 
subjectivism of  reasons for each individual, Gaus understands the standard of  public 
justification as sufficient reasons sensitive to specific subjects: “a proffered justificatory 
argument must provide everybody who is to be subject to the [proposed] arrangement 
with sufficient reasons”.20 Accordingly, to publicly justify a moral or political conception 
requires that the conception be validated from the perspective of  every free and equal 
moral person.  
The most significant characteristic that differentiates Gaus’s convergence approach 
from the consensus approach concerns the sorts of  justificatory reasons. Gaus classifies 
justificatory reasons into three kinds, ranging from the loosest one to the most stringent 
kind as intelligible reasons, accessible reasons, and shareable reasons. His convergence 
approach argues that the intelligible reasons suffice, while the latter two requirements of  
accessibility and shareability are unnecessary and too rigid. 21  The intelligibility 
requirement only demands that the reasons can figure in a justification for a certain 
political arrangement, such as a coercive law, so long as the members of  the public can 
see those reasons as reasons for them, “as opposed to mere utterances, expressions of  
emotions or other irrational demands.”22 Departing from the approach claimed by the 
consensus liberals, Gaus argues that the validation of  the political conception does not 
require a strong “publicness” in the sense that the reasons must be based on beliefs 
actually shared by all as long as it has given good reasons intelligible to everybody that they 
subscribe to the political arrangement.23 Therefore, the consensus in supporting reasons 
is not necessary to expect; a convergence upon the moral demand suffices.  
Let me sum up Gaus’s arguments in approximately four steps. First of  all, given 
the open justification, you and I are both justified in holding our different belief  systems. 
The most crucial step Gaus takes is that secondly, the reasons and rational justifications 
of  evaluating your and my belief  systems are not truth, rather, they are analyzed in terms 
of  the relations among us. Therefore it is rational for you to hold a certain belief  α which 
is within your belief  system, even if  belief  α is not justified for me. Consequently, thirdly, 
public justification requires that my moral demands can be imposed on you on the 
                                                             
20 Gerald Gaus, “Subjective Value and Justificatory Political Theory”, 255. 
21 Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier, “The Roles of  Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: 
the implications of  convergence, asymmetry and political institutions,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 35 
(2009): 51-76. 
22 Vallier, Kevin, “Public Justification”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/justification-public/>.  
23 See Gerald Gaus, “Subjective Value and Justificatory Political Theory”, 256. Italic added by me.  
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condition that my moral demands are justified, not from mine or anyone else’s, but from 
your point of  view. The rejection of  truth and a justified reason that is sensitive to 
particular interlocutors in relations together produce the inevitable outcome of  
reasonable pluralism, a subjectivism of  justifications. In other words, justified reasons are 
subjective to differing standpoints occupied by different members of  the public. Fourthly, 
the fact of  reasonable pluralism implies that no one’s reason is hence likely to be widely 
endorsed by every member of  the public. That is to say, according to Gaus, the 
consensus approach’s shared public reason requirement is unattainable by virtue of  the 
very fact of  reasonable pluralism. Therefore, the prevalent version of  the convergence 
approach is as follows: 
 
(1) A believes that, at the level of  public deliberation in the public discourse, he 
has a sufficient reason Ra to endorse the law L. 
       B believes that, at the level of  public deliberation in the public discourse, 
she has a sufficient reason Rb to endorse the law L. 
(2) Reason Ra and Rb are both reasons from A’s and B’s comprehensive belief  
systems. That is to say, given reasonable pluralism, they are neither the same 
nor can be categorized to the same evaluative set, for instance, political 
values.  
(3) A does not hold the same comprehensive doctrines as B does. B does not 
hold the same comprehensive doctrines as A does either. 
(4) However, Gaus argues, on the basis of  his theory of  justification, a rational 
belief  system is determined according to its members’ belief  system instead 
of  the idea of  truth.  
(5) Therefore, it is possible that A regards B’s comprehensive belief  system as 
rational for B to believe. B also regards A’s comprehensive doctrines as 
rational for A to believe. 
(6) A and B are both sincere in public deliberation. 
(7) A believes that B is justified in endorsing the law L. B also believes that A is 
justified in endorsing the law L.  
Therefore, 
(8) Given that A believes that, at the level of  public deliberation in the public 
discourse, he has a sufficient reason Ra to endorse the law L. 
B believes that, at the level of  public deliberation in the public discourse, she 
has a sufficient reason Rb to endorse the law L. 
C believes that, at the level of  public deliberation in the public discourse, she 




N believes that, at the level of  public deliberation in the public discourse, he 
has a sufficient reason Rn to endorse the law L. 
(9) Ra, Rb, Rc…Rn are not public in the sense that the consensus approach 
adopts. They are not the same, nor can they be attributed to the same 
evaluative set, for instance, political values. They can be any reason as A, B, 
C…N sees fit. 
 
2.3 A Broader Version of the Convergence Approach: Religious Critics 
 
For my purpose, the convergence approach in contrast with the consensus approach is a 
broader approach compared to the political liberal convergence approach that Gaus has 
adopted and developed. What brings religious critics into alignment with the political 
liberal convergence approach is their objection to the consensus approach’s insistence on 
the shareable public reason requirement. The adoption of  such a requirement would 
exclude religious reasons and arguments from the public sphere, since they are not 
shareable with all citizens. This is something that religious critics fundamentally oppose. 
Contrariwise, the convergence approach essentially maintains that citizens will be able to 
introduce any reason they fit into public reason and justification. They believe that a 
more generous approach to religion not only better honors citizens’ freedom but also 
greatly benefits our political society. Some religious critics, as will be shown later, who do 
not adopt the name of  the convergence approach or who do not regard themselves as 
belonging with this approach do advocate a similar strategy. That is to say, insofar as 
there is a convergence on a certain institution or laws from individuals, a public shared 
reason underlying such a convergence is not enlisted whatsoever. Their specific 
viewpoints and arguments differ from each other to some extent and also from the 
standard account of Gaus’s convergence account; nonetheless, contra the consensus 
approach regarding the place of religious reasons and arguments, they do generally 
support a convergence claim that “citizens should be uninhibited in giving expression to 
their particular conceptions of truth and value and, indeed, inviting such expression in all 
deliberative settings makes for a better politics.”24  
    Michael Perry believes that it is unfair to exclude religious doctrines for three 
reasons. First of all, controversial religious beliefs are not necessarily more problematic 
than controversial nonreligious beliefs.25 Secondly, speaking from the perspective of an 
                                                             
24 Stephen Macedo, “Why Public Reason? Cooperation, Law, and Mutual Assurance”, working paper 
in progress. 
25  Michael J. Perry, “Religious Morality and Political Choice: Further Thoughts—and Second 
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American, he argues that religious beliefs are not necessarily divisive or destabilizing for a 
still highly religious American society. On the contrary, religious arguments to some 
degree promote good political decisions. 26  Thirdly, religious beliefs are not 
epistemologically inferior to other beliefs; hence their epistemic status cannot be held 
against them when it comes to public justification.27 Therefore, Perry proposes a model 
of “ecumenical political dialogue” that was meant to be inclusive of the religions so that 
reasonable religious believers can effectively participate.28 Similarly, Jeremy Waldron 
believes that there are actual benefits to be gained from a more inclusive ideal of  public 
justification to the extent that more reasons than shareable reasons should be permitted, 
because shareable public reason seems too conservative with regard to the human 
capacity to reason and adds too little to our public debates.29 Nicholas Wolterstorff30 and 
Jeffery Stout31 both raise a serious issue engendered by the consensus approach. They 
argue that the shareability requirement of public reason has imposed excessive burdens 
on religious citizens. Religious citizens either have to suffer from abstaining from fully 
expressing their deepest convictions along with their pursuit of integrity, or they have to 
face the provision of being ostracized from their community. Christopher Eberle also 
adopts a convergence approach even though he explicitly criticizes the “standard” 
convergence approach in Gaus’s sense. He believes that “a defensible conception of 
public justification must permit each citizen to rely on a fund of considerations that is 
sufficiently rich as to enable him to articulate a public justification not only for 
characteristic liberal commitments, but also for a wide range of the important political 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Thoughts—on Love and Power.” San Diego Law Review 30 (1993): 714. 
26 See ibid., 714-715. 
27 See ibid., 715. 
28 See Michael J. Perry, “Toward an Ecumenical Politics,” George Washington Law Review 60 (1992): 
599-619. Philip Quinn considers Perry’s picture to be very attractive as well. See Philip Quinn, 
“Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of  the Religious”, Proceedings and Addresses of  the American 
Philosophical Association 69 ((1995): 35-56. 
29 See Jeremy Waldron, “Religious Contribution in Public Deliberation”, San Diego Law Review 30 
(1993): 817-848. Waldron is also very keen on stressing the positive influence of  Christian 
conceptions on secular life. Since we are looking at what religion could contribute to the political 
domain, I am not discussing his point of  how religion contributes to our ethical life, which belongs to 
another persistent struggle between Divine Command Theory and secular ethics.  
30 See Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of  Religion in Decision and Discussion of  Political Issues”, 
in Robert Audi & Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: the place of  religious convictions in 
political debate. (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.1997).  
31 See Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2004). Robert M. 
Adams also shares this worry. See Robert M. Adams, “Religious Ethics in a Pluralistic Society,” in 




decisions he faces.”32 And clearly the consensus approach fails to supply such a sufficient 
and tenable account of public justification. Additionally, along with Perry’s claim, Eberle 
believes that shareable reasons are not necessarily epistemically better than religious 
reasons as grounds for political decisions.33 
All these above religious critics have more detailed and deep considerations for 
including religious arguments and adopting a convergence approach of  public 
justification, but I can only manage to give a sketch of  their core claims here. It is 
certainly impossible to fully survey them all, but I believe my sketch suffices to show how 
those critics align with the idea of  the convergence approach, even without claiming the 
name. In light of  the instances above, the convergence approach I am referring to from 
this point on, as opposed to the consensus approach of  public reason, is a wider version 
which incorporates religious critics with or without identifying themselves explicitly with 
“the convergence approach”. 
 
2.4 Summary of  the Convergence Approach’s Critiques of  the Consensus Approach 
 
I believe that my explications of  both the convergence approach in the wider sense and 
in its prototype sense have illustrated one fundamental point for my purpose. While the 
consensus approach requires members of  the public to share the justificatory reasons of  
the law, the convergence approach is open to all the reasons that members of  the public 
adopt. They can bring in any reason that they deem as justified for themselves. This 
variation of  shareability of  reasons significantly influences their account of  public reason 
and subsequently of  public justification, especially for the debate of  religion’s place in 
politics. With shareable public reason, reasonable citizens would be able to “explain the 
basis of  their actions” mainly their voting “to one another in terms each could 
reasonably be expected to endorse.” 34  Citizens thus refrain from deploying 
comprehensive doctrines which are not shareable by all members of  the public in 
democratic discussion of  political issues in the public forum. This shareable public 
reason requirement essentially influences the place of  religious reasons and arguments in 
the public forum. We cannot reasonably expect all members of  the public, including 
religious and nonreligious citizens, to actually endorse religious reasons as valid reasons; 
therefore public reasoning in political life has excluded personal comprehensive doctrines 
including religious doctrines. By contrast, for the convergence approach, the genuine 
                                                             
32 Christopher Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 206. 
33 See Christopher Eberle, “Consensus, Convergence, and Religiously Justified Coercion”, Public 
Affairs Quarterly 25 (2011): 281-303. 
34 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1996) 218. 
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public reason is plainly all the reasons held by every individual of  the public. They are 
free to refer to any conviction or argument including religious reasons for public 
justification. 
According to the convergence approach, there are four major problems with the 
consensus approach questioning two things: the plausibility and desirability of  the 
shareability requirement of  public reason. One, the shareability requirement of  public 
reason is unfeasible if  not entirely impossible to satisfy. From the point of  view of  
theoretical reason, the convergence approach argues that the fact of  reasonable pluralism 
already presupposes that human reasons are too divisive to assume that we can reason in 
the same fashion. Specifically, the practical implication of  the fact of  reasonable 
pluralism is that since we tend to diverge and disagree with each other on basically every 
aspect, the fact of  reasonable pluralism also implies a pluralistic understanding of  justice, 
which makes an overlapping consensus on political conceptions of  justice implausible. 
Hence, the content of  shareable public reason is rendered void. I call these two critiques 
on the implausibility of  the shareability requirement of  public reason ‘the subjectivism 
critique’ and ‘the asymmetry critique’, representing these two critical claims: 
 
The Subjectivism Critique: the shareability requirement of  public reason is 
self-defeating, for the fact of  reasonable pluralism already supposes the 
unshareability of  human reasons; 
The Asymmetry Critique: the fact of  reasonable pluralism also entails reasonable 
pluralism of  justice, which narrows the likelihood of  an overlapping consensus on 
political conceptions of  justice; the content of  shareable public reason is thus 
susceptible to being rendered empty.   
 
Two, in accordance with the convergence approach, the shareability requirement is also 
undesirable as it tends to destabilize our political society. The consensus approach’s 
so-called lack of  capacity of  stabilizing the society consists in two aspects: one is its 
inability to give an individual citizen sufficient moral motivation to comply with the 
shareability requirement of  public reason; and the other is its further inability to assure 
that everyone else would also actually comply with such a requirement. From the 
individual’s point of  view, the shareability requirement is too demanding to be desirable, 
since it has imposed too strenuous burdens on religious citizens to follow. Moreover, it is 
even more difficult to be sure that all citizens would not only agree to such a requirement 
but would actually comply with it. Therefore, laws cannot be successfully publicly 
justified in the same vein as the consensus approach. Likewise, I call the critiques on the 
shareability requirement’s undesirability “the integrity critique” and “the assurance 
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critique”, which are illustrated as:  
 
The Integrity Critique: the shareability of  public reason exerts too demanding 
burdens for citizens to follow as it hurts their integrity; 
The Assurance Critique: the shareability of  public reason cannot ensure that all 
citizens will honor such a fair, cooperative society.  
 
Furthermore, an opposite claim imbedded in the integrity critique is that, on the 
contrary, the convergence approach protects citizens’ integrated existence. This is:  
 
The Claim of  Integrity: the convergence approach is more attractive to citizens as 
it protects their integrity and freedom. 
 
The convergence approach’s claim of  integrity shows that the convergence approach’s 
ambition is more than bankrupting the consensus approach; it also aims to establish its 
superiority by claiming that it has offered a better alternative account of  political 
conceptions’ public justification. Such a claim implies that the convergence approach is a 
less demanding approach for citizens, since a convergence on the laws from each 
individual’s differing standpoints suffices, while it places no other burdens on citizens. A 
complete defense of  the consensus approach not only needs to combat all of  the 
critiques the convergence approach raised, it also needs to expound why the consensus 
approach is superior to the convergence approach.     
The rest of  the sections in this chapter will engage in the detailed explication and 
assessment of  “the subjectivism critique” and “the asymmetry critique”, while “the 
integrity critique” and “the claim of  integrity”, will be the focus in the next chapter. As 
for the refutation of  the assurance critique, which answers the question why the 
convergence approach fundamentally fails to supply a sufficient account of  public 
justification, it will be discussed in the sixth chapter. 
 
III. The elucidation of  “The Subjectivism critique” and “The Asymmetry Critique” 
 
As shown previously, the convergence approach asserts that the shareable public reason 
requirement maintained by the consensus approach is unfeasible if  not entirely 
impossible to follow. For one thing, the convergence approach deems that the fact of  
reasonable pluralism already presumes the implausibility of  shareable reasons among 
citizens in a political society. Specifically, there is no reason to argue that the fact of  
reasonable pluralism has excluded reasonable disagreements about justice, which is 
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assumed by the consensus approach.   
 
3.1 The Subjectivism Critique  
 
As pointed out previously, the contrast between the convergence approach and the 
consensus approach is primarily manifested in the requirement of  justificatory reason’s 
shareability. The political liberal convergence approach led by Gaus accepts the fact of  
reasonable pluralism, and argues that it is precisely because of  reasonable pluralism that 
we can understand each other’s reasons but cannot share them. 
Gaus claims that the requirement of  consensus on foundational reasons is a 
reasonable but superfluous requirement. A publicly justificatory argument will succeed 
even if  it has no actual consent or consensus, provided that it has good reasons for each 
individual to submit. The point of  publicly justified political arrangements for Gaus is 
for everybody to submit or subscribe to it, while whether there is a consent or consensus 
is beside the point. In other words, as long as everybody finds good reasons to accept 
such political arrangements, consensus is superfluous.35 Not only is consensus not 
desirable for publicly justified laws, but it is also implausible given the fact of  reasonable 
pluralism. Both the “cognitive limitations” of  humans in general and a discrepancy in 
their limitations among different people result in subjectivism of  reasons for different 
people.36  
With respect to the extent of  the shareability of  citizens’ reasons, Gaus 
distinguishes them into three versions from the weakest to the strongest (and he 
translates the idea of  reasons into evaluative standards): 1) “identical evaluative sets”: 
members of  the public share the same evaluative standard, for instance, economic 
gains.37 2) “Shared ordering”: members of  the public do not share the identical standard 
but a set of  standards, and order them in the same way. 38 For example, citizens consider 
a law’s legitimacy from the perspective in the exact order of  public safety, human rights, 
and fairness of  opportunities. And 3) “shared standards”: members of  the public reason 
from a common set of  evaluative standards but they may disagree about their order.39 
They may consider a law’s legitimacy from the order of  public safety, human rights and 
fairness of  opportunities, or they may do that according to the order of  fairness of  
opportunities, human rights, public safety. As we can see now, the weakest one is the 
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shared standards requirement, which corresponds to the consensus conception of  
shareable public reasons for public justification, designating that citizens shall reason 
from a common set of  evaluative standards.  
Gaus believes that even the weakest shared reason is too strong to impose a 
significant restraint on public reasons for public justification.40 According to Gaus, the 
impossibility of  shared public reason is due to real cognitive limitations which are also 
fundamentally rooted in reasonable pluralism. As a result of  the cognitive limitations of  
humans, humans have no basis upon which to claim we have grounds to confirm our 
view as correct in absolute confidence, even after rational reflection.41 Recall that for 
Gaus, the justification of  a moral or political conception concerns each member of  the 
public and therefore it depends on whether it can be valid from every individual’s 
perspective. That is why Gaus argues that to reach a public justification for a moral or 
political conception, a convergence of  public reasons incorporating different 
comprehensive conceptions of  the good suffices, while there is no need for shared 
reasons. A convergence conception of  public justification is thus believed to be public 
and impartial, since it converges and rests on everyone’s reasons.  
Moreover, due to the “cognitive limitations” among reasonable citizens, these citizens 
also face unmanageable disputes between themselves.42 The cognitive limitations among 
reasonable citizens mean two things. One, every member of  the public has their own 
evaluative systems with different reasons or orders.43 A’s reason Ra as ground for law L is 
likely to be absent from person B’s evaluative system since B might also support law L 
for a different reason, Rb. Therefore, it should not be an obstruction for A to conclude 
that B is justified in appealing to reason Rb to ground L, irrespective of  A’s own rejection 
of  Rb. And second, we have to admit that there is not only cognitive limitation but also 
cognitive discrepancy in terms of  the level of  moral sophistication among reasonable 
citizens in light of  Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory, which divides adults’ moral reflection 
ability into six stages (stage 1 to 6, ranging from the least sophisticated to the most 
sophisticated).44 Gaus points out that some people who are at stage 1 may even have 
difficulty in identifying basic right and wrong, whereas some others who have 
                                                             
40 Ibid., 286. 
41 Gaus sides with Rawls (in his Political Liberalism stage) that “questions of  the truth or falsity of  our 
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42 Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason: a theory of freedom and morality in a diverse and bounded world, 286. 
43 Ibid., 287-288. 
44 Ibid., 214-216, 256-257, 277-278, 290. 
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sophisticated moral reasons cannot only see complicated moral problems clearly, but they 
can even assist less sophisticated people to understand intricate moral problems.45 It 
follows that it is unfair and implausible to ask people who, for instance, are only at stage 
1 to reason similarly to someone at stage 6. Recall that according to Gaus, the fact of  
reasonable pluralism is the starting point of  the convergence approach. Reasonable 
pluralism presupposes the mutual intelligibility of  reasonable citizens’ reasons for public 
justification in the public discourse. However, due to the cognitive limitations of moral 
persons and also the cognitive diversity and discrepancy among moral persons, Gaus 
concludes that “shared standards” have to be rejected.46 
The convergence approach therefore believes that the shareability requirement 
falls short of  the subjectivism of  reasons. That is to say, such a requirement is 
inconsistent with public reasoning by pluralistic standards contingent on different 
members of  society. Gaus and Vallier once argued that if  we embrace the consensus 
approach’s shareability requirement, we must presume that everyone reasons in the same 
way, which raises a quandary: “why would justificatory liberals, starting out with a strong 
commitment to reasonable pluralism as the outcome of  the free use of  human reason, 
embrace a conception of  public justification that assumes we reason identically?”47 This 
question implies that the fact of  reasonable pluralism assumes the mutual intelligibility 
and divisiveness of  reasons that every reasonable member of  the public reasons 
differently. Since it is assumed that every member of  the public is reasonable, we are all 
justified in holding our own divergent belief  systems. That is to say, in a well-ordered 
society, for instance, although a certain belief  α is absent from my belief  system, I would 
understand that it is justified for you to believe α. And we are all entitled to have different 
beliefs or conceptions of  the good; therefore it is wrong and unreasonable for me to 
coerce you into forsaking α out of  my belief  system. Nor can I accuse you of  being 
epistemically defective in any way in believing α. In that sense we can say that our reasons 
are mutually intelligible but not shareable.   
 
3.2 The Asymmetry Critique 
 
The subjectivism critique concludes that the fact of  reasonable pluralism presumes the 
difficulty of  shareable public reason for reasonable citizens in a democratic society. By 
virtue of  the subjectivism critique, which signifies that there are pervasive and reasonable 
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47 Gerald Gaus & Kevin Vallier, “The Roles of  Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: 
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disagreements between reasonable citizens on so many subjects, it is also unreasonable to 
expect citizens to agree on the content of  public reason, namely the formation of  an 
overlapping consensus.   
The fact of  reasonable pluralism so far encapsulates reasonable citizens’ 
disagreements about comprehensive doctrines, which are not invoked in public reason 
for public justification. However, it has been pointed out that citizens’ reasonable 
disagreements about justice are just as profound as their disagreements about 
comprehensive doctrines.48 In the realm of  normative political philosophy, political 
philosophers also always disagree sharply about conceptions of  justice, including on 
issues of  “the nature and extent of  rights”, the exact meaning of  fairness of  opportunity, 
the definition of  equality of  resource distribution, among many other things.49 For 
instance, the debates about abortion, same-sex marriage, and tax regulations are typical 
arguments reflecting reasonable disagreements about justice. Therefore, it is hard to 
explain why only comprehensive doctrines are excluded from public reason. The 
convergence approach believes that there is an “apparent asymmetry” in the consensus 
approach’s treatment of  the disagreements about justice and the disagreements about 
comprehensive doctrines.50 Moreover, the consensus approach’s insistence on shared 
public reason might collapse too, as there will probably not be any political conception 
of  justice that is supported by shareable public reasons. 
The convergence approach’s asymmetry critique has two layers. First of all, they 
argue that in contrast with the claim that reasonable citizens tend to differ in their 
comprehensive doctrines, citizens do inevitably share many comprehensive doctrines too, 
such as friendship, family, love and integrity. 51  Furthermore, numerous historical 
examples and contemporary political debates have shown that reasonable persons 
disagree over matters of justice just as fundamentally and profoundly as they do over 
                                                             
48 In real every day politics, “All we need to do is look at current political debates over issues like 
abortion, taxation, capital punishment, health care, or freedom of  expression to see that many 
reasonable people disagree in deep and seemingly intractable ways about justice.” Jonathan Quong, 
Liberalism without Perfection, 192. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Both political liberalism’s critics (e.g., Joseph Raz, Gerald Gaus) and its defenders (e.g., Charles 
Larmore, Jonathan Quong) tend to refer to “conceptions of  the good” instead of  “comprehensive 
doctrines” for the sake of  simplifying the relationship between conceptions of  justice and the good. 
However, the notion of  comprehensive doctrines has a much wider scope, content-wise, than the 
term “conceptions of  the good” can cover—for instance the philosophical issue of  ontology—so I 
follow Rawls in sticking with the term “comprehensive doctrines” even when their original texts use 
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matters of comprehensive doctrines.52 Combining those two points, they argue that the 
disagreements about justice do not substantially differ from disagreements about 
comprehensive doctrines. Therefore, they argue that should the former disagreements be 
part of public reason and justification, there is no reason to exclude comprehensive 
doctrines.  
On the first point, Joseph Chan has offered a general description of what 
constitutes a conception of the good life. To him, a good life includes the following 
constituents: “virtues or dispositions as practical wisdom, courage, temperance, integrity 
and sincerity; goods or values including aesthetic experiences, human relationship, 
amusement, play and knowledge…and a particular way of realizing them.”53 Chan 
believes that although people may “differ about the weights of these goods” respectively, 
these goods are “generally regarded as desirable”.54 Therefore, it seems that it is too 
presumptuous to exclude comprehensive doctrines from constituting part of public 
reason.  
Regarding disagreements about justice, Simon Clarke points out that many people 
are willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause of justice, such as in the American Civil 
War, the French Revolution, and the conflicts in Eastern Europe around the 1980s to 
1990s.55 In those conflicts, constitutional issues over fundamental justice regarding 
citizens’ rights, the balance of power or the institutional arrangements of the polity were 
the central concern. Simon Caney has expressed similar concerns. Sidetracking the 
historical illustrations and focusing on contemporary liberal democratic systems, 
analogous empirical observations emerge as well.56 People disagree tremendously in their 
views about many issues related to justice. For example, in the United States, democrats 
and republicans’ disagreements about distributive justice and tax policies differ 
profoundly. Likewise, they argue heatedly over their positions on women’s right to 
abortion, citizens’ right to guns, the aims of punishment, and the legitimacy of death 
penalty, which are all fundamental constitutional concerns. The defense of the legitimacy 
of the death penalty is one of the reasons keeping Turkey from becoming a member of 
the European Union. In that sense, those disagreements about justice, just like 
disagreements about comprehensive doctrines, fundamentally set citizens in a liberal 
democratic polity apart from each other, and it is those fundamental disagreements about 
                                                             
52 See Simon Clarke, “Contractarianism, Liberal Neutrality, and Epistemology,” Political Studies 
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53 Joseph Chan, “Legitimacy, Unanimity and Perfectionism,” 11. 
54 Ibid., 12. 
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56 See Simon Caney, “Liberal legitimacy, reasonable disagreement and justice,” Critical Review of  
International Social and Political Philosophy 1:3(2007): 22. 
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justice that render the overlapping consensus of  political principles implausible. Hence, 
the account of  the liberal principle of  legitimacy cannot be established and the content 
of  shared public reason is implausible as well.  
Moreover, a further question arises: do the disagreements about justice derive 
from the disagreements about comprehensive doctrines? If  the two sorts of  
disagreements are independent from one another, the fundamental disagreements about 
justice already render the political liberal account of  legitimacy unjustified since citizens 
are just as much divided by the disagreements about justice as they are by the 
disagreements about comprehensive doctrines. However, some do believe that the 
disagreements about justice must be derivations of  our disagreements about 
comprehensive doctrines, as normative reflections on the issues of  justice are essentially 
boiled down to “reflection on the values and principles that are implicated in these 
processes of  deliberation and decision-making.” 57  That is to say, our distinct 
comprehensive doctrines are bound to affect our view of  politics and therefore it is 
impossible to insulate political views about justice from other comprehensive doctrines.  
Take the example of  the disagreements about women’s right to abortion. The 
debate about whether women should be granted the constitutional right to have an 
abortion mainly relates to two competing comprehensive doctrines. One believes that the 
utmost value of  life outweighs anything else, while the other believes that women’s right 
to making choices about their own bodies and lives prevails over the fetus’s life. Although 
this discussion involves a key biological issue of  whether a fetus should be seen as a 
person, it is still a principal disagreement between two different comprehensive doctrines. 
According to this view, if  the disagreements about justice are the result of  the 
disagreements about comprehensive doctrines, Jeremy Waldron argues that the so-called 
overlapping consensus, in the sense of  the consensus approach, would be essentially 
denigrated as a modus vivendi, which is precisely what Rawlsian liberals aim to distinguish 
themselves from. Waldron’s argument is that as long as each comprehensive doctrine 
generates its own conception of  justice, these conceptions of  justice become rivals of  
each other, and hence they cannot offer sincere moral support for the overlapping 
consensus without compromising their own claims about justice.58 Therefore, it is 
impossible for competing comprehensive doctrines to be related to a single conception 
of  justice in a strong moral relationship such as an overlapping consensus but only in a 
modus vivendi. Furthermore, Gaus argues that due to the inexorable connection between 
the disagreements about justice and comprehensive doctrines, the prospect of  a 
consensus emerging on justice in a society that disagrees on comprehensive doctrines is 
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IV. The Consensus Approach’s Rebuttal of the Subjectivism critique: Objectivity in 
Public Justification 
 
A proper judgment about the subjectivism critique and the asymmetry critique calls for 
the answer to a question like this one: is it possible for reasonable citizens to engage in 
public reasoning with shareable public reason? I would give a positive answer for the 
consensus approach. And such an answer consists in two parts: one thing is that 
justificatory reasons in the public sphere are not necessarily subjective but can be 
objective for reason holders, hence they are likely to be shareable; and the other part 
concerns whether there can be an overlapping consensus on a political conception of 
justice, which will be addressed in the next section.  
This section is going to present the first part of the positive answer, namely why a 
subjectivism of justificatory reasons is wrongfully suggested. For the moment, my 
proposal consists in three steps. Firstly, I will argue that the fact of reasonable pluralism 
by no means entails a subjectivism of reasons or rational belief systems. Secondly, even if 
we concede that the fact of reasonable pluralism can be the result of subjectivism of 
reasons, it is still conceivable to have objective reasons and beliefs in the political domain; 
therefore we can still have shareable public reason. Thirdly, the consensus approach 
believes that such an objectivity of justificatory reasons is given rise to by the standard of 
reasonableness. 
 
4.1 Step 1: Cutting off Subjectivism of Reasons and the Fact of Reasonable Pluralism 
 
Unlike Gaus, I believe that the fact of reasonable pluralism in Rawls’s sense cannot be 
stretched as far as to entail subjectivism of reasons and beliefs. Reasonable pluralism is 
the idea that reasonable people tend to disagree with each other about comprehensive 
religious, moral and metaphysical doctrines. Because citizens exercise their human reason 
to their best ability, which simply presents the fact that reasonable citizens are bound to 
disagree with each other on comprehensive doctrines, yet it does not entail that 
reasonable citizens can accept others’ comprehensive doctrines as justified.60  
The key to reasonable pluralism consists in the recognition of  disagreements about 
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comprehensive doctrines among citizens as reasonable, so that we cannot coerce those 
who disagree with us. For example, the conviction that an omnipotent god exists is a 
vitally important part of  religious belief  for many religious citizens. Nevertheless, atheists 
believe that no such god exists. As reasonable citizens, the fact of reasonable pluralism 
implies that religious citizens would understand that it is reasonable for atheists to have 
such a belief regardless of how much they disagree with them. There is no way for 
religious citizens to coerce atheists into upholding their own claims. However, religious 
citizens’ understanding of the disagreements they have with atheists does not amount to 
them recognizing atheists’ belief as justified or right. By the same token, the fact of 
reasonable pluralism by no means implies subjectivism of reasons and rational beliefs. 
The fact of reasonable pluralism avows a moderate but nonetheless non-compromising 
statement like: we are not skeptical about our beliefs or reckon that others’ beliefs or 
reasons as justified, since the fact of reasonable pluralism intends to be reticent about 
this; instead, we only recognize that it is unreasonable for us to coerce others into 
accepting our beliefs. Therefore, subjectivism of reasons has stretched way further than 
the fact of reasonable pluralism.   
 
4.2 Step 2: Public Justification Can Be Objective 
 
Nonetheless, Gaus could claim that granted that the subjectivism of reasons and 
justifications is not necessarily entailed by the fact of reasonable pluralism; subjectivism 
of reasons could still lead to reasonable disagreements about comprehensive doctrines. 
Subjectivism of  reasons is nevertheless not excluded, which still is capable of  inducing all 
kinds of  reasonable disagreements about justice. Confronting this claim would require us 
to consider that, given the possibility of  subjectivism of  reasons, the reasonable 
disagreement about justice is not boundless, and hence public reason in the pursuit of  
public justification can still be conceptually but not only contingently shareable. In other 
words, even if subjectivism of reasons is not a necessary condition of the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, it could still play a role as a sufficient condition. And sufficient 
scrutiny of  the relationship between subjectivism of  reasons and reasonable 
disagreements about justice calls for an explanation of  why reasonable disagreements 
about justice are not rampant and hence public reason is still shareable. My conjecture is 
that, while the consensus approach confirms the fact of  reasonable pluralism, it 
nevertheless understands public reason as being objectively approachable. 
The baseline of my conjecture rests upon a comprehension that differs from Gaus’s 
convergence approach of the idea of justification itself. On the one hand, “to claim that a 
belief  or judgment is justified is to say that it is justified based on good and sufficient 
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reasons.”61 On the other hand, a person can be justified in holding a certain belief  which 
is nevertheless not sufficiently justified by good reasons.62 It could be the result of  some 
factors that this person is not aware of, or some knowledge that is beyond this person’s 
comprehension. However, this person is justified in holding such a view based on the 
considerations he takes to be reasons given his existential education, information, and 
knowledge. For instance, a citizen, Derek, decides to vote for the political candidate 
Claire since he believes that she is competent, honest, and she would do everything to 
bridge the expanding gap between the rich and the poor, judging from her past work 
experience and possibly her campaign speech. However, Derek does not know that Claire 
is not who she claims to be, and she was severely corrupt in her previous occupation, for 
which the evidence has not yet fully surfaced. Derek is justified in believing that Claire is 
an honest candidate, though the belief  itself  that Claire is an honest candidate is not 
necessarily justified.  
The difference between the two justifications comes down to the different goals of  
the justifications of  the consensus approach and Gaus’s argument respectively. In 
rejecting the reference to the truth of  reasons, Gaus argues for a public justification 
based on convergent results of  one-to-one reasoning. In that case, every reason in 
one-to-one relations can be particular to each individual, as long as everyone converges 
on certain laws or policies as their results. And due to the fact of  reasonable pluralism, 
hardly anyone uses the same reason to reach their decision about the law or policy. In 
Gaus’s argument, the goal of  justification lies in the second sense, which is to make a 
certain belief  justified for someone, irrespective of  whether such a belief  itself is justified. 
Contrariwise, the consensus approach denounces the account of  justification in the 
second sense and adopts the justification in the first sense. That is to say, the goal of  
public justification for the consensus approach is the justification of  principles of  justice 
itself. In other words, the purpose of  public justification for the consensus approach is 
an objective standard of  justification. The consensus approach argues that in the domain 
of  the political, the political decisions shall be endorsed by all reasonable citizens on 
grounds of  shareable public reasons, which is possible considering the fact of  reasonable 
pluralism. The basis of  public reason, namely the political conceptions of  justice can be 
objective enough for all reasonable citizens to share in a well-ordered society. 
I need to clarify that in addressing objectivity here, I am talking about a practical or 
political objectivity, which needs to be distinguished from the objectivity in meta-ethical 
discourse. Ronald Dworkin’s idiosyncratic analyses of objectivity maybe of some help 
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here. Generally speaking, Dworkin does not believe that meta-ethical studies contribute 
much to our understanding of normal ethical issues, and any metaethical statement is a 
normative ethical judgment. 63  He argues for a different way of comprehending 
objectivity apart from the objectivity discussed in the metaethical discourse. He objects 
to understanding an ethical life from an “Archimedean point” which is a standpoint 
outside of the ethical life (Just as Archimedes is outside of the earth in his famous quote 
“give me a place to stand, and I can move the earth.”). He believes that one cannot 
genuinely rationally understand ethical issues from a meta point of view, namely, a 
position that is not placed within the sphere of ethical life. Dworkin believes that ethics 
research is an interpretive project, and we can only truly understand ethics as people who 
are committed to it as rational agents. Although Rawls does not hold such a view of  
meta-ethics, his advancement of  political constructivism, in the same vein as Dworkin, 
claims a different standard of  objectivity apart from the one in meta-ethics. It is just that 
Rawls’s departure from the meta-ethical discourse, unlike Dworkin’s divergence, is 
motivated by the fact that meta-ethical debates are too contentious for political purposes. 
The whole starting point of the project of political liberalism, which is the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, is to unbolt the justification of liberalism from the shackle of 
metaphysical standards of evaluation. Nevertheless, political liberalism’s departure does 
not mean that it commits to ethical subjectivism; rather, it can still politically construe an 
objective standard for its purpose in the political domain.64 
 
4.3 Step 3: Reasonableness as the Standard of  Objectivity  
                                                             
63  For Dworkin’s detailed explication on his objections of  meta-ethics see Ronald Dworkin, 
“Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It,” Philosophy& Public affairs 25 (1996): 87-139; Justice for 
Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011) Chapter 2-4.  
64 For the sake of  proving political constructivism’s eligibility of  producing objectivity, Rawls reviews 
six widely recognized essential elements of  a conception of  objectivity and argues that political 
constructivism covers all of  them. See Rawls’s detailed explication in Political Liberalism, 110-112.  
The plausibility of  constructing a practical or political objectivity as a separate evaluative 
standard from metaphysical objectivity nevertheless faces a severe challenge. Leif  Wenar argues that 
although political constructivism avoids controversy about the truth of  moral judgments, it cannot 
avoid controversy about the sources of  normativity. The epistemic question of  “what is true or 
correct” is decided by the comprehensive doctrines all the way down, which leaves no room for any 
other epistemology in the political domain. For instance, a moral realist will never recognize a political 
standard shaped by political constructivism. And a Catholic not only would think that “God’s word is 
authoritative on matters of  justice”, she would also believe that “there is no other source of  authority 
on such matters.” See Leif Wenar, “Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique,” Ethics 106 (1995): 55.  
In the same vein, Samuel Scheffler also argues that Rawls’s insistence on preferring the politically 
constructed objectivity to moral truth has negated his aim of bringing out political constructivism, 
which is to gain as many consensuses that have been excluded by the idea of moral truth. See Samuel 




Political constructivism is not an epistemic model that starts its construction from 
scratch. Instead, for political constructivism, “not everything is constructed, we must 
have some material… from which to begin.”65 Political constructivism relies on certain 
existing social presumptions as the structure and form with which to start the 
construction. The principles of political justice are the outcome of the procedure of 
construction, which is essentially based on practical reason. The structure and form from 
which political constructivism begins its construction is “a rather complex conception of 
person and society”.66 The person is seen as someone belonging to a political society as a 
fair system of social cooperation, and is said to possess two moral powers, “a sense of 
justice” and “a sense of a conception of the good”, namely, being both reasonable and 
rational.67 If we accept the original position as “a procedural device of representation” 
which is simply “laid out”, it follows that, reasonable and rational persons under 
reasonable, or fair, conditions, will select certain principles of justice. 68  “Political 
constructivism specifies [the] idea of the reasonable and applies this idea,” instead of the 
concept of truth, “to its subjects: conceptions and principles, judgments and grounds, 
persons and institutions.”69 Therefore, according to Rawls, the idea of reasonableness is 
such a criterion which is fundamental, compelling and objective enough for us as the 
benchmark in the political domain.  
For Rawls, the term reasonableness “refers to the fair terms of social cooperation, 
and involves a notion of reciprocity and mutuality among people.”70 Reasonableness is 
defined by Rawls from two aspects of what counts as a reasonable person. The first basic 
aspect, Rawls argues, is the “willingness to propose principles and standards as fair terms 
of cooperation and to abide by them” given the assurance that others will likewise do 
so.71 The second basic aspect is “the willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment 
and to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the legitimate 
exercise of political power in a constitutional regime.”72  
The public characteristic of  the reasonable or reasonableness is clear now. By being 
reasonable, “we enter the public world as equals of  others and stand ready to propose, or 
                                                             
65 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 104. 
66 See ibid., 93. 
67 Ibid. 
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accept” fair terms of  cooperation with others.73 In as much as we are reasonable, we are 
ready to work out the framework, which is “reasonable to expect everyone to endorse 
and act on provided others can be relied on, to do the same,” 74 for the public social 
world. An expectation of  reasonableness, being able to justify our actions to others, is 
therefore, the necessary condition for striving for a public basis of  justification.  
Religious disagreements are, to a certain extent, not public in the way I have 
presented above. Debates about religious doctrines, religious rules and religious rituals 
within each religion or among different religions belong to the domain of  comprehensive 
doctrines’ discussion. It is also not always the case that a society is organized on fair 
terms of  social cooperation among participants, since religious communities can 
function in a variety of  ways. Nevertheless, unless we are talking about a closed or a 
semi-closed religious community like the Amish community, which rarely interacts with 
or is affected by the outside world, we can say that if  a religious believer is also a citizen 
or a society member of  a constitutional democratic society and would like to associate 
with the society, he or she enters the public world just like everyone else. The expectation 
of  taking others’ interests into account, namely being reasonable, also applies. As a 
matter of  fact, such an expectation of  being reasonable or reasonableness is the 
prerequisite for them to share a public world with others who have differing religious and 
moral convictions. As an active participant in the society, a religious believer needs to go 
further than just tolerating others; she also needs to be able to justify political principles 
to others. A reasonable religious believer, who lives in a constitutional regime, is someone 
willing to propose and abide by fair terms of  social cooperation, to accept the fact of  
reasonable pluralism (the fact that different people tend to form different religious and 
moral convictions), and to find a public basis of  justification in terms of  the legitimate 
exercise of  political power. 
To summarize the three steps above, firstly, the basic assumption of the fact of 
reasonable pluralism does not constitute a subjectivism of reasons. Secondly, even if we 
concede that subjectivism of reasons has the propensity to partially contribute to the 
reasonable disagreements about comprehensive doctrines, the goals of public 
justification are not then susceptible to subjectivism of reasons; rather, the public 
justification the consensus approach aims for can be “objective”. The third step is that 
the objective standard of the consensus approach of public justification is a notion of 
reasonableness, which relies on the notion of a reasonable person. And this notion of 
reasonableness is shareable among reasonable citizens in a democratic society. Therefore, 
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Gaus’s conceptual link between subjective human reasons and reasonable disagreements 
about justice is untenable, and reasonable disagreements about justice are not as 
boundless as Gaus suggests. The next question is: to what degree can the reasonable 
disagreements about justice be extended? Can reasonable disagreements about justice be 
categorically differentiated from reasonable disagreements about comprehensive 
doctrines? And if  so, on what basis? 
 
V. The Relationship between Reasonable Disagreements about Justice and 
Comprehensive Doctrines 
 
In this section, I am going to show that reasonable disagreements about justice are not as 
fundamental as reasonable disagreements about comprehensive doctrines. I shall make 
two major arguments in this section. First of  all, I argue that, in contrast with what many 
have alleged, the consensus approach does not neglect, let alone deny the possibility of  
reasonable pluralism of  justice. The challenge engendered by reasonable disagreements 
about justice, however, does not upset the provision of  forming an overlapping 
consensus and depleting the content of  public reason. As a matter of  fact, the whole 
project of  political liberalism is built upon the awareness of  reasonable pluralism of  
justice and also the aspiration of  evolving it. Secondly, I shall introduce a distinction 
between reasonable disagreements about justice and reasonable disagreements about 
comprehensive doctrines advanced by Jonathan Quong, responding to the claim that the 
equivalent fundamental reasonable pluralism of  justice as reasonable pluralism of  
comprehensive doctrines unravels the consensus approach’s project. In short, reasonable 
disagreements about justice are not as fundamental as disagreements about 
comprehensive doctrines after all.  
 
5.1 Reasonable Disagreements about Justice: Presupposed by the Consensus Approach 
    
As shown previously, given A Theory of  Justice (TJ)’s failure in solving the congruence of  
justice and the good, Political Liberalism (PL) revised the theory due to the fact of  
reasonable disagreements about comprehensive doctrines; nevertheless, it does not mean 
that PL presumes no such reasonable pluralism about justice. In fact, Rawls has been 
aware of  the reasonable disagreements about conceptions of  justice since the beginning 
of  the project of  political liberalism.75 As a matter of  fact, he understands that it is 
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precisely the reasonable pluralism of  comprehensive doctrines that shows that the 
conception of  justice as fairness is “unrealistic”.76 It is impossible in a well-ordered 
society’s for all of  its’ citizens to endorse this conception of  justice as fairness as a 
comprehensive doctrine. It is exactly this awareness that inspires the project of  political 
liberalism. Rawls contends that PL’s main aim is to show “how a well-ordered society can 
be formulated given not only the fact of  reasonable pluralism of  comprehensive 
doctrines but also a family of  reasonable political conceptions of  justice.”77 Besides justice 
as fairness, Rawls believes that there are other reasonable political conceptions that can 
be part of  an overlapping consensus of  reasonable comprehensive doctrines, so long as 
they are reasonable and accept the fact of  reasonable pluralism. Therefore, public 
reasoning can be conducted on the basis of  reasons specified by a family of  reasonable 
political conceptions of  justice which can be endorsed by all reasonable citizens. 
Additionally, as public reason is specified not by one conception but a family of  political 
conceptions of  justice, which are bound to evolve over time and over debates, the 
content of  public reason is by no means “fixed”.78 Reasonable disagreements about 
conceptions of  justice along with their evolvements, are thus actually to be expected as 
the subject matter of  public reason.  
 
5.2 Reasonable Disagreements about Justice: Justificatory but Not Foundational 
 
Jonathan Quong has introduced a distinction between two different types of  reasonable 
disagreements to illustrate that reasonable pluralism about justice is not the type that 
poses a serious challenge to the consensus approach’s main claim. Quong distinguishes 
what he calls foundational disagreement from justificatory disagreement. The former is 
“characterized by the fact that the participants do not share any premises serving as a 
mutually acceptable standard of  justification.”79 The reasonable disagreements about 
comprehensive doctrines are foundational disagreements. The latter one, on the contrary, 
is the type that participants “do share premises which can serve as a mutually acceptable 
standard of  justification,” yet “they still disagree about some substantive conclusions.”80 
And the reasonable pluralism about justice belongs to this type of  justificatory 
disagreement. Quong argues that a political conception’s public justification can still be 
met “when the state imposes a view that arises out of  a justificatory disagreement”81 as 
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long as it is free from foundational disagreement. Therefore, the so-called reasonable 
pluralism about justice shall not pose too much of  a challenge to the consensus 
approach’s account of  public justification. Quong makes an analogy between a 
justificatory disagreement and a filter, which “ensures that any values or arguments in 
public debate will be at least mutually acceptable” if  they are reasonable, but “it does not 
guarantee that all the participants will agree on the exact weight or ranking of  those 
values or principles.”82 
Let me illustrate the difference between foundational disagreement and justificatory 
disagreement by a scenario of  a debate among three friends regarding the issue of  
same-sex marriage. Say, hypothetically, three students Allan, Brian, and Carrie are 
discussing the legality of  same-sex marriage.83 Allan says, setting aside the legal question, 
from the perspective of  morality, I believe that gay marriage is immoral, as according to 
the Bible, marriage is only between a man and a woman. Since the moral authority 
derives from God’s command, only a marriage that takes place between a man and 
woman can be morally good. Carrie disagrees. Carrie rejects the idea that the Bible or 
God’s commandments can be valid sources of  morality. Rather, a same-sex marriage is 
two people’s private affair which does not affect or hurt anyone; thus, it is not immoral at 
all. At this moment, Brian joins this debate too. Brian’s point is not about the morality of  
gay marriage, but about the justice of  legalizing gay marriage. Brian says, I believe it is 
unwise to legalize same-sex marriage. Firstly, some empirical studies have shown that 
children do less well when they are raised by same-sex parents than by heterosexual 
parents. Besides, the legalization might require some members of  the clergy to perform 
ceremonies that violate their religious freedom, the fundamental constitutional right 
guaranteed in the first amendment of  constitution. Carrie still disagrees. Carrie believes 
that the exclusion of  gay couples from marriage hurts their equal dignity, and hence 
same-sex couples should not be discriminated against. The function of  “religious 
freedom” articles should be the benchmark for exemptions to general laws, rather than a 
set of  rules for a certain group of  people. Also, Carrie says that permitting same-sex 
marriage would actually benefit children as more homeless children could be adopted.  
In the debate between Allan and Carrie, the disagreement they have is a 
foundational disagreement about the morality of  same-sex marriage. They disagree with 
each other at the level of  ultimate convictions of  human life and there is no common 
standard of  justification as the basis for evaluating their debate. That is precisely why 
                                                             
82 Ibid., 207. 
83 The form of  illustrating foundational disagreement and justificatory disagreement by means of  a 
hypothetical conversation between Allan and Carrie and the later conversation between Brian and Carrie is 
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reasonable disagreement of  comprehensive doctrines is foundational; there is no shared 
justificatory framework for assessing the disagreement. Their fundamental divergence lies 
in whether God’s divine command or scripture could serve as a moral basis. Allan agrees 
whereas Carrie disagrees with such a fundamental moral presumption. It is impossible to 
decide whether Allan or Carrie is right in this debate, and their argument will require us 
to reflect on the issue of  whether God exists and whether his commands should be the 
fundamental moral authority. However, the standard of  evaluating these issues is 
certainly under serious dispute. The disagreement between Brian and Carrie, however, is 
a justificatory disagreement about marriage justice. In their debate, we can see that they 
both accept the fact of  reasonable pluralism. Neither of  them appeals to their 
comprehensive doctrines in their debate. Besides, they both aim to find the best answer 
to this question which is accessible and shareable for everyone. Brian believes the 
protection of  religious liberty should take priority in this issue, while Carrie insists on the 
primacy of  the values of  equality and anti-discrimination. And they both believe their 
positions are the best interpretation of  the ideal or concept of  marriage justice.  
 
VI. Political Liberalism as an Interpretive Project 
 
Thus far, the two arguments in section five have illustrated two points. Firstly, the extent 
of  reasonable disagreements about justice are not as deep as critics reckoned; reasonable 
disagreements about justice only exist at the level of  justificatory disagreements, differing 
from reasonable disagreements about comprehensive doctrines that occupy the 
fundamental level in terms of  ultimate convictions and human purposes. And secondly, 
reasonable disagreements about justice are presupposed by the project of  political 
liberalism, and as a matter of  fact, they encourage and propel interpretations of  justice. 
However, Quong’s arguments have not provided sufficient justification for these two 
points. In the previous subsection, I introduced Quong’s argument of  distinguishing 
reasonable pluralism of  justice from reasonable pluralism of  comprehensive doctrines by 
differentiating justificatory disagreements and foundational disagreements. While 
foundational disagreements are disagreements about ultimate convictions and human 
purposes all the way down with no agreements anywhere at all, justificatory 
disagreements are actually disagreements on the basis of  foundational agreement. Then 
the question becomes, what is the foundational agreement? Similarly, why can we be sure 
that differing interpretations of  justice encourage us to understand the idea of  justice 
better, rather than further diverting us from it?   
For Quong, in the previous example, in spite of  Brian and Carrie’s reasonable 
disagreements about justice, they still share the fundamental normative framework 
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insofar as they both abstain from engaging in comprehensive doctrines for solving 
political problems. In other words, they share a commitment to finding a political 
solution to political problems.84 First of  all, Brian and Carrie as social participants both 
believe that the society should be a fair system of  social cooperation between free and 
equal citizens. Secondly, they both agree that their effort in finding the best interpretation 
of  justice should be done based on setting aside the reasonable pluralism of  their 
comprehensive doctrines. In other words, they believe that their argument should appeal 
to political values that are independent of  any comprehensive doctrine. Such a 
foundational agreement manifests the minimal ideal of  reasonableness, which according 
to Quong, consists of  three basic premises of  the project of  political liberalism: (1) a fair, 
social, cooperative society constituted by (2) free and equal citizens who recognize (3) the 
fact of  foundational reasonable pluralism.85 It is the shared understanding of  these 
premises that precludes reasonable citizens from relying on sectarian comprehensive 
doctrines and that makes them accept the freestanding character of  principles of  justice. 
For Quong, these premises are conceived as constituents of  a reasonable citizen.86 
Likewise, in replying to Habermas’s question of  whether political liberalism uses the 
reasonable to express the truth or validity of  moral judgments, Rawls expresses a similar 
view:  
 
“Political liberalism does not use the concept of  moral truth applied to its own 
political judgments…political liberalism uses reasonable or unreasonable to 
make political judgments…It lays out political ideals, principles, and standards 
as criteria of  the reasonable, which in turn is connected with the two basic 
aspects of  reasonable persons as citizens…For the political purpose of  
discussing questions of  constitutional essentials and basic justice, the idea of  the 
reasonable is sufficient.”87  
 
However, the ideal of  reasonableness as such seems severely insufficient to me. Instead 
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of  treating those three points as premises of  reasonableness as the moral foundation of  
political liberalism, my answer to those two questions proposed in the beginning of  this 
section takes a different path. 
As far as I am concerned, the deficiency of  Quong’s plan, and also of  Rawls’s 
construction of  objectivity standard in PL, is the incapability of  reasonableness 
adequately to serve as a moral foundation for political liberalism. If  we ask why 
reasonable citizens share those premises as reasonable people, the only way to answer 
would be that otherwise they are being unreasonable, which to some extent ends the 
pursuit of  an answer to that question. Moreover, the ideal of  reasonableness works as a 
reflective second-order notion rather than a substantive first-order notion, in that 
reasonableness denotes the attitude (or willingness, as Rawls puts it) which sets a 
restriction on how reasonable citizens decide on the principles of  justice, while it 
articulates no substantive political values or makes no claims pertaining to our 
constructions or propositions of  conceptions of  justice. The problem is, under the 
guidance of  a reflective second-order notion, it is hard to fathom how reasonable 
disagreements about justice are anticipated by political liberalism and even would be able 
to promote our understanding of  justice. Additionally, it is also unclear exactly how a 
family of  conceptions of  justice in the overlapping consensus comes about. The reflective 
second-order notion of  reasonableness, however, is insufficient to serve as such a 
substantive moral ideal. The appreciation of  reasonableness as a shared constraint on 
reasonable citizens contributes little to explaining away the instability brought by 
reasonable disagreements about justice, not to mention illuminating the prospect of  an 
overlapping consensus on political principles of  justice. 
Therefore, I believe that the response to the asymmetry objection calls for a morally 
more robust foundation than the notion of  reasonableness or a reasonable person. Such 
a notion should, on the one hand, be compatible with the fact of  reasonable pluralism, 
and on the other hand be able to fit the liberal political practices and also lead the 
development of  conceptions of  justice along with social changes. Dworkin’s suggestion 
of  launching the project of  political liberalism as an interpretive project seems like a 
promising candidate for directing the way toward such a notion,88 for two reasons: for 
one thing, an interpretive light corresponds with the practical sensitivity of  political 
liberalism; moreover, considering political liberalism as an interpretive project precisely 
explains Rawls’s vision that a family of  reasonable political conceptions of  justice is 
bound to evolve along with social and institutional practices. 
According to Dworkin, a successful interpretation of  the concept of  justice in a 
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liberal democratic society includes two dimensions: one, it should fit the contemporary 
liberal institutional and social practices, and two, the interpreted conception should also 
put the practices in the best light, that is to say, it should also manifest the values that the 
practices serves.89 On the basis of  Rawls’s distinction of  “concept” and “conception” in 
TJ, Dworkin has elaborated them further in Law’s Empire.90 For concepts like justice 
(concepts like democracy, liberty, equality, law and so on are all the same kind), we in 
general “agree about the most general and abstract propositions” about it and we share a 
practice of  “judging acts and institutions as just and unjust”, but we “disagree about 
more concrete refinements or interpretations of  these abstract propositions.”91 People 
can share the concept of  justice in spite of  sharp disagreements about, for instance, both 
the criteria for identifying justice and about which institutions are unjust. Concepts like 
justice actually encourage us to reflect on and contest its practice. We can share such a 
concept while we do not have to share their instances. On the one hand, we “share the 
concept of  justice in complex political practices” which require us to “interpret these 
practices in order to decide how best to continue them.”92 On the other hand, the 
concept of  justice is elaborated by us “assigning value and purpose to the political 
practice”, so that we form views of  the particular conceptions of  justice “in light of  the 
purpose and values”.93 An illuminating analysis of  the concept of  justice “must deploy… 
the value that the practice [of  justice] should be taken to serve and of  the conceptions of  
the concepts in play that best serve those values.”94 It is also the reason that a useful 
analysis of  the concept of  justice cannot be entirely value neutral. The argument we are 
having over reasonable disagreements about conceptions of  justice is an effort to find 
the best interpretation of  the concept of  justice. The subject matter that we are arguing 
about when it comes to public reason and trying to reach a public justification for is 
about a family of conceptions of justice, whilst it is the basic and also relatively general 
concept of justice that supplies the standard for our public reason. Therefore, the 
distinction between concept and conception helps us understand that firstly, a compelling 
theory of  justice is in itself  very likely to be controversial. Moreover, the controversies of  
interpretive concepts such as justice are not random controversies, but are guided by the 
underlying values of  the concept. In this sense, it is solid to argue that reasonable 
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disagreements about conceptions of  justice are rather encouraged, and they promote our 
understanding of  the concept of  justice in our political practices.   
 
VII. The Moral Foundation of  Political Liberalism 
 
In putting political liberalism under the light of  interpretivism, it is important to note 
that an interpretive project cannot be a morally trivial one. Any interpretation of a 
political tradition must choose among very different conceptions of what that tradition 
embodies and “take some to be superior and hence to provide a more satisfactory 
justification than others.”95 Accordingly, the political constructivism adopted by political 
liberals must “construct” toward some substantive moral ideals “that provide the best 
account and justification of the liberal traditions of law and political practices.”96 Political 
liberalism understood as an interpretive project requires us to identify these ideals or 
values underlying its political and legal practice. Inasmuch as the fundamental 
commitment to the ideal of  justice is shared, the interpretations of  justice will steadily 
progress under the guidance of  its core values. 
It is a prevalent misunderstanding that PL recasts its commitment to justice in TJ as 
it has shifted its focus to the legitimacy of  conceptions of  justice. However, this does not 
mean that PL’s quest for legitimacy is irrelevant to TJ’s concern for justice. Contrariwise, 
the public justification of  the legitimacy of  political institutions cannot be achieved if  it 
is fundamentally at odds with basic tenets of  justice. The achievement of  political 
conceptions’ legitimacy must be conducted upon the fundamental aspiration of  justice. 
The project of  political liberalism is intrinsically committed to justice in spite of  the 
reasonable pluralism about comprehensive doctrines. In the project of  political liberalism, 
reasonable citizens still search for the most appropriate or the best conceptions of  justice. 
Political liberalism has included more conceptions or interpretations of  justice since 
legitimacy (its goal) is less stringent than only the truth of  justice, which is what sets 
political liberalism apart from the undertaking of  TJ.  
As what I argued in the previous chapter, the fact of  reasonable pluralism makes us 
consider that what essentially matters in politics is not the truth of  the comprehensive doctrines 
ascribed to by the people, but the people who hold differing comprehensive doctrines. 
Therefore, that a liberal state should refrain from imposing the truth claim of  any 
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particular comprehensive doctrine is not because of  the merit of  any other 
comprehensive doctrine, but rather out of  respect for those citizens who hold those 
doctrines. And Charles Larmore also suggests that the fundamental basis of  public 
justification is the equal respect for persons.97 Yet, the equal respect in Larmore’s term is 
as inadequate as reasonableness for political liberalism, for it is also a second-order claim, 
thus it falls short of  providing a first-order substantive moral basis for political 
liberalism.  
By contrast, I conceive equal respect as a first-order substantive basis of  justice in 
the domain of  the political for political liberalism. Equal respect for people is shown as a 
vindication of  three main pillars of  political values: freedom, equality, and fairness, all of  
which are embodied in those three basic premises of  a reasonable person. In contrast to 
what Quong and Rawls have argued, those basic premises of  political liberalism are 
neither facts nor ex ante assumptions of  political liberalism as a package deal. Instead, 
those premises have identified the most important political values of  freedom, equality, 
and fairness that reasonable citizens accept as valuable, which constitute what counts as 
equal respect for people, the cornerstone of  justice in the political domain. These values 
are so fundamental to liberal political practice that a better understanding of  these values 
will help us better understand what is just and what is not. 
Specifically, firstly, citizens are free and equal in the sense that each possesses these 
two moral powers: (1) “the capacity to form, revise, and rationally pursue a conception 
of  one’s rational good”, and (2) “the capacity to understand, to apply, and act from a 
public conception of  justice.”98 Furthermore, the value of  fairness is embodied by fair 
terms of  social cooperation and the requirement that every citizen understands that they 
cannot impose their comprehensive doctrines on others. As Samuel Freeman has made 
clear, reasonable people act in ways that can be justified to others and are willing to abide 
by fair terms of  social cooperation for their own sake. If  a person “takes advantage of  
every opportunity” to favor him and only himself, “but in doing so is insensitive to the 
interests of  others and does not care about the adverse effects” inflicted upon them, 
then “he is acting unfairly and is being unreasonable.”99  
Critics tend to confuse the consensus of  “the consensus approach” with the 
consensus in the concept of  “overlapping consensus” so that they believe the consensus 
approach pursues an actual consensus in public reasoning. At one point, Gaus claims that 
the consensus approach Rawls and Macedo advocate is a populist theory of  public 
                                                             
97 See Charles Larmore, “The Moral Basis of  Political Liberalism,” The Journal of  Philosophy 96 (1999): 
621. 
98 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 19. 
99 Samuel Freeman, Rawls, 296. 
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justification which takes popular acceptance as its goal, hence is not a justificatory 
theory.100 I believe that I have already shown that this is a misunderstanding of  the 
consensus approach. The consensus approach is not concerned with a unanimous 
consensus about the conception of  justice, but about the way reasonable citizens 
deliberate. The consensus that “the consensus approach” aims for is the manner of  
shareable public reason in public reasoning. Perhaps a minor adjustment of  expression in 
PL would have been of  some help to make this clearer. Rawls describes the endorsement 
of  citizens of  an overlapping consensus of  comprehensive doctrines as something they 
were “expected to endorse”. Given the consensus approach’s insistence on distinguishing 
an overlapping consensus from a modus vivendi by sincere moral support, it is 
understandable that many critics take this endorsement as amounting to agreeing to the 
justification of  such a consensus as morally right. Nevertheless, it is not how Rawls or 
other public reason liberals understand “expected to endorse”. Also, taking the 
endorsement as a fully moral agreement has overlooked the initiative of political 
liberalism. The more accurate understanding of such endorsement perhaps should be 
cast in light of a Scanlonian sense of “cannot reasonably reject”.101 After a public 
deliberation on a law’s legitimacy that is conducted by shareable public reasons, citizens 
would have no reason to reject the result even though they still do not believe that result 
is morally correct. Let us go back to the earlier hypothetical debate between Brian and 
Carrie about the justice of legalizing same-sex marriage. As a matter of fact, it is very 
likely that after serious debates Brian and Carrie will still disagree with each other. 
However, it would be acceptable for both of them if the state were to act on the basis of 
either of their arguments. That is to say, Brian cannot reasonably reject or he can 
reasonably be expected to endorse the state’s decision resting on Carrie’s reason even if 
he does not believe it is the best or even correct reason, and vice versa. This is because 
their reasons are mutually acceptable to each other because they both share the premise 
that the society is fair, citizens are free and equal, and everyone accepts the fact of 
reasonable disagreement of comprehensive doctrines. And they share those premises 
because they are morally correct. Plus, religious liberty, non-establishment and 
anti-discrimination are all important political values that both Brian and Carrie are 
committed to. The key point is that both Brian and Carrie’s decisions in that debate are 
different interpretations of  justice that are both in accordance with equal respect for 
people, and thus are expected to be accepted by all reasonable citizens. Therefore, in a 
dispute regarding a certain law’s legitimacy, by offering such reasons to each other in 
                                                             
100 See Gerald Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism: an essay on epistemology and political theory, 132. 




public discussions, reasonable citizens can be expected to endorse the legitimacy of a 
family of conceptions of justice even when they have reasonable disagreements about 
them.  
The consensus approach’s retreat from committing to any comprehensive doctrine 
does not mean it loses its commitment to justice. The key to upholding the consensus 
approach’s account of  public justification is that reasonable citizens share these 
foundational premises, for they are the most fundamental values for understanding what 
equal respect is in a liberal society. The reason why citizens share foundational premises 
precisely lies in the common ground of  their claim to shareable public reason for public 
justification. These political values are tied to the principles of  political justice and 
facilitate fair social cooperation over time. Therefore, these political values are not, like 
their critics have implied, a coincidental overlapping consensus that happens to have 
emerged from the convergence of  every citizen’s comprehensive doctrines. Rather, they 
are the very values that manifest the equal respect people have for each other in a liberal 
democratic society that political liberalism stands for and the firm basis on which 
reasonable citizens can conduct public reasoning.102 Rawls and other political liberals 
advocate that a theory of  justice must be presented in a way that is independent of  any 
comprehensive doctrine. I still believe that they are absolutely right about that, but the 
only exception, the only particular comprehensive doctrine that we are committed to, is 
equal respect for people as the basis for a just political life, which appreciates the political 
values of  freedom, equality and fairness. At the end of  the day, I believe a political 
project of  liberalism has made one truth claim that it has not given explicit voice to, 
which is the equal respect for people consolidated by fairly treating citizens as equal and 
free moral persons, certainly still confined in the domain of  the political. It is this claim 
that sets political liberalism apart from populist politics.   
One last point before concluding. Along with Dworkin, I also believe that political 
liberalism is better seen as an interpretive project, which fits with Rawls’s claim of  the 
evolvement of  conceptions of  justice along with social and institutional practice. And I 
also believe that political liberalism must call for a morally more substantive concept than 
the second-order notion of  reasonableness for the purpose of  interpretation. But I also 
think we need not go as far as Dworkin hopes for. Dworkin argues that “a useful analysis 
                                                             
102 In “The Idea of  Public Reason Revisited”, Rawls said that, “Political liberalism holds that even 
though our comprehensive doctrines are irreconcilable and cannot be compromised, nevertheless 
citizens who affirm reasonable doctrines may share reasons of  another kind, namely, public reasons 
given in terms of  political conceptions of  justice…public reason is a way of  reasoning about political 
values shared by free and equal citizens that does not trespass on citizens’ comprehensive doctrines so 
long as those doctrines are consistent with a democratic polity.” See John Rawls, “The Idea of  Public 
Reason Revisited”, 805, 807. 
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of  an interpretive concept must join issue in the controversies it hopes to illuminate”.103 
However, we do not need to get involved in controversies in comprehensive doctrines to 
grasp the understanding of  justice. The only concession regarding truth claims that 
political liberalism has to concede is the respect for people, which consists in respecting 
them as free and equal moral persons, and treating them fairly. 
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter examines two major critiques of  the consensus account of  public reason 
from the alternative approach, the convergence approach. The convergence approach 
opposes liberals’ consensus justification for secularism, established on the basis of  
shareable public reason, which inevitably excludes religious reasons and arguments from 
the public sphere. Instead, the convergence approach calls for a wide inclusion of  all 
moral and religious points of  view held by each citizen in public reason. In general, the 
convergence approach raises four major arguments against the consensus approach of  
public justification, targeting two aspects, with each aspect also generating two critiques. 
The general two aspects are the plausibility of  having shareable public reason and the 
desirability of  utilizing shareable public reason. This chapter mainly discusses the two 
critiques from the first perspective: shareable public reason’s plausibility. The 
convergence approach points out that due to the fact of  reasonable pluralism the 
consensus approach is wrong in presuming the shareability of  human reason in general 
(the subjectivism critique), and because of  this, the consensus approach’s account of  
public justification also suffers from reasonable disagreements about justice (the 
asymmetry critique).   
The realization of  the fact of  reasonable pluralism prompts Rawls’s turning from TJ 
to PL. He realizes that, due to the fact of  reasonable disagreement about comprehensive 
doctrines, it is unstable to insist on the conception of  justice as fairness. Therefore, he 
advances the project of  political liberalism to argue that in spite of  reasonable pluralism, 
there can be a family of  political conceptions of  justice that are supported by political 
values which are expected to be endorsed by all reasonable citizens with common public 
reason that is shareable. A family of  political conceptions of  justice which have met such 
a condition can serve as a basis for public reason and justification. In this chapter, I have 
argued that, as an interpretive project, political liberalism ultimately is committed to and 
honors the equal respect we have for people manifested by the political values of  
freedom, equality and fairness, which is the baseline of  justice in political life. The 
foundational commitment to equal respect in turn sets a limit to the fact of  reasonable 
                                                             
103 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes, 225. 
168 
 
pluralism in the political sphere. The fact of  reasonable pluralism does not frustrate the 
project of  TJ; rather, the development of  the project of  political liberalism in its 
awakening also carries on TJ’s endeavor of  justice, and furthermore, enriches it with 
more possibilities for our increasingly diverse liberal societies. 








In the last chapter, I presented the convergence approach’s four major critiques of  the 
shareability requirement of  public reason. They are concerned with two aspects: the 
plausibility and desirability of  the shareability requirement, and each aspect includes two 
specific critiques. I discussed the first aspect of  the convergence approach’s critiques: the 
plausibility of  shareable public reason. The convergence approach argues that, due to the 
fact of  reasonable pluralism, human reasons are bound to be unshareable by nature (the 
subjectivism critique). Consequently, conceptions of  justice are also too profound and 
divided to be shareable, so that the content of  public reason cannot be fulfilled by an 
overlapping consensus of  reasonable comprehensive doctrines (the asymmetry critique). 
I argued that these two critiques are both untenable. The standard of  public justification 
can be objective enough in the political realm, thus the subjectivism critique is a 
farfetched inference of  reasonable pluralism. Moreover, the limit of  reasonable pluralism 
is actually placed by a fundamental commitment to justice, manifested by the core values 
of  freedom, equality, and fairness. This limit of  reasonable pluralism also determines that 
disagreements about justice are, as a matter of  fact, the expected interpretations of  
justice. 
This chapter is going to consider the convergence approach’s first critique of the 
desirability aspect of shareable public reason. They argue that the consensus approach 
has inflicted on citizens excessive burdens and discouraged their following the moral 
duty of respecting the shareable public reason (the Integrity Critique). The essence of this 
critique is mainly embodied in the argument of integrity. The integrity argument states 
that the shareable public reason requirement has cut off citizens’ ultimate moral and 
religious convictions, thereby damaging their integrated existence by obstructing the 
invocation of their moral and religious convictions into public reason and justification. 
Moreover, such a requirement prevents religious citizens from adequately participating in 
democracy and even infringes upon their religious liberty. The convergence approach 
furthermore points out that the integrity argument not only illustrates the consensus 
approach’s undesirability, it also reveals its own corresponding desirability. Contrary to 
the consensus account, the convergence approach believes that integrity is a foundational 
value in public reason, and its inclusive approach of allowing all points of views into 
public reason preserves citizens’ integrity and freedom in the political society.  
With respect to the integrity critique, I will argue that the requirement of shareability 
of public reason does not harm citizens’ integrity, as it by no means requires citizens to 
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denounce their most fundamental moral and religious convictions. Furthermore, I will 
distinguish between “full participation” and “unrestricted participation”, as was originally 
done by Robert Audi to explain how a religious citizen can participate in politics 
unrestrictedly but not fully, and vice versa. Additionally, since such a requirement of 
shareable public reason is not a legal duty but a moral duty, it leaves citizens’ religious 
liberty and their freedom in general intact. Therefore, these rebuttals will largely clear the 
integrity charge that the convergence approach raised against the consensus approach. 
Moreover, I will argue that not only does the convergence approach fail to undermine the 
consensus account, but also that it fails to accomplish its theoretical aspiration in 
safeguarding individual integrity, thus it ceases to be a promising approach. 
In the second section, I will begin to unfold the integrity critique. In the third and 
fourth sections, in defense of  the consensus approach, I will argue that such an argument 
does not truly undercut the efficacy of  the consensus approach’s account of  citizens’ 
moral duty. Completing the defense for the consensus approach regarding the integrity 
critique, the fifth section will illustrate the groundlessness of  the convergence approach’s 
claim of  integrity, namely why the convergence approach itself  also fails to fulfill its goal 
of  sustaining citizens’ integrity in the political society. In Section Six, I will consider a 
critique related to the integrity critique which argues that the exclusion of  nonpublic 
reason in public deliberation is unfair. 
 
II. The Convergence Approach’s Integrity Critique: Citizens’ Lack of  Moral Motivation   
 
The Integrity Critique claims that the consensus account of public reason has imposed 
too onerous a burden on citizens, especially religious citizens. According to the 
consensus approach, citizens are asked to refrain from invoking their own moral and 
religious convictions in public reason and justification. Therefore, it might encroach 
upon their integrated existence, and it also infringes on their freedom. Contra the 
consensus conception, the convergence approach has its intuitive practical attractions to 
religious citizens. The convergence conception incorporates all comprehensive reasons 
held by citizens into public reason in the public discourse, which allows religious citizens 
to participate in political debates with their religious arguments. The convergence 
approach believes that it secures citizens’ individual integrity and hence helps them fulfill 
their freedom in the political society. The convergence approach thus develops an 
essential integrity argument, which mainly claims that: (1) shared public reason damages 
religious citizens’ integrated existence; and (2) it prevents them from democratically 





2.1 The Integrity Critique & the Claim of  Integrity1  
 
Nicholas Wolterstorff  criticizes the consensus approach’s requirement that of  shareable 
public reason demands religious citizens to refrain from invoking religious arguments in 
the public discourse, constituting serious damage to religious citizens’ integrated 
existence and their identity. Wolterstorff  endorses the convergence approach since it 
protects every citizen’s particularity. According to the convergence conception, we can 
advance different reasons to different citizens as they see them as persuasive. 
Wolterstorff  believes that it is each person’s own “moral and religious perspective that 
leads her to articulate the ethic of  the citizen in a liberal democracy.”2 A religious person 
inexorably bases her decisions concerning fundamental issues of  justice on her religious 
convictions. And even when a person plays the role of  a citizen, it is still impossible for 
her to “leap out her perspective” as there is no “adequate independent source”.3 For a 
religious person, the endeavor to achieve integrated personhood is not an option but a 
necessity. 
Likewise, Jeffrey Stout also understands the consensus conception of  public 
justification as an impairment to religious people’s integrity and, furthermore, as an 
impediment to their expressive freedom. The true respect for others, as Stout sees it, is 
“most fully displayed in the kind of  exchange where each person’s deepest commitments 
can be recognized and assessed for what they are properly.”4 Stout points out that the 
trouble with the consensus conception is that it “underestimates the role of  a person’s 
                                                             
1 In this chapter, I use “integrity”, “identity” and “integrated existence” interchangeably. The integrity 
argument also has some related variations, such as the truthfulness argument, the fairness argument 
and so on. In this chapter, I crystalize these related arguments as the integrity argument.  
The exclusion of  comprehensive moral and religious convictions is also an exclusion of  citizens’ 
most profound understanding of  truth. It nevertheless expresses a more general concern about the 
political approach of  secularism, which I have already mentioned in my second chapter. Besides, it is 
probable that religious citizens may feel it is unfair to them since it is religious reasons and arguments 
that are excluded from public reason, and so it may seem that the consensus approach unfairly prefers 
secular perspectives over religious ones. However, a shareable requirement itself  involves nothing 
about the dichotomy between secular and religious perspectives; it is just that religious reasons are 
fundamentally unshareable for a general citizenry. Even the religious critic Philip Quinn acknowledges 
that this political liberal approach is fair for religious reasons. See Philip Quinn, “Political Liberalisms 
and Their Exclusions of the Religious”, Proceedings and Addresses of  the American Philosophical 
Association 69 ((1995): 42. 
2 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues”, in 
Robert Audi & Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: the place of  religious convictions in political 
debate. (Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers Inc.1997) 113. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Jeffery Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2004)10. 
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collateral commitments in determining what he or she can reasonably reject when 
deciding basic political questions.”5 In order to understand a person, seeing his wider 
cultural and communal surroundings, including his religious convictions as a horizon 
(which Wolterstorff  calls perspective and Stout calls collateral commitment), is vitally 
significant. The full definition of  one’s identity or existence therefore involves references 
to a defining horizon. As Charles Taylor states:   
 
“My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide 
the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case 
what is good, or value, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or 
oppose.”6  
 
That is to say, people’s self-definition and their conceptions of  the good are inseparable 
from their own horizons, which are constituted by many other people. To be specific, our 
horizon—the meanings we project onto the world around us—is the result of  a lifelong 
education, or disciplining, or socialization, by other people. These other people thereby 
become constitutive of  our horizon. 7  It is a classical Hegelian vision of  
self-consciousness. Simply put, it is impossible for one individual to understand herself  
without interaction with and recognition of  another individual. We become 
self-conscious of  ourselves from others, and we gain our freedom also because of  it.  
A person’s horizon varies a great deal from person to person, including his values, 
religious judgments, and conceptions of  good. Stout points out that it is impossible to 
expect that political issues, even fundamental political questions (such as “constitutional 
essentials and questions of  basic justice” in the Rawlsian sense) will not be influenced by 
individual particularities.8 Along with Wolterstorff, Stout believes that the real way to 
show respect to another also largely lies in the respect for distinctive point of  view, 
namely, her individuality or “particularity”.9 However, the consensus approach requires a 
shared common basis of  reasoning in principles, which counters the fact that the reason 
we have is located in our individual horizons. Therefore, Stout sides with the 
convergence approach’s public justification conception.10  
                                                             
5 Ibid., 70. 
6 Charles Taylor, Sources of  The Self: the making of  the modern identity (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1989) 27. 
7 I thank Arie-Jan Kwak for the elaboration on this point. 
8 Jeffery Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 70. 
9 Ibid., 72. 
10 Stout, however, departs from Wolterstorff  in the aspect that Stout does not believe one’s collateral 
commitment is primarily determined by one’s “consocial” or group environment. Stout believes that a 
173 
 
Wolterstorff  and Stout’s arguments have illustrated why they believe that religious 
citizens’ integrated existence will be severely undermined by the consensus conception. 
As for the fundamental significance of  a person’s integrity or identity, apart from 
recognition from others—which is what respect for people entails—Taylor also points 
out that it assists our self-understanding. For Taylor, selfhood or personhood is mainly 
what distinguishes humans from other beings like animals, while identity is a feature of  
the substantive content of  selfhood.11  
Moreover, apart from criticizing the consensus approach’s failure in cutting off  
citizens’ integrated existence, the convergence approach also makes a positive claim. As 
they respect the value of  integrity, they claim that their approach overcomes a severe 
deficiency of  the consensus approach, and therefore offers a more promising alternative. 
The convergence approach links the value of  integrity with the principle of  public 
justification. Vallier claims that “respect for integrity” and “respect for reasonable 
pluralism” are the foundational values in public reason. It is these two foundational 
values that account for the basis of  public justification, and also “shape the structure of  
law ratified by public justification”.12 From the perspective of  grounding the public 
justification, Vallier identifies the root of  public justification with the recognition that 
living in accordance with my own projects and principles is a fundamental right.13 
Therefore, “when coercion is publicly justified, it no longer restrains persons’ actions in 
ways they find objectionable”.14 Regarding the second function, public justification 
entails that coercion must be acceptable for each citizen; the public justification principle 
is therefore meant to “respect each person’s point of  view”, which is “bound up with 
their integrity”.15 Echoing what Taylor and other Hegelians argue, it is the value of  
integrity that shapes our options, preferences, and life projects. “Integrity carves out 
social space for each person to pursue her projects and act in concert with her 
                                                                                                                                                                               
person’s exposure to culture or influences from outside his group also constitute to his identity or 
individuality. One would fail to express respect for another “if  one assimilates his view to some form 
of  group thinking.” Therefore, the differences setting off  one community from another are not only 
differences that make a difference in political debate. “There are also differences that set off  
individuals from the communities in which they were raised or with which at some point they become 
affiliated.” See ibid., 74-75. 
  Paul Cliteur brings to my attention that Stout’s image of  a Socratic dialogue is actually not apt. 
Socrates was a ruthless rationalist, who would have no time for people who advance reasons that he 
could not understand and critically analyze. 
11 Charles Taylor, Sources of  The Self: the making of  the modern identity, 33-34. 
12 See Kevin Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation (Routledge, 2014) 85. 
13 See ibid., 86. 
14 Ibid., 87. 
15 Ibid., 88. 
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principles.”16 Integrity-based reasons thus serve as the most secure foundation and 
“robust defeaters” against “a whole host of  competitor reasons”; and by the same token, 
“for a wide range of  laws”.17 Therefore, the convergence approach makes a claim that is 
on the exact opposite of  the consensus approach, the claim of  integrity, which protects 
citizens’ integrity in the political sphere. 
Let me abstract the following propositions to sum up the integrity argument’s line 
of  critiques of  the consensus approach:  
 
p(1) As a moral person, one needs to fully understand oneself.  
p(2) A full self-understanding is a person’s understanding of  their particular 
integrated existences inhabiting their horizon or collateral commitments 
which include their fundamental moral and religious convictions.  
p(3) Due to the varieties of  every one’s horizon or collateral commitments, 
every individual has their own particularity.  
p(4) Expressing selves or respecting other moral persons is recognizing their 
individuality or particularity.  
p(5) Therefore, a true expression of  respect is manifested in recognizing 
everyone’s individual integrated existence, including their deepest moral 
and religious convictions.  
p(6) One’s political existence is also embedded in one’s integrated existence; 
therefore it is impossible for one to step out of  their integrated horizon in 
political matters. In other words, the pursuit of  one’s integrated existence 
is a necessity rather than an option. 
p(7) Therefore, political issues should be decided in light of  one’s integrated 
existence, including one’s own fundamental convictions.  
p(8) The consensus conception’s requirement of  shared public reason in 
political discourse, however, requires religious citizens to exclude their 
most fundamental convictions,18 namely their religious points of  view. 
p(9) For religious citizens, excluding their most fundamental religious 
convictions from the political discourse is breaking down their integrated 
existence. 
Hence, the first outcome for religious citizens is: 
                                                             
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 We have to be careful here that the exclusion of  religious points of  views from public reason is not 
just the exclusive version; it also includes the inclusive version of  public reason. Inclusive public 




Outcome A: The consensus conception breaks down religious citizens’ 
integrated existence. 
 
Due to the constraint brought about by the consensus approach, the convergence 
account claims that either citizens cannot act on what truly motivates them, or they 
have to “bear the costs of  being alienated from some sectors of  their society”19, 
most likely from their own religious communities, for instance, recognition, fraternity, 
and mutual understanding, among others. If  religious citizens receive a message 
from the society that “acting on religious reasons in the public sphere is considered 
inappropriate or immoral,” some of  them probably “will be less inclined to act in 
accordance with their religious identities for the fear” of  social pressure or public 
condemnation.20 Yet a citizen as a social being craves recognition from those with 
whom he associates and feels belonging. Such a yearning could be so strong that a 
religious citizen may suffer from the difficult struggle between the loss of  fraternity 
with his most intimate social relations and the danger of  being subject to public 
condemnation. 
 
2.2 Restraints on Citizens’ Freedom in Democratic Societies 
 
The integrity argument is established upon a basic presumption about personhood which 
is beyond reproach, consisting of  p(1) to p(5): every human being deserves to be fully 
respected by others for who they are.21 The preservation of  their integrated existence is 
also undeniably a part of  “respecting others as who they are”. The core claim of  the 
integrity argument, the articulation of  one’s integrated existence in liberal democracy 
starts from p(6) on. According to this line of  reasoning of  the integrity argument, the 
first undesirable outcome of  the consensus conception is that it splits the identities of  
religious people.  
Stout thinks that the consensus conception’s shared public reason is in tension with 
democratic citizens’ liberty of  free expression. Stout believes that all democratic citizens 
have the freedom “to express whatever premises actually serve as reasons for their 
claims.”22 It is a specific and practical criticism, and Stout’s critiques stem from Hegel’s 
criticism of  Kantian moral epistemology. To begin with, Stout argues that the whole 
                                                             
19 Kevin Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation, 62. 
20 Ibid. 
21 There is some limitation, of  course, in that we don’t respect a thief  for his thieving behavior or a 
murder for his murderousness, etc. I thank Paul Cliteur for pointing this out to me. 
22 See Jeffery Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 10. 
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paradigm of  public justification is still attributed to the same category of  Kant’s model, 
which is hardly a model that every reasonable citizen is expected to endorse.23 For 
example, “Hegel believes Kantian preoccupation with universally valid principles 
epistemologically naïve” and the political liberal evaluative criterion of  reasonableness 
too static.24 Hegel believes that social and political norms are creations of  social practices 
which are always in a process of  unfolding transformation in time.25 According to the 
Hegelian paradigm, unlike the reasonable persons in the Kantian paradigm, reasonable 
individuals do not merely statically agree to rules that everyone else agrees but are always 
“prepared to engage in discursive exchanges with any point of  view that they can 
recognize as responsibly held”.26 That is the reason that individuals’ free expression is of  
much importance for us as these exchanges involve an “improvisational and immanent” 
expression of  one’s own point of  view, which fundamentally shapes our social practices 
and consequently our social rules.27 To that extent, free expression is seen as a celebration 
of  “democratic individuality as a positive good.”28 Stout emphasizes that “to take 
expressive freedom seriously is to see our capacity to engage in reasoning… as something 
that cannot be captured definitively in the mere application of  rules that no reasonable 
person could reasonably reject.”29 As a result, the consensus conception which breaks 
down religious people’s integrity also prevents them from acting on their convictions in 
the political domain, the vital domain of  life. Stout argues that we should accept the 
convergence conception “to reason from widely justifiable premises in the political 
arena.” 30 Therefore, this harm to religious people’s integrity has in effect unduly 
constrained their democratic participation in political life. Either they cannot act on what 
truly motivate them, or they have to bear the costs of  being alienated from some sectors 
of  their society. It is also a practical concern that citizens should be able to fully 
participate in politics according to their own viewpoints. Paul Weithman claims that 
citizens should be allowed to participate in public life, in most cases voting, according to 
                                                             
23 Ibid., 78. 
24 Ibid., 78, 80. 
25 Ibid., 79. 
26 Ibid., 80. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 84. This advancement of  free expression is also the positive freedom that Isaiah Berlin 
brought to revived emphasis in the paper “Two Concepts of  Liberty”. 
29 Ibid., 80. Italic added by me.  
30  Ibid., 82. Stout also believes that Hegelian arguments suffice to abandon contractarianism 
altogether. According to Hegelian epistemology, “normative concepts are not located at the 
contractual level and applied on the basis of  the constitutive contract.” Rather, “they are in the 
process of  mutual recognition” in which individuals respect each other’s individuality and conduct the 
exchanges of  reasons. 
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their own concerns and what matters to them the most. When they vote for public 
candidates, the votes should be based on candidates’ positions on public issues or what is 
of  most importance to them.31 Weithman argues that the right attitude requires “not that 
there be one ground… which all can affirm, but that for each person there be some 
ground for them that they can affirm.”32 For example, some citizens view the value of  
family as the most important issue; some are more concerned with the equality of  
women; while some may have more of  an interest in environmental and animal welfare. 
There is nothing wrong with them converging on liberal democracy from differing 
perspectives.33 
Therefore, the second undesirable outcome of  the integrity critique is stated as: 
 
Outcome B: The consensus conception’s requirement of  shared public reason 
also results in restricting religious citizens’ full participation in 
democratic societies. 
 
A related but harsher criticism of  the consensus approach is that its refusal to allow 
religious reasons and religious arguments into public deliberation not only damages 
religious citizens’ positive freedom in a democracy, but that it also curtails their religious 
freedom. Religious liberty is a fundamental constitutional right, according to which one is 
able to act on one’s beliefs to the extent of  holding the beliefs and participating in 
religious practice, i.e., worship. Therefore, if, for instance, citizens are told that they 
should not rely on their religious beliefs to vote for the candidates they prefer, this is a 
serious constraint on the free exercise of  their religion. Subsequently, the third 
undesirable outcome derived from the integrity critique is: 
 
Outcome C: Restricting religious citizens in referring to their religious beliefs in 
democratic engagement particularly invades their religious liberty.  
 
To sum up, these nine propositions from the integrity argument have made a compelling 
case against the consensus conception. Three unpleasant outcomes follow: 1) by virtue 
of  asking religious citizens to shelve their deepest religious convictions in the political 
discourse, the consensus conception is fundamentally at odds with this precious ideal of  
holding a person’s integrated existence together. Worse still, the consensus conception 
                                                             
31 Paul Weithman, Religion and the Obligations of  Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004) 216-217. 
32 Ibid., 216. 
33 Ibid., 217. 
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also 2) at a more general level, curtails religious citizens’ freedom to participate in a 
democratic society as citizens and 3) especially curtails their religious freedom. To protect 
citizens, especially religious citizens, from these consequences, the critics suggest a 
rejection of  the consensus conception and advocate for the convergence approach, 
which could protect citizens’ integrity.   
 
III. Defeating the Integrity Critique 
     
As powerful as the integrity argument’s critiques are, I nevertheless believe they are 
mistaken. 34  A valid defense for the consensus approach against the convergence 
approach’s integrity argument needs to consider and rebut those three undesirable 
outcomes one by one. First of  all, I will argue that the respect or recognition of  one’s 
integrity or identity is not a predominant ideal that directs one’s decisions in every matter 
of  life. Secondly, the consensus conception’s requirement of  shared public reason does 
not damage religious citizens’ integrated existence. Thirdly, contra outcome B, the 
consensus conception is the one encouraging citizens’ full participation in democracy. 
Last but not least, unlike outcome C, the shareable public reason requirement does not 
infringe upon religious citizens’ religious liberty. In this current and the following section, 
I will take on these three points respectively.  
                                                             
34 Brian Barry argues that it is a mistake of  political liberalism to come up with a plausible account 
explaining why citizens’ sense of  justice is congruent with their conceptions of  good. Barry argues 
that the sense of  justice alone is enough to motivate citizens to participate in a stable polity in a 
democratic society. For Barry’s critique, see Brian Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” 
Ethics 105 (1995): 874–915. 
Barry’s critique has shown that he adopts a moral internalist account of  moral motivation which 
says that moral reasons alone can motivate people’s actions, and moral desires are not 
needed.  Internalism, externalism, and the Humean account are all explanations of  the link between 
moral judgment and moral motivations. Internalism argues that moral judgment suffices for moral 
motivation, while externalism believes that it is the desire that really motivates moral agents’ actions, 
and the Humean account argues for the combination of  moral judgment and desire. For the 
divergence of  moral internalism, externalism, and the Humean account in moral psychology. See 
Michael Smith, The Moral Problem, (Blackwell Publishing, 1994) Chapter 4.  
It appears that since Barry’s critique has illuminated a divergence between two accounts of  
moral motivation, moral internalism and externalism, in order to address his critique properly, political 
liberals have to take a stand between these two accounts. However, the fact of  reasonable pluralism 
implies that moral motivation is also subject to reasonable disagreements, thus the disagreement of  
what really explains moral motivation is just as profound for political liberalism to settle. (It appears 
that Rawls adopted a weak externalism in this regard, which does not matter nonetheless.) 
Nevertheless, I believe it is because the arguments with respect to the sense of  justice already suffice 
for those moral internalists, whereas a full range covering this issue needs to take into account those 
who are not swayed by moral internalism. But of  course a full examination of  this matter exceeds the 




3.1 Integrity: Not a Trumping Ideal 
 
As previously pointed out, the key claim of  the integrity argument is p(6): the 
inseparability of  one’s political existence from one’s individual existence. Since it is a 
necessity for one to search for and preserve one’s integrity, it is impossible for one to 
step out of  one’s integrated horizon and into some sort of  independent source when it 
comes to making political decisions. However, I argue that keeping a moral person’s 
integrated existence intact is not the most important value that we aim to uphold.  
    My argument consists of  three complementary parts. First of  all, it is not certain 
that one’s collateral commitments or horizon is actually integrated in harmony. The 
argument of  integrity is fundamentally established upon a too demanding coherentist 
assumption of  human nature and reason for practical actions. It supposes that we are 
consistently integrated human beings, thus, for one thing, there will not be inner conflicts 
within our identities, and for another, our actions will be consistent with our identities. 
For instance, if  I hate liars, I will never tell a lie. Or if  I am a pacifist, I will oppose any 
war. This epistemological assumption of  human nature seems fair and sensible. When we 
meet someone new, some knowledge of  her past stories and her background seem to be 
a short cut to assist us to know this new person and predict her future reactions to some 
matters. In a football match, it is also how a goalkeeper prepares for penalties: by 
attacking the player’s usual scoring angle. However, in real life, we often find ourselves 
trapped in inner conflicts with regard to our own self-definition. For example, a black 
Christian heterosexual male and a white Jewish homosexual female may find themselves 
cornered in rather confusing and unintegrated horizons. Secondly, we also may do things 
that are inconsistent with our identities, and we do not always act consistently with our 
history. Romeo falls in love with Juliette, the girl of  his family feud who he is supposed 
to hate. Likewise, a member of  a primitive Inuit group may refuse to eat seafood. A girl 
from a traditional family values community may refuse to even get married and have a 
family at all. A boy raised Muslim could decide to become an atheist when he grows up. 
A determined Roman Catholic may end up supporting her friend’s homosexual marriage. 
These imaginary scenarios where self-contractions take place are all perfectly probable, 
and they are not necessarily problems. These conflicts within oneself  are crucial to a 
healthy personality. “Each person has or can have a variety, a multiplicity of  different and 
perhaps disparate communal allegiances”, which “requires management”.35  
Thirdly, even if  we accept the integrity of  individuals’ collateral commitments, 
                                                             
35 Jeremy Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative,” University of  Michigan 
Journal of  Law Reform 25(1991):789. 
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recognizing and respecting a moral person’s integrated individuality by no means implies 
that our life or decisions are thus confined or even determined by our collateral 
commitments or horizon. Respecting one’s collateral commitments does not entail that 
one is deprived of  the position of  final authority over his own reasons or motives. P(6) 
suggests that one’s horizon or a collateral commitment is superior to one’s own reason or 
desires. More information regarding why the decision of  one’s collateral commitments is 
able to prevail over one’s decision on his reason or motive needs to be filled in. The 
integrity argument may refute that there is no independence of  one’s own reason or 
desires deriving from one’s collateral commitments or horizon. However, the integrity 
argument cannot be pushed to this extent that there is zero room for one to develop 
one’s faculty of  inferential reason or individual free will. Otherwise the integrity 
argument, which initially calls for recognizing particularity, will end up swallowing up all 
possibilities of  individual decisions by reason. 
 
3.2 Federer, Nadal, or No One in Particular? 
 
As the opposite of  outcome A, I argue that the consensus conception’s exclusion of  
religious argument entailed by the requirement of  shared public reason does not mean 
disrespecting or breaking down religious citizens’ integrated existence. My objection to 
outcome A has three layers of  arguments. Firstly, the consensus conception does not 
criticize or reject religious citizens’ religious convictions, and political liberals do not ask 
religious citizens to forsake their religious convictions. Not evoking religious reasons in 
the political forum is compatible with them occupying the fundamental place of  religious 
citizens’ comprehensive doctrines. As shown previously, because something is of  
fundamental significance to me does not mean that all my behaviors and thoughts are 
driven by it. Secondly, as for the relationship between religious citizens’ religious 
convictions and their political claims, citizens have the freedom of  conscience to decide 
individually how they think the values of  the political domain are related to other values 
in their comprehensive doctrines. Thirdly, in contrast with the accused hostility towards 
religion,36 the consensus approach’s exclusion of  religious reasons is not the aim of  using 
shared public reason. Rather, the usage of  shared public reason is the only condition for 
each party to conduct a valid discussion in the political forum. To illustrate these above 
                                                             
36 In contrast with what Rawls has emphasized on several occasions, that public reason is not against 
religion, critics still believe that public reason has shown hostility towards religion. Or as what Jeffery 
Stout points out, no one would say that the argument of  public reason shows support to religion. See 
Patrick Neal, “Is Political Liberalism Hostile to Religion,” in Shaun P. Yong ed., Reflections on Rawls: An 




points, a hypothetic example may be of  some help.  
Hypothetically, at a tennis world congress, in front of  all the world’s tennis fans, 
Allan, Brian, and Carrie are conducting a public debate about what is the true nature of  
tennis, and the outcome of  their debate will have a coercive effect on how everyone plays 
tennis.  
 
Allan: Roger Federer is the God of  tennis. He is the one who defines tennis. 
Viewing Roger Federer as my religion in tennis and being his follower is 
my indispensable tennis identity.  
Brian: I disagree. I believe Rafael Nadal is the God of  tennis. He is the one who 
defines tennis. Viewing Rafael Nadal as my religion in tennis and being his 
follower is my indispensable tennis identity. 
Carrie: I disagree with both of  you. I know how great Federer and Nadal are, 
but I do not believe any single player should dictate how everyone 
understands tennis. There is no way we would reach agreement of  what 
tennis is and how to play it if  you two hold up to your “indispensable 
tennis identities”. 
 
In this quite a realistic debate; both Allan and Brian insist on making their claims on the 
basis of  their ‘indispensable tennis identities’ with their fundamental tennis convictions. 
However, Carrie believes that the public discussion about tennis should exclude anyone 
referring to their tennis God. By abstaining from referring to Federer and Nadal, Allan 
and Brian are not asked to discard or question their beliefs of  the greatness of  those two 
great players. Nor is Carrie questioning the fundamental position of  Federer and Nadal 
in Allan and Brian’s understandings of  tennis. It is true indeed that Allan and Brian 
believe that the sport of  tennis is defined by Federer and Nadal, yet it by no means 
indicates that they cannot discuss tennis without referring to these two great players. It is 
clearly absurd to conclude that Allan and Brian have lost their tennis identities or that 
they are less Federer and Nadal fans. The importance of  Federer and Nadal to the sport 
of  tennis is within Allan and Brian’s freedom of  conscience, and everyone is entitled to 
have their own idea of  who their tennis God is. But when the question becomes a public 
topic and will have coercive influence on the world’s tennis fans, if  the current mode of  
conversation continues, a public discussion would be as Carrie predicted: impossible. No 
matter how eloquent these three participants are and how compelling the arguments are 
that they each provide for their claims, they lack a basis to conduct their discussion of  
the question, namely what tennis is. There is no way for other parties to participate in 
this discussion if  Allan and Brian grip tightly to their insistence on Federer and Nadal as 
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the final reference in this public discussion.  
Likewise, conducting public discussions in secular terms does not require any 
abnegation of  one’s theism. Even if  it is fundamentally believed by one that everything is 
created by God, it is a different matter that one cannot engage in secular debates without 
God talk. To confound those two different matters would dramatically compress the 
room of  moral principles and evaluative standards’ development, which is contrary to the 
reality of  this secular world. One is not surrendering his integrity when he withholds 
appealing to his religious convictions; rather, he realizes it as a necessary condition to 
conduct a valid public discussion. Additionally, what is noteworthy in this artificial 
example is that no tennis fan will have any difficulty in accessing or comprehending Allan 
and Brian’s points of  Federer and Nadal, which is not the common case for religious 
arguments. In actual liberal democracies, religious arguments tend to be unintelligible and 
inaccessible to many unreligious citizens or religious citizens from other faiths, even after 
careful examination. We live in a situation where the religious part of  society is also a 
tower of  Babel: no one understands the arguments of  the other. A good argument for a 
Mormon is only applicable for him, while it could be totally unconvincing to Jews or 
Muslims. So purely on the basis of  religious pluralism, even in a world where there are 
only religious believers, they would be obliged to speak the language that is universally 
understandable to each other too. Even the conventional Christian arguments would not 
be convincing to all Christians.37 As a matter of  fact, many religious believers tend to use 
public reason, even only for pragmatic concerns, in the court to make their case more 
compelling. In that sense, this hypothetical tennis example has already downgraded the 
difficulty of  putting religious arguments into public discussions since the only problem in 
this example is the unshareability. Nonetheless, it may be objected that the hypothetical 
example of  tennis is inappropriate as tennis cannot be compared to politics. Yet the 
analogy here is not between tennis and politics; rather is between Federer or Nadal’s 
fundamental influence on a tennis fan and a religion’s impact on its devout believers, 
which is what integrated existence signifies.   
 
3.3 “Full Participation” and “Unrestricted Participation” 
 
The next issue I am taking on is a claim similar to outcome B, which argues that not 
being able to refer to Federer and Nadal in the discussion prevents Allan and Brian from 
fully participating in the tennis congress. As far as I see, the convergence approach’s 
criticism on this point has confused two distinct concepts: “full participation” and 
                                                             
37 I thank Paul Cliteur for making this point. 
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“unrestricted participation”.38 One can participate fully in political debate irrespective of  
whether or not one unrestrictedly “runs out all my arguments or express all my 
sentiments”, so long as one has revealed all one’s reasons that can be discussed and 
evaluated by one’s fellow citizens. 39  By contrast, unrestricted participation is not 
necessary full participation. An unrestricted way to take part in democratic debates could 
result in bringing in too personal judgments that cloud what can really be reflected upon.  
In a democratic regime, as I have argued in chapter three, citizens do not merely 
share a public life together; they also share a “participant’s perspective” on political 
matters. Citizens not only share a public life together, they are also generally positive 
participants in a democratic regime who help shape our public life together. That is to say, 
as full participants, citizens are those whose fundamental interests are affected by, and 
also who really take part in political decision making. A “participant’s perspective” impels 
citizens to employ justificatory public reasons that can be shared among all citizens in the 
public arena. When a citizen takes a participant’s point of  view towards a political matter, 
his reason in the public discussion does not merely make sense to himself  alone; it has to 
be accessible, understood, and shared by a general citizen body as well. Therefore, 
citizens are all able to equally examine a political conception’s legitimacy on the same 
basis of  matters that they all care about. On the other hand, unrestricted participation 
signifies that those citizens who take part in the democracy reason without any 
restrictions and do not accept public reasons as the reasons they should take to guide 
their public life. For those citizens who view democratic participation as uncircumscribed, 
they do not share reasons underlying a state’s plans and decisions. Instead, they still 
reason as scattered individuals who are not necessarily part of  a liberal democracy. 
Perhaps we can show the difference between full participation and unrestricted 
participation more clearly by revisiting our hypothetical story of  the election between 
Bob, Derek, and Claire.40 Recall that Bob votes for the candidate Claire because and only 
because they are both Anglicans. Although Derek votes for Claire too, this is because he 
believes that she is a candidate with solid political merit and virtues. The problem is that 
Bob has no other reason that he can share with a general citizen body to convince others 
to accept his decision in voting for Claire. Psychologically, Derek may even be less 
                                                             
38  This distinction is brought out by Robert Audi in Religious Commitment and Secular Reason, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)108. For Audi, full participation does not depend on 
whether all one’s arguments or sentiments have been expressed in democratic processes.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Although “ordinary citizens of  most liberal democracies are not given the opportunity to cast 
votes on laws and policies,” they participate in political decisions mainly by voting on candidates who 
seek public offices. See Paul Weithman, Religion and the Obligations of  Citizenship, 117. I discussed this 
story in much detail in the third chapter. 
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passionate as Bob in taking part in this election. Nevertheless, Derek has fully 
participated here while Bob has participated too, but in an unrestricted fashion, inasmuch 
as only (compared to Bob) Derek’s reasons would be understood, accepted, and even 
sympathized with by a general citizen body. Furthermore, if  there is hard evidence that 
Claire is not who she claims to be, and she was severely corrupted in her previous 
occupation, and if  Derek is made aware of  that new finding, which has been proved to 
be true, he is expected to change his vote or at least have second thoughts about it. By 
contrast, Bob’s unrestricted and unshakeable support for Claire would not be interfered 
with by this new finding since his support is based on her religion, which stays the same 
in this case. Suppose again, if  Claire declares that she is not religious anymore, which 
change will not influence Derek but could possibly lose Bob’s vote. Plus, following the 
convergence approach’s picture of  unrestricted participation, with all arguments included 
in the public discourse, if  Bob’s religious denomination unfortunately becomes the 
minority, in canvassing his religious argument, Bob would possibly confront challenges 
by members of  other religious groups, for instance Presbyterians or non-Christians, who 
would want to coerce him towards favoring their religions. 
 
IV. Public Reason Encroaching on Religious Liberty? 
 
The previous hypothetical tennis example may engender a subsequent question with 
respect to outcome C: does not referring to Federer and Nadal in the discussion prevent 
Allan and Brian from exercising their tennis religious freedom or their freedom in 
expressing their most fundamental convictions? Likewise, in the previous supposed 
example of  the election, the consensus approach would say that Bob has a moral duty to 
refrain from voting for Claire only because she is also an Anglican; is that an 
infringement of  Bob’s religious freedom?   
I believe that there is both conceptual confusion and a normative problem in this 
so-called outcome C. For one thing, this outcome has conflated legal right and moral 
evaluation, namely “the (legal) right to do something” and “doing the (morally) right 
thing”. While the requirement of  shareable public reason asks for the realization of  the 
latter “right”, it has not infringed upon citizens’ legal right to their religious liberty. 
Moreover, a reflection of  the normative logic of  religious liberty brings this idea to the 
surface: the benchmark of  defining the violation of  religious liberty does not depend on 
the burdens that have been imposed on religious citizens, but relies upon the question 
whether it deprives individuals of  a fair opportunity, with regard to background 




4.1. “The Right to Do Something” and “Doing the Right Thing” 
 
First of  all, there is basic confusion in these two questions. The claim of  outcome C 
mistakenly equates “the right to do something” with “doing the right thing”. Allan and 
Brian have every right to invoke Federer and Nadal as the final authoritative reference in 
their tennis congress; however, it by no means signifies that they are doing the right thing. 
It is also certainly Bob’s right to vote for any candidate as an exercise or demonstration 
of  his religious liberty, which also does not mean that Bob is making the right decision. 
The “right” in the first sense is a legal right, which by itself  involves a permission to do 
things morally wrong or neutral. By contrast, “doing the right thing” is a moral judgment, 
which is independent of  the “right” in the legal sense. Religious liberty is citizens’ 
fundamental constitutional right. However, “countenancing this right does not imply that 
every exercise of  it is beyond moral criticism… rights are not a moral license to do 
everything they forbid others to prevent.”41  
Let me strengthen this argument by addressing two further concerns. First of  all, 
admittedly, a legal right to do something does not mean that doing anything under that 
category is morally praiseworthy. However, there must be something intrinsically good, 
valuable, or worthy of  protection about that category, otherwise there would not be any 
law to guarantee its legal status to begin with. Therefore, it is not entirely correct to say 
that “the right to do something” and “doing the right thing” are independent of  each 
other. In terms of  the source, the former “right” must have fundamentally derived from 
the latter “right”. For example, most constitutional laws stipulate freedom of  speech as a 
fundamental constitutional right, and the legal right to speak freely is recognition and 
protection for the value of  speech in general. I think it is a justified belief. Nevertheless, 
it does not mean that every type of  speech is morally praiseworthy. By the same token, 
although freedom of  religion is seen as recognition and protection for religion in 
general,42 it by no means implies that invoking religious liberty under all circumstances is 
                                                             
41 Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason, 93. 
42 It’s also a contentious issue whether religious freedom as a fundamental constitutional right is a 
protection for religion per se or for other reasons. Some theorists believe it is because religion itself  is 
good in its nature. For instance, John H. Garvey, “An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom,” 
Journal of  Contemporary Legal Issues 7(1996): 275-291; Michael J. Perry, “Religion, Politics, and the 
Constitution,” Journal of  Contemporary Legal Issues 7(1996): 407-446; John Finnis, “Does Free Exercise 
of  Religion Deserve Constitutional Mention?” The American Journal of  Jurisprudence 54(2009): 41-66. By 
contrast, some theorists argue that we only save this constitutional right out of  prudential concerns. 
Such as, Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion (Princeton University Press, 2012). Even more, some 
perceive the constitutional foundation position of  religious freedom in connection with constitutional 
practice. For example, Andrew Koppelman, “Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?” University 
of  Illinois Law Review 3(2006): 571-603. The question of  whether religious liberty is a protection of  the 
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morally commendable. Therefore, the moral duty of  not invoking religious doctrines in 
public reason imposed by the consensus approach is incapable of  outweighing citizens’ 
religious liberty. However, if  religious doctrines are invoked in public reason as an 
exercise of  religious liberty, religious citizens are unable to explain the basis of  their 
actions to other citizens in terms that each could reasonably be expected to endorse. 
That is to say, they are being unfair to other citizens. In the artificial election story, as Bob 
is unable to justify his decision to other citizens, he is being unfair to any citizen who is 
not an Anglican. Moreover, although citizens have a right to make wrong decisions, they 
do have to live with the consequences, for instance, a degenerated democracy. As Audi 
says, “If  citizens in a democracy do no more in shaping their society by their political 
participation and in contributing to public service than they must do by law, their society 
will at best languish”.43 Back to the tennis example. Should Allan and Brian insist on their 
claim on their tennis god, they also would have to face the consequence of  a deadlock of  
their tennis congress. As for the society in which Bob lives: if  every religious citizen 
voted for who they felt was most pious to their religions, this election might end up with 
an elected official who is unable to be responsible for all citizens in the society.   
Secondly, even though it is legally permissible to do morally wrong things as long as 
it is still legal, to what degree can we permit or tolerate such morally wrong behavior? Or, 
to put it differently, when does a morally wrong but legally right behavior become illegal? 
Let us take the example of  free speech again. The right of  free speech does not mean 
that any individual can say anything they like. For instance, the limits of  morally 
repugnant free speech have been set by the punishment for “hate speech” in many states’ 
criminal laws. And also, the crime of  blasphemy, no matter how morally contentious it is, 
still remains valid in many criminal laws. These two examples of  the limits of  free speech 
clearly show that having a right to do certain things is not a green light to do all these 
things. Back to the constitutional right of  religious liberty. In the American Constitution, 
the limitation to this first Amendment right’s exercise has been placed in the same article: 
non-establishment. The state’s permission of  citizens’ religious liberty claims cannot 
amount to any certain sort of  establishment. Back to the artificial election story. Bob’s 
decision in backing up another Anglican certainly does not constitute an establishment 
of  an Anglican Church. Nevertheless, it might lead to this consequence if  all religious 
believes from the same faith voted as Bob did. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                               
nature of  religion is too complicated and irrelevant for me to answer here. For the sake of  argument, 
I accept the most generous assumption to religion, that religious freedom is a recognition and 
protection for the concept of  religion itself. 
43 Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason, 86. 
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4.2 Burdens and Fairness 
 
The other mistake of  the outcome C stems from a normative problem. Outcome C 
presumes a common logic that restricting religious citizens’ ability to refer to their 
religious beliefs in democratic engagement prevents them from practicing their religions, 
which is a serious setback to a person’s legitimate interests. And the state should not 
impose such burdens in the absence of  a compelling reason. “A law conflicting with 
religious conduct should be withdrawn or amended or an exemption should be carved 
out.”44 In a recent article, Alan Patten points out that the mistake of  this common logic 
pertains to its failure to recognize the relationship between burden, responsibility, and the 
justification of  state action.45 The common logic assumes that a burden or restraint on 
religious citizens itself  implies a presumption of  exemption or religious accommodation. 
However, this presumption would be “valid only if  the burden on the religious believer is 
not appropriately regarded as the believer’s own responsibility”. 46 The severity of  
religious constraint does not signify that preventing such constraint or removing it is 
everyone’s responsibility, since if  a person’s religious commitments are her own 
responsibility, the costs should not be borne by others.47 Likewise, the fact that a person 
is seriously or seemingly unequally burdened by a law does not by itself  “establish 
unfairness because the burden might be one for which she is legitimately considered 
responsible.” 48 Subsequently, the key question shifts from the presumption against 
religious constraints to locating where the responsibility belongs, which is where the 
principle of  fairness comes into play. 
    According to the fairness principle that Rawls developed, it is a “public 
responsibility” to ensure that primary institutions provide “fair background conditions 
for citizens to pursue their ends.”49 If  the fair background conditions are not established 
yet, individuals have a claim to fairness treatment, but if  individuals still feel restrained 
given that those background conditions are fulfilled, then they are “expected to bear this 
burden themselves.”50 Thus, a claim of  religious liberty deprivation calls for more than 
the demonstration of  religious constraints; “it must also be shown that the burden or 
                                                             
44 Alan Patten, “The Normative Logic of  Religious Liberty,” The Journal of  Political Philosophy 25 (2017): 
130. Such a consideration is also behind the legislation of  RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act) 
in the United States. 
45 Ibid., 139. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 139-140. 
48 Ibid., 142. I thank Paul Cliteur for bringing up this point to me first. 




restriction on religious conduct undermines the fair background conditions against which 
individuals are entitled to pursue their ends.”51 If  we put the claim of  religious liberty 
into this light, individuals would be given “especially weighty interests in being able to 
pursue and fulfill their religious convictions,” as long as these interests do not conflict 
with the fair background conditions on the basis of  which all others can pursue and 
fulfill their claims.52 The point of  the fairness principle is to encourage us “to avert our 
attention from the balance between constraints and public interest” to “the concern 
about fairness”.53 I believe that this is precisely why the consensus approach’s argument 
of  public reason does not hinder individuals from exercising their religious liberty. The 
essence underlined as shareable public reason’s moral duty is not to add burdens on 
religious believers. Instead, the crux is to present a fair democratic setting that is 
understandable and shareable to all citizens to lay down their claims and pursue their 
ends. Asking citizens to refrain from invoking religious arguments would make religious 
citizens present their case perhaps in a less comfortable or familiar language in the public 
deliberation, but it is not unfair in the sense that it is the language that is shareable and 
conversable for all citizens. 
To conclude the two sections above, I believe that the integrity critique which 
criticizes the consensus conception of  imposing unnecessary restraints on religious 
citizens is untenable on close examination. The integrity argument’s objection has indeed 
been built upon a valid assumption, consisting of  p(1) to (5), that we need to respect 
each person’s integrated existence. However, it leads to three unwarranted outcomes: A, 
the consensus conception has impaired a religious citizen’s integrated existence; B, it also 
seriously constrained religious citizens’ participation in democratic political life; and C, it 
especially invades religious citizens’ religious freedom. Firstly, p(6)’s claim that the pursuit 
of  identity is a predominant ideal in every individual is not necessarily true, nor is our 
existence or identity always integrated. Secondly, regarding outcome A, the requirement 
of  shared public reason only asks citizens to refer to the language and the terms that 
every reasonable citizen is expected to understand and share whilst attaching no 
judgment of  their religious convictions, and it therefore leaves their integrated existence 
intact. It is just that the religious convictions are unshareable. Contra outcome B and C, 
the distinction between “the right to do something” and “doing the right thing” helps me 
to emphasize that the consensus approach’s shared public reason requirement does not 
interfere with citizens’ legal rights. Last but not least, the real question of  citizens’ 
religious liberty deprivation lies in whether it departs from the principle of  fairness, 
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which is one of  the grounding values of  the consensus approach. I hope it is clear now 
that citizens’ integrated existence and their freedom either in engaging in political life or 
in being free from intervention will not be in any way shaken by the consensus 
conception of  public justification. 
The above twelve propositions of  the integrity argument are all meant to point to 
the alternative plan of  the consensus approach: the convergence approach. The 
convergence approach claims that its account better respects the value of  integrity and as 
a result better secures citizens’ freedom in a political society. Although this section has 
debunked that the consensus approach is exempted from the critiques the integrity 
argument raised, the next section goes one step further to argue that the convergence 
approach, as a matter of  fact, fails to warrant the value of  integrity and citizens’ freedom 
as it has claimed. 
 
V. Debunking the Claim of  Integrity 
 
The all-inclusive convergence approach is, in Gaus’s opinion, deeply rooted in a rejection 
of  the Hobbesian-Lockean contractarian idea that “the only resolution of  the clash of  
private judgments about morality” is “the voice of  public reason”, thus we need to 
“bracket our private judgment and defer to the reason of  public authority.”54 Gaus and 
other convergence approach advocates believe that this Hobbesian-Lockean resolution 
inherently “politicize[s] the resolutions of  all moral disputes,” and more worrisomely; it is 
a dangerous bargain that it alienates our freedom and gives total control over our lives to 
others.55 In contrast with the consensus approach, which makes such a bargain, the 
convergence approach claims its superiority in being able to safeguard individual integrity, 
that is to say, to ensure that citizens are able to act in ways that are in accordance with 
their deepest moral and religious convictions (the Claim of  Integrity). It is a justified 
concern to protect each citizen’s integrated existence. However, I believe that the claim 
of  integrity cannot be maintained. Although the convergence approach’s argument 
departs from the significance of  recognizing individual integrity, the importance of  
upholding one’s integrity does not necessarily lead to the claim that we have to avow each 
individual’s ultimate values in the political society.  
As Jeffery Stout’s argument of  integrity manifests, Hegel is the one who most 
prominently brought the significance of  recognition of  integrity, or in his term, 
self-consciousness of  self-sufficiency to the forefront of  political theory. Stout 
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(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 24-25. 
55 See ibid., 24, 48. 
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understands that recognition of  integrity or identity is indispensable for an individual’s 
liberty of  free expression, which also corresponds to Hegel’s characterization of  
self-sufficiency and freedom. For Hegel, a free agent must be self-sufficient.56 However, 
freedom for Hegel is a tremendously rich and also organic concept, which involves not 
only interpersonal relations but also the relationship between agents and the state. The 
actualization of  integrity and freedom that are threatened here by the consensus 
approach is related to how an agent’s identity or freedom can be recognized by the state. 
However, for Hegel’s dialectic theory, one’s freedom’s realization is not only affected by 
the state, but also affects the state, and it is precisely through this mutual reaction 
between individual agents and the state that one’s freedom and identity are fully realized. 
I follow Rawls’s analysis of  Hegel’s concept of  freedom (along with its realization), 
which is addressed on three levels. First, freedom is actualized in a system of  political and 
social institutions in the sense that one’s interests are recognized and respected by such 
institutions.57 Secondly, an agent wills the ends of  the political institution in a state to be 
his own ends, which is a better way to obtain his freedom.58 Thirdly, “through exposure 
to the political institutions of  ‘public opinion’,” freedom on the level can be educated 
and orientated.59 For starters, Hegel also denies the contrarian view that sees the state as 
a limitation to freedom, which he believes “neglects the important role that social 
institutions [play]… in constituting free and rational individuals,” as freedom by its nature 
is actually realized in the state.60 A state’s primary function, according to Hegel, “is not to 
promote the welfare of  citizens but to secure and maintain their freedom.”61 Alan Patten 
elaborates this point as follows, “the state is the sphere in which individuals directly, 
explicitly, and intentionally work for the good of  others, or for the whole community, 
and seek to preserve and promote a community of  mutual recognition in which all can 
                                                             
56 “For Hegel, a complete conception of  what a subject’s freedom…comes into view only at the 
moment that the real possibility of  self-conscious freedom is established. It is only when we see that 
and how free subjectivity is possible that we know precisely what it is for a subject to be free. We can 
see how an argument of  this sort works if  we think of  the Phenomenology as starting out with only the 
barest idea of  what it is to be free, with what Hegel sometimes calls a ‘formal definition’ of  freedom. 
In both ‘Consciousness’ and ‘Self-Consciousness’ this bare concept of  freedom is denoted by the 
term Selbstandigkeit, which literally means ‘self-standingness’, though it is often translated as 
‘self-sufficiency’ or ‘independence’.”  
Frederick Neuhauser, “Desire, Recognition, and Lord and Bondsman,” in The Blackwell Guide to 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit (Kenneth R. Westphal ed., Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009) 39. 
57 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of  Moral Philosophy (Babara Herman ed., Harvard University Press, 
2000) 352. 
58 Ibid., 349. 
59 Ibid., 357-358. And Alan Patten, Hegel’s Idea of  Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2002) 190. 
60 See Alan Patten, Hegel’s Idea of  Freedom, 165. 
61 Ibid., 177. 
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develop and sustain their free and rational faculties.”62 Moreover, for Hegel, citizens do 
not conceive states instrumentally as a protection or a representative; they regard political 
institutions as “a constitutive component of  their identity and good”.63 In order to 
understand freedom sufficiently, we need to combine moral agents’ freedom’s 
actualization as both private individuals and citizens. Every moral agent has his or her 
own “particular interest”, which refers to “the satisfaction of  some empirically given 
need, desire, inclination and so on”, and they only concern the agents’ “actions, motives 
and dispositions”.64 A state enables individuals to fulfill their particular interests as long 
as these interests are developed and “protected by the rule of  law”.65 That is to say, the 
right of  their particular interests is recognized in the state since the state respects and 
protects individuals’ choices.66  
However, private individuals do not only live as individuals, they are also citizens in 
a state and accordingly have “universal interests”. A universal good is good for him or 
her independently of  what s/he desires, but aims at the good for all free and rational 
agents that make up the community as a whole.67 This is where freedom on the second 
level comes in. With respect to the possible conflicts between an individual’s particular 
interests and universal interests, Hegel argues that they should pass over their own 
interest in the universal, and “knowingly and willingly acknowledge this universal interest 
even as their own substantial spirit, and actively pursue it as their ultimate end.”68 This is 
a claim of  the priority of  universal interests compared to particular interests. Besides, it is 
also a confirmation of  the highest priority of  being a citizen for a moral agent. They do 
not live simply as private individuals; rather, they are “concerned with the universal end” 
or interests and their will as citizens are directed to and “acting in the full conscious 
awareness of  this end.”69 Private individuals do not work for something alien to their 
own purposes and identity, but they work to realize the good of  the whole community, 
during which they give rise to an important, probably the central aspect of  their identity: 
citizenship.70 The third level of  freedom is thus approached in Hegel’s discussion of  the 
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Wood ed., Cambridge University Press, 1991) 282 (§260). 
69 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of  Moral Philosophy, 356. 
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are objectively free when they are acting as citizens, which is nevertheless also criticized by lots 
Hegelian scholars. He believes that being a good citizen according to Hegel is central to one’s identity. 
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roles of  public opinion. Public opinion assembles citizens’ views, including their 
discontents with government affairs, and it thus provides the state with a better 
understanding of  people’s thoughts and needs.71 In this process, the public also becomes 
familiar with the political institutions and acquires “a knowledge of  what the state’s 
decisions and polices are based on.”72 The educative aspect of  public opinion is precisely 
manifested in the sense that the publicity provides an important opportunity for citizens 
to develop their political abilities, and also remedies for the “self-conceit of  individuals 
and of  the mass”.73 Through public opinion, ordinary citizens are educated to “acquire 
and continuously reinforce an orientation” to the “universal interests and concerns”.74 
Starting from the significance of  integrity’s realization, the convergence approach is 
correct in emphasizing the significance of  conceiving of  a full knowledge of  self-identity 
as a mutual recognition process between individuals. Indeed, individuals attract the 
recognition of  their fellowmen to reinforce their own self-consciousness as free and 
rational agents. They are also correct in identifying an individual’s deepest convictions, 
values, and motivations with their background and their participation in their affiliated 
institutions, such as family and civil society as a dialectic and mutual process. Only by 
viewing individuals as social members “can they be expected to have the convictions, 
values, motivations, and dispositions that stabilize an institutional structure in which they 
can develop and maintain” their integrated existence.75 
Nevertheless, the convergence approach’s defense of  identity and freedom absorbs 
from the Hegelian argument in a very incomplete way. The convergence approach’s claim 
of  integrity is based on a rather barren concept of  freedom in an isolated manner, which 
                                                                                                                                                                               
The reason behind that is connected with how one gets one’s self-consciousness. Hegel believes one 
can only fully understand oneself  through interaction with and recognition from another. Thus, a 
moral agent “can develop the capacities and attitudes that make up free and rational agency only in 
the context of  a community of  mutual recognition.” This mutual recognition relationship is also built 
into the relationship between citizens and the state. An institutional structure preserving and 
promoting their freedom can only be maintained “unless individuals adopt the ends and dispositions 
of  the good citizen.” To put it roughly and simply, a political institution’s operation and maintenance 
is indispensable to a citizen’s recognition, while a citizen’s fundamental freedom is also built upon 
their support for those political institutions. A life of  citizenship is therefore reflectively endorsable in 
a way sensitive to some given desires or goals of  private ends, but is about establishing and 
maintaining one’s own freedom itself. It is the acting as a good citizen that helps one to fully become 
oneself, and one can endorse it from the perspective of  an end that one is inevitably committed to.  
For Hegel, individuals are thus objectively free as citizens, and they “support an institutional structure 
which in turn develops and secures their own capacities for freedom and rationality.”  
71 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of  Moral Philosophy, 357-358. 
72 Ibid., 358. 
73 See Hegel, Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right, 352 (§315). 
74 Alan Patten, Hegel’s Idea of  Freedom, 190. 
75 Ibid., 186. 
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merely advocates its actualization on the first level, namely, the freedom of  having 
individuals’ particular interests recognized and respected by the state. 76  In 
comprehending the essence of  integrity, the convergence approach has yet to attend the 
possibility of  realizing it in a much deeper sense. For instance, the state is an 
indispensable constitutive part of  this narrative story of  dialectic recognition, and also, 
individuals are not only members of  certain groups or tribes, but, more importantly, they 
are citizens. The operation and self-sufficiency of  a political institution do not stand by 
themselves; rather, just as how an individual becomes self-conscious through others’ 
recognition, a political institution’s self-sufficiency also relies upon the general acceptance 
and compliance of  the institution’s rules, which are established by citizens. In other 
words, if  such an institution fails to imbue people with the disposition to accept its rules, 
it will possibly lack self-sufficiency. Therefore, the state is also a constitutive part of  the 
self-sufficient institutions that can foster and reinforce citizens’ capacities of  freedom 
and rationality. However, the convergence approach, in advancing its integrity claim, 
misses the dialectic relationship between individuals’ claims of  freedom and the state, 
and it therefore fails to recognize the possibility that each individual’s identity and their 
private interests can be actualized in harmony with the universal good. Since the 
convergence approach falls short of  seeing the importance of  engaging in politics for 
individuals, it certainly lacks a positive affirmation of  democratic citizenship, and 
inevitably lacks a full understanding of  freedom in a mutual relationship between citizens 
and the state. 
 
VI. Public Reason as a Preemptive Procedural Constraint 
 
Another prevalent critique closely related to the integrity critique is the fairness critique, 
which claims that the requirement of  public reason, namely the moral duty of  abstaining 
from invoking comprehensive including religious reasons in the public forum, is unfair to 
those citizens who can only introduce their comprehensive doctrines to support their 
decisions. Nevertheless, the deeper source of  this critique and the integrity critique are 
both embedded in an inadequacy of  recognizing the justification of  public reason. They 
mistakenly believe that public reason cannot be overridingly justified in public 
deliberation, since nonpublic reason may possibly outweigh public reason or even works 
as second-order reason excluding the consideration of  public reason.77 However, I will 
                                                             
76 Kevin Vallier has even made a quite astonishing claim that citizens do not need to care about 
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a good citizen without voting.” See Kevin Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation, 230. 
77 See Jeremy Waldron, “Public Reason and ‘Justification’ in Courtroom,” Journal of  Law, Philosophy and 
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argue that it is the public reason established upon our commitment to justice underlined 
by the value of  fairness that gives a second-order or quasi-exclusionary reason to 
preemptively exclude the involvement of  reasons that cannot be shared by our fellow 
citizens in public deliberation.  
To unfold this critique and my rebuttal, let us look at a justification from the 
perspective of  practical action for a while. Waldron adopts Joseph Raz’s analysis of  
reason to criticize public reason’s requirement in public deliberation. I will briefly 
illustrate Waldron’s critiques as follows. It is true indeed that justification involves not just 
the ascertaining of  reasons, but also the weighing of  their strength.78 Waldron argues that 
the process of  justification requires a comprehensive search “for all the reasons that 
might pertain to D [a political decision] one way or the other.”79 A public reason may 
seem to weigh very heavily in favor of  a certain decision, but it does not mean that it is 
the overriding reason, since such a public reason might be overpowered by an even 
stronger nonpublic reason. Waldron thinks that we will not feel content in finding strong 
reasons in favor of  a decision that is supported by public reason, since “everything 
depends on how the strength of  public reasons lines up in relation to the strength of  
nonpublic reasons opposing the decision.”80 If  a nonpublic reason is excluded from 
being considered in our deliberations by the constraint of  public reason, then although a 
public reason might seem to be of  utmost importance in supporting the political decision, 
we cannot say that this public reason justifies the decision, as not all reasons which 
should have been considered are actually considered.81 Consequently, if  the nonpublic 
reason which would outweigh the public reason is excluded, then perhaps “the 
conclusion ought to be that we may not infer anything about the justification of  D [the 
political decision] on the basis of  the public reason.”82  
Moreover, Waldron further argues that a nonpublic reason may be not only a reason 
against a political decision in terms of  its outweighing strength compared to an opposing 
public reason, but this nonpublic reason could also work as an exclusionary reason 
excluding the consideration of  the public reason.83 According to Raz, by an exclusionary 
reason, in contrast with first-order reasons, which constitute a person’s reasons for his 
actions, it is “a second-order reason to refrain from acting for some reason.”84 First-order 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Culture 1(2007):120. 
78 Ibid., 116. 




83 Ibid., 120. 
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reasons and second-order reasons are not weighed by strength, like the weighing between 
first-order reasons in conflict. If  reason p is a reason for someone to do something, and 
reason q is “an exclusionary reason for her not to act on p”, then reason p and q “are not 
strictly conflicting reasons.”; Reason q is not a reason for someone to not do something; 
rather, it is “a reason for not doing something for the reason p”.85 Their “conflicts are 
resolved not by the strength of  the competing reasons but by a general principle of  
practical reasoning which determines that exclusionary reasons always prevail, when in 
conflict with first-order reasons.”86 For instance, in the controversy over same-sex 
marriage and abortion, religious reasons for a lot of  people are exclusionary reasons in 
their decisions. For many religious citizens, the moral order of  the divine command is the 
exclusionary reason for them to exclude taking public reason into account. In other 
words, the religious reasons derived from their holy scriptures are not just compelling 
reasons against public reason, but could be the reasons negating any practical weight of  
public reason. In the case of  abortion, the fact that a fetus is also a human being, 
according to many citizens’ religion, could be such an exclusionary reason that ends the 
discussion of  the permissiveness of  abortion.  
The point that Waldron is trying to drive home is that no matter what the role 
nonpublic reasons may play in the public deliberation, be it outweighing first-order or 
exclusionary second order reasons, the justification process must stay open to all relevant 
reasons, including public reasons and nonpublic reasons.87 Otherwise, “the reasoning 
process that justificatory discourse involves is in danger of  becoming not just truncated 
but distorted.”88 We will not be able “to determine the true weight or bearing of  the 
reasons” and reach a truly solid justification of  a political decision “unless we take into 
account the weight and bearing of  all the reasons” on the table.89 Therefore Waldron 
concludes that the failure of  staying open and taking all reasons into consideration is a 
moral defect of  the idea of  public reason.  
Waldron is right in bringing out the point of  exclusionary reason here. Nonetheless, 
contrary to Waldron’s vision, I believe that the theoretical device of  exclusionary reason 
would help to strengthen the account of  public reason instead. The idea of  public 
reasons actually works as a preemptive constraint against introducing unshareable reasons 
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into the public deliberation ex ante. According to Raz, there are two sorts of  
exclusionary reasons: one is “incapacity-based” exclusionary reasons, which are the type 
of  reasons that preclude first-order reasons due to the agent’s “temporary incapacity to 
form a balanced judgment”; the other is “authority-based reasons” that derive from a 
claim of  authority and that amount to exclusionary reasons.90 That is to say, according to 
Raz’s analysis of  reasons, apart from the scenario where citizens are temporarily unable 
to make sound judgments, what counts as exclusionary reasons derives from a legitimate 
claim of  authority.91  
Such an analysis appears to fit Waldron’s accounts just right since divine commands 
are indeed a powerful source of  moral authority for religious citizens. However, even 
considering this issue from within Raz’s theoretical scope, it is hard to say that such a 
moral authority is legitimate in the first place. In other words, it is difficult to claim that 
divine commands are able to provide better action guidance for the agent, since the 
epistemic capacity of  a better informed and balanced rationality is what is required for an 
authority that fits with the normal justification thesis. However, the tense and twisted 
relationship between rationality and faith is always a hotly debated issue, while the center 
piece of  divine commands lies in the commands, which actually reflects the preemptive 
thesis of  authority. For instance, the famous biblical story of  Abraham and Isaac 
perfectly illustrates the preemptive nature of  God’s authority, whereas it is far from 
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   I do have some reservations about Raz’s conception of  the authority of  the three theses above. To 
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amounts to an argumentative circle in which Raz employs the constituency of  authority to justify what 
authority can implicate. Moreover, the normal justification thesis implies a perfectionist claim of  
authority which is yet to be justified, and this thesis is the centerpiece of  Raz’s thesis of  authority. 
Additionally, the claim of  authority in fact has counted first-order reason twice, as on the one hand it 
excludes us from taking our original first-order reasons into account, while at the same time it also 
works as a first-order reason that must be taken it into account. However, I do not aim to examine the 
merit of  Raz’s study of  general conception of  authority here; rather, my purpose is simply to 
demonstrate how a reason derived from authority provides exclusionary reasons for the agent.  
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claiming that, in that story, God offers a better guide for action for Abraham than the 
direction Abraham could have given to himself. After all, God requests Abraham’s son, 
Isaac, as a sacrifice. More significantly, the above contention of  whether God’s 
commands fit the conception of  a general authority is exactly what political liberals aim 
to set aside in the first place. The fact of  reasonable disagreements of  comprehensive 
doctrines precisely requires us to refrain from pursuing such matters.   
I believe that, contrary to what Waldron presumes, public reason works as a 
quasi-exclusive procedural constraint in public reasoning. Waldron has not really grappled 
with the weight of  public reason for citizens and the subsequent moral duty of  following 
public reason.92 Public reason does not work the same as nonpublic reason for citizens; 
instead, at least on the level of  constitutional essentials or matters of  basic justice, the 
requirement that all public officials act on the basis of  and follow public reason, along 
with all reasonable citizens performing the civic duty of  following public reason, 
constitutes political legitimacy.93 That is to say, this requirement of  civic duty from 
ordinary citizens is part of  what the idea of  political legitimacy entails. Moreover, instead 
of  begging the question of  the position of  nonpublic reasons in public reasoning, public 
reason actually ex ante precludes the involvement of  nonpublic reason that pertains to 
individuals’ own idea of  truth rather than reasons that might be shared by all citizens as 
free and equal people. Rawls indicates that the emphasis on nonpublic reason is 
incompatible with the idea of  democratic citizenship and political legitimacy.94  
The idea of  political legitimacy is based on the values of  liberty, equality, and 
fairness (Rawls sometimes identifies this as the criterion of  reciprocity). As illustrated in 
Chapter Four, the value of  fairness remains at heart of  our commitment to justice. It is 
the ideal of  fairness that precludes us from invoking reasons that are incommensurable 
to our fellow citizens. The civil duty of  refraining from advancing comprehensive 
doctrines that cannot be explained by political values into the public deliberation is based 
on the value of  fairness. This value, at a fundamental level, denotes that the exercise of  
political power is proper only when reasonable citizens “are prepared to offer one 
another fair terms of  cooperation according to what they consider the most reasonable 
conception of  political justice; and when they agree to act on those terms, they are 
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willing to do this even at the cost of  their interests in particular situations, provided that 
other citizens also accept those terms.”95 The willingness here takes two forms: one is 
what reasonable citizens themselves are ready to contribute; the other is what they can 
reasonably expect from other reasonable citizens, which brings the problem of  mutual 
assurance to the surface. To ensure that collective political decisions are arrived at 
through public reasoning, it is not enough to follow the guidelines of  public reason from 
one’s own standpoint; it is also necessary to be assured that everyone else will abide by 
the civic duty of  public reason as well. In the language of  game theory, that no one will 
defect. And this problem will be my focus in the next chapter.  
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter focuses on the third critique of  the shareable public reason requirement, 
which is also the first critique of  the aspect of  its desirability. The Integrity Critique 
argues that the shareability requirement of  public reason has produced three undesirable 
outcomes for citizens, which are that the requirement invades their integrated existence, 
restricts their democratic participation, and hurts their religious freedom. In response to 
the integrity critique, I clarify that, firstly, the value of  integrity may not be as demanding 
as the convergence approach has claimed. Secondly, the consensus approach by no 
means requires citizens to relinquish their deepest moral and religious beliefs and hence 
does not damage their integrated existence. Thirdly, the convergence approach confuses 
two different conceptions of  democratic participation and thus mistakenly accuses the 
shareable public requirement of  preventing citizens from fully taking part in politics. 
Lastly, I point out that there is a distinction between ‘the right to do something’ and 
‘doing the right thing’. Religious freedom is a foundational constitutional legal right. 
However, it does not denote the moral correctness of  all references to such a legal right 
under all circumstances. Moreover, the presumption of  religious liberty does not merely 
hinge on the restraint that religious citizens exercise, but rather on the question whether 
they have been posited in a fair social and political condition. 
The theoretical and practical attractions of  the convergence approach are 
manifested in its aspiration to protect each individual’s integrity and to encourage them 
to articulate themselves in the political sphere. It advocates incorporating each individual 
citizen’s most essential moral and religious convictions representing their identities into 
the public sphere. However, I argue that the convergence approach’s aspiration of  
guarding individual integrity cannot be accomplished due to the incompleteness of  its 




theoretical structure.  
Lastly, I consider a closely intertwined critique, which questions the fairness of  
excluding unshareable nonpublic reason in the public deliberation. I argue that it is 
precisely the value of  fairness that demands a fair democratic setting that prioritizes 
public reason as a quasi-exclusionary procedural constraint which precludes the 
advancement of  nonpublic reasons that cannot be expected to be shared among free and 
equal citizens.   
In the next chapter, I will entertain the final critique of  the shareability requirement 
of  public reason, the assurance critique, which argues that the consensus approach 













Recall that in Chapter Three, I brought out and answered the underlying question why it 
is fundamentally important that the political institutions must be rationally acceptable to 
all reasonable citizens. In other words, granted the fact of  reasonable pluralism, why we 
ought to turn to the proposal of  public justification of  political institutions instead of  
pursuing a comprehensive truth ground. I believe that it is the equal respect that we owe 
to each other as equal members of  a democratic political society and the perspective of  
internal participants of  the political society that push us to search for public justification. 
The perspective of  the public nevertheless allows another interpretation, the 
convergence approach, to account for public justification, apart from the consensus 
approach that I have defended in Chapter Three. The previous two chapters and this 
current chapter are dedicated to the examinations and discussions of  the convergence 
approach’s critiques of  the consensus approach. I categorize four of  them: the 
subjectivism critique, the asymmetry critique, the integrity critique, and the assurance 
critique. The subjectivism critique and the asymmetry critique are critiques of  the 
consensus approach’s plausibility, while the integrity critique and the assurance critique 
question the consensus approach’s desirability from the standpoint that the consensus 
approach fails to supply a successful plan for the stability issue.  
The convergence approach claims that the shareability requirement is undesirable as 
it tends to destabilize our political society, which consists in two aspects: one is its 
inability to give an individual citizen sufficient moral motivation to comply with the 
shareability requirement of  public reason, and the other is its further inability to assure 
that everyone else will also comply with such a requirement. Firstly, from the individual’s 
point of  view, the shareability requirement is too demanding to be desirable, as it has 
imposed too strenuous a burden on religious citizens. Secondly, it is even more difficult 
to be sure that all citizens will not only agree to such a requirement but will actually 
comply with it. Therefore, laws cannot be successfully publicly justified on the basis of  
shareable public reason. 
   This chapter is going to consider the last critique, the assurance critique, namely, 
the critique that the consensus approach can barely ensure that everyone else in the 
political society will also honor the fair terms of  cooperation over time. The assurance 
problem is not merely a challenge for the consensus approach but also for the 
convergence approach. The convergence approach, however, claims that it offers better 
solutions to this issue. In general, I will identify two solutions that the convergence 
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approach supplies and point out that neither of  them suffices to solve the assurance 
problem. One is what I will call “the absolutist strategy”, that the state intends to 
persuade every member and prospective individual member of  society to agree with the 
political decision by understanding every single one’s comprehensive doctrines. The 
absolutist strategy has its theoretical attraction in providing for every individual member 
of  the society adequate moral motivation to be cooperative. But this solution is 
practically problematic, because of  an inefficiency problem and an indeterminacy 
problem in implementing this ambition. The other strategy overcomes those two 
problems by using public rules coupled with the threat of  punishment. However, this 
strategy is also normatively problematic as it fails to supply genuine moral motivation for 
citizens, which is what makes the convergence approach attractive in the first place.  
I believe that the fundamental root of  the inadequacy of  the convergence approach’s 
solutions stems from the fact that the convergence approach is unable to grasp the core 
inter homines feature of  public justification and is therefore incapable of  stabilizing the 
society as it has claimed. In contrast, I will argue that the consensus approach has a 
better plan for the assurance problem. The consensus approach is the approach that 
recognizes that the power of  public justification lies in its reasons being for us together 
rather than for you or for me. Moreover, the promise of  the consensus approach’s 
solution consists in an underappreciated aspect of  public reason, the transformative role 
of  public reason, which precisely explains the transformation or the development of  
cooperative virtues of  reasonable citizens.  
    Here is how my argument will proceed. In Section II and III, I will present the 
assurance problem and assess two solutions that the convergence approach has come up 
with: the absolutist solution and public rules with the threat of  punishment. Having 
identified the defects of  both solutions, I will point out the fundamental pathology of  
the convergence approach in Section IV. In Section V, I will indicate why the consensus 
approach’s transformative aspect of  public reason facilitates the cultivation of  
cooperative virtues which foundationally address the assurance critique and at the same 
time strengthen our underlying commitment to justice. Lastly, I will manifest how 
transformative public reason deals with the controversial diversity-related claims in 
Section VI. 
 
II. The Convergence Approach’s Strategy I: the Absolutist Strategy  
 
2.1 The Assurance Problem and the Absolutist Strategy 
 
To recapture the fourth critique the convergence approach launches against the 
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consensus approach:  
 
The Assurance Critique: the shareability of  public reason cannot ensure that all citizens will 
actually honor the fair cooperation in our political society. 
 
The mutual assurance problem in collective action has actually been a long standing 
problem ever since Hobbes’s time.1 To ensure collectively rational outcomes, it is not 
enough to agree to certain conventions. It is also necessary to establish some 
mechanisms to assure actual compliance from people and to prevent them from 
defecting. Paul Weithman has underlined the assurance problem’s significance and 
challenge to the framework of  political liberalism. According to political liberalism, the 
core issue of  stability for the right reason is an assurance problem in social cooperation. 
This kind of  stability “requires that citizens be assured of  one another’s acceptance of  a 
public conception of  justice.”2 Weithman argues that political liberalism only signifies 
that public justification of  political legitimacy is satisfied when an overlapping consensus 
of  comprehensive doctrines is generated, whereas the obtainment of  overlapping 
consensus alone cannot show that the political society would be stable for the right 
reason.3 In other words, in the well-ordered society, reasonable citizens cannot be sure 
that other citizens will also honor the fair terms of  cooperation over time and hence 
accept (one of) a family of  political conceptions of  justice supported by an overlapping 
consensus.  
Specifically, in Rawls’s account of  reasonableness, Weithman detects a problem that 
the political society could be susceptible to destabilization “if  people’s commitment to 
justice is conditional on other people’s commitment” to justice.4 He points out that the 
adherence of  fair social cooperation inevitably requires that some citizens sometimes act 
against their own interests or their own comprehensive doctrines in exchange for justice.5 
This consideration of  justice could be extra high if  it is just me who adheres to fair terms 
of  cooperation. Even with the presence of  an overlapping consensus, a person’s 
comprehensive doctrines only give him sufficient reason to adhere to fair terms of  
cooperation on the conditions that others also do the same.6 Therefore, “it is rational for 
a person to honor the terms of  cooperation and treat the political conception of  justice 
                                                             
1 See Paul Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” in Rawls and Religion (Tom Bailey and 
Valentina Gentile ed., Columbia University Press, 2015) 84. 
2 Ibid., 77.  
3 Ibid., 84-86.  
4 Andrew Lister, “Public Reason and Reciprocity,” The Journal of  Political Philosophy 25 (2017): 156. 
5 See Paul Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” 85. 
6 Ibid.  
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as authoritative only when she has the assurance that all others or a sufficient numbers 
of  others also adhere to the terms” and accept the authority of  the political conception 
of  justice.7 Weithman correctly identifies that it is the reference to public reason which 
intends to help solve the assurance problem.8 However, he claims that the shareable 
public reason that the consensus approach adopts is not the most promising candidate 
for resolving the issue. The cardinal problem of  the consensus approach stems from its 
exclusion of  religion from political reasoning accompanying its emphasis on shareable 
public reason. The exclusion of  religion, perhaps especially against the backdrop of  
American society, would produce enormous political divisions, which can permeate so 
deeply “that adherents of  different comprehensive doctrines come to doubt the sincerity 
of  one another’s allegiance to political values” if  the political values are just the 
camouflage for one’s comprehensive doctrines.9 Consequently, Weithman argues that 
political liberalism must allow the incorporation of  religious reasons along with other 
comprehensive doctrines into public deliberation so long as the Rawlsian “proviso” is 
fulfilled, which Weithman interprets as citizens being able to adopt and reason from a 
common viewpoint in due course as well.10 Weithman understands the satisfaction of  the 
proviso as the acceptance of  the legitimacy of  political institutions, which alone settles 
the assurance problem.11 In other words, for Weithman, citizens are allowed to introduce 
and base their votes on their comprehensive doctrines, provided that they would be able 
to invoke public reason to justify their votes when facing others’ doubts.12 Weithman thus 
concludes that his strategy outweighs the consensus approach in its inclusion of  citizens’ 
comprehensive doctrines, and it is also congruent with public reason.  
For Weithman, the convergence of  each citizen suffices to meet the goal of  stability, 
and consensus is not needed. What gives reasonable citizens the assurance that fellow 
citizens would commit to the society’s fair cooperation is simply that their reasons are 
introduced into the public sphere. To put it more directly, citizens will be cooperative if  
the political system (or the laws) is justified from each of  their points of  view. The 
“proviso” of  public reason does not add substance to such a mechanism of  assurance. 
                                                             
7 Ibid., 86. 
8 See ibid., 86. 
9 Ibid., 87. 
10 Ibid., 88-90. “To engage in public reason is to appeal to one of  these political conceptions-to their 
ideals and principles, standards and values-when debating fundamental political questions. This 
requirement still allows us to introduce into political discussion at any time our comprehensive 
doctrine, religious or nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to 
support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support.” John Rawls, “The 
Idea of  Public Reason Revisited,” The University of  Chicago Law Review 64 (1997):776. 
11 See Paul Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” 90. 
12 See ibid., 92. 
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Weithman’s strategy aims to persuade every new individual member of  the society to 
agree with the political decision, which I call “the absolutist strategy”. In view of  new 
circumstances and new groups of  people coming into this society, the state needs to 
attend to each of  their comprehensive doctrines to make the law justified to each of  
them so that every individual will be sufficiently motivated to cooperate. This absolutist 
strategy has the main attraction that it embodies the equal respect that we owe to each 
other.  
As I have briefly mentioned in the beginning, it is the respect for persons that 
prevents us from taking my own comprehensive doctrines as the ones can be coerced 
upon others. Departing from the concern of  equal respect, the convergence approach 
argues that the law must be seen as validated from each citizen’s perspective. Therefore, 
in public reasoning, the citizens could provide different reasons persuasive to different 
groups of  people with differing comprehensive doctrines. The convergence approach 
aims to give individuals’ integrity due recognition by including their ultimate convictions 
in politics. For Gerald Gaus, the aim of  public reason is to solve the puzzle of  “how can 
we identify social demands that all have sufficient reasons to acknowledge as moral 
demands.” 13  Driven by this question, Gaus believes that a moral imperative is 
authoritative social morality for all “only if  each normal moral agent has sufficient reason 
to internalize” such an imperative, thus it cannot go against each moral agent’s integrity, 
in other words, such a moral requirement cannot be at odds with the most fundamental 
conviction of  each moral agent.14 Religious critics believe that religious doctrines or 
religious reasons are integral to religious citizens’ identity; therefore, they are too 
important to be ruled out. The convergence approach would at least allow ample room 
for religion in politics. As Nicholas Wolterstorff  has argued, politics should “not only 
honor[s] us in our similarity” but also “in our particularities”.15 We offer reasons that are 
“tailor-made” for our particular addressees: “To Ryan, I offer reasons that I hope he will 
find persuasive; to Wendy, I offer reasons that I hope she will find persuasive.”16 
Whenever a new group or new member comes into the society with brand new 
comprehensive doctrines, the convergence approach designates that all the existing 
members have to make an effort to learn their comprehensive doctrines to be able to 
                                                             
13 Gerald Gaus, The Order of  Public Reason: a theory of  freedom and morality in a diverse and bounded world 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) 262. 
14 See ibid., 400. 
15 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,” in 
Robert Audi & Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: the place of  religious convictions in political 
debate (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. 1997) 111. 
16 Ibid., 107. 
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persuade them that their doctrines support the constitutional principle.17  
Apart from being moved by the equal respect that we owe to others, the 
convergence approach deems this effort to be the necessary cost that we must pay to 
engage in political deliberation if  we aim to be assured that everyone is going to 
cooperate fairly, and hence that we can sustain the society’s stability. Justice can be costly 
as adhering to the terms of  cooperation would require that we act against our own 
comprehensive doctrines. The convergence approach believes that there is tremendous 
cost in maintaining the stable social structure. Furthermore, the convergence approach 
suspects that, as a valid empirical inference, reasonable citizens are likely to defect from 
public reason without any consideration of  others or compensation for their being 
reasonable. Some convergence approach adopters even envision that, for the sake of  
keeping the society in order, the process of  pay off  would be costly and solemnly as 
cutting my own hand and letting the blood out to show my commitment of  engaging in 
fair cooperation to others.18  
 
2.2 Two Deficiencies of  the Absolutist Strategy: Inefficiency and Indeterminacy19 
  
I believe that the convergence approach’s strategy of  getting everyone and every group 
on board by learning others’ comprehensive doctrines and thereby persuading them is 
highly inefficient and unrealistic. It seems like a plausible approach if  the number of  
people we are addressing is small, such as a family, a group of  friends, or even a small 
community within which everyone is familiar with each other. The cost of  understanding 
                                                             
17 See Stephen Macedo, “Why Public Reason? Cooperation, Law, and Mutual Assurance,” working 
paper in progress. 
18 See Brian Kogelmann and Stephen G.W. Stitch, “When Public Reason Fails Us: Convergence 
Discourse as Blood Oath,” American Political Science Review 110 (2016): 717-730. 
19 As a remedy to these two deficiencies, Gaus appeals to an idea of  “umpire” who understands 
democracy as an adjudicative mechanism and who adjudicates public reason among private reason 
holders who make conflicting judgments. In analogy with a referee in a football match, the umpire 
does not need to be a purely epistemic authority, but his judgment is the resolution to the practical 
dispute, for instance, by voting. See Gerald Gaus, “Reason, Justification, and Consensus: Why 
Democracy Can’t Have It All,” in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (James Bohman 
and William Rehg ed., Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997) 233-234. 
However, I think this adjudicative mechanism fails for three main reasons. First of  all, this voting 
mechanism fundamentally abnegates the aspiration of  the convergence approach, at least for the 
absolutists who aim to justify every moral demand to every individual social member. Secondly, the 
direct voting mechanism, at least without further elaboration, is actually a populist design which is 
bound to be unstable to changes occurred in people’s comprehensive doctrines. Thirdly, even if, 
temporarily speaking, the society’s comprehensive doctrines are stable, this mechanism nevertheless 
encourages the stabilization of  permanent majorities and minorities, which is against basic justice and 
also tends to destabilize the current society in the long run. 
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each other’s comprehensive doctrines is relatively marginal compared to the aspiration of  
realizing justice for every group member. In a small group where everyone knows each 
other, it is possible and necessary to reach a decision that attends to every single person’s 
considerations. A public decision made on that basis is not only publicly justified, but 
also further strengthens the stability of  the maintenance of  this group. For instance, a 
five-person family is thinking about their vacation location this summer and they have 
different dream locations in mind. Some of  them want to enjoy the vacation in Italy 
while others look forward to spending the summer in a much cooler place such as 
Norway. These two different locations represent completely different vacation 
preferences and seem irreconcilable. However, it is important to choose a destination 
that fulfills the needs behind every family member’s choice and hence is acceptable for 
everyone so that everyone will enjoy themselves on the vacation. However, this mode of  
reaching a convergence will be highly inefficient and unrealistic in a political society 
constituted of  strangers. It takes a large amount of  time and economic cost as well for us 
to learn others’ comprehensive doctrines, and these costs exponentially increase, 
especially with new groups entering the relatively stable political society. Even for public 
officials who are in the position to possess much more information and understanding 
of  any changes occurring in the society, such an individualized requirement is still too 
unrealistic and demands overly favorable treatment from public resources. Therefore, the 
convergence approach’s petition of  attending to and accommodating every new 
comprehensive doctrine when new circumstances give rise to it and new groups form or 
come to the society cannot be realistically held up.  
Another problem that arises from this strategy is that, in order to persuade every 
new individual member, if  all citizens are able to invoke all kinds of  reasons into politics, 
which may be invoked to justify or undermine a certain law’s legitimacy, citizens may 
“have a much more diverse array of  potential reasons to reject L [certain laws] than 
would be the case were they permitted to rely only on shared reasons.”20 Simply put, 
under the guideline of  the convergence approach, while the possibilities of  entering 
public reason increase, the difficulty of  converging on a decision regarding debated laws 
escalates as well. That is to say, reaching a concrete political decision would become 
highly unlikely if  it depends on every individual’s actual acceptance.  
The inadequacy of  the first strategy is logical rather than normative. The reasoning 
behind the first strategy is that political institutions (e.g., laws) have to reflect on every 
individual member’s concerns; however, political institutions as a set of  rules and 
regulations with a set of  political values cannot both work efficiently and at the same 
                                                             
20 Christopher Eberle, “Consensus, Convergence, and Religiously Justified Coercion,” Public Affairs 
Quarterly 25 (2011): 290. It is not clear how religious critics combat this indeterminacy though.   
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time meet every single individual’s requirements and preferences. Given the inadequacy 
of  the first strategy, the convergence approach also advocates a contrasting strategy that 
includes the threat of  punishment to ensure that no defection occurs, which disregards 
whether individual concerns are properly accommodated. I will argue, however, that this 
second strategy is normatively insufficient.     
 
III. The Convergence Approach’s Solution II: Public Rules with the Threat of  
Punishment 
 
This solution (of  the convergence approach) precisely identifies that the main element 
undermining the assurance provided by public reason is the unreliability of  individuals’ 
performance, which is called “noise and drift”.21 Specifically, along with Weithman, some 
other convergence approach adopters argue that the consensus approach is fragile in 
grappling with the stability issue since what the consensus approach offers by public 
reason is only “cheap talk” in the sense that it does not impose cost for defecting.22 Due 
to this problem that is essentially attached to public reason, the convergence approach 
holds that the stability maintained by public reason is fragile as it “permits noisy signaling 
that can be amplified by informational drift” even in a well-ordered society, since “the 
phenomena do not require that agents be unreasonable or substantially misinformed.”23 
While Weithman has pointed out the assurance problem, he has not explained how the 
problem could be settled apart from emphasizing that the public reason proviso would 
be satisfied anyhow. The question for Weithman remains why citizens would be able to 
accept political legitimacy in spite of  their contrary comprehensive doctrines. For 
instance, according to Weithman, a religious citizen may bring into the debate of  the 
legalization of  women’s abortion rights or same-sex marriage her religious doctrine 
which says that neither abortion nor the same-sex marriage should be legalized. But she 
would still accept the legitimacy of  both of  these laws despite her objections. However, it 
remains unexplained why and how she would suddenly be able to accept a law that is 
                                                             
21 See John Thrasher and Kevin Vallier, “The Fragility of  Consensus: Public Reason, Diversity and 
Stability,” European Journal of  Philosophy 23 (2013): 941-942, 944. “Noise is the problem of  
distinguishing between communication by citizens that signal allegiance to the public conception, and 
hence assurance, and forms of  communication that do not.” For instance, the trouble with telling the 
difference between sectarian or self-interested reasons and public reasons as the basis of  political 
decisions in the public forum is the typical noise. And the drift is the amplification of  noise that 
occurs over large numbers of  interactions.  
22 See Gerald Gaus, “A Tale of  Two Sets: Public Reason in Equilibrium,” Public Affairs Quarterly 
25(2011): 317. 




exactly the opposite of  her comprehensive doctrines. 
Some convergence approach writers thus advise us to jettison public reason as a 
plan at all. Notably, John Thrasher and Kevin Vallier argue for an assurance mechanism 
consisting of  bodies of  legal and moral norms, formal or informal, just like a traffic light 
which coordinates drivers from different directions at an intersection.24 This is a shift 
from public reason as a direct moral activity between citizens to “public rules” which 
regulate citizens’ public deliberation indirectly.25 And the point of  this shift is that the 
assurance and stability that we are aiming for no longer depends upon individuals’ moral 
consciousness or reasonableness, which, as the convergence approach deems, is 
fundamentally unreliable. A consequential change along with this assurance mechanism 
advanced by the convergence approach is that, in contrast to what the consensus 
approach insists, we need not know or even share one another’s reason for complying 
with public rules, as the rules determining the inherent stability can be achieved without 
knowing the reasons behind one another’s compliance.26 Hence, “stability for the right 
reasons can be maintained so long as social processes and institutions associated with the 
political conception are publicly recognized and followed.”27  
However, Thrasher and Vallier have not made the role of  public rules as a 
coordinated traffic light completely clear. They have not been clear about what the public 
rules are exactly, and this vagueness could lead to differing interpretations, none of  which 
genuinely bolsters the convergence approach’s claim. Are the public rules legal norms or 
moral norms? If  the public rules that the convergence approach has in mind are moral 
norms which work as an assurance mechanism, it is implausible for the convergence 
approach to really distinguish them from the moral duty of  civility out of  shareable 
public reason. Moreover, even if  there is a way to distinguish the moral norms from 
shareable public reason, for instance by specifying some grounding moral norms and 
strengthening their moral forces, the problems of  noise and drift which led Thrasher and 
Vallier to reject public reason in the first place still exist too. That is to say, it is still 
difficult to determine whether citizens are actually converging on moral norms or if  they 
are again simply dissembling the master moral norms as another mask for their 
self-interest-motivated actions.   
In the same vein, Gaus identifies the problem of  assurance as a problem that the 
consensus approach is bound to fail to tackle. While the consensus approach is 
concerned with accounting for the normative expectations of  others in explaining why 
                                                             
24 See ibid., 946-948. 
25 See ibid., 948. 
26 See ibid., 948-949. 
27 Ibid., 949. 
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everyone complies, it ignores that the assurance problem lies more critically in the 
“first-order empirical expectations about what others will do”28. Moreover, the “empirical 
expectations are a much more powerful factor” than the normative expectations of  
assurance from others.29 In order to gather the empirical expectations from others, a 
certain amount of  knowledge of  others’ information is needed. Gaus continues, “If  we 
assume that each and every person has full knowledge of  the compliance of  others… we 
can see how iterated interactions lead to complete compliance.” 30 However, since it is 
likely that there are always mistaken judgments about others in reality, it is impossible to 
gain full empirical knowledge of  others. What we can know for sure is the knowledge 
and information relied on by those with whom we regularly interact every day. Gaus 
believes that the key to lowering the possibility of  the defection of  others is equilibrium 
in political decisions with citizens’ “unrestricted set of  reasons”.31 And the most effective 
way to prevent deviation from the equilibrium of  compliance is still punishment: Law 
enforcement helps to “counteract non-compliance” and hence stabilizes norms “in the 
face of  temptation to defect”.32 Gaus even goes as far as to claim that “it is very hard to 
see how stability can be secured in the face of  imperfect information without willingness 
of  many to punish perceived violators”.33   
I believe that this strategy of  deploying state coercion is still not a very promising 
way to maintain assurance. It is very likely indeed that coercion or punishment to rule 
violators would effectively strengthen the cooperation by increasing the costs of  not 
complying. The risk of  fines or jail may “tip the balance in favor of  cooperating rather 
than defecting.”34 However, David Gauthier reminds us that it is not necessarily workable 
from a practical point of  view. Someone “will not fear punishment if  I[one] know[s] that 
the state lacks the personnel or resources to monitor my[his] behavior properly, or if  
I[one] know[s] that the police or judges can be bribed.”35 For the purpose of  solving this 
problem, it would however cost hugely to “establish a comprehensive system of  policing 
                                                             
28 Gerald Gaus, “A Tale of  Two Sets: Public Reason in Equilibrium,” 318. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 320. 
32 Ibid., 321. 
33 See ibid. In A Theory of  Justice, Rawls seems to also adopt the Hobbesian approach to the assurance 
problem in the sense that it is the problem for a state to manage to manifest its efficacy. He identifies 
that “the aim is to assure the cooperating parties that the common agreement is being carried out. 
Each person’s willingness to contribute is contingent upon the contribution of  the others. Therefore 
to maintain public confidence in the scheme that is superior from everyone’s point of  view, or better 
anyway than the situation that would obtain in its absence, some device for administering fines and 
penalties must be established.” John Rawls, A Theory of  Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971) 270. 




and justice”, and it perhaps will not work after all due to an infinite regression of  
avoiding punishment by bribing someone superior.36  
Moreover, the threat of  punishment from a coercive state does not suffice to 
provide genuine moral motivation for citizens to undertake collective cooperation 
together. Citizens can be obliged to comply with the rules when there is threat of  
coercion; however, it does not mean that they would believe that they have the obligation 
to comply. That is to say, under the threat of  punishment, citizens are forced to be 
cooperative. Being forced to be cooperative on fair terms cannot sufficiently answer the 
assurance problem, as the problem of  stability generally is motivational, and being forced 
to do something is not an adequate account for moral motivation. Neither moral 
judgment nor moral desire can be inferred from the psychological state under force. 
Admittedly, this strategy is not solely reliant upon punishment but rather deploys the 
threat of  punishment as a precautionary measure to prevent possible defection. 
Nonetheless, the fear of  punishment cannot explain the generality of  collective 
cooperation activity, and far from reflects citizens’ willingness to recognize their political 
institutions and democratic procedures.  
I believe that such a vision of  the cost and even the bleak, pessimistic 
characterization of  assurance problem itself  stem from a mistaken or at least exaggerated 
assumption of  human nature. The convergence approach resembles Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s assumption of  a bad man’s perspective of  law37, in which people only respect 
or honor certain ideals when there is reward or compensation or when they are sure that 
they are not being taken advantage of  by others. For instance, the convergence approach 
assumes a world where I judge whether I have breached traffic rules by the consequence, 
and I would only accept the fine of  my violating traffic rules on the condition that others 
who have broken the rules are also fined. Although it is empirically true that even many 
reasonable citizens harbor such a perspective of  social cooperation, it does not mean that 
it is the only perspective from which citizens depart when it comes to social cooperation. 
It is still plausible and perhaps commonplace that most of  reasonable citizens regard the 
fair cooperation within our society as of  fundamental importance to our political life. For 
example, most church attendees take their hats off  in a church not only because they 
dread others’ critiques, but also because they take the social rule of  taking hats off  in a 
                                                             
36 See ibid., 131-132, 163. For instance, “fisherman will overfish unless monitored and punished by 
police officers. But a self-interested police officer would accept a bribe from the fisherman, unless 
monitored and punished by some superiors. And a self-interested superior would accept a bribe from 
the police officer, unless subject to some system of  monitoring and punishment from an even 
higher-up authority”. The regression could keep going on like this. 
37 See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, “The Path of  the Law,” Harvard Law Review 10 (1897): 457-478.   
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church as their behavior standard.38 In football matches, most football players refrain 
from hurting their opponents in their quest for possession of  the ball not just because 
they might otherwise be punished by the referee, but because they regard the vicious foul 
as something essentially wrong in itself. Likewise, most reasonable citizens, especially 
against the backdrop of  democratic public culture that Rawls conceives of, realize or 
come to realize the moral significance of  being fair to each other. Surely I am not 
imaging the society that Rawls has in mind as a highly civilized or developed society full 
of  moral angels; nevertheless, I do not believe the society model and behavior patterns 
that the convergence approach visualizes have appropriately measured what a real liberal 
society with democratic traditions is capable of. The inadequacy of  this strategy of  the 
convergence approach consists in its negligence of  a generally overlooked aspect of  
public reason, the transformative or educative aspect of  public reason, that citizens can 
be actively involved in fair social cooperation for the promotion of  justice, out of  a civic 
duty which is embedded in what counts as a responsible, good citizen. I will come back 
to this transformative aspect of  public reason later.  
To summarize the convergence approach’s two strategies, both of  these two 
strategies have their attractions; however, they both fail to resolve the assurance problem. 
On the one hand, the absolutist strategy helps to explain that its mode will sufficiently 
motivate all citizens to honor fair cooperation in society by attending to every citizen’s 
concerns. Yet, due to the essential unreliability of  individuals, the absolutist strategy is 
highly inefficient and indeterminate in realizing its absolutist goal to expunge the 
assurance problem. On the other hand, deploying public rules with threats of  coercion 
would effectively stabilize the individualistic fluctuation and thus overcome those two 
deficiencies of  the absolutist strategy; it nevertheless lacks the attraction of  the first 
strategy inasmuch as it fails to provide a normatively compelling moral motivation for 
citizens’ collective cooperation. Therefore, neither of  these two strategies succeeds in 
giving individual members an assurance that others will also be effectively motivated to 
commit to social cooperation. It seems like the convergence approach is forced to 
confront a dilemma: either it insists on its ambition to incorporating or satisfy every 
individual at the expense of  practical unfeasibility, or it tackles the practical difficulty of  
assurance by coercion, which disappoints its ambition of  making laws as moral demands 
justified to every individual member. This dilemma, I believe, is caused by its perverted 
vision of  political institutions as a market that aggregates individual choices. 
 
IV. The Pathology of  the Convergence Approach  
                                                             
38 This example is an adaption of  H. L. A. Hart’s critique of  taking the habit of  obedience as what is 




For the standard convergence approach, political institutions are not registers whose 
tasks are simply to register the views of  the citizenry. Rather, the “best political 
institutions draw directly on the firmest knowledge possessed by citizens” to generate 
publicly justified outcomes.39 Recall that Gaus boils down the fundamental question in 
public justification to this simple question: how can we justifiably impose moral demands 
on others? For the convergence approach advocates, the answer hinges on whether the 
justification can be accepted by the specific interlocutors in this interpersonal relationship. 
When it comes to the public sphere, the convergence approach’s aim in the end is an 
“agreement of  all parties in a given group on a set of  rules to structure their interaction 
and cooperation.”40 This aim is achieved if  all or a majority of  the members comply with 
the rule they agreed to beforehand.41 The reasons they offer to each other are reasons for 
each individually rather than reasons for all individuals together. In deciding whether a 
contested law can be approved or disapproved of  by collective decision-making 
procedures while putting grounding reasons aside, liberal democracy becomes a market 
of  private choices for consumers: the choice that attracts the most endorsement 
becomes law. The task of  political institutions becomes similar to how a market generates 
output from input.42 Political institutions work as a market: The more information the 
institutions gather from citizens, the more reliably justified outcomes the institutions may 
be able to generate.43 
Public reason deliberation in this sense merely looks for a location to record each 
individual’s point of  view, while harboring no ambition to exert any influence on the 
result of  public reason. The convergence approach considers “tampering with citizens’ 
behaviors is morally unattractive on liberal grounds”.44 Instead, they consider politics “as 
a market”, which should just “transform information about citizens’ reasons into publicly 
justified outputs.”45 In other words, the convergence approach leaves sufficient room for 
all moral viewpoints which may “reflect a wide variety of  concerns and interests” in a 
political society to freely compete, and those voted on or agreed by most people become 
                                                             
39 Gerald Gaus & Kevin Vallier, “The Roles of  Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: 
The implications of  convergence, asymmetry and political institutions,” Philosophy Social Criticism 
35(2009): 66-67. 
40 Gerald J. Postema, “Public Practical Reason: An Archeology,” Social Philosophy and Policy 12(1995): 
72. 
41 Ibid.  
42 See Gerald Gaus & Kevin Vallier, “The Roles of  Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: 
The implications of  convergence, asymmetry and political institutions,” 66-67. 
43 See ibid., 66-71. 




publically justified laws.46 Public reasoning is in this sense instrumental, since reasons are 
relatively sensitive to each citizen individually, which renders the process of  public 
practical deliberation almost superfluous. Even in the initial scenario between two 
individuals, for the convergence approach, it is never a goal to identify or recognize 
considerations which could be normatively attractive for both parties in an interpersonal 
relationship, not to mention for a whole citizenry. Rather, it suffices for their purpose so 
long as one party manages to make the other party “get on board” regardless of  her 
reasons and also the efficacy of  their exchange of  opinion.  
According to their view of  politics as a market, public deliberation is indeed 
superfluous, while the merit of  the convergence approach’s instrumental view of  public 
reasoning needs to reflect on the further question whether it is desirable to perceive 
politics as a market. For starters, its biggest merit is efficiency, since this model does not 
investigate the basis of  the final choices of  consumers. However, the notion of  
“consumer sovereignty” can only be acceptable insofar as the action that the consumer 
chooses only affects her, which is not the case in our real political life.47 From the point 
of  view of  rational actions, this model “may provide a useful analysis of  rational 
self-interest,” but it is hardly a method of  moral justification, as justice is not seen as a 
value in this model.48 The “task of  politics is not only to eliminate inefficiency, but to 
create justice”, one of  whose distinctive features is fairness, as in political situations, the 
citizen’s preference might also affect that of  fellow citizens.49 The market model of  
politics adopting collective decision-making procedure, is nonetheless deficient in that 
regard as “collective decision-making procedures cannot satisfy the standard of  fairness 
and hence cannot be intrinsically valuable.”50  
Moreover, the convergence approach fails to acknowledge that public reasoning is 
moral reasoning by nature, which is reasoning addressed by persons to a public of  which 
they count themselves as members. In order to “locate common ground for action and 
assessment among rational agents who must live in close proximity to, and interact with 
each other,” the reasons citizens offer one another in public deliberation are supposed to 
be reasons for us rather than for you or for me.51 “Public justification is aimed not only 
                                                             
46 See ibid. 
47 Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of  Political Theory,” in Deliberative 
Democracy: Essays on Reasons and Politics (James Bohman and William Rehg ed., The MIT Press, 1997) 
10. 
48 See Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 136. 
49 See Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of  Political Theory,” 10-11. 
50 Thomas Christiano, “Introduction,” in Philosophy and Democracy: An Anthology (Thomas Christiano 
ed., Oxford University Press, 2003) 10. 
51 See Gerald J. Postema, “Public Practical Reason: An Archeology,” 74. 
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at vindication; it also aims at common formation of  judgment.”52 Practical deliberation 
on the convergence approach merely creates convergent paths for coordinated behavior 
directed toward their realization. The convergence approach appears to be able to 
accurately reflect the formation of  people’s judgment but it can only passively “write it 
down” or register people’s comprehensive doctrines while it cannot actively contribute to 
the formation process.  
Contrariwise, the consensus approach identifies the essential “inter homines” 53  
characteristic of  public justification. The consensus approach’s shareability requirement 
of  public reason signifies that “public justification is not merely ad hominem; it is 
essentially inter homines.”54 For the consensus approach,  
 
“[T]he reasons I offer you are not merely reasons that I find persuasive, nor 
reasons I believe you do or could find persuasive, but rather reasons I believe 
we do or could find persuasive… the policies or judgments, thus, are put 
forward as those they together can endorse on the basis of  reasons they 
together can recognize as having force for them.”55  
 
Therefore, only reasonable people who are committed to public reasoning are able to 
“engage together in articulation, deliberation, and argument about the structure and 
direction of  their common life.”56 Practical moral or political discourse is in that sense 
robustly public in conducting public reasoning with shareable public reasons. In short, 
the convergence approach’s practical reasoning fails to provide a solid basis for real 
public justification. Their practical reasoning is essentially instrumental reasoning, in the 
sense that their reasons are set out to be normative reasons internal to practical 
deliberation, but their initial aim of  attending everyone’s reasons cannot be sustained in a 
political society. This is because the convergence approach’s vision of  democratic politics 
as a market downplays the central importance of  justice. By contrast, the consensus 
approach regards the task of  public justification as having to be justifiable to all of  us 
altogether, which fundamentally deviates from the convergence approach’s aggregated 
individualistic route. 
From the perspective of  the practical guidance of  public reason, Steve Macedo 
argues that “the robustness of  mutual assurance in conditions of  fluid diversity is greatly 




55 Ibid., 74, 76. 
56 Ibid., 76. 
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enhanced by our mutual subscription to publicly reasoned political conceptions of  justice 
capable of  being articulated and extended to cover all major questions of  justice even 
when new circumstances arising, since the articulation and extension are taken place on 
grounds” shareable by all.57 
However, the robustness of  public reason by no means refers to inertness in 
shaping the public culture of  liberal democratic societies. Macedo clarifies that the 
understanding of  the robustness of  shareable public reason is not the ability to make 
predictions about future political affairs, but is an expression of  the moral confidence of  
a transformative aspect of  public reason, that through shareable public reasons, our 
fellow citizens are committed to “carrying forward our shared political project on 
mutually endorsable terms”: values of  freedom, equality, and fairness. 58 It is this 
transformative aspect of  public reason that facilitates us to see the promising way out of  
the assurance problem. 
 
V. Tackling the Problem of  Assurance: Public Reason’s Transformative Role  
 
Before explaining the consensus approach’s response to the assurance problem, I will set 
two puzzles aside. To begin with, it is puzzling that, while Weithman confirms the role 
that public reason has played in explaining reasonable citizens’ moral duty to be fair to 
each other, he also deems the exclusion of  religious reasons in political deliberation as 
too politically controversial and suspicious. In accord with this thought, political 
conceptions as freestanding views cannot be intelligible if  they are easily identified as the 
camouflage of  comprehensive doctrines. Admittedly, it is possible that a person may use 
the political value of  religious liberty to champion her own religious doctrine in political 
deliberation. Nevertheless, it is a different issue than that citizens should honor the moral 
duty of  following public reason in public deliberation. The former is a factual concern 
while the latter is a normative requirement. Secondly, in introducing the assurance 
problem, Weithman has extended Rawls’s original concern from “expected to be 
endorsed” to actual endorsement. However, the public justification that the consensus 
                                                             
57 Stephen Macedo, “Why Public Reason? Cooperation, Law, and Mutual Assurance”, working paper 
in progress. He lays down three layers of  robustness of  shareable public reason. Firstly, “it is robust 
to shifts in the balance of  power among groups and to changes in people’s non-public doctrines,” as it 
is based on freestanding political conceptions that appeal to autonomous or independent principles 
of  political morality of  fairness instead of  referring to citizens’ comprehensive doctrines. Secondly, it 
is also “robust to new circumstances and problems” as its resources are sufficient to incorporate new 
challenges as new circumstances arise. Thirdly, it is “robust to the emergence of  new groups” as well, 
inasmuch as the political principles and “institutional forums should provide means for fairly 




approach puts forward at no point depends on actual endorsement but only needs to be 
endorsable. The criterion for public justification is not actual acceptance but 
acceptability.59 The point is to say that the question of public justification is a normative 
one, and it aims to work out the content and structure of liberal political justification 
given the fact of reasonable pluralism in any democratic society. 
According to political liberalism, Rawls dealt with the moral psychological problem 
of  “why and how we shall all be fair to each other in social cooperation” by the 
conception of  reasonableness. Rawls believes that several consequences will follow from 
citizens’ moral power to be reasonable, namely they are ready to “propose and to abide 
by fair terms of  cooperation, their recognizing the burdens of  judgment and affirming 
only reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and their wanting to be full citizens.”60 It 
follows that citizens will have a capacity to acquire conceptions of  justice and a desire to 
act according to these conceptions along with a conception of  the good. On the basis of  
just social institutions and political practices, they are willing to do their fair share as long 
as they have reasonable assurance that others will do their fair share too. Therefore, over 
the long haul, citizens will gradually develop and strengthen mutual trust and confidence 
in sustaining this fair cooperative society.61 It seems that for Rawls, the conception of  
reasonableness presumes the condition that every reasonable citizen would adhere to the 
fair terms of  social cooperation. Reasonable people act in ways that can be justified to 
others and are willing to abide by fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake. 
Since the essence of being reasonable for citizens who share a political life together 
simply is to take other people’s interests or considerations into account, it is within 
reasonable citizens’ moral power to be ready to “propose principles and standards as fair 
terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will 
likewise do so.”62 It is true that in reality, anyone could be unreasonable sometimes and 
act totally out of self-interest even though he ought to act reasonably and fairly. The 
convergence approach cannot eradicate that possibility either, even if  it allows every 
citizen to introduce their own comprehensive doctrines. A person who is entitled to 
bring her comprehensive doctrines into political deliberation is still capable of  turning 
her back on the fair terms of  social cooperation in reality. Anyone could still defect, even 
from their own convictions, for all kinds of  reasons, which is why real-life politics is 
                                                             
59 A popular misunderstanding of  the consensus approach confuses the task of  public justification 
with actual popular acceptance, whereas popular acceptance is such a foundational assumption or 
starting point of  political liberalism that liberalism would be unstable without it. See Jonathan Quong, 
Liberalism without Perfection (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) 159. 
60 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1996) 86. 
61 Ibid. 
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complicated. The difference between the consensus approach and the convergence 
approach is defined by their conceptual divergences instead of  the results of  their 
practical implementation. 
Whereas Rawls spent a great deal of  ink in addressing the issue of  stability, it 
appears that most of  his concern was on the former question, “why a reasonable citizen 
should follow public reason” rather than the latter one, “why a reasonable citizen will 
follow public reason”, which implies “how this citizen could be assured that others will 
do the same”. Rawls did not say much specifically about the problem of  assurance in his 
detailed treatment of  stability, which is because he does not deliberately consider the 
issue of  assurance as a conceptually separate issue from the problem of  stability for 
political liberalism. For Rawls, the answer to “why I as a reasonable citizen am expected 
to follow public reason in public life” also answers “why everyone else is also expected to 
do the same”. That is to say, according to Rawls, what deals with the issue of  stability 
also includes an answer to the mystery of  assurance, that answer exactly consists in the 
content of  public reason, and the content of  public reason is supplied by political 
conceptions of  justice supported by an overlapping consensus.63 Therefore, the problem 
of  assurance is fundamentally a question of  how could every individual reasonable 
citizen regard political values as a priority to their comprehensive views so that they will 
not defect from the guideline of  public reason filled with an overlapping consensus of  
political conceptions.64 In order to grasp the essential point of  this conviction, I believe 
                                                             
63 It is worthwhile to note that, for Rawls, the concept of  overlapping consensus is conceived as an 
ideal which could be approximated as close as possible but maybe not fully achieved in actual politics. 
An ideally full overlapping consensus can be achieved “if  the liberal conceptions correctly framed 
from fundamental ideas of  a democratic public culture are supported by and encourage deeply 
conflicting political and economic interests, and if  there be no way of  designing a constitutional 
regime so as to overcome that.” The arrival of  a full overlapping consensus takes two steps from the 
modus vivendi to constitutional consensus, which designates that certain liberal principles of  political 
justice are accepted, and from constitutional consensus to an overlapping consensus, which is wider, 
deeper, and more specific than constitutional consensus. See ibid., 158-168.  
However, in my chapter here, I do not intend to follow the distinction between constitutional 
consensus and overlapping consensus, as the differences between these two concepts are not really 
crystal clear. Moreover, it may complicate the story and hinder our understanding of  the gist of  how 
to achieve such a consensus. 
64 The only time that Rawls explicitly addresses the basis of  the reasonable assurance that other 
citizens will comply with constitutional arrangements is when he states that the very basis is “past 
experience” (Ibid., 168). Rawls does not elaborate on that though. In my view, given his 
characterization of  the stability issue, including the assurance problem, as how an overlapping 
consensus could emerge, the “past experience” for Rawls refers to the historical evidence of  religion 
and philosophy which supports the notion that political values are received from comprehensive 
views. Nevertheless, I do not believe this “past experience” is appropriate for giving this support. In 
fact, I do not believe any factual evidence could play the role as a substantive reason here. After all, 
any historical argument could be easily overruled by any new incoming situation, and we cannot use 
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that there is a “transformative” or “educative” aspect of  public reason directing toward 
the improvement of  justice, which has not been paid too much attention, and which 
provides us with the key to the problem of  assurance.65  
Let me illustrate the transformation process of  citizens’ appreciation of  
fundamental political values as follows. Given that the barricade for citizens’ collective 
cooperation may be their self-interests or comprehensive views, it is important to notice 
that a person’s self-interests or comprehensive doctrines may be not dominant all the way 
down. In other words, most people’s comprehensive doctrines are not general or 
extensive throughout, and there is lots of  room for liberal principles of  justice to 
“loosely cohere” with part of  them; in the meantime, the liberal principles of  justice 
would, at least partially, “allow for the pursuit of  different comprehensive doctrines.”66 
The upshot is that many citizens come to accept the principles of  justice as part of  
constitutional and political practice without any particular presumptions of  those 
principles’ relationship to their comprehensive doctrines. They could very likely accept 
those principles out of  self-interests as well as for the society.67 Rawls identified two 
conditions, the fulfillment of  which would make citizens pledge their allegiance to liberal 
principles of  justice and political institutions, which is what gives reasonable citizens the 
assurance that everyone else will lead a fair cooperative political life. Firstly, the liberal 
principles and political institutions should be able to fix and prioritize the content of  
basic rights and liberties, an undertaking that would free citizens from “the calculation of  
social interests”.68 Secondly, political groups must be able to use public reason in public 
reasoning on its own terms as they “enter the public forum of  political discussion and 
appeal to other groups who do not share their comprehensive doctrines.”69 This is a 
vitally important point as this point makes it rational for citizens to, 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
historically successful experiences to prove this success of congruence is going to last into future. As 
Rawls himself claims, “History is full of surprises” (Ibid., 87). 
65  Macedo accurately identifies the transformative aspect of  public reason: “transformative 
constitutionalism itself  suggests certain principles of  accommodation, for it is not simply a set of  
limits on political power, but an aspiration toward a certain kind of  civil society: one in which people 
share a public moral order and respect one another as common participants in that order. Since a 
liberal public morality is always (more or less) in a state of  coming-into-being, we should 
accommodate dissenters when doing so helps draw them into the public moral order: when it helps 
transform a modus vivendi into a deeper set of  shared principled commitments.” See Stephen 
Macedo, “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of  Religion: Defending the Moderate 
Hegemony of  Liberalism,” Political Theory 26(1998):73.  
66 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 160. 
67 See ibid. 
68 See ibid, 161. 
69 Ibid., 165. 
220 
 
“[M]ove out of  the narrower circle of  their own views and to develop political 
conceptions in terms of  which they can explain and justify their preferred 
policies to a wider public so as to put together a majority. As they do this, they 
are led to formulate political conceptions of  justice. These conceptions provide 
the common currency of  discussion and a deeper basis for explaining the 
meaning and implications of  the principles and policies each group endorses.”70  
 
Therefore, the employ of  public reason together with the basic rights and liberties settled 
down in the constitution tends to “encourage the cooperative virtues of  political life: the 
virtue of  reasonableness and a sense of  fairness, a spirit of  compromise and a readiness 
to meet others halfway, all of  which are connected with the willingness to cooperate with 
others on political terms that everyone can publicly accept.”71 The cultivation of  this 
cooperative virtue is in line with the human nature to “understand, act on, and be 
sufficiently moved by a reasonable political conception of  right and justice to support a 
society guided by its ideals and principles.” 72 Moreover, on the basis of  political 
principles predicated on fundamental political values, reasonable citizens act together in 
willingness and with good intentions in accordance with constitutional arrangements. 
And “as the success of  political cooperation continues, citizens gain increasing trust and 
confidence in one another”73 to carry on this cooperation. When new and fundamental 
constitutional problems arise, as long as an overlapping consensus is in place, it will be 
able to be weighed to work out what political conceptions best fit the underlying 
fundamental political values. A virtuous circle of  the transformation of  liberal society is 
thus generated. It is in this transformation process of  overlapping consensus that we that 
it is through citizens’ adherence to public reason that they are engaging in a voluntary 
process of  identifying and promoting those political principles underpinned by basic 
political values. Therefore, in such a society, reasonable citizens’ collective fair 
cooperation is not merely out of  self-interest, habits of  obedience, or even fear of  
punishment, but out of  a willing, engaging, and critical attitude to the very political 
society in which they live together, and by virtue of  the cooperation through which they 
advance its civic culture in their everyday lives. I have to emphasize that by civic culture, I 
mean the social culture of  daily life which includes all comprehensive doctrines of  civil 
society. It needs to be differentiated from the tradition of  democratic thought in a 
democratic society. The content of  democratic thought is “at least familiar and 
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intelligible to the educated common sense of  citizens generally.”74 And it includes 
society’s main institutions, and their accepted forms of  interpretation, which are seen as 
“a fund of  implicitly shared ideas and principles.”75 The point of  the transformative 
aspect of  public reason exactly lies in the progression of  the social culture in general.  
In short, the convergence approach’s solutions to the assurance problem fall short 
of  seeing public reason as a continuing process that progresses along with the 
evolvement of  a family of  conceptions of  justice. The convergence approach’s view of  
laws as protecting individuals so that they can freely live up to their own comprehensive 
doctrines presents an incomplete image of  the aims of  a liberal constitutional order. The 
incompleteness is due to their neglect of  the properly understood transformative aspect 
of  public reason. Yet, “public reasons are made, shaped in the process of  public practical 
discourse, and learned through learning how to participate in that discourse.”76 The 
transformative aspect of  public reason tends to “transform the larger context within 
which members understand and evaluate proposed judgments and principles.”77 It is this 
transformative aspect of  public reason that explains the reasonable assurance every 
citizen gains from her reasonable fellow citizens. Moreover, it is also the direction that 
public reason is able to steer towards that strengthens the desirability of  the idea of  
public reason as such. 
 
VI. An Example of  Transformative Public Reason: the Controversy of  Diversity 
 
Lastly, I will develop the transformative role of  public reason to entertain a concept 
which is often entangled with controversies: diversity. The consensus approach is often 
accused of  being indifferent to the claim of  diversity in terms of  the accommodation for 
new groups with ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity in contemporary liberal 
democratic societies. This accusation is not true, however.78  
For those theorists who champion diversity, diversity is undoubtedly regarded as a 
vital value for the prosperity of  liberal democracy. However, their championing diversity 
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76 Gerald J. Postema, “Public Practical Reason: An Archeology,” 74. 
77 Ibid. 
78 In contrast with the accusation, Steve Macedo believes that shared standards of  public reasoning 
actually may facilitate diversity instead. He argues that the sharing of  commitments to a public 
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fluidity and facilitate the flourishing of  those forms of  diversity prepared to accept the regulative 
values of  free and equal citizenship.” See Stephen Macedo, “Why Public Reason? Cooperation, Law, 
and Mutual Assurance”. 
222 
 
is established upon jumping over two presumptions: firstly, diversity is a value rather than 
a social fact that arises within the evolvement of  the society; secondly, not only is 
diversity an important political value or a value of  sociological importance, it is also a 
value that possesses comparable significance with the values as liberty, equality, and 
fairness of  opportunities that underscore our liberal democracy. Furthermore, there are 
two possible interpretations that depart from regarding diversity as a political value: 
diversity should be either perceived as an important instrumental political value which 
aims to enrich and promote the justice of  a liberal democratic political society; or, in a 
stronger sense, that diversity should be entertained as an indispensable intrinsic value 
such as liberty, equality, and fairness, which are at the heart of  a liberal democratic 
society.  
Nonetheless, these two presumptions cannot be so quickly taken for granted, since 
either refutation of  these two presumptions would overcome the critics’ critique of  the 
consensus approach’s so-called underestimation of  diversity. For one thing, if  diversity in 
society is a social fact that arises along with the development of  contemporary liberal 
society, then it is not entitled to or needs no special protection to warrant or even 
support its continuation. This is the strongest rejection of  accommodating diversity.  
A weaker version would be if  we perceived the value of  diversity as an instrumental 
value which facilitates the realization of  justice, then the critics’ (including many religious 
critics who I attribute to the convergence approach) claim of  diversity must be able to be 
supported by the contribution that diversity makes to justice, otherwise the value of  
diversity does not deserve to be paid special attention. Moreover, if  the value of  diversity 
becomes a burden and ceases to support the realization of  justice in society, it will lose 
its importance as an instrumental value. Macedo points out that “any tolerably complete 
account of  our disposition toward diversity needs to take account of  the dependence of  
our political order on the habits, values, and interests formed in ‘private’ communities, 
including religious communities. The degree of  support that these communities provide 
for our shared political project is a vital public concern.” 79  Therefore, the 
accommodation that we make toward claims of  diversity should depart from a 
perspective that recognizes the utmost importance of  diversity for the core political 
values of  the democratic society.80  
                                                             
79 Stephen Macedo, “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of  Religion: Defending the 
Moderate Hegemony of  Liberalism,” 65. 
80  I believe that Macedo views diversity in this light, that diversity helps to strengthen the 
fundamental political values: “[I]ndeed, there is ample reason to think that a modern mass liberal 
democracy cannot thrive…without the support of  certain patterns and kinds of  intermediate 
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The weakest rejection of  critics’ claim of  diversity would still be strong enough. 
Even if  diversity is regarded as an intrinsic political value that has been embedded within 
the liberal democratic value system, it does not necessarily enjoy the same privileged 
position as liberty, equality, and fairness, as not all important political values have the 
exact same weight. Hence, if  diversity is a downstream value of  the fundamental values 
of  liberal democracy, then at least the accommodation for diversity would have to be 
limited by those primary bases of  liberal democratic societies. In other words, the 
accommodation for diversity cannot conflict with the basic values of  liberty, equality, and 
fairness; otherwise, the accommodation for diversity has to be outweighed by those basic 
values.81 The consensus approach’s fundamental commitment to justice based on liberty, 
equality, and fairness places exactly such a limitation on other values. In that sense, 
contrary to what the critics have claimed, the consensus approach is able to support 
whatever the claim of  diversity advances, so long as it does not conflict with the 
fundamental values of  liberty, equality, and fairness. Demarcating by the basic rights and 
constitutional essentials that protect the equality of  all individuals, the consensus 
approach actually leaves rather spacious room for newcomers, whatever religious or 
cultural minorities, to make their cases while also giving due weight to legitimate policy 
goals. All the consensus approach asks for is that newcomers should be able to take the 
basic values underscoring shareable public reason seriously, and realize that their religious 
or philosophical views do not enjoy special privileges in the public sphere. Therefore, if  a 
democratic society strengthens the values of  liberty, equality, and fairness embedded in 
public reason by discouraging various kinds of  religious or comprehensive views, it does 
not mean that such a society is unfair to those comprehensive doctrines, nor does it 
represent the advancement of  a particular comprehensive doctrine. 
Granted that the consensus approach seeks common ground that all reasonable 
citizens would be able to stand on, this does not mean that it cannot still “affirm the 
superiority of  certain moral character and encourage certain moral virtues”82, insofar as 
they belong to a reasonable political conception of  justice for a constitutional regime. 
Such values as liberty, equality, and fairness are shared by citizens and do not depend on 
any particular comprehensive doctrines, since they are distinctively political values tied to 
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political conceptions of  justice and to the forms of  judgment and conduct essential to 
maintain fair social cooperation over time.83 Thus, these values characterize the ideal of  a 
good citizen of  a democratic state, which is specified by the moral duty of  public reason, 
and subsequently these values signify the direction that the transformative aspect of  




This chapter considers the last critique facing the consensus approach, the assurance 
critique: the consensus approach cannot ensure that everyone else in the political society 
will also honor fair terms of  cooperation over time as I do. As this is a problem that 
applies to all public justification theories, the convergence approach also struggles to 
come up with an ideal response to that issue.  
I gathered two types of  solutions representing two divergent directions of  the 
convergence approach. One solution aims to strive for an absolutist ideal which works 
for every individual member in the society, from the perspective of  their comprehensive 
views. However, this solution is logically problematic as it is both at best inefficient, if  
not entirely unrealistic, and indeterminate in terms of  convergent political decisions. 
Moreover, the convergence approach’s other solution of  public rules along with the 
threat of  punishment also fails. On the one hand, such a solution cannot be categorically 
differentiated from the consensus approach’s solution if  the public rules are conceived 
of  as moral rules, which is not acceptable for the convergence approach. On the other 
hand, regarding the threat of  punishment as what makes collective cooperation plausible, 
it obscures the aspect of  citizens willingly engaging in public life and recognizing political 
institutions as just.  
I believe that the convergence approach’s fundamental mistake is in treating public 
justification as essentially aggregated individual activity, while it fails to recognize the inter 
homines characteristic of  public justification. The consensus approach deviates from the 
convergence approach’s mistake on this vital point. It views the undertaking of  public 
justification as a task for all of  us together. Therefore, citizens shall be able to develop 
political conceptions providing common currency for a discussion that is shareable with 
every reasonable citizen. Public reasoning conducted this way is on the one hand robust 
                                                             
83 See ibid., 193-194. Rawls believes the reasoned opinions of  the U.S. Supreme Court can be seen as 
such a political institution that can manifest the educative role of  public reason. The judges “develop 
and express in their reasoned opinions the best interpretation of  the constitution,” which on the one 
hand “best fits the relevant body of  constitutional materials” including precedents, on the other hand 
is justified “in terms of  the public conceptions of  justice” underscored by political moralities. 
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to changes in people’s comprehensive doctrines in the society, and on the other hand 
leaves ample room for diversity-related claims so long as they do not at least conflict with 
important political values. In that sense, there is a transformative aspect to public reason 
which encourages the enhancement of  liberal democracy by involving every reasonable 
citizen as an engaging party in such a transformation process. As long as the 
transformative force of  liberal democracy works effectively over time, it will encourage 
the fair cooperative virtues of  reasonable citizens in the political life, which 
fundamentally facilitates eradicating the root of  defection from the cooperative scheme. 
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Conclusion       
 
Returning to the question that was posed at the outset of the Introduction: How can free 
and equal citizens, who are deeply divided by conflicting (religious) disagreements, live 
together peacefully and endorse the same set of political principles in a constitutional 
democratic regime? This dissertation developed an answer to that question in six 
chapters. 
I would like to present the reasoning that led to that answer by outlining the 
thirteen crucial steps taken in this dissertation, and offer a final reflection:  
 
1. Religious disagreements pose a huge challenge to the legitimacy and stability 
of our political society. (Chapter Two) 
2. The fact of reasonable pluralism leads us to search for a political solution to 
this challenge. (Chapter Two) 
3. Secularism is such a political solution. (Chapter Two) 
4. Secularism and atheism are distinct concepts; secularism does not necessarily 
entail any substantive view of religion. (Chapter One) 
5. Secularism as a political principle includes liberty of conscience and the 
separation of state and religion; the latter is the most pressing issue, and the 
focus of this dissertation. (Chapter Two) 
6. There are four different interpretations of the separation of state and religion, 
summarized in Separation-theses S1, S2, S2’ and S3. (Chapter Two) 
7. Thesis S1 and S2 are both too incoherent to be conclusive interpretations of 
the separation thesis. (Chapter Two) 
8. For it to be legitimate, the separation of state and religion should be 
established upon shareable public reason (thesis S3). (Chapter Three) 
9. Public reason secularism’s (S3, the consensus approach) biggest rival, the 
convergence approach (supporting thesis S2’), launches four critiques—the 
subjectivism critique, the asymmetry critique, the integrity critique, the 
assurance critique—claiming that the shareability requirement of public 
reason is neither possible nor desirable. (Chapter Four to Six) 
10. The convergence approach’s four critiques do not stand up to careful 
scrutiny. (Chapter Four to Six) 
11. Moreover, the convergence approach does not recognize the “inter homines” 
feature of public justification. (Chapter Six) 
12. By contrast, the consensus approach helps to reinforce the civic virtues of 
liberalism. (Chapter Six) 
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13. Therefore, public reason secularism is the ideal political principle in a 
democratic political society with religious disagreements. (Chapter Three 
to Six) 
 
Chapter One undertakes a preliminary issue: the confusion of secularism and 
atheism. By distinguishing secularism from atheism, it makes it possible to view 
secularism as a political doctrine. Chapter 2-6 addresses which model of secularism 
is publicly justifiable. The key debate here is that between the consensus approach 
and the convergence approach, and it centers on whether public reason should be 
shareable (Chapter 4 to Chapter 6). This debate on public reason’s shareability directly 
determines whether religion could play any role in the public justification of political 
institutions. In other words, the debate on the shareability requirement dictates 
whether we should support thesis S3 or thesis S2’.  
For those supporting the consensus approach, public reason must be shareable 
in the sense that citizens are able to explain their arguments to each other and vote 
on the basis of  the political values of  public reason when it comes to fundamental 
political questions. Their theoretical opponent, the convergence approach argues 
that public reason cannot nor should be shareable. They raise strong objections to 
the consensus approach. Their claim of the impossibility of shareable public reason, 
however, derives from a misunderstanding of the fact of reasonable pluralism. They 
claim that (1) the fact of reasonable pluralism already presupposes the unshareability 
of reasons (the subjectivism critique); (2) By the same token, they argue that public 
reason has no content as the fact of reasonable pluralism also entails the reasonable 
pluralism of political conceptions of justice (the asymmetry critique). The integrity 
critique follows from the convergence approach’s objections to the desirability of 
shareable public reason for the stability of a political society. They indicate that (3) 
the requirement of  shareable public reason, which in effect excludes religious 
arguments, imposes too heavy a burden which will result in a lack of  moral 
motivation to honor such a requirement. Lastly, (4) the assurance critique holds that 
the shareability requirement of public reason will not keep citizens from defecting 
from social cooperation. 
Nonetheless, these critiques are all unsuccessful. First, the convergence 
approach has stretched the fact of reasonable pluralism too far. The fact that it is 
reasonable for citizens to disagree with each other’s comprehensive views is not 
tantamount to their acknowledgment of others’ beliefs as also justified. Also, while it 
is reasonable for citizens to differ on conceptions of justice, this does not lead to 
public reason lacking any substance.  
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Admittedly, the convergence approach has its attractions in its aspiration of  
protecting each individual’s integrity and counting everyone’s reasons as equally 
important in the public deliberation. Nevertheless, it is not able to deliver on these 
promises. This is because the convergence approach wrongly assumes that the task of 
public justification is generating a convergent decision aggregated from every single 
individual in the political society, in which the “publicness” is eschewed. Instead, the 
consensus approach regards public justification as justifiable to all of  us together. The 
consensus approach’s identification of  the nature of  public justification employs the 
assumption that there are certain public goals that are shareable by all reasonable citizens 
and that trying to achieve them is the fundamental aspiration of  justice.  
The convergence approach and the consensus approach provide us with two 
different visions of  justice. The vision of  justice of  the consensus approach is mainly 
embodied in a common public life, in which political institutions and social structures 
realize their public functions and provide public goods. To mention just a few: providing 
national defense, securing law and order, maintaining basic infrastructures, supplying 
public education, and so on. The realization of  these functions requires well-informed 
citizens who are able to communicate with each other on common bases. By virtue of  
the integrity argument which envisions a public life shaped and defined by individual 
citizens’ life projects, the convergence approach has indeed offered a challenge by 
questioning how much space the consensus approach’s vision of  justice leaves for 
individuals, while it has yet supplied its answers to a state’s core functions. However, a 
just state cannot leave such questions to the disaggregated and uncoordinated 
decision-making of  individuals. Justice should “identify the things that people value 
depend on extensive coordination and cooperation with another, and that one of  the 
tasks of  the state is to facilitate this coordination and cooperation.”1 The consensus 
approach’s shareable public reason better corresponds to the practical operation of  real 
politics. It is vitally important that public reason makes it rational for every reasonable 
citizen to explain and justify their preferred policies to a wider public. And it also 
facilitates reducing the social divisiveness of  basic political institutions.  
In this thesis, I argue that the reason that it is possible for all reasonable citizens to 
be able to share public reason is that reasonable citizens share the most fundamental 
political values of  freedom, equality, and fairness, which constitute equal respect for 
people; the substantive basis of  justice. The foundational commitment to equal respect in 
turn sets a limit to the fact of  reasonable pluralism in the political sphere. Not only is the 
shareability requirement of public reason viable, it is also highly desirable. In employing 
                                                             
1 Alan Patten, “Public Good Fairness,” unpublished. 
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shareable public reasons in the public discourse, citizens are able to “develop political 
conceptions in terms of  which they can explain and justify their preferred policies to a 
wider public so as to put together a majority.”2 They are taking a constructive, engaging 
and critical attitude to the very political society that they live in together, which will over 
time promote liberal democracy and nourish the general civic culture of  the political 
society.  
To be sure, my defense of public reason secularism (thesis S3) does not establish 
that secularism on the basis of shareable public reason is the only justifiable form of 
secularism or that it will be accepted by all. No dissertation can achieve that, not within 
the scope of a dissertation at least. Nevertheless, I do hope that public reason secularism 
at least offers an attractive political vision for all reasonable citizens for now, and even 
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Public Reason Secularism: A Defense of Liberal Democracy 
 
This book is propelled by the following question: How can free and equal citizens who 
are deeply divided by conflicting (religious) disagreements endorse the same set of 
political principles in a constitutional democratic regime and live together peacefully? I 
propose an answer to that question, and it takes me six chapters to argue for it: the 
answer lies in the general endorsement of the political principle of “public reason 
secularism,” comprised of liberty of conscience and the separation of state and religion. 
Particularly, the separation of state and religion that I argue for is a separation in the 
robust sense that religion ought to be excluded from the public sphere. That is to say, 
religious arguments should not play any role in public matters, especially in lawmaking.  
In the first chapter, I draw an analytical distinction between secularism as a political 
principle about the relationship between state and religion and secularism as a view of  
religion per se. To my mind, the latter view mistakenly identifies secularism with atheism. 
In contrast with atheism, the secularism I defend in this book is a political concept. From 
the second chapter on, I begin to argue for it. Secularism, concerning the relationship 
between state and religion, is a constitutional principle; hence, its justification is a matter 
of  political legitimacy. Due to the fact of  reasonable pluralism, secularism cannot be 
established or built upon any comprehensive justifications. Instead, the justification of  
secularism should not be comprehensive but public, which means that it should be 
justified for all citizens in a democratic regime.  
In chapter three, I present the justification for secularism built upon public reason 
shared by all reasonable citizens in a democratic society. Due to the fact of  reasonable 
pluralism, the justification of  political legitimacy requires that all reasonable citizens are 
expected to endorse an account of  shareable public reason. This consists in a family of  
political conceptions supported by an overlapping consensus of  reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. Therefore, those comprehensive doctrines that cannot be 
shared, notably religious doctrines, are inescapably excluded from public reason. 
Therefore, the separation of  state and religion as a constitutional principle ought to be 
formulated according to shareable public reason. This form of  separation leads to the 
robust principle that religion should be excluded from the public domain. This approach, 
based on public reason, is referred as “the consensus approach”.  
Many critics believe that the separation of  state and religion ought not to be so 
strict that the citizens are not allowed their liberty of  conscience in this domain. They 
argue that when fundamental political matters are at stake, citizens should be permitted 
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to advocate and vote on the basis of  religious reasons alone. Insofar as there is a 
convergence of  rational support for political institutions from separate motivational 
standpoints of  distinct individuals, we do not need a publicly shared reason underlying 
such a convergence, and hence no strict separation of  state and religion is necessary. 
Therefore, I call the approach which advocates permitting personal standpoints, 
including religious ones, into politics “the convergence approach”. 
The convergence approach argues that public reason cannot and should not be 
shareable. They claim that (1) the fact of reasonable pluralism already presupposes the 
unshareability of human reasons (the subjectivism critique). By the same token, they 
argue that (2) any shareable public reason has no content because the fact of reasonable 
pluralism also entails the reasonable pluralism of political conceptions of justice (the 
asymmetry critique). The integrity critique follows from the convergence approach’s 
objections to the desirability of shareable public reason from the perspective of the 
stability of a political society. And, the integrity critique indicates that (3) the requirement 
of shareable public reason, which in effect excludes religious arguments, is too much of a 
burden and will result in a lack of moral motivation to honor this requirement. Lastly, (4) 
the shareability requirement of public reason will not keep citizens from defecting from 
social cooperation (the assurance critique). 
Nonetheless, these critiques are all unsuccessful. For one thing, the convergence 
approach has stretched the fact of reasonable pluralism too far. The fact that it is 
reasonable for citizens to disagree with each other’s comprehensive views is not 
tantamount to their acknowledgement of others’ beliefs as also justified. Also, it is 
reasonable for citizens to differ on conceptions of justice, which nevertheless does not 
lead to the emptying out of public reason. Admittedly, the convergence approach has its 
attractions in its aspiration of protecting each individual’s integrity and counting 
everyone’s reasons as equally important in public deliberation. Nevertheless, it is not able 
to deliver the goods. This is because the convergence approach wrongly assumes that the 
task of public justification is the generation of a convergent decision aggregated from 
every single individual in the political society, in which the “publicness” is eschewed. 
Instead, the consensus approach regards public justification as justifiable to all of us 
together. The consensus approach’s identification of the nature of public justification 
employs the assumption that there are certain public principles that are shareable by all 
reasonable citizens, which is the fundamental aspiration of justice.  
The convergence approach and the consensus approach provide us with two 
different visions of  justice. The vision of  justice of  the consensus approach is largely 
embodied in a common public life, in which political institutions and social structures 
perform their public functions and provide public goods. To mention just a few: national 
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defense, law and order, basic infrastructure, public education, and so on. The realization 
of  those functions requires well-informed citizens who are able to communicate with 
each other on a common basis. By virtue of  the integrity argument, which envisions a 
public life shaped and defined by individual citizens’ life projects, the convergence 
approach has indeed offered a challenge by questioning how much space the consensus 
approach’s vision of  justice leaves for individuals. However, the public life that the 
convergence approach envisions is constituted of  the disaggregated and uncoordinated 
decision-making of  individuals. Yet a state’s core task is to identify the things that people 
value, as they are relevant to extensive coordination and cooperation with each other, and 
to facilitate this coordination and cooperation. The consensus approach’s shareable 
public reason better corresponds to the practical operation of  real politics. It is vitally 
important that public reason makes it rational for every reasonable citizen to explain and 
justify his preferred policies to a wider public.  
In this thesis, I argue that the shareability requirement of public reason is not only 
viable, it is also highly desirable. In employing shareable public reasons in public 
discourse, religious doctrines are excluded from the public justification of legislative 
proposals. Hence, the separation of state and religion should be maintained in the robust 




Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
 
Publieke Rede Secularisme: een Verdediging van Liberale Democratie 
 
Dit boek wordt aangedreven door de volgende vraag: Hoe kunnen vrije en gelijkwaardige 
burgers, die diep verdeeld zijn door tegenstrijdige (religieuze) meningsverschillen, 
dezelfde politieke beginselen onderschrijven in een constitutioneel democratisch regime 
en vreedzaam samenleven? Ik beantwoord deze vraag in zes hoofdstukken: het antwoord 
ligt in de algemene goedkeuring van het politieke principe van “publieke rede 
secularisme”, bestaande uit gewetensvrijheid en de scheiding van staat en religie. Met 
name de scheiding van staat en religie waar ik voor pleit, is een scheiding in de robuuste 
zin dat religie buiten de publieke sfeer zou moeten blijven. Dat wil zeggen dat religieuze 
argumenten geen rol mogen spelen in publieke aangelegenheden, vooral niet bij het 
maken van wetten. 
In het eerste hoofdstuk maak ik een analytisch onderscheid tussen secularisme als 
een politiek principe inzake de relatie tussen staat en religie, en secularisme als een 
opvatting van religie als zodanig. Naar mijn mening identificeert deze laatste opvatting 
ten onrechte secularisme met atheïsme. In tegenstelling tot atheïsme is het secularisme 
dat ik in dit boek verdedig een politiek concept. Dit beargumenteer ik in het tweede 
hoofdstuk. Secularisme, betreffende de relatie tussen staat en religie, is een 
constitutioneel principe; vandaar dat de rechtvaardiging ervan een kwestie van politieke 
legitimiteit is. Vanwege het redelijk pluralisme kan secularisme niet worden vastgesteld of  
gebouwd zijn op een alomvattende rechtvaardiging. In plaats daarvan moet de 
rechtvaardiging van het secularisme niet alomvattend maar publiek zijn, wat betekent dat 
het gerechtvaardigd moet zijn voor alle burgers in een democratisch regime. 
In hoofdstuk drie presenteer ik de rechtvaardiging voor secularisme gebouwd op de 
publieke rede, welke gedeeld wordt door alle redelijke burgers in een democratische 
samenleving. Vanwege het redelijk pluralisme zal de rechtvaardiging van politieke 
legitimiteit worden bereikt op voorwaarde dat van alle redelijke burgers wordt verwacht 
dat zij een verklaring van een deelbare publieke rede goedkeuren. Dit maakt deel uit van 
een familie van politieke opvattingen, ondersteund door een overlappende consensus van 
redelijke veelomvattende doctrines. Daarom zijn de alomvattende doctrines die niet 
kunnen worden gedeeld, met name religieuze doctrines, onvermijdelijk uitgesloten van de 
publieke rede. Derhalve zal de scheiding van staat en religie als een constitutioneel 
beginsel geformuleerd worden op basis van een deelbare publieke rede. Deze vorm van 
scheiding leidt het principe tot het robuuste gevoel dat religie uitgesloten zal worden van 




Veel critici zijn van mening dat de scheiding van staat en religie niet zo strikt zou 
moeten zijn dat de burgers in dit domein geen vrijheid van geweten wordt toegestaan. Zij 
beweren dat wanneer fundamentele politieke zaken op het spel staan burgers op grond 
van alleen religieuze redenen mogen argumenteren en stemmen. Voor zover er een 
convergentie is van rationele steun voor een bepaalde institutie vanuit verschillende 
motiverende standpunten van afzonderlijke individuen, hebben we geen publiekelijk 
gedeelde rede nodig die aan dergelijke convergentie ten grondslag ligt, en derhalve is een 
strikte scheiding van staat en religie niet noodzakelijk. Daarom noem ik de aanpak die 
pleit voor het toestaan van persoonlijke standpunten, inclusief religieuze, in de politiek 
“de convergentiebenadering”.  
De convergentiebenadering stelt dat de publieke rede niet kan en niet deelbaar zou 
moeten zijn. Zij beweren dat (1) het feit van redelijk pluralisme reeds de ondeelbaarheid 
van menselijke redenen veronderstelt (de subjectivisme-kritiek); (…) (2) Evenzo beweren 
zij dat enigerlei  deelbare publieke rede geen inhoud heeft omdat feitelijk rationeel 
pluralisme tevens het rationeel pluralisme van politieke concepties van rechtvaardigheid 
omvat (de asymmetrische kritiek). De integriteitskritiek komt voort uit de bezwaren 
vanuit de convergentiebenadering op de wenselijkheid van deelbare publieke rede, vanuit 
het perspectief van de stabiliteit van de politieke orde. Zij geven aan dat (3) het vereiste 
van een deelbare publieke rede, hetgeen in feite religieuze argumenten uitsluit, een te 
groot bezwaar vormt en zal resulteren in een tekort aan morele motivatie om dit vereiste 
recht te doen. Ten slotte, (4) het deelbaarheidsvereiste van de publieke rede zal niet 
voorkomen dat burgers nalaten sociale samenwerkingsverbanden aan te gaan (het 
zekerheidsvereiste).  
 Evengoed boeken al deze kritieken geen succes. Ten eerste rekt de 
convergentiebenadering het feitelijk rationeel pluralisme te ver op. Het feit dat het 
redelijk is dat burgers geen overeenstemming bereiken aangaande elkanders alomvattende 
visies, betekent niet dat hun erkenning van elkanders geloofsovertuigingen ook 
gerechtvaardigd is. Ook is het aannemelijk dat burgers verschillen in hun 
rechtvaardigheidsconcepties, hetgeen echter niet leidt tot het uithollen van de publieke 
rede. Toegegeven, de convergentiebenadering heeft haar aantrekkingskracht waar het 
gaat om de aspiratie om de integriteit van ieder individu te beschermen, en waar zij ieders 
redenering als even belangrijk acht in publieke deliberatie. Toch overtuigt men niet. Dit 
komt omdat de convergentiebenadering ten onrechte aanneemt dat het doel van publieke 
rechtvaardiging is om een convergent besluit te genereren, geaggregeerd uit elk individu 
uit de politieke samenleving, waarin het “publieke” wordt geschuwd. In plaats daarvan 
beschouwt de consensusbenadering publieke rechtvaardiging als rechtvaardigbaarheid 
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naar ons allen tezamen. De manier waarop in de consensusbenadering de identiteit van 
publieke rechtvaardigbaarheid wordt vastgesteld, gaat uit van de aanname dat er zekere 
publieke principes zijn waarmee alle redelijke burgers kunnen instemmen, hetgeen het 
fundamentele doel van rechtvaardigheid is.  
 De convergentiebenadering en de consensusbenadering verschaffen ons twee 
verschillende visies op rechtvaardigheid. De visie op rechtvaardigheid van de 
consensusbenadering bestaat grotendeels uit een gemeenschappelijk publiek leven, 
waarin politieke instituten en sociale structuren hun publieke functies vervullen en 
publieke goederen verschaffen. Enkele voorbeelden zijn: nationale verdediging, recht en 
orde, basale infrastructuren, publiek onderwijs, et cetera. De realisatie van zulke functies 
vereist goedgeïnformeerde burgers die in staat zijn om met elkander te communiceren op 
een gemeenschappelijke basis. Krachtens het integriteitsargument, dat een publiek leven 
gevormd en gedefinieerd door de levensprojecten van individuele burgers voorstelt, heeft 
de convergentiebenadering inderdaad een uitdaging opgeworpen door te bevragen 
hoeveel ruimte de visie op rechtvaardigheid van de consensusbenadering voor individuen 
laat. Echter, het publieke leven dat de convergentiebenadering voorstelt bestaat uit 
gedesaggregeerde en ongecoördineerde besluitvorming van individuen. Nochtans is het 
een kerntaak van een staat om de dingen die mensen waarderen, afhankelijk van 
extensieve coördinatie en coöperatie met elkander, te identificeren, en om deze 
coördinatie en coöperatie te faciliteren. De deelbare publieke rede van de 
consensusbenadering stemt beter overeen met de praktische werking van echte politiek. 
Het is van essentieel belang dat de publieke rede het rationeel maakt voor ieder redelijk 
burger om zijn geprefereerde beleid uit te leggen aan, en te rechtvaardigen richting een 
groter publiek. 
In deze dissertatie betoog ik dat het deelbaarheidsvereiste van de publieke rede niet 
alleen haalbaar, maar ook hoogst wenselijk is. Door de deelbare publieke rede in het 
publieke discours te hanteren worden religieuze doctrines uitgesloten van de publieke 
rechtvaardiging van wetsvoorstellen. Zodoende zou de scheiding van kerk en staat 
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